The Turco-Egyptian question in the relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841 by Rodkey, Frederick Stanley

THE UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS
LIBRARY
305
iL
V-ll,cob-2
Latest Date stamped
below.
Sife*



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES
IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Vol. XI September-December, 1923 Nos. 3 and 4
BOARD OF EDITORS
ERNEST L. BOGART JOHN A. FAIRLIE
LAURENCE M. LARSON
PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
URBANA, ILLINOIS
COPYRIGHT, 1924
BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION
IN THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND,
FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, 1832-1841
BY
FREDERICK STANLEY RODKEY
PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA

CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
Introduction 9
I. The Three Great Powers and the Problem of the Near
East in 1832-1833 13
II. Evolution in Near Eastern Relations, 1834-1838 36
III. The Question of Constantinople versus the Question of
Alexandria 75
IV. The Negotiation of the Treaty of July 15, 1840 120
V. The Isolation of France 164
VI. The Turco-Egyptian Question Concluded: France and
the Four Powers Reconciled 195
Appendix A. The French Bourse, January, 1840, to
August, 1841 233
Appendix B. France and the Eastern Question: An Ex-
tract from an Article which was Published in The
Examiner, August 23, 1840 234
Appendix C. Extracts from the Conclusions drawn by
Commodore Napier in his War in Syria 236
Appendix D. Extracts from the Information and Opin-
ions of American Diplomatic Agents Relative to the
Turco-Egyptian Question 237
Appendix E. Bibliographical Notes 255

PREFACE
A number of special works, in addition to general histories,
which treat more or less extensively certain phases of the Turco-
Egyptian question during the period 1832-1841, have been pub-
lished heretofore, and a few of these perhaps deserve special
mention. Sergi Goriainow's valuable little volume on Le Bosphore
et les Dardanelles, based almost exclusively upon archival ma-
terial found at Petrograd, touches upon the question briefly, from
the Russian point of view, in so far as it concerned the status of
the Straits. Major John Hall's England and the Orleans Monarchy,
based largely upon similar material found at London and Paris,
deals with the question primarily from the point of view of the
relations of England and France. Adolf Hasenclever's careful
study on Die Orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-1841, which
has been based to a considerable extent upon official records found
at Berlin and Vienna, but also to some extent upon numerous
published sources, treats the question during the most critical
part of the period from the point of view of the relations of all
the great European Powers. Furthermore, Vicomte de Guichen's
La Crise de Orient de 1839 a 1841 et VEurope, which like Hall's
work has been based largely upon archival material found at Paris
and London, treats, as does Hasenclever's, the question during its
later critical stage primarily from the point of view of the rela-
tions of the Powers. However, no work has heretofore appeared
which deals exclusively with the Turco-Egyptian question in its
entirety. It has been with the idea that the question to be best
understood must be so presented at least in its entirety so far
as it affected the three great Powers most vitally concerned that
this monograph has been prepared.
The author is indebted to several members of the History De-
partment of the University of Illinois for valuable suggestions and
criticisms. He is indebted particularly to Professor A. H. Lybyer
at whose suggestion the study was undertaken and under whose
careful guidance and direction the whole of it has been carried to
completion. The author, himself, is of course responsible for all
errors, both in presentation and in interpretation of the facts.
FREDERICK STANLEY RODKEY

INTRODUCTION
During the past century the question of the Near East, which
has been primarily that of the disposition of the territories form-
erly belonging to the Turkish Empire, has proved particularly
troublesome to European statesmen. It has been so first, because
of the ambitions of certain Powers to gain control of the whole
or of part of Turkey, while other Powers have worked to preserve
its independence and its integrity; and secondly, because of the
existence throughout the Ottoman dominions of what has been
one of the most complex racial situations which has ever existed
anywhere. Undoubtedly no question in European diplomacy in
recent times has been more directly and more continuously at
the root of the rivalries of the great Powers than this one of the
Near East. On two occasions, notably in 1854 and again in
1914 it certainly played a major role in bringing about conflicts
most disastrous in their consequences, the last of which today
even threatens the existence of European civilization. On other
occasions, while not bringing on actual hostilities, it has come
dangerously near to doing so and has at least profoundly affected
the great Powers in their diplomatic relations with each other.
Such was the case in the period between 1832 and 1841, when,
perhaps, the question as we understand it today had its origin.
In the period just preceding 1832 the three Powers, England,
France, and Russia, were in alliance to further the cause of Greek
independence. Their general policies in regard to Near Eastern
affairs, however, were by no means identical. Russia, since the
time of Peter the Great, had been the traditional enemy of
Turkey. Her rulers had acquired extensive territories and special
political privileges at the expense of the Ottoman Porte, and it
was well known that they entertained the hope of falling heir
some day to the whole region of the Straits. France, on the other
hand, since the time of Francis I had been the traditional friend
of Turkey. She had quite uniformly shown sympathy and had on
some occasions given active aid to the latter in her struggles with
Russia and Austria. But, it must be remembered, she too had her
own ambitions in the Mediterranean by 1832. Her occupation of
Algiers was under way and her interest in Egypt, where the noted
[9]
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Albanian, Mehemet Ali, with the aid of French experts 1 had made
himself virtually independent of the Sultan, dated back to the time
of Napoleon. Many Frenchmen, it may be ventured, were be-
ginning to look forward to the day when France would become
"mistress of the whole south and east coast of the Mediterranean,
from Ceuta to where the Taurus dips into the sea."
2
England,
like France, had at times befriended Turkey. However, her inter-
ests in the Near East had never been paramount. It was before
the day when oil counted for much in the diplomatic affairs of
nations, and the commercial route to India was still by way of
the Cape of Good Hope.
The period between 1832 and 1841 saw many important de-
velopments both in the direct affairs of the Near East itself and
in the resulting relations of the great Powers. It was the period
when the forces of Mehemet Ali on two occasions threatened to
*A number of French experts were in the employ of Mehemet Ali. Note the
following extract from a footnote found in Vicomte de Guichen, La crise d'Orient
de 1839 a 184.1 et I'Europe, pp. 3-4: "Parmi les Frangais qui etaient alors a son
service, nous citerons le colonel Varin, directeur de 1'Ecole de cavalerie, Bruneau,
sous-directeur de 1'Ecole d'artillerie, d'Armagnac, chef d'escadrons du regiment
de cuirassiers, Mary, chef d'etat-major de 1'armee d'Arabie, le commandant
Haragly, chef de la comptabilite du ministere de la Guerre. Dans les autres
services du gouvernement egyptien, on remarquait Monget, ingenieur des Ponts-
et-Chaussees, Henry, directeur des Constructions maritimes, Houssard, capitaine
de vaisseau, Koenig, directeur de 1'Ecole des Princes, Em-Bey, directeur des
Fabriques de produits chimiques, Linant, ingenieur en chef pour les travaux de
canalisation, Lambert, sous-directeur de 1'Ecole Polytechnique, le Dr. Clot-Bey,
fondateur de 1'Ecole de me~decine, inspecteur general du service medical, le Dr.
Perron, directeur de 1'Ecole de medecine veterinaire, Hamont, directeur des
Haras, Prince, directeur de 1'Ecole de medecine veterinaire, Chedufan, medecin en
chef de 1'armee d'Arabie, Bonfort administrates des immenses proprietes d'lbra-
him Pacha, 1'ingenieur de Cerisy, crateur de 1'arsenal d'Alexandrie; enfin Besson-
Bey, vice-amiral de la marine eegyptienne et Jumel qui avait enrichi 1'Egypte
de la culture du coton." Other Frenchmen in the employ of Mehemet Ali were:
Colonel Seves (Suleiman Pasha), chief military adviser of the Pasha, Leroux,
de Toron, and Baladin, under-officers in the Syrian army, and Galise and
Mimaust, engineers. Other Europeans in the employ of Mehemet Ali were:
Cherubini, probably an Italian, physician to the Pasha, Colonel Schultz, a Polish
officer in command of St. Jean d'Acre, and Pacysci, another Polish officer in the
employ of the Pasha.
See Marshal Marmont, The Present State of the Turkish Empire, p. 265.
The Times, Dec. I, 1840, Feb. 6, March 4, April 9, 1841.
"See Appendix B.
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destroy completely the Ottoman Empire; when Russia modified
temporarily her policy with regard to Turkey from one of open
hostility to one of professed friendship and peaceful penetration;
when France continued to oppose Russia and to reveal more
markedly her favoritism for Mehemet Ali; and finally, when
England, awakening to a realization that through the development
of steam navigation the Near East might furnish half-way stations
on the road to India, stepped forward to oppose actively both the
designs of Russia at Constantinople and those of France at
Alexandria. Indeed, it was the period during which for the first
time there was serious danger of a general European war as a
result solely of the rivalries of the great Powers in the Near East.

CHAPTER I
THE THREE GREAT POWERS AND THE PROBLEM
OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833
The Sultan Mahmoud II, from the beginning of his reign (1808),
directed his policy toward "crushing the various forces within the
[Ottoman] empire, whether the Janissaries or too powerful Vice-
roys, which hampered the omnipotence of the central power.'' 1
One of the greatest obstacles to the success of such a policy was
to be found in the rapidly increasing strength of Mehemet AH,
Pasha of Egypt. Under the circumstances a clash between the
Porte and its powerful vassal was inevitable. Mehemet Ali, well
aware of the feelings of his overlord,
2 and dissatisfied with the
meager reward
3 he had received in return for the important role
played by his army and navy which had assisted the Ottoman
forces in their attempts to subdue the Greek insurgents,
4 de-
termined to strike the first blow. Consequently, in November, 1831,
after a period of deliberate and formidable preparation,
5
a com-
bined land and naval force under the command of Ibrahim Pasha
was sent forth to lay siege to the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre.
Mehemet was anxious to conceal his real motives, and to the
commissioner of the Porte who remonstrated with him for thus
invading a neighboring pashalic, without the permission of the
Sultan, he loudly protested the loyalty of his intentions, declaring
that the presumptuous Governor of Acre, Abdallah Pasha, had
"
'insulted his beard whitened in the service of his sovereign,' and,
in the interest of the Porte, he now proposed to chastise his ar-
rogance." The Sultan and his ministers placed little faith in these
^Cambridge Modern History, X, p. 548.
3C. C. Frankland, Travels to and from Constantinople, in the Years 1827
and 1828, II, pp. 146-149.
The governorship of the Island of Crete. According to the Sultan's original
promises, "The reward of his [Mehemet Ali's] assistance was to be the Pashalik
of Crete, while his stepson Ibrahim was to govern, in the Sultan's name, the
reconquered Morea." J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, p. 188.
4A. Cahuet, La question d'Orient dans I'histoire contem-poraine, p. 78.
"Barker to Abbott, Alexandria, June 2, 1831: "'There is now no manner of
doubt that the formidable expeditions in Alexandria and Cairo are destined to
besiege Acre.'
"
J. Barker, Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of
Turkey, II, p. 176.
[13]
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assurances. They had no doubts that the Pasha was launched
upon a career of conquest.
6
Significant of this belief on the part of
the Ottoman authorities is the fact that repeated advances were
made by them to the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, 7
both before and after the fall of Acre, to secure a close and in-
timate connection between Turkey and England.8 Furthermore,
M. Maurojeni, the Turkish charge d'affaires at Vienna, was or-
dered to proceed to London to sound out the British government
upon the subject.
9 When it became known in Constantinople that
practically every important position south of the Taurus moun-
tains had fallen before the victorious Egyptians, the alarm of the
Sultan and his ministers became so great that Namic Pasha, a
major-general of the Imperial Guard, was despatched to England
"with a letter from His Highness to King William IV, praying for
naval assistance on the coast of Syria."
10 His Britannic Majesty's
government, preoccupied with other affairs and underestimating
the seriousness of the situation in the Orient, refused to grant the
assistance desired. 11 It will be remembered that at that time the
T. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, Jan. 26, 1832, cited by J.
Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy, p. 150.
7In Nov., 1831, Canning had been sent to Constantinople on a special
mission to secure the consent of the Porte to the conditions under which it was
proposed that Greece should be separated from Turkey.
8
F. O. Turkey 211, 212, Canning to Palmerston, May 17, Aug. 7, 1832, cited
by Hall, op. cit., p. 153. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 164.
Canning gave Mahmoud to understand that Great Britain might support the
Sultan, and at the same time urged Palmerston to send a naval force to the
Levant. Ibid, [footnote]. See also a "Memorandum on the Turkish Question
sent by Stratford Canning to Lord Palmerston." F. O. Turkey 211, Dec. 19,
1832, quoted in ibid., p. 638.
'Hall, op. cit., p. 153. Parliamentary Debates, XXII, pp. 320-321.
10
F. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1832, cited by Hall,
op. cit., p. 153. A similar unsuccessful appeal was made to France at about the
same time. See P. Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la monarchie de juillet, II, p.
364. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 164.
"On July n, 1833, Lord Palmerston admitted in the House of Commons
that the British government had not thought it fit to afford assistance to the
Porte at the particular time when it had been requested. "No doubt," he added,
"if England had thought fit to interfere, the progress of the invading army
would have been stopped, . . . ; but although it was easy to say, after events
had happened, that they were to be expected, yet certainly no one could
anticipate the rapidity with which they had succeeded each other in the East."
Parl. Deb., XIX, p. 579. See also ibid., XXII, p. 320.
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question of Parliamentary reform was still of major importance
in British politics. Moreover, as Lord Palmerston pointed out
upon a later occasion, when the English "were embarking in naval
operations in the North Sea, and on the coast of Holland, and
were under the necessity of keeping up another naval force on the
coast of Portugal, it would have been impossible to have sent to
the Mediterranean such a squadron as would have served the pur-
pose of the Porte, and at the same time have comported with the
naval dignity" of Great Britain.
12
Likewise in France where, it is true, public opinion was sympa-
thetic to Mehemet Ali, almost no alarm seems to have been
occasioned by the advance of the Egyptian forces through Syria.13
Even as late as January 15, 1833, the Journal des Debats, leading
organ of the Doctrinaires, argued that it would probably be im-
possible for Ibrahim to make a successful advance into Asia
Minor. After pointing out the difficulties to be encountered in
such an undertaking, it concluded with the remark that the
question was still far from appearing to be decided in favor of
Egypt.
14
Of a far different character, however, was the attitude of Russia.
At St. Petersburg the developments in the Near East were re-
garded in a serious light.
"
'The Emperor,'
" Nesselrode declared
on November 9, 1832, in a despatch to Boutenieff, the Minister of
Russia at the Porte,
" '
s'est penetre de I'idee of putting an
end to the insurrection in the Orient; with this in view he has re-
solved to exert all of his moral influence upon the Viceroy of
Egypt.'
" 15 In order to promote a reconciliation between the
contending forces Lieutenant General Muravieff was sent im-
mediately on a special mission to Constantinople and Alexandria.
Parl. Deb., XX, p. 900.
13
"To judge from the absence of French and British Ambassadors at the
Porte, and from the official silence maintained on the subject by the Govern-
ments connected with the Mediterranean, one would have supposed that the de-
cisive battle of Koniah was the first event of the war, and that this denouement
of an extraordinary drama came upon Western Europe with all the surprise of
novelty." The Times, May 7, 1833. This comment, found in the most prom-
inent journal of the opposition party in England, is possibly overdrawn, but it is
nevertheless significant. See another editorial in The Times, April 30, 1833.
"Journal des Debats, Jan. 15, 1833.
18
S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 29.
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The Russian government, guided by the theory that no Power
can have a better neighbor than a weak state,16 wished to main-
tain without strengthening the Turkish dominion. 17 If Mehemet
Ali should succeed in destroying the feeble regime of the Porte, he
would most certainly build up in its place a strong and vigorous
government of his own. Moreover, it was believed that the tri-
umph of the Viceroy of Egypt would carry with it an augmenta-
tion of the influence of France.18 Accordingly, Russia regarded
the situation as one of real and immediate concern. Unwilling to
rely entirely upon the remonstrances which her representatives
had been directed to make to Mehemet and Ibrahim, she de-
termined that steps should be taken in preparation for an active
intervention. With this in view Admiral Greigh was ordered to
equip the Black Sea fleet and to place it in readiness to sail to
Constantinople upon the first appeal of the Sultan.
18
The Russian Cabinet must have realized that the execution of
such a policy as it had adopted would occasion jealousy and alarm
on the part of certain other great Powers especially England and
France. It is not at all improbable that the explanatory note,
19
forwarded on November 15, 1832, by Nesselrode to the Prince de
Lieven, Russian Ambassador at London, was prepared with the
deliberate intention of counteracting such feelings at the Court of
St. James. In that document the Emperor's chief Minister, after
pointing out that the seriousness of the insurrection of Egypt had
led his august master to tender the moral aid of Russia to the
support of the Grand Seignior, and after explaining the motives
back of the Muravieff mission, hinted that the Tsar's government
would favor the granting by England of naval assistance upon the
coast of Syria as requested by the Porte.
Meanwhile, affairs were undergoing a rapid development in the
Near East. The Turks, many of whom had lost all hopes of suc-
cess even before the battle of Koniah,20 were panic stricken when
"Ibid., IX, pp. 25-27, 47-50.
"Guizot, Memoires pour servir a I'lristoire de mon temps, IV, pp. 43-44.
18
Goriainow, op. at., p. 30.
"G. F. Martens, Nouveau supplement au recueil de traites, III, pp. 642-643.
See statement made by Palmerston in the House of Commons, Aug. 29, 1833.
Parl. Deb., XX, p. 900.
""Letter from Constantinople, Dec. 10, 1832, Journal des Debats, Jan. io :
1833-
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the results of that decisive engagement became known. Nothing,
it seemed, could prevent the victorious Egyptians from marching
directly upon Constantinople.
21 It was at this critical moment that
General Muravieff, the Russian Envoy Extraordinary, arrived in
the Ottoman capital. Mandeville and Varennes, the British and
French charges d'affaires, were soon convinced that he brought
from his court an offer of military assis'tance to the Porte.22 In
fact M. de Varennes became so alarmed at the possibility of a
Russian armed intervention that with the aid of some of the mem-
bers of the Divan, he proceeded to exert his influence to prevent
it.
23 The suspicions of the British and French representatives un-
doubtedly were correct. It is certain that on December 23, only
three days after the arrival of Muravieff, the Tsar's Ambassador,
M. de Boutenieff, definitely offered in the presence of both the
Seraskier and the Reis Effendi24 to place the Black Sea fleet at
the disposal of the Sultan. This generous offer was received with
profuse expressions of gratitude.
25 Nevertheless the Porte hesi-
tated when it came to accepting the aid of its traditional enemy.
After a brief delay the Ottoman authorities determined upon an
attempt at a direct agreement with Mehemet Ali. As a result,
early in the month of January, 1833. the former Capitan-Pasha,
Halil, and the Ametchi Effendi, Reschid, were despatched to
Egypt empowered to conclude an arrangement with the rebellious
M
P. Mouriez, Histoire de Mehemet-Ali, III, p. 213.
"F. 0. Turkey 212, 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Dec. 31, 1832, Jan. 8,
1833. F. 0. France 463, Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 21, 28, 1833, cited by
Hall, op cit., pp. I54-I55-
**Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, p. 219. L. Blanc, Histoire de dix ans, 1830-1840, IV,
pp. 145-146. Commodore Porter, the American representative in Turkey, wrote
to Secretary of State Livingston, March 25, 1833: "There appears to be two
parties in the Government, one for, the other against accepting of the aid of the
Russians. At the head of this latter, it is said, is the Seraskier Pacha, whose
hostility to Mohamed Alii has caused all the troubles between him and the
Sultan. The Ulemas and most of the officers of the Divan are said to be of his
party. The mass of the people are in favor of Mohamed Alii, and if it depended
on them the Capital would be delivered to him without opposition." U. S.
Department of State Archives, Turkey, Vol. II, Porter to Livingston, No. 100,
March 25, 1833.
"The Seraskier was the Minister of War and the Commander in Chief of
the armies. The Reis Effendi was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
"Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
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vassal.26 General Muravieff, who must have realized that much
would depend upon the success of the projected negotiations, set
out immediately upon his mission to Mehemet AH.27
Though the chief center of diplomatic activity was thus trans-
ferred from the Bosphorus to the Nile, at Constantinople, Mande-
ville and Varennes continued their endeavors to secure peace and
prevent an armed intervention from the north. On January 9,
1833, M. de Varennes forwarded a letter to Ibrahim urging him
not to persist in the march of his army upon Constantinople. 28
Later, when it became evident that his first appeal had gone un-
heeded,
29 a second was prepared and despatched to the Viceroy
himself, as well as to the Commander in Chief of the army in
Asia Minor.30
Meanwhile, the Egyptian army had broken up camp at Koniah
and had begun to advance in the direction of Constantinople.
That movement, added to the uncompromising attitude of Ibra-
him,
29
so alarmed the Sultan that he lost hope in the pending
negotiations and determined to avail himself of the aid which had
been offered by the representative of Russia. Consequently, a
direct application for the assistance of both land and naval forces
was made to M. de Boutenieff by the Reis Effendi.31 oth Mande-
ville and Varennes, who opposed such a move on the part of the
Porte, exerted themselves in vain to induce it to withdraw its de-
mand. " 'A drowning man'," the Ottoman Minister of Foreign
*E. de Cadalvene et E. Barrault, Histoire de la guerre de Mehemed-Ali
contre la Porte Ottomane, pp. 343-344. Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, p. 220. The Turkish
representatives arriving in Egypt on Jan. 21, were received by the Viceroy
"with the greatest marks of distinction." However, as they were instructed to
offer him only the districts of Acre, Naplous, Jerusalem, and Tripoli, he was un-
willing to conclude a definite settlement with them. See Barker, op. cit., II, pp.
193-195-
"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 31.
"Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 343-344.
"F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Jan. 13, 26, 1833, cited by
Hall, op. cit., p. 157.
*Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 348-349. Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, p. 221.
"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 31. According to press reports, this application for
aid was made on Feb. 2. See Journal des Debats, April 22, 1833. Letter
from St. Petersburg, The Times, March 30, 1833.
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Affairs informed them,
"
'will clutch at a serpent.'
"32 Nevertheless
they did not abandon all hope immediately. A few days after the
Sultan's request for aid had been communicated to the Russian
Ambassador, Muravieff returned from Egypt announcing that
Mehemet AH had promised to refrain from further hostilities
against his overlord.
33
Also, Varennes received assurances from
Ibrahim Pasha dated February 3, to the effect that the Egyp-
tian forces would not advance, for the present at least, beyond
the positions they had just occupied at Kutayah.
34
Thereupon
the British and French charges d'affaires renewed their activities,
again endeavoring to persuade the Porte to ask that the despatch
of the Russian succor might be delayed.
35 On this occasion it
seems their efforts were rewarded by a slight degree of success. At
any rate, at a conference between the Russian and Ottoman min-
isters in Constantinople on February 8, the Reis Effendi, sup-
ported by certain other members of the Sultan's Cabinet, suggested
that since the immediate danger which threatened the Turkish
capital had disappeared, the arrival of the Tsar's fleet should be
countermanded. Boutenieff replied that such a step could be
taken only when the Sultan was willing to make a formal declar-
ation in writing to that effect, and after he had placed at the
12
F. 0. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Feb. 3, 4, 15, 1833, cited by
Hall, op. cit., p. 157. Porter, the American representative, wrote on January 2,
1833: "Great consternation prevails among the higher authorities of this Govern-
ment. Their days are employed in labors to avert the impending evils which
threaten the Empire, and their nights in consultations, discontents prevail in
the Army, the Navy and among the Mass of the people, great indeed must be
their terror when they can be induced to resort to the expedient of introducing
foreign troops to quell their domestic enemies, and those troops Russians, the
future appears not to be thought of in the danger which now threatens." State
Dept. Turkey, II, Porter to Livingston, No. 85, Jan. 2, 1833.
"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 31. Muravieff arrived at Constantinople on Feb.
6. Note Most of the dates given by Goriainow are taken from the Russian
calendar. Twelve days must be added to his dates to avoid confusion.
"Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., p. 352.
35
F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Feb. II, 23, 1833, cited by
Hall, op. cit., p. 158. See also Metternich to Apponyi, Feb. 21, 1833, Aus Met-
ternich's Nachgelassenen Papieren, V, p. 444.
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disposal of the Russian legation a steamboat or a "batiment leger"
to convey his counter request to the proper authorities.
36
Meanwhile, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Due de
Broglie, had learned that offers of assistance had been made to
the Sultan by Boutenieff, and, on January 21, forwarded to M. de
Talleyrand, the representative of France in London, a despatch
directing that the question of joint intervention in the Near East
should be proposed to the British government. 37 It was soon
apparent that the Court of St. James refused to entertain such
a suggestion and therefore Broglie, who was not willing to act
alone, was forced to abandon the project. At the same time, in
order to protect French influence in Ottoman affairs, he sent
Admiral Roussin with the rank of an ambassador to Constan-
tinople.
87
It so happened that on February 17, the precise date when
Admiral Roussin arrived at his destination, the Ottoman authori-
ties presented a memorandum to M. de Boutenieff requesting
that if possible the sailing of the Tsar's squadron should be pre-
vented. 38 Just why the request was made at that particular time
has never been clearly demonstrated. According to an account
written by a correspondent of the Journal des Debats, it was due
to the prompt and energetic remonstrances of the new French
Ambassador.39 However, as it is difficult to believe that Roussin
could have exercised so great and immediate an influence with the
Porte, such an explanation cannot be accepted without reserve.
In answer to the French assertions the Journal de Saint Peters-
bourg contended that the Sultan's request was no more than the
natural result of the stand taken by Boutenieff at the conference
held on February 8, between the Russian and Turkish diplomats.38
Regardless of what may have been the true explanation of the
origin of the Sultan's memorandum, it is certain that it was
issued too late to accomplish its purpose. For, on February 20,
after the lapse of only eighteen days from the time that the
3G
Extracts from the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des
Debats, April 22, 1833. Goriainow, op. cit., p. 32.
"Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, p. 366. See also Hall, op. cit., p. 156.
""Extracts from the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des
Debats, April 22, 1833.
^Letter from Constantinople, Feb. 25, 1833, Journal des Debats, March
17, 1833. A translation of this letter appeared in The Times, March 19, 1833.
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Turkish request for assistance had been made, a Muscovite squad-
ron under command of Rear-Admiral Lazareff made its appear-
ance in the Bosphorus and anchored before Bujukdere. When
Roussin learned of the arrival of the Russians he immediately
instructed his dragoman to warn the Porte that, in case Admiral
Lazareff was not promptly requested to depart he would consider
his mission at an end.40 At the same time he attempted to induce
the British Minister to make a similar representation. This
Mandeville refused to do. The English Cabinet, its charge
d'affaires declared, had given him no authority
"
'to hold language
of so high and energetic a character.'
"41 After having had time for
reflection Admiral Roussin must have realized that a withdrawal
would not secure the result which he wished to attain. At any
rate he decided to modify his tactics and on February 21 con-
cluded with the Ministers of the Sultan an arrangement which
made him responsible for the return of the Egyptian army and
the conclusion of peace on the conditions already offered to
Mehmet AH by Halil Pasha. When the French Ambassador had
thus bound himself to secure a settlement the Ottoman repre-
sentatives in turn promised to make a request that the Russian
fleet should depart from the Bosphorus.
42 Yet Mahmoud, it ap-
pears, was still unwilling to depend entirely upon the efforts of
Roussin to conclude for him a satisfactory peace with his re-
bellious vassal. According to the Journal des Debats, he did
actually present a note to the Russian legation, February 23,
1833, requesting that their ships of war "should return with the
first favorable wind."43 Nevertheless, his attitude was vacillating
and uncertain. Lazareff's fleet withdrew as far as the harbor of
Sizopol, a little to the north of Constantinople, but the repre-
sentatives of the Tsar never gave serious consideration to the
question of quitting the Bosphorus.
44
"Ibid., Hall, op. cit., p. 158.
"Ibid.
*2
"La sublime Porte, de son cote, s'engage a declarer et annoncer qu'elle
renonce a toute espece d'assistance etrangere qu'elle se trouverait avoir demandee
en raison des circonstances." Journal des Debats, April 30, 1833. Annual Regis-
ter, 1833, p. [290]. Bitter rivalry resulted between the French and Russian rep-
resentatives at the Porte. See accounts from Constantinople, March 7, 8, 1833,
The Times, April 6, 1833, and Journal des Debats, April 4, 1833.
**
Journal des Debats, April 30, 1833.
"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 32.
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On the day after the conclusion of the arrangement with the
Sultan, Admiral Roussin despatched an officer, Monsieur Olivier,
to the Viceroy to warn him that in case he did not consent
immediately to terms on the basis of the four pashalics of Syria
he would most certainly incur the hostility of France.
45 Mehemet
AH, however, was too shrewd to allow himself to be frightened
thus. He had taken considerable care to keep himself informed as
to the attitude of the Powers,
46 and must have known that there
was little danger of any one of them attempting by force of arms
to compel him to withdraw from the territories already occupied
by his troops. As a result he remained unshaken in his resolve
to extend his rule over the pashalics of Adana and Itcheli, includ-
ing the seaports of Selefkeh and Alaya, as well as the whole of
Syria.
47 In answer to the representations of Roussin he returned
a prompt and scornful rejection.
48 At the same time he sent word
"Note the following extract from a letter written by Roussin to Mehemet
Ali, Feb. 22, 1833: ". . . Persister dans les pretentions que vous avez soulevees,
ce serait appeler sur votre tete des consequences desastreuses, qui, je n'en doute
pas, eveilleront vos craintes. . . . II ne me reste plus qu'a esperer que vous ne
nous forcerez pas a la cruelle necessite d'attaquer une puissance, en partie, notre
ouvrage, et de ternir une gloire dont je suis 1'admirateur sincere, c'est mon
premier aide-de-camp qui aura 1'honneur de remettre ces depeches a Votre
Hautesse." Journal des Debats, April 19, 1833. See also, Cadalvene et Barrault,
op. cit., pp. 372-373, and Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 46.
""The Viceroy had given commissions to merchants at Leghorn and at Mar-
seilles to charter vessels for the sole purpose of conveying to him at Alexandria
any declaration in his favour by England and France (which he awaited with the
greatest anxiety; the instant it could be known in those ports." Barker, op. cit.,
II, p. I9S-
"Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, British and Foreign State
Papers, XXII, p. 145.
"Mehemet Ali to Roussin, March 8, 1833, quoted by Cadalvene et Barrault,
op. cit., pp. 375-377. Annual Register, 1833, pp. [29o]-[29i]. Gliddon, the
American consular agent at Alexandria, wrote to Porter, March 8: "His High-
ness [Mehemet Ali] is said to have given a direct negative to the demands; and
to have expressed surprise, that the French Government had changed its tone,
adding that he was 'not a plaything.'
"Much solicitude appears to be felt for the arrival of the new English
Diplomatic Agent, Col. Campbell; as it seems to be expected, that the British
Cabinet will conduct its mediation with more steadiness and candor than have
been displayed by the Power hitherto the most prominent in His Highnesse's
favor. It is even said that Mon. Mimaut (to whose ill judged complaisence is
ascribed much of the Pasha's now baffled expectations of support from France)
was this morning refused an audience." State Dept. Turkey II, Gliddon to
Porter, March 8, 1833.
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to the Sultan that he had directed his son Ibrahim, into whose
hands he had put the negotiations, that if what he had asked was
not granted immediately, the Egyptian army should be marched
upon Constantinople.
49 This intelligence, arriving at the Turkish
capital on March 23,50 so alarmed the Sublime Porte that the
Reis Effendi was directed to confer with the representatives of the
three great Powers, "in order to ascertain from them their private
opinions with respect to the best means of averting the dangers"
which threatened with ruin the Ottoman Empire.
51 On its part
the Porte announced, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, that
it was willing to add to the concessions already granted to the
Viceroy the governments of Aleppo and Damascus. It appears
that the foreign envoys were so perplexed by the situation of
affairs that they were not able to suggest a better alternative.
After a brief delay it was decided that a Turkish plenipotentiary
should proceed to the Egyptian headquarters in Asia Minor with
authority to offer the additional concession which had been de-
termined upon by the Porte.52 In order to facilitate the step
about to be taken, Admiral Roussin directed M. de Varennes to
accompany the Ottoman representative on his mission, and to
inform Ibrahim Pasha that he could never expect France to
acquiesce in the cession of the pashalics of Adana and Itcheli.52
Also with the aim of inducing Ibrahim to conclude peace upon
the new conditions offered by the Sultan, Mandeville forwarded a
letter to His Highness in which he pointed out that with respect to
Great Britain, the sentiments of His Majesty's government were
already too well known to leave any doubt of the sensation which
a refusal of the Ottoman terms would cause to the British govern-
ment, "and of the consequences which would inevitably ensue
from it."53
Regardless of the pressure which was thus brought to bear
upon him, Ibrahim refused to entertain the idea of a settlement
unless it embraced the cession of Adana as well as that of all
Syria. Finding their efforts to be in vain, Varennes and the
^Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 145.
""Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, p. 231.
"Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 144.
"Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, ibid., pp. 146-147.
"Mandeville to Ibrahim, March 29, 1833, ibid., p. 147.
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Forte's representative at length determined to yield and to
promise the granting of the Egyptian terms.54 Accordingly, on
that basis, the well-known preliminaries of Kutayah were agreed
upon, April 8, 1833. Ibrahim Pasha, having added a diplomatic
triumph to his string of military successes, was then ready to
prepare for the retreat of his army to Syria.
55
However, when
the Sultan's list,
56
designating the different persons on whom the
governments of the Empire were to be bestowed for the following
year, was published on April 15, it was seen that Mahmoud
had omitted the Pashalic of Adana when he named the territories
to be held by Mehemet and Ibrahim. Thereupon the retrograde
movement of the Egyptian forces was promptly arrested.57 It is
possible that the Sultan did intend to ignore the arrangement
which had just been concluded. Be that as it may, the situation
at Constantinople was too serious to permit him to delay a settle-
ment for any considerable length of time.57 Finally on May 3, he
decided to take notice of his former omission and graciously to
concede the administration of the pashalic in question to Ibrahim
Pasha.58
In the meantime the Tsar Nicholas, becoming alarmed at the
activities of the French representatives in Turkey, had despatched
Count Orloff on a special mission to Constantinople. M. de
Boutenieff was too moderate and of "too weak a character" to
please the Tsar who was eager to be represented by an ambas-
sador who would act with energy and resolution.59 The instruc-
"Mandeville to Palmerston, April 14, 1833, ibid., p. 148. Hall's story of the
conclusion of the preliminaries of Kutayeh (see Hall, op. cit., p. 160) would lead
one to believe that the Sultan himself decided to yield and that he gave his
approval before the step was taken. Some evidence which has been found tends
to indicate that that was not the case. See Journal des Debats, May i, 5, 7, 10,
1833-
"Mandeville to Palmerston, April 15, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 148.
MG. F. Martens, Nouveau recueil de traites, XVI, pp. 18-20. The list given
in Staff Papers, XXII, pp. 148-149, is not complete.
W
F. O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, April 23, May 4, 1833, cited
by Hall, op. cit., p. 161.
^Mandeville to Palmerston, May 4, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 149. This
appears to be an extract of one of the despatches cited by Hall. See above, note
57. The firman granting Adana to Ibrahim was not proclaimed until May 6,
1833. For a copy of it see Journal des Debats, May 28, 1833.
"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 33.
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tions given to Orloff, drawn up in that spirit, directed him to in-
duce the Porte to confide absolutely in the support of Russia, to
keep the Russian forces at Constantinople
60
until the conclusion of
peace between Turkey and Mehemet Ali, and, above all, to con-
vince Mahmoud that in the support of the Tsar's government
lay his only hope of salvation.
61 Upon the arrival of Count Orloff
at the Turkish capital, May 5, 1833, Russian influence with the
Sultqn and his ministers seems to have become supreme. The
British Ambassador to Turkey, Lord Ponsonby, who had arrived
at his post on May I, was not long in coming to that conclusion.62
Admiral Roussin, true to his former policy, exerted himself in vain
to destroy it. It was at this time that he tried every means to se-
cure for the French military flag access to the Dardanelles. After
he found that the Porte persisted in its refusal to permit such a
movement, an attempt was actually made by the warship
Mesange,
63 to force a passage through the narrows leading to
Constantinople. Although a few cannon shots from the forts lo-
cated at the mouth of the Straits were enough to induce the
French to abandon the project, Count Orloff was sufficiently
alarmed by the incident to declare that if foreign ships of war
entered the Dardanelles, he would be obliged to take every
possible measure to defend the capital.
64 In fact the rivalry at
Constantinople between the representatives of Louis Philippe and
the Emperor Nicholas soon became so acute that those repre-
""In order to reenforce the squadron under Admiral Lazareff, two additional
detachments of the Russian Black Sea fleet had arrived in the Bosphorus on
April 6 and 22 respectively. A camp was formed on the Asiatic shore at
Unkiar Skelessi and several detachments of Muscovite troops were landed. For
a contemporary explanation of the reasons for this move see extracts from the
Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des Debats, April 22, May
14, 1833.
"See extracts from OrlofPs instructions and from a letter written by the
Tsar to the Sultan quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 33-35.
"Hall, op. cit., p. 162. In addition see an article copied from the Austrian
Observer, and editorial comment thereon, in The Times, May 24, 1833.
"This incident occurred on May 14, 1833.
"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 36. Letter from Constantinople, May 23, 1833,
Journal des Debats, June 16, 1833.
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sentatives would undoubtedly have welcomed a resort to bel-
ligerent measures.
65
As might be expected, when relations of such a marked char-
acter were developing in the Near East, lively reactions were oc-
casioned elsewhere. It has already been noted that when Broglie,
alarmed by Boutenieff's offer of Russian aid to the Sultan, sug-
gested a joint Anglo-French intervention in the Turco-Egyptian
question, his proposal had been rejected by the British govern-
ment. Although the English Cabinet thus appeared to commit
itself to inactivity, and although Lord Palmerston later declared
in the House of Commons that "Great Britain did not complain
of the assistance which Russia had afforded to Turkey, but on the
contrary, was glad that Turkey had been able to obtain effectual
relief from any quarter,"
66
it is obvious that the British ministers
viewed the advances of Russia in the Orient with considerable ap-
prehension. A glance at Palmerston's private correspondence will
reveal that his attitude was not always in strict harmony with
some of the arguments he advanced in the halls of Parliament
when he was defending the past policy of the administration.
Significant in this respect is the following extract from a letter
written on March 21, 1833, by the Foreign Secretary to his
brother, Sir William Temple :
"
'Roussin has settled capitally the
Turkish dispute with the Egyptian, and has done well in sending
back the Russian admiral with a flea in his ear.67 The Russians
65
0rloff to Nicholas, May 25/June 6, 1833. "Nous n'avons qu'un seul regret
ici, c'est de partir sans nous mesurer avec la flotte franchise;" quoted by T.
Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I., Ill, p. 432. See also,
an extract copied from a despatch, Orloff to Nesselrode, May 17/29, 1833, in
Goriainow, op. cit., p. 137, and letters from Constantinople May 25, 1833, The
Times, June 22, 1833, and May 23, 1833, Journal des Debats, June 15, 1833.
"Talmerston continued: ". . . . Our government reposed perfect confidence
in the assurances it had received from the Russian Government, that when the
force so sent had effected the object for which it was despatched ... it would
retire to the Russian dominions." These statements were made on March 17,
1834. Parl. Deb., XXII, p. 322. See also similar statements made on other oc-
casions. Pad. Deb., XIX, p. 578; XX, p. 875.
67
It appears to have been believed in London at that date that the Russian
fleet which had arrived at Constantinople on Feb. 20 would be forced to
return immediately to Sevastopol. See T. Raikes, Journal, I, p. 168; also The
Times, March 19, 1833.
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will no doubt be very angry, but that will not signify.'
"68 Also
worthy of note is the fact that the British Cabinet was at last
ready to send a considerable fleet to the Near East. Early in May,
1833, Palmerston announced that they were going to send Sir
Pulteney Malcolm to the Mediterranean with
"
'two three-deckers,
two large 74*5, and two 5O-gun frigates, equal to 74/8, and be-
sides a large armed steam-vessel'
"
carrying
"
'four heavy 32-
pounders.'
"69
At the same time, the French government did not fail to retain
its interest in Turco-Egyptian affairs. Regardless of the vigorous
protests made by Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Tsar's Ambassador
in Paris, who was warmly supported by his colleagues from
Austria and Prussia, the conduct of Admiral Roussin at Constan-
tinople received the approval of his government.
70 The alarm
against Russian aggression in the Near East was proclaimed in
the Chamber of Deputies, 71 and even by the Doctrinaire press.72
In fact, for a brief period a war between Russia and France was
considered by some observers to be altogether possible.73 How-
ever, it was soon apparent that neither the Cabinet of Louis
Philippe nor that of the Emperor Nicholas had any desire to
"Palmerston to Temple, March 21, 1833, H. L. Bulwer, The Life of Henry
John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, II, p. 144.
"Palmerston to Temple, May 7, 1833, ibid., p. 158. A French fleet also,
under Admiral Hugon, had been sent to the Mediterranean. The two fleets were
in each other's company for a considerable part of the summer of 1833. See
The Times, June 17, July 25, Aug. 5, 1833. Journal des Debats, June 16, 1833.
F. 0. France 464, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 22, 29, 1833, cited by
Hall, op. cit., p. 160. Raikes, Journal, I, p. 173. Letter from Constantinople,
April 16, 1833, Journal des Debats, May 10, 1833.
Archives Parlementaires de 1787 a, 1860. Second Series, LXXXIV, pp. 31-
33> 36-37, 95-98. Similar sentiments were expressed in the Chamber of Peers.
See ibid., p. 676.
"Journal des Debats, March 23, 1833.
"Letters from Paris, March 23, April 28, 1833, in The Times, March 25,
May 3, 1833. According to Thureau-Dangin, the Emperor Nicholas would
undoubtedly have welcomed an opportunity to lead a crusade of the European
Powers against the new regime in France. Nevertheless he was not willing that
Russia alone should undertake such a project. See Thureau-Dangin. op. cit.,
II, pp. 373 ff-
28 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [354
provoke an immediate outbreak of hostilities.74 When the French
King's message at the closing of the legislative Chambers ap-
peared on April 25, it was found to be of a very peaceful char-
acter,
75 and promptly thereafter it was reported from Paris that
M. Pozzo di Borgo had lately held frequent conferences with the
Due de Broglie, "the alleged object of which was to convince the
French Government of the disinterestedness of the motives of his
court in sending an expedition to Constantinople."
76
Although it is obvious that the Russian government was not
eager to enter into an armed conflict, it is equally apparent that
it was determined to profit by the situation in the Near East and
to make its influence predominant in Turkey. Having received
reports from both Count Orloff and M. de Boutenieff to the effect
that the Grand Seignior was anxious to enter into an intimate
agreement with the Emperor Nicholas,77 Nesselrode, on May 20,
1833, forwarded to Orloff a despatch in which he instructed the
Tsar's representatives at the Porte to conclude a defensive alliance
to protect Turkey and the southern coast of Russia.
78 Mention
was made at that early date of a secret clause which should specify
the part to be fulfilled by the Porte in consideration of Russia's
promised services. At first, some of the Ottoman Ministers, who
were unaware that advances had been made to the Russians by
the Sultan, objected to the acceptance of such an arrangement
with the traditional enemy of their native land. Nevertheless,
when the English fleet suddenly appeared at the isle of Tenedos,
and it was feared that it might attempt to force a passage through
the Dardanelles, their opposition faded away.
79 A message was
sent promptly to Orloff inviting him to join in a conference for
the discussion of the proposed alliance, and an agreement as to
terms was reached at a meeting between the Russian and Turkish
74See editorial comment in The Times, April 30, May 7, 1833, and C. C.
Greville, The Greville Memoirs; (Stoddard edition), p. 256.
Archives Pad., LXXXIII, p. 131.
"The Times, May 6, 1833.
"See extracts from Orloff to Nesselrode, May 17/29, 1833, and Boutenieff
to Nesselrode, April 12/25, 1833, quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
"See ibid., pp. 38-40.
79
See ibid., pp. 40-41.
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plenipotentiaries which resulted on June 26.
80 Almost immediately
thereafter the Tsar's Ambassador was able to declare: " ... la
presque conclusion of the defensive treaty ... is a reponse sans
replique to Russian influence at Constantinople."
81 The terms of
an arrangement having thus been agreed upon, were promptly
embodied into a definite convention which was signed on July 8,
i833.
82 This Convention of Unkiar Skelessi, as it was popularly
called, was destined to play "a great part in the political vicis-
situdes of the Eastern Question."83 Its first public article pro-
claimed the existence of peace and friendship between the two
Emperors and provided that their Majesties engaged to come to
an unreserved understanding with each other upon all the mat-
ters which concerned their respective tranquillity and safety. They
would "afford to each other mutually for this purpose substantial
aid, and the most efficacious assistance." The real significance
of the treaty, however, was contained in a secret article which
released the Sultan from any obligation to render such assistance
to the Tsar and provided that Turkey should "confine its action
in favor of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of
the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any Foreign
Vessels of War to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever."84
As the Egyptian forces had, in the meantime, finally completed
their evacuation of Asia Minor, the Russian troops in Turkey
were re-embarked and on the second day following the conclusion
m
lbid., op. cit., p. 41.
81
Orloff to Nicholas I, June 19/July I, 1833, quoted by Schiemann, op. cit.,
Ill, p. 433.
82G. Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de I'Empire Ottoman,
II, pp. 229-231. E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, II, pp. 925-927.
Martens, N. R., pp. 655 ff. State Papers, XX, pp. 1176 ff.
83C. Phillipson and N. Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorus and Dar-
danelles, p. 62.
"Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 926, 928. The precise meaning of the stipulation
in the secret article has been the subject of repeated controversy. As it was
interpreted by Nesselrode it "legalized the armed intervention of Russia" in
Turkey. According to a recent historian it did more. "It guaranteed to Russia a
free passage for her warships through the straits, and it closed the door into the
Black Sea to every other Power." Marriott, op. cit., p. 210. See also, Marmont,
op. cit., p. 53.
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of the famous treaty of alliance, sailed out of the Bosphorus on
their way to Sevastopol.85
During the course of the Russo-Turkish negotiations, especially
when the results began to be foreseen, the French Ambassador at
Constantinople was tempted to announce to the Porte that, if it
thus delivered itself into the hands of Russia, it would inevitably
incur the hostility of France. It was only through the efforts of
his colleague, Lord Ponsonby, it appears, that he was finally dis-
suaded from taking such a decided stand.
86 The latter was in-
tensely hostile to Russia but he believed the policy suggested by
Roussin would only provoke a contest which they were not then
in a position to sustain.
87
When the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi became known
in western Europe, the French and English Cabinets resolved to
instruct their representatives to urge the Sultan not to ratify the
treaty. If the latter should disregard their advice and confirm the
signatures of his plenipotentiaries, they were to warn him that
France and Great Britain were resolved, in the event of an armed
intervention of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, to act as
the circumstances might appear to require,
"
'equally as if the
treaty above mentioned were not in existence.'
"88
Great Britain, it seems, was particularly aroused by the famous
arrangement. The Times, in commenting on the subject, declared
that it was quite evident, that such a convention could never be
sanctioned by the great Powers of Europe. The mutual guarantee
of the tranquillity and possessions of the respective parties was a
mere pretext for the invasion of Turkey "whenever the Autocrat
should deem the season favorable." "Both this article," the
editorial writer of the journal pointed out in conclusion, "and the
supplementary provision for shutting the Dardanelles contain
such barefaced and impudent pretensions that they must be
scouted with contempt, or resisted with vigour, or be ordered to be
M
E. Driault, La question d'Orient depuis ses ongvn.es jusqu'A nos jours, p.
143. Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 405-406.
"Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 49-50.
"Ibid., p. 50.
88
F. O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, Aug. 27, 1833, cited by Hall,
op. cit., p. 165.
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formally cancelled."
89
Although Palmerston, upon being ques-
tioned about the treaty in the House of Commons, had refused to
make any statements divulging the attitude of the British Cabinet
upon the subject,90 the King's speech, when it was read at the
closing of Parliament on August 29, 1833, was found to contain
the following significant declaration: "The hostilities which had
disturbed the peace of Turkey have been terminated; and you
may be assured that my attention will be carefully directed to any
events which may affect the present state or the future independ-
ence of that Empire." 91 Moreover, Palmerston in a letter written
to his brother, William, five days after the final message had been
delivered to the two Houses declared that " 'The King spoke the
passage about Turkey with emphasis, and looked round at Lieven
to see how he took it.' " 92 Then turning to the question of the
attitude of Austria upon the Eastern question the Minister for
Foreign Affairs continued,
"
'Metternich is delighted with the Rus-
sian treaty with the Sultan: He is easily pleased!'" 93
At the same time, events destined to have an important in-
fluence upon the attitude of England and France were develop-
ing in another part of Europe. Early in August the crowned heads
of Austria and Prussia had held, near Teplitz in northern Bo-
hemia, a meeting which was regarded with considerable suspicion
by both of the western Powers.94 It was only a month later when
the famous Miinchengratz conference between the Tsar of Russia,
the Emperor of Austria, and the Crown Prince of Prussia was
assembled. The chief outcome of the latter meeting was the sign-
ing of a convention the aim of which was to provide for effective
**The Times, Oct. 16, 1833. The editorial quoted is typical of the attitude
this journal had been maintaining for some time. See ibid., Jan. 26, 29, July 12,
Sept. 5, 1833. See also, The Poor Man's Guardian, Aug. 31, 1833, in A very Rare
and Valuable Collection of Radical, Revolutionary, and Seditious Publications,
pp. 279-280.
The reference is to Palmerston's reply to questions asked on Aug. 24, 1833.
Pad. Deb., XX, p. 875.
"
1
'bid., p. 903.
B2Lieven was Russia's Ambassador to England.
"Palmerston to Temple, Sept. 3, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 165.
"Metternich to Hugel, Aug. 16, 1833, Metternich, op. cit., V, p. 458. See
also, ibid., p. 429.
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opposition to the principle of non-intervention.
95 That agreement,
signed on September 18, 1833, included secret articles touching
upon the question of the Near East. Thereby the contracting
parties mutually pledged themselves to maintain the existence of
the Ottoman Empire under the reigning dynasty; to oppose any
combination which should menace the independence of the
sovereign authority in Turkey, whether by the establishment of a
temporary regency, or a complete change of dynasty; and finally,
should their efforts to prevent dissolution fail, they would them-
selves act in accord in everything concerning the establishment of
the new order of things.
96
Such an arrangement was of particular value to Austria.
Alarmed by the spread of revolutionary ideas in Europe, the
Cabinet of the Emperor Francis was eager to maintain a close
alliance with the Court of St. Petersburg. At the same time it
was also eager to preserve the independence and integrity of the
Ottoman Empire. According to a statement made by Palmerston
on October 8, 1833, Metternich had even gone so far, six months
before, as to declare to him through the medium of a charge
d'affaires,
"
'that if Russia attempted to appropriate to herself one
inch of Turkish territory, it would be war with Austria.'
" 9T
Indeed, the positions of England and Austria on the Turco-Egyp-
tian question were in many respects identical.98 As a prominent
statesman of the period has pointed out, they had a simple and
fixed idea; they were anxious only to support the Ottoman
Empire, and to defend it against its enemies.99 The fact that they
''The convention drawn up on Sept. 18, 1833, did not receive the sig-
nature of Prussia. After the conference of Miinchengratz had broken up, Counts
Nesselrode and Ficquelmont received instructions from their respective Emperors
to proceed to Berlin with the aim of persuading King Frederick William III to
join in the said arrangement. According to Metternich, it was only after the
most arduous labors, extending over more than three weeks, that they finally
succeeded in effecting their object. By the resulting Treaty of Berlin, signed on
Oct. 15, 1833, the Prussian Cabinet accepted with a slight change in form the
convention which had originated at Miinchengratz. See Metternich to Hiigel,
Oct. 22, 1833, ibid., pp. 520-526. Also a copy of the treaty of Berlin, ibid., pp.
526-528.
"Ibid., p. 526, [footnote]. Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
"Palmerston to Temple, Oct. 8, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 170.
''Metternich to Neumann, Feb. 15, 1833, Metternich, op. cit., V, p. 476.
"Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 43.
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did not agree in their respective stands taken towards the develop-
ments in the Orient in 1833 was due, to a large extent at least, to
their differing attitudes concerning Russia. Austria was willing to
accept at their face value the explanations offered by her Imperial
neighbor;
100
England was not. With respect to Russia, the latter
in 1833 was following a policy similar to that of France.
Hence it is natural that the secret deliberations at Miinchen-
gratz tended only to increase the apprehensions of the British gov-
ernment. Palmerston believed even that an eventual partition of
Turkey between Austria and Russia had probably been one of the
topics of discussion.
"
'It is needless to say,'
" he declared in com-
menting upon the question,
"
'that England and France would
oppose this to the utmost of their means.'
"101 In order to support
the British position, it was determined immediately that the
protest which had been made at Constantinople should be re-
peated at St. Petersburg and that re-enforcements should be sent
to the fleet of Admiral Malcolm in the Mediterranean.102 Although
no authorization was given to the commander of the fleet to pass
the Dardanelles, Palmerston announced it as his opinion that if
Turkey were again threatened by Russian intervention, the com-
bined English and French squadrons ought to proceed to Con-
stantinople and defend the Bosphorus.
"
'I think,'
" he con-
cluded,
"
'that when we have seven liners and the French six, the
eleven or twelve Russians will never venture to face us, with a
host of transports besides in their train; indeed, the English fleet
alone would be enough to stop them.'
" 103
The government of France was also aroused by the proceedings
at Teplitz' and Miinchengratz
104
and, although it was anxious not
to take a step that might lead to war,
105 was quite willing to join
with England in repeating to the Russian Cabinet the protest
which the two Powers had recently made to the Sublime Porte.
100
See Metternich, op. cit., V, pp. 455-447, 477, 486-494. See also, Mtmoires
inedits de M. de Sainte-Aulaire, quoted by Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, pp. 372-
373 [footnote], and, Raikes, Journal, I, pp. 176-177.
101Palmerston to Temple, Oct. 8, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 169.
Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 171.
lM
Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, pp. 380-382. See also comment in Revue
des Deux Mondes, Oct. i, 1833, XII, p. 108.
1M
Driault, op. cit., p. 143.
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Accordingly, in the month of October, 1833, the British and
French charges d'affaires at St. Petersburg, Mr. Bligh and M. de
Lagrene, were instructed from their respective capitals to com-
municate to Count Nesselrode notes almost identical in language
to those presented at Constantinople by Roussin and Ponsonby to
the Reis Effendi.106
In reply to the representations of the western Powers, the
Russian Chancellor professed that he could not understand the
deep regret which the conclusion of the treaty of July 8, 1833,
had caused the British and French governments. That arrange-
ment was purely defensive. It had been concluded between two
independent Powers, exercising the plenitude of their rights, and
it did no prejudice to the interests of any state whatever. It did,
he admitted, change the nature of the relations between Russia
and the Porte. It established relations of intimacy and confidence
wherein the Turkish government would henceforth find a guar-
antee of stability, and, if need be, means of defense calculated to
ensure its preservation. In concluding his remarks, Nesselrode
warned the western Powers that the Emperor was resolved on
faithfully fulfilling, should the occasion present itself, the obliga-
tions which the treaty of July 8, imposed upon him: "acting as
if the declaration contained in the note of M. Lagrene [and Mr.
Bligh] did not exist."
107
Regardless of the fact that her chief Minister dared to use
such highsounding terms in answer to the equally bold communi-
cations made to him by the representatives of England and
France, Russia was not eager to engage in a test of armed
strength with her rivals in the Orient. A famine which existed in
the southern provinces of the Tsar's Empire rendered the pos-
sibility of successful campaigning in those parts very doubtful.
108
**State Papers, XXIV, pp. 1290, 1292.
1<nState Papers, XXIV, pp. 1291-1292, 1292-1293.
108Palmerston to Temple, Dec. 3, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 176. Letters
from Constantinople, Oct. 10, 18, 1833. The Times, Nov. n, 26, 1833. Clay, the
American representative at St. Petersburg, wrote to Secy, of State McLane,
Dec. 9, 1833: "The southern Governments of the Empire are in a most unfor-
tunate state. The failure of the harvest has deprived the peasants of the means
of supporting life, and estates which, during other years, yielded an ample
revenue to their proprietors are now, not only unprofitable, but in most instances
a heavy burden to the owners. A Prince Dolgorouki informed me, that his
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Realizing that fact, Palmerston was able to write on December 3,
1833 : "I trust we shall be able to keep the peace . . . Turkey
is the most likely cause of collision; though I think they [the
Russians] will hardly pursue their schemes of aggrandizement
there at present.'
"109 Thus at the end of the year 1833, although
the status of the relations between England, France, and Russia
resulting from the Turco-Egyptian affair was still far from re-
assuring, it was becoming apparent that the Treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi would probably not occasion an immediate outbreak of
hostilities among the great Powers.
peasants usually payed him 20 Roubles each per annum; but this year he had
been obliged to remit fifty thousand Roubles to buy bread for them. The Govern-
ments most afflicted are Voronetz, Penza, and Tambov, though the inhabitants
of many others in the south are nearly as necessitous. Want has driven the
peasants of Voronetz to commit acts which even the oppression of their masters
has never excited. The roads are infested with armed bands of slaves who
commit the greatest excesses. News of this was brought by Courier to St.
Petersburg on Thursday last, and in less than three hours afterwards the
Emperor had left the city, in order to restore tranquillity by his presence and
punish the offenders." State Dept. Russia, XII, Clay to McLane, No. 12,
Dec. 9, 1833.
109Palmerston to Temple, Dec. 3, 1833, Bulwer, op. at., II, p. 176. See also,
letter from Paris, Jan. 14, 1834, The Times, Jan. 16, 1834.
CHAPTER II
EVOLUTION IN NEAR EASTERN RELATIONS
1834-1838
Although England and France were able to unite in objecting
to the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi they were by no
means agreed upon all that appertained to the question of the
Near East. Especially did they differ in their respective attitudes
toward the developing power of Mehemet Ali. It was natural, as
a contemporary writer has pointed out, that France, whose protege
and pupil the Viceroy loved to call himself, should see in him only
"un continuateur" of the work begun on the banks of the Nile by
Napoleon.
1 It was also natural that she should seek to consolidate
her influence at Cairo and Alexandria, in order to extend along the
southern shores of the Mediterranean that new sovereignty whose
starting point and center had just been fixed by the taking of
Algiers.
2
Truly, Admiral Roussin, in February, 1833, had pro-
tested vigorously against Mehemet Ali's pretensions. Neverthe-
less, his attitude at that time was due to a fear that if peace were
not promptly concluded between the contending parties, Russia
would profit by the situation in furthering her aggressive schemes
against Turkey.
3 After he had learned that the Viceroy refused to
c, op. at., IV, p. 128.
The conquest of Algiers had been begun by the government of Charles X
in 1830. For a time negotiations to secure the cooperation of Mehemet Ali were
carried on by Polignac. See ibid., I, pp. 141-159. Cahuet, op. cit., p. 77.
L. Brehier, L'Egypte de 1798 a 1900, p. 137. A. de Vaulabelle , Histoire moderne
de I'Egypte, 1801 a 1833, II, p. 410. The British government protested vigorously
against the projected conquest. See a note dated June 3, 1830, which was pre-
sented to the Prince de Polignac by Lord Stuart de Rothesay, British Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1839, L, Papers relating to the Occupation of Algiers by the
French, pp. 13-14.
"Note the following extract from a letter which it was claimed Roussin wrote
to Mehemet Ali, May 8, 1833: "'I feel satisfaction in being one of the first to
announce to you the happy conclusion of peace between the Grand Seignior and
your Highness, on conditions equally advantageous and honourable to Egypt. . . .
'Your Highness will be just enough to recognize to which side France has
constantly been inclined; attentive to the events of the East, she has felt that
the immediate termination of war between the Mussulmans was the condition
of their safety. She has desired this peace sincerely and ardently. Such was the
object of the steps taken by me on the 23rd of February, in proposing terms
[36]
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comply with his demands he turned to the opposite extreme and
counselled a complete surrender on the part of the Porte.
4 Like-
wise, the Consul-General of France at Alexandria, Monsieur
Mimaut, as well as practically all of those who belonged to the
"French Colony in Egypt," were very decided in their favoritism
for the cause of the Sultan's ambitious vassal. 5
In the French Chamber of Deputies, Mehemet Ali was de-
fended repeatedly, one speaker even going so far as to declare that
it would, perhaps, be fortunate if the Egyptian army should take
possession of Constantinople. The Arab race, he pointed out,
better disposed towards civilization, more active, and more in-
telligent than the "Tartar race, would be able to rejuvenate that
Empire, worn out and languishing, that Empire upon which even
the spirit of innovation has exerted in vain its electric virtue."
Then too, he maintained, a powerful barrier would be formed
against Russia if Mehemet Ali should establish his power through-
out Turkey.
6 The Due de Broglie was more cautious, and in his
utterances took the position that the policy of France should be to
maintain the Ottoman Empire as long as providence would permit
it to exist.7 At the same time, however, he carefully avoided
making any remarks which might be interpreted as being hostile
to the cause of the Viceroy and he admitted that if it were "written
which circumstances rendered at that time suitable, and which your Highness
from principle might have adopted, fully persuaded that France would not have
withheld her endeavours to ameliorate them. . . .
'What is passing in the Bosphorus [Russian intervention] has convinced her
[France] of the necessity of strengthening Egypt still more; she has obtained
for Egypt the whole of Syria, and can say that in that she has done for your
Highness more than any other power. . . .'
" The Westminster Review, XXXV,
Jan. 1841, pp. 203-204. It is apparent that Roussin was pleased greatly when
the Sultan finally consented to grant the terms demanded by Mehemet Ali.
See letters from Constantinople, May 7, II, 1833, Journal des Debats, May 30,
June 6, 1833. The attitude of many in France was quite similar to that of the
Ambassador. See ibid., May 13, Aug. I, 1833; Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, p.
370. Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 44-45.
4
Hall, op. cit., p. 160. Letters from Constantinople, April 16, 1833, Journal
des Debats, May 9, 10, 1833.
5
Barker, op. cit., II, p. 191.
"Extract from speech delivered by M. Jay, May 21, 1833. Archives Parl.,
LXXXIV, p. 92. See also, ibid., pp. 87-91, 160; LXXX, pp. 14, 219.
'Ibid., LXXXIII, p. 780.
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in the designs of God that that Empire [Turkey] should some
day succumb," it would then be the aim of France to further the
establishment out of the Ottoman territories of independent states
which would take "naturellement" their place in the political bal-
ance of Europe.
8
On the other hand, in Great Britain, the ambitious policy of
Mehemet AH was regarded with considerable suspicion. Indeed,
the British government made so vigorous a protest at Alexandria,
through its Consul-General, Colonel Campbell, that the rebellious
Pasha was on the point of withdrawing his demands in regard
to the district of Adana when the Sultan finally consented to
invest Ibrahim with the administration of the territory in dispute.
9
It cannot be doubted that Lord Palmerston entertained a decided
opinion on the question. On March 21, 1833, ne wrote:
"'
. . .
[Mehemet All's] real design is to establish an Arabian kingdom,
including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There
might be no harm in such a thing in itself; but as it would
necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not
agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to
India as an active Arabian sovereign would be.'
"10
When the British Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to the
question of "the road to India" he was calling attention to a
phase of the problem which was of vital importance to Great
Britain. The successful application of steam power to transpor-
tation by sea had opened up a vast store of possibilities for the
future. Among the numerous projects which had received im-
mediate attention was that of a direct line of communication, to
be operated by means of steamers, between England and India.
6
Archives Parl., LXXXIII, p. 781. Thiers, who was then minister of com-
merce and industry, made the following declaration in the Chamber of Peers,
June 8, 1833: "Quelle devait etre la direction de nos efforts? C'etait d'empecher
que les grands voisins qui entourent I'Empire turc ne s'agrandissent a ses depens;
c'etait d'empecher que 1'equilibre de 1'Europe fut trouble dans 1'Orient, de faire
(ce qui etait bon pour 1'humanite et bon pour la France) que de nouveaux
Etats independants et commergants s'etablissent dans la Mediterranee." Ibid.,
LXXXIV, p. 678. See also, ibid., LXXXV, pp. 525-526.
*F. 0. Turkey 228, Campbell to Palmerston, May 2, 3, 7, 9, 13, 15, 1833,
cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 162. Journal des Debats, June 28, 1833. Parl. Deb.,
XXI, p. 24.
"Palmerston to Temple, March 21, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 145.
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The idea was suggested as early as 1823," but it did not receive
serious consideration from the British government until some ten
years later. One of the earliest prominent supporters of the pro-
ject was Lord William Bentinck who was Governor-General of
India from 1828 to 1835. A statement which he made in India
on the eve of his departure for England is of sufficient value to
warrant its being quoted in full. It was as follows: "I have
been a zealous supporter of the cause of steam communication
with Europe, from the strongest conviction, confirmed by every
day's further reflection, of its vast importance to innumerable in-
terests, both national and commercial. I cannot command the op-
portunity of forwarding its future success; but, if within my reach,
you may depend upon my most earnest efforts to promote its
progress, and to obtain for India an advantage so great in all
its direct and indirect consequences, that in my opinion it would
be cheaply bought at any price."
12 Another Englishman of note
who was interested in establishing a direct line of communication
between Great Britain and her possessions in the Orient, was
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Chesney. Chesney had travelled ex-
tensively in the Near East and in 1832, when he returned to Eng-
land, was convinced that the projected steam route was entirely
practicable.
13 At that time two possible lines of communication
were being considered one by way of the Isthmus of Suez and
the Red Sea, the other by way of the Euphrates river and the
Persian Gulf. Chesney was interested particularly in the latter.
He was anxious that the British government should test out its
practicability and soon succeeded in interesting in the project a
number of prominent individuals including Lord Palmerston and
other members of the Cabinet then in office.14 After some delay
the matter was presented to Parliament, on June 3, 1834, and a
select committee was appointed "to inquire into the best means of
"See a series of letters dating from May 31, 1823, to Oct. 23, 1832, urging
that measures be taken by the government to facilitate steam communication
with India. Pad. Papers, 1831-1832, X, Part 2, pp. 675-766.
"Part. Papers, 1839, XXXIX, Representations from the Presidencies as to
Steam Communication, p. 3.
"F. R. Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, pp. 142-143.
"Ibid., p. 143. The interest of King William IV was aroused. See ibid., pp.
145-146. See also the account given in S. Lane-Poole (Editor), The Life of the
late General F. R. Chesney, by his wife and daughter.
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promoting the communication with India by steam." 18 The com-
mittee made a detailed investigation of the problems involved and
on July 14, 1834, presented in the House of Commons twelve
resolutions which embodied their conclusions and recommenda-
tions.16 With respect to the Egyptian route, they stated in those
resolutions that experiments made for five successive seasons by
the Indian government had completely established the practicabil-
ity of that line of communication during at least eight months in
the year. Therefore, the committee suggested that measures
should be taken to establish the route by the Red Sea, and they
proposed that the expense incurred thereby should be divided
equally between India and Great Britain. As to the Euphrates
route, sufficient experiments to really test its value had not been
made. There appeared to be no physical obstacles for eight
months of the year, but during the other four months, when the
river was low, it was not certain that the line was practicable. As
the East India Company had expended between 60,000 and
70,000 Pounds on the communication by way of Egypt, it was
recommended that the expense of ascertaining the practicability
of the route through Syria and Mesopotamia, which was esti-
mated at 20,000 Pounds, should be defrayed by the Home govern-
ment.17 The suggestions of the select committee were well re-
ceived by the House and a resolution for the granting of the sum
stated was promptly passed.
18
The fact that a wide difference existed between the respective
interests of England and France in the Near East was by no
means unknown at the time. On February 15, 1833, Metternich
wrote significantly to Baron Neumann, the Austrian charge
d'affaires at London : "Egypt has been for a long time considered
by those different [French] governments as la conquete assuree de
la France. . . . But the English Ministers have nothing to learn
from us on this subject that they do not know better already. If
"Parl. Deb., XXIV, p. 142.
K
Ibid., XXV, p. 930. Parl. Papers, 1834, XIV, Report of Select Committee
on Steam Navigation to India (234 pages).
"At that date some attention was given to the possibility of digging a canal
to connect the waters of the Mediterranean with those of the Red Sea. See,
Parl. Papers, 1834, XIV, Report of Select Committee on Steam Navigation to
India, pp. 28-34. Archives Parl., LXXXII, p. 277.
"Parl. Deb., XXIV, p. 932.
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the question of Egypt is an Austrian question, it is undoubtedly
in a still greater degree an English question."
19 As Metternich
must have known, there had long been a disposition in England
to regard French relations with Egypt with considerable suspi-
cion.20 During the course of Ibrahim's campaign in Syria, both
Sir Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked disapprovingly
"upon Varennes' efforts to persuade the Porte to allow France to
mediate between the Sultan and the Pasha." 21 In Parliament
attention was called to the activities of the French in Egypt and
also in Algiers and it was intimated that the administration ought
not to maintain too close an alliance with the government of Louis
Philippe.
22
Regardless of the fact that differences did exist between the
interests of England and France relative to certain aspects of the
Eastern question, the Cabinets of both those countries were
particularly anxious to prevent such differences from becoming
evident. As The Times pointed out, the July Monarchy instinc-
tively believed that since its rising, there had been formed a
northern coalition for its destruction23 and that an intimate un-
derstanding with England was essential to guarantee its safety.
On May 20, 1833, M. Guizot, who was then the Minister of
Public Instruction, declared that the English alliance was "une
fait important" in the French political situation. "That alliance,"
he continued, "is fortunate, favorable to the progress, to the good
order, to the prosperity of the two countries."
24 At the same time,
the British government, alarmed by the menace of Russian aggres-
sion towards Turkey and India, believed it was necessary, for the
"Metternich to Neumann, Feb. 15, 1833, Metternich, op. cit., V, p. 478.
For further comment on the policy of France, see Metternich to Prokesch, Feb.
2 3 J 833, ibid., p. 483.
"Hall, op. cit., p. 155. Note the following: "The French Government would
have wished to have seen Meh'med Ali at Constantinople; but the Russians were
so quickly at the Bosphorus that of two evils the French chose the least, and
supported the Sultan against their will." Barker, op. cit., II, p. 191. See also,
The Times, Dec. 6, 1833, Journal des Debats, Apr. 15, 1833.
21
F. O. Turkey 211 and 212, Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 22, 1832,
F. 0. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, Sept. 26, Oct. 26, 1832, cited by
Hall, op. cit., p. 155.
"Parl. Deb., XVIII, pp. 1026-1029; XXI, 107; XXII, pp. 339-340.
23The Times, Dec. 6, 1833.
"Archives Part., LXXXIV, p. 42.
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sake of self-defense, to secure the support of France.
25 These
facts reveal the main reason why, during the Turco-Egyptian
crisis of 1833, the two western Powers were so anxious to make it
appear that they were in perfect accord concerning all questions
of foreign policy. Before an open break between them could
result from their rival interests in the Near East, it was necessary
that radical changes should be evolved in their respective relations
with Austria, Prussia, and Russia especially with Russia.
In the beginning of the year 1834 the prospect for such a change
did not appear to be very promising. At Constantinople the
representatives of the Emperor Nicholas were endeavoring ac-
tively to conserve the preponderant influence which their master
had so recently gained in the councils of the Sublime Porte, 26 and
at St. Petersburg a new arrangement between Russia and Turkey,
relative to the execution of the Treaty of Adrianople, which had
been concluded in 1829, was on the point of being signed by
Achmet Pasha and Count Nesselrode.27 Those developments were
naturally looked upon by the western Powers as conclusive evi-
dence confirming their apprehensions in regard to the secret aim
of Russia to profit at the expense of the helpless Porte.
28
Indeed,
"The Times, Dec. 6, 1833. Raikes, Journal, I, pp. 218-219. Note the follow-
ing statement made by Palmerston on March 17, 1834: "... when two such states
[as England and France] were bound together by the ties of interest, and the
bonds of integrity, confidence, and honour, the House might well consider that
they must form in Europe a power of no mean importance." Parl. Deb., XXII,
P- 327-
"See a series of letters from Constantinople, Dec. 10, 1833, Jan. 28, Feb.
25, March 5, 19, April i, 15, July i, 8, 29, 1834, in The Times, Jan. 13, Feb. 27,
March 26, April 10, 18, 28, May 13, July 28, Aug. 2, 25, 1834.
"By the treaty of Jan. 29, 1834, the Tsar gave up all but 4,000,000 ducats
of what remained to be paid of the indemnities provided for in the Treaty of
Adrianople, and in turn the Porte ceded to Russia a tract of country, from the
Pashalic of Akhiskha, on its northeastern frontier. Turkey was to pay that
portion of the indemnity which was not relinquished in annual payments of
500,000 ducats each, and until it was paid the important post of Silistria was to
remain as a pledge in the hands of the Russians. See, State Papers, XXVI,
pp. 1245-1248.
^C. C. Greville, The Greville Memoirs. A Journal of the Reigns of King
George IV and King William IV (Reeve edition), III, pp. 69-70. Letter from
Paris, Dec. 31, 1833, The Times, Jan. 3, 1834.
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the strained relations of England and France with the government
of the Tsar were destined to continue for some time.29
On April 21, 1834, Palmerston gave an excellent summary of
the British Cabinet's attitude, relative to the Turkish problem, in
a letter to his brother, William Temple.
"
'With Russia,'
" he
wrote,
"
'we are just as we were, snarling at each other, hating
each other, but neither wishing for war. Their last communication
on Eastern affairs is anything but satisfactory. However, there
is nothing at present done by us, because there is no danger of
anything being done by them. They cannot return to Turkey un-
less invited by the Sultan, and the Sultan will not invite them
unless he is again attacked by Mehemet Ali; but Mehemet AH will
not stir as long as we beg him not to do so, because he knows
that our fleet could effectually prevent him. . . . Our policy as to
the Levant is to remain quiet, but remain prepared; time may
enable the Turks to reorganize their resources, and the chapter of
accidents is fertile in events.' "30 The Viceroy, realizing the possi-
bilities which such a condition of affairs might offer to him, ven-
tured to suggest to the representatives of the western Powers at
Alexandria that their respective courts should recognize his inde-
pendence in return for the cooperation of his army and navy in a
crusade against Russia.
31 His offer was promptly rejected, but the
situation was still further complicated by a revolt in Syria against
the regime he had so recently established there under the author-
**It was during the period of these strained relations in 1834, when the
famous "Portfolio Papers," professing to reveal a Machiavellian policy on the
part of Russia, first appeared in England. See, The Portfolio; or a Collection of
State Papers, etc., edited by D. Urquhart. Series I (5 vols.). See also, L. C.
Sanders, Life of Viscount Palmerston, p. 76. C. C. Greville, The Greville
Memoirs. A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852, I, pp.
102-104, J39-
*Palmerston to Temple, April 21, 1834, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 182-183.
Soon afterwards the Emperor Nicholas decided to recall his ambassador, Prince
Lieven, from London and to appoint only a charge d'affaires in his place. See,
Palmerston to Temple, June 27, 1834, ibid., p. 199. The Times, May 23, 1834.
M
Blanc, op. cit., V, p. 404. F. 0. Turkey 246, Campbell to Palmerston,
Sept. 4, 5, 1834, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 220. Letter from Constantinople,
Nov. 25, 1833, The Times, Dec. 28, 1833.
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ity of his son Ibrahim.
32 In 1832 the Syrians had welcomed the
Egyptians as their deliverers, but they soon found the overlord-
ship of the Pasha to be even more distasteful than that of the
Porte which had preceded it.33 The Sultan, anxious to add to
the difficulties which confronted his hated vassal, did what he
could to encourage the insurgents.
34 He even dreamed of recover-
ing the dominions which he had lost the preceding year and, in
order to avail himself to the utmost of any opportunity which
might occur, sent considerable reenforcements to the army of
Reschid Pasha in Asia Minor.35 A correspondent of The Times
KA. A. Paton, A History of the Egyptian Revolution, II, pp. 116-117. An-
nual Register, 1834, p. [465]. Although the Viceroy's proposal was rejected by
the French Ministers, sympathy for the cause of Mehemet Ali still existed in
France. Note the following: ". . . tout le monde sait que les Turcs, livres a eux-
memes, sont incapables de resister aux forces regulieres d'Ibrahim; le Sultan
invoquera encore une fois la protection des Russes. D'un autre cote, que repre-
sente le pacha d'Egypte, si ce n'est 1'Angleterre et la France? Ces deux
puissances prendront parti pour leur allie; de la le conflit qui parait inevitable.
Ce sera une guerre sous un autre pavilion. Nous sommes bien loin encore du
desarmement." Revue des Deux Mondes, June 14, 1834, XIV, p. 732. It appears
that many believed at the time that England, as well as France, was favorably
inclined towards Mehemet Ali. An American, W. H. Hodgson, wrote in a long
report on Egypt, March 2, 1835, addressed to the State Department: "In the
political and commercial relations of Great Britain with her East-Indian posses-
sions, Egypt constitutes a link of primary importance. Every consideration of
interest prompts her to desire the independence of Mohammed Ali. . . . She
desires the establishment of a strong Government on the Red Sea, and upon the
Euphrates, to give security to commerce, and to control the uncivilized lawless
tribes, existing on the lines of intercourse, between the Mediterranean and the
Indian Ocean.
"France regards Egypt as a quasi colony, and aspires to its possession. Egypt
looks to France, for science and art, and France anticipates a predominance
in her councils, in the contingency of future wars in Europe or Asia.
"Russia secretly encourages the extension of Mohammed Ali's dominions, by
which the Sultan's power may be reduced, and Turkey become an easier prey to
herself." State Dept. Turkey VI, Hodgson's Report on Egypt, March 2, 1835.
"The major part of the dissatisfaction was due to the attempts of Mehemet
Ali and Ibrahim to introduce Egyptian systems of taxation and conscription
into Syria. See, Paton, op. cit., II, pp. 121-122. Barker, op. cit., II, pp. 204-206.
Annual Register, 1834, p. [465].
"Nugent, Lands, Classical and Sacred, II, pp. 279-280.
"Annual Register, 1834, p. [465].
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wrote from Constantinople on May 27, 1834: "A rupture between
the Porte and Egypt appears inevitable. . . . What elements for
Russia to act upon! . . . the circumstances of February last are
reproduced under, if possible, aggravated difficulties; the crisis
is momentous, and here [at Constantinople] our only hope is in
the alliance of France and England."
38
At the same time, the great Powers were all determined to
prevent a renewal of the conflict in the Orient.
37 Russia particu-
larly, it appears, was anxious that the peace should not be broken.
Baron Ruckmann, the Tsar's charge d'affaires at the Turkish cap-
ital, declared in a note to the Porte that although his master
would, true to his sacred engagements, hold himself bound to
place at the Sultan's disposal any assistance he might demand
for defense against an aggressor, he could not comply with his
"best ally's" request in a case in which the latter engaged in
hostilities of his own seeking.
38 The Russian government had be-
come aroused by the reactions which its Turkish policy had pro-
duced in western Europe and it must have realized that the Cabi-
nets of England and France would never peacefully submit to a
second active intervention, on the part of its army and navy, in
the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the
Sultan was forced to refrain from the immediate execution of his
hostile intentions.
Before the close of the year 1834, a governmental change
destined to be of importance in connection with the relations of
the great Powers in the Near East, occurred in Great Britain. The
Whig administration, having lost the support of the House of
Commons, resigned and was replaced in office by a Tory regime
under the leadership of Sir Robert Peel. That was exactly what
the Russians had been looking forward to for a considerable
^Letter from Constantinople, May 23, 1834, The Times, June 24, 1834. See
also, Annual Register, 1834, p. [465].
"Hall, op. cit., p. 220.
"Letter from Constantinople, Aug. 26, 1834, The Times, Sept. 20, 1834.
Annual Register, 1834, p. [466].
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period of time.
39
They were alarmed especially, it seems, by the
alliance which the Whig ministers had formed with the French,40
and they hoped that the Tories, led by the Duke of Wellington,
could be won over to the cause of legitimacy. In a conversation
with Thomas Raikes, at Paris on November 13, 1833, Count Pozzo
di Borgo declared: "Your union with France will produce no
benefit to England; they will make no treaty of commerce, they
will only use you for their own purposes. Russia is your old ally,
and under the Duke's government, convinced as we are of the
rectitude of his intentions, there are no facilities to commerce, no
sacrifices, that we would not make to cement that alliance; but
under your present rulers we are everywhere held up to odium
and suspicion, as if the conviction that you have unjustly deserted
an old friend only made you more anxious to injure and traduce
her for your own satisfaction."
41
Indeed, when Wellington did
become Foreign Secretary in Peel's Cabinet, Anglo-Russian rela-
tions were improved perceptibly. The Duke proposed to restore
normal diplomatic relations with Russia by the despatch of an
ambassador to St. Petersburg and, believing that the evil which
arose from the passage of Russian ships from the Black Sea to
the Mediterranean would not be diminished by the opening of
the Dardanelles to the fleets of the Powers, maintained that
"Note the following statements recorded in the Journal of Thomas Raikes,
under the date of Oct. 8, 1833: "I called on Count Pozzo di Borgo... all his
questions seemed to tend to what means could overthrow the Whig government
in England. He desired C , who was with him during my visit, and who is
going to England, to tell the Duke [of Wellington] that, if ever he returned to
office, all the Four Powers [Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Holland] were unan-
imous to abide in everything by her [England's] instructions; . . . but, added he,
'if she is still to be governed by her present rulers, let her beware of the con-
sequences. Our plans are laid. We shall attack her in her most vulnerable
point, in her commerce. We have means in our power to destroy her; we will
prohibit every species of manufacture or produce that can in the slightest degree
affect her interests; we will shut up the Sound against her; we will offer such
advantages to America, her rival, that the whole carrying trade of Europe, shall
come into her hands; and we will do everything to accelerate that ruin which
her own mad rulers are already eventually bringing on her head.' " Raikes,
Journal, I, pp. 189-191. See also, Metteraich, op. cit., V, pp. 561, 567.
"See a memoir presented to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in April, 1834,
Martens, N. S. Ill, p. 743 ff. Also a letter from Constantinople, June 4, 1834,
The Times, July 2, 1834.
41
Raikes, Journal, I, pp. 193-195.
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England and France should endeavor to effect the closure of the
Straits to the warships of all nations.
42
Although his stay in office
was too short to permit him to realize the complete triumph of
his policy, when he was succeeded by Palmerston, in the spring
of 1835, he had the satisfaction to see that the latter was im-
pressed by the soundness of his opinion upon the question of the
Dardanelles.43 Moreover, the Whigs also took over the idea of
sending an ambassador to St. Petersburg. To fill that post they
chose Lord Durham, a diplomat who in 1832, while on a special
mission to Russia relative to both Belgian and Oriental affairs,
had succeeded in winning the favor of the Tsar.44
Durham, in 1835, anxious to place the relations of the two courts
upon as cordial a basis as was possible, determined to become
acquainted personally with Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Near
East.45 Consequently, when he proceeded to the seat of his new
position, he followed a circuitous route by way of the Mediter-
ranean and the Black Seas, stopping long enough in Turkey to en-
joy a visit with Lord Ponsonby and to obtain an interview with
His Highness, Mahmoud II.46 When he traveled through the
southern provinces of Russia he saw no symptoms of any
preparations for war and he became convinced that the Tsar did
not have the power, even if he had the will, to call suddenly into
action a sufficient force to take Constantinople.
47
Arriving at St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1835, the British
Ambassador found the Russian statesmen inclined to say that
they had enough to do at home. The possession of the Turkish
capital by their country, they professed to believe, would be a
calamity instead of an advantage.
48 The reply made by Durham
^Greville, Journals (Reeve edition), (Series i), III, pp. 183, 225-229. Hall,
op. cit., p. 222-223.
"F. 0. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, June 20, 1836, cited by Hall,
op. cit., p. 223. Bourqueney to Soult, July 12, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 510.
"Palmerston to Durham, June 23, 1832, S. J. Reid, Life and Letters of the
First Earl of Durham, I, pp. 301-303. Grey to the Princess Lieven, July 31,
1832, Nesselrode, Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode, VII, pp.
232-234.
"Reid, op. cit., II, p. 16.
"See a letter from Constantinople, Nov. 18, 1835, The Times, Dec. 15, 1835.
See also No. 10, Appendix D.
47
Reid, op. cit., II, p. 17.
"Ibid., p. 16.
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to their declarations was friendly but, at the same time, firm.
"I do not believe," he stated, "[that] you entertain the designs
attributed to you because you are too wise and too clever to
attempt impossibilities. The retention, nay, the occupation of
Constantinople is an impossibility. We never could and never
would permit it, while there was a shilling in our treasury, or a
drop of blood in British veins."
49
Early in the year 1836, in response to a request made by
Palmerston for an exact account of the political situation at St.
Petersburg, Durham prepared his "luminous and remarkable
'Report on the state of Russia.'
"60 That document signified "an
attempt to unravel a political problem which directly concerned
the interests of England and the peace of Europe, namely,
whether Russia was likely to make a hostile movement for her
own security or for territorial expansion."
50 Russia recognized,
the British representative contended, that a fresh and formidable
change had come over the Eastern question. She knew that it was
no longer possible for her to measure swords with Turkey alone
and that any hostile movement on her part against the Ottoman
Empire would occasion a war with the English, who would prob-
ably be supported by both the French and the Austrians. But
this, after all, was only one side of the question. Although the
external difficulties of Russia were great, they did not stand alone.
An analysis of the Empire's population, its military and naval
resources, and its financial condition proved that there was not a
single element of strength which was not counterbalanced by a
corresponding degree of weakness.
51
"In these circumstances and
with the evidence of these facts before me," Durham pointed out
in conclusion, "I humbly conceive that I am justified in reporting
to his Majesty and to the Government my conviction that the
peace of Europe is not likely to be disturbed by any ambitious
or hostile enterprises on the part of Russia, for which she has
neither the inclination nor the means."52
While Durham was thus occupied at St. Petersburg, important
*Ibid., pp. 16-17.
"Ibid., p. 29.
n
lbid., pp. 30-35.
n
lbid., p. 36. Others who were acquainted with conditions in Russia were
of similar opinion. See Guichen, op. at., p. 95, particularly footnote 2.
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developments, tending to increase Great Britain's interest in the
Near East, were taking place. It will be remembered that in July,
1834, the British Parliament had granted a sum of 20,000 Pounds
which was to provide the money for an experiment to test the
practicability of a steam route to India by way of the Euphrates
river and the Persian Gulf. After several months delay, during
which time the government came near to abandoning the project
because of the opposition of the Porte,
53 an expedition for the
purpose was equipped and placed under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Chesney. Chesney and his band departed from England
early in the year 1835 and they arrived at the mouth of the
Orontes river, on the coast of northern Syria, on April 3."
Although the Sultan, three months earlier, had at last issued a
firman granting permission to the English to navigate the Eu-
phrates,
55 the Colonel and his followers were destined to ex-
perience a second tiresome delay before they could proceed with
the execution of their plans. Mehemet Ali had promised to give
his assistance to the British government in favor of the undertak-
ing but when the moment came to give a "bouyourldee" to the
local governors to enjoin them to assist Chesney, he delayed
signing the document, and hence the expedition could not pro-
ceed. 56 The British commander, chafing under this inaction, ob-
tained an interview with Ibrahim Pasha at Tripoli on April 24,
1835, but he could not prevail upon him to do otherwise than
await his father's orders.57 It was only after strong remonstrances
were made by His Britannic Majesty's government to the Viceroy
that the latter finally consented to lend his cooperation to the
project.
58
However, by the close of the summer of 1835, all of the
expedition's equipment, including the parts of two iron steam-
boats the Tigris and the Euphrates had been loaded on wagons
and transported from the mouth of the Orontes inland toward the
"Chesney, op. cit., p. 157-158.
"Barker, op. cit., II, p. 216.
55
Letter from Constantinople, May 6, 1835, The Times, June I, 1835.
"Barker, op. cit., II, pp. 216-217. The Constantinople correspondent of The
Times claimed that the hostile attitude of the Pasha was due to the influence
at Alexandria of the Tsar's representative, M. Duhamel. See, letters from Con-
stantinople, May 13, 21, 26, 1835, The Times, June 8, 13, 20, 1835.
"Chesney, op. cit., pp. 179-180.
**Ibid., pp. 199-200.
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waters of that famous river, the commercial possibilities of which
it was the aim of Chesney's party to discover.
59 The difficulties
encountered were numerous but, as a contemporary periodical
expressed it, the "resolute perseverance" of the commander and
the "never failing exertions" of the officers and men triumphed
over all obstacles.60 On May 21, 1836, soon after the two steam-
ers had been launched upon the Euphrates, they encountered a
hurricane which blew in from the desert with so much violence
that the Tigris foundered, carrying down with her several
members of her crew.61 Nevertheless, Chesney and the rest of the
survivors, refusing to become discouraged, continued their
journey in the one vessel which had successfully weathered the
storm. They reached the Persian Gulf in June, 1836, and the
following winter, after a delay occasioned by their waiting to effect
a communication with India, steamed up the Tigris river to Bag-
dad, where the party finally was disbanded.
62 That the expedition
was a significant one cannot be denied. A fellow-countryman has
paid the following tribute to its resolute commander: "Although
neglected and overlooked by an ungrateful country, his name will
live forever as the pioneer of the greatest work, in reference to
India, of the nineteenth century, and one which will one day be
seen in its true light as being the only real route to our Indian
possessions."
63
"Ibid., pp. 192-199. Barker, op. at., II, pp. 217-218, 222.
^Gentleman's Magazine, Aug., 1836, Series 3, VI, p. 199.
n
lbid., Sept., 1836, p. 317. Chesney, op. cit., pp. 251-259.
"Ibid., pp. 293-326. For a more detailed account of the Euphrates expedi-
tion see F. R. Chesney, The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates
and Tigris, carried on by order of tine British Government in the years 1835,
1836, and 1837. (4 vols.)
""Barker, op. cit., II, p. 222. Some others were not so enthusiastic. Lord
Broughton recorded in his "Recollections" under date of Aug. 10, 1836: "A very
numerous deputation, headed by Lord William Bentinck, waited on me at the
Indian Board, to discuss a proposal for establishing a steam communication with
India. The scheme met with many and serious obstructions, but was started at
last. I heard no complaints, except from a very clever friend of mine, who said
to me, The deuce take these projectors! Letters come from India now quite quick
and quite often enough; I am sure many of them are not answered yet. What
will it be when letters and despatches come from India once a week?'
" Lord
Broughton, Recollections of a Long Life, V, p. 60.
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At the same time that Chesney was pushing forward through
Syria and Mesopotamia, a growing British interest in Oriental
affairs was marked at Constantinople by increased activity on the
part of Lord Ponsonby. The English Ambassador, refusing to
permit himself to be influenced by the convictions expressed by
Lord Durham in regard to the policies of Russia, was absolutely
convinced that the intentions of the northern court were Machia-
vellian in character.64 Also, he was imbued with a violent hatred
for Mehemet AH.65 Hence it was natural that he should desire
both to destroy the preponderance of Russian influence in Turkey
and to limit the developing power of the ambitious Viceroy of
Egypt. In his endeavor to realize the former aim progress was
extremely slow, for he was handicapped by the opposition of the
representatives of the Emperor Nicholas and by the feelings of
gratitude which the Porte bore towards Russia because of the
aid that Power had tendered to it when Ibrahim's army was
threatening Constantinople.
66 In his efforts to accomplish the
latter aim, aided by the Grand Seignior's desire for revenge against
the Egyptians, he was more fortunate. It is significant in this
connection that when, in December of 1835, Ponsonby complained
that the Pasha's system of monopoly and trade restriction was in
violation of the rights conferred upon English merchantmen by the
treaties of commerce existing between the Ottoman Porte and
Great Britain, Mahmoud promptly issued a firman to his power-
ful vassal ordering him to abolish within the territories under his
"Hall, op. cit., p. 223. Ponsonby persisted in maintaining that view even in
1836 after the Russian Cabinet had consented a second time to remit a part of
the indemnity due from Turkey and to evacuate Silistria. See, F. 0. Turkey 273,
Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 14, 1836, cited by ibid., p. 224. Letter from
Constantinople, Sept. 6, 1836, published in the Allgemeine Zeitung and copied in
The Times, Oct. 6, 1836. Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 256-257, III, p. 4.
"See a Memorandum addressed to the Porte by Lord Ponsonby, March 3,
1836, quoted by P. Merruau, L'Egypte contemporaine de Mehemet-Ali a Said
Pacha, p. XLV.
"For comment on the subserviency of the Porte to Russia see: C. B. El-
liott, Travels in the Three Great Empires of Austria, Russia, and Turkey, I,
p. 131. Annual Register, 1835, pp. [494]-[499]. Letters from Constantinople,
Dec. 2, 30, 1834, March 4, 1835, Jan. 20, May 25, 1836, The Times, Jan. i, 28,
March 30, 1835, Feb. 16, June 17, 1836. Raikes, Journal, II, pp. 164-165.
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control all such restrictions as were not in conformity with the
established Turkish practices.67
Russia viewed with alarm the evidence of Britain's increasing
interest in the Near East and, zealous in her efforts to guard the
influences she had gained at Constantinople, looked suspiciously
upon every advance made by the Porte to Ponsonby. After it
became known that the British Ambassador had persuaded the
Sultan to permit the undertaking of the Euphrates expedition,
Count Nesselrode forwarded a long protest to the Turkish capital.
"His Imperial Majesty," the Russian Chancellor instructed M. de
Boutenieff to warn the Porte, "has remarked with surprise, that,
deaf to his own interests and to every friendly suggestion, the
Sultan had authorized the English Government to establish a
steam communication on the Euphrates, and still favored the
execution of its ambitious designs in Egypt, by delivering a fir-
man, which, when the opportune moment has arrived, will serve
to legitimate an attack on its governor. The Emperor, after hav-
ing uselessly warned the Sultan of the dangers to which he ex-
poses the empire by acceding to the demands of the English
Cabinet, now considers himself bound to inform the Porte that
should hostilities between England and the Governor of Egypt
arise on his refusal to obey the firman of the Porte, Russia could
hot remain a passive spectator of so unequal a conflict, and might
find herself drawn by the force of circumstances into a position
which might render the continuation of the present friendly rela-
tions no longer possible."
68
"State Papers, XXIII, pp. 1291-1292. English merchants at that time were
complaining constantly about the trade restrictions in the Near East. See, let-
ters from Constantinople, Aug. 5, Dec. 2, 16, 1835, March 9, May 4, 1836, The
Times, Aug. 28, Dec. 28, 1835, Jan. 12, April 4, May 28, 1836.
"Martens, N. S., Ill, p. 760-762. Letter from Constantinople, March 16,
1836, The Times, April u, 1836. Gentleman'! Magazine, May, 1836, Series 3,
V, p. 541. The date of this document has not been found but it is apparent that
the Russian government was openly hostile to the Euphrates project at a yery
early date. In "A Statement of His [Britannic] Majesty's General Proceedings,
and of the Principles by which he was guided from the period of his Accession,
1830, to that of the recent Change in the Administration," dated Jan. 14, 1835, men-
tion, was made of Russia's "recent opposition to the projected establishment of
a steam communication with India, by the Euphrates." See L. J. Jennings, The Cor-
respondence and Diaries of the late Right Honorable John Wilson Croker, p. 348.
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Lord Durham realized that the anti-Russian activities of the
British Ambassador in Turkey were a serious handicap to him in
his efforts to improve the status of Anglo-Russian relations and
he complained to Palmerston about the matter.69 The British
Minister of Foreign Affairs thoroughly approved of the course fol-
lowed by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at the Muscovite
Court but, being unwilling to trust Russia as far as the latter did,
took a more cynical view of her assurances and refused really to
condemn the stand which Ponsonby had taken in opposition to
Russian influence in Turkey. In answer to Durham's complaint he
declared:
"Ponsonby goes perhaps too far in his suspicions of
Russia, and certainly is too warlike in his own inclinations; . . .
but Ponsonby has great merits and has done us good service at
Constantinople, . . . what you say about Russia very much coin-
cides with our views. Whether we entirely believe or not that the
Russian government has altered the policy which, certainly, at no
distant period, it pursued as to Turkey, it would be unwise not to
appear to give credit to acts which are in conformity with pro-
fessions; . . ."
70
It is obvious that in Great Britain Durham encountered innum-
erable obstacles in his efforts to quiet apprehensions in regard to
Russian policies. In addition to the alarm occasioned there by
Russia'sNear Eastern policyin 1833, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry
at Constantinople in the period immediately following that year,
strong sentiments were stirred up by the way in which the Rus-
The Due de Barante, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported in
May, 1836, that Durham had confidentially told him that if he were a member
of the British Cabinet, Lord Ponsonby would not remain at Constantinople for
twenty-four hours. See, Barante to Thiers, May 14, 1836, Barante, Souvenirs
du Baron de Barante, V, pp. 380-381.
'"Palmerston to Durham, May 31, 1836, Reid, op. cit., II, p. 43. Six weeks
later Palmerston wrote to his brother William: '"Russia is coquetting with
Durham; and in order to cajole him, is obliged to be civil to us; so his appoint-
ment has answered. Metternich has taken a fling, as if bit by a horse-fly, and
Ancillon has mimicked him as a donkey would do. . . .
'I have just got Ponsonby's reports about Churchill, but have not been
able to read them yet. I fear he may have gone a little too far; but all his
colleagues, not excepting Roussin, are jealous of him, and would be too glad of
an opportunity to throw him over if they could. I must support him to the
full extent of propriety.'
" Palmerston to Temple, July 9, 1836, Bulwer, op. cit.,
Ill, pp. 13-14.
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sians had suppressed the risings of the Poles, 71 by the Tsar's part
in the occupation of Cracow in i836, 72 and by his attempts to crush
an insurrection which had broken out a short time before in
southern Russia among the Circassians. The sympathy of the
British nation was particularly aroused, it seems, by the efforts of
the latter peoples to win their independence, and certain adventur-
ous Englishmen even went so far as to join openly with the
rebels.73 In December of 1836, the activities of some of these
Britons came near to occasioning very serious and far reaching
results. A schooner, the Vixen, which had been engaged in illicit
trade with the Circassians, was captured in the Black Sea by a
Russian brig of war.
74 The owners of the vessel, Messrs. Bell and
Company, complained loudly about their loss and appealed to
the British government for support.
75 Palmerston was inclined
to sympathize with their cause but he had no wish
"
'to begin
fighting at the goodwill and bidding of Mr. James Bell, the bank-
rupt of Bucharest,'
"
as he called him.76 It is true that the affair
served to increase English animosity against Russia, but the
Minister of Foreign Affairs adopted the stand that there had been
no violation of International Law and hence refused to insist that
reparation should be made by the Court of St. Petersburg.77
Thus, this possibility of hostilities resulting between the two
Powers was happily averted.
"Note the following: "The wrongs of the Poles at that time [the early
i83o's] excited as much indignation in England as was afterwards evoked by the
Bulgarian atrocities of the Turks." Reid, op. cit., II, p. 4.
"In February, 1836, the little Republic of Cracow, the last stronghold of
the Poles, was occupied by the troops of the three eastern Powers. At that
time the indignation of the British was so great that the peace of Europe was
seriously threatened. See Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoirf generate, X, p. 331.
Reid, op. cit., II, p. 41. Blanc, op. cit., V, pp. 29-30. Pad. Deb., XXXII, pp. 403-
426.
"Letter from Constantinople, Oct. 12, 1836, The Times, Nov. 4, 1836.
"Letter from Constantinople, Dec. 28, 1836, ibid., Jan. 27, 1837. State
Papers, XXVI, pp. 24-26.
"George Bell to Palmerston, Jan. 27, 1837, ibid., p. II. The appeal was re-
peated. See Bell to Palmerston, Apr. 4, 1837, Ibid., p. 33.
'
"Palmerston to Granville, Feb. 3, 1837, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 248-249,
[footnote].
"Reid, op. cit., II, p. 67. Palmerston to Durham, May 23, 1837, State Pa-
pers, XXVI, pp. 40-41. For a more detailed study of the affair see additional
papers in ibid., pp. 3-60.
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The fear and hatred of Russia amongst the British people in
1835 and 1836 must have been intense indeed. At any rate a re-
view of certain contemporary products of the press leads to that
conclusion. Not only the publications of such radicals as David
Urquhart, the editor of the Portfolio,
78 but also the journals of
the Conservatives were extremely bitter in their denunciation of
the policies of the Muscovite state which, according to The Times,
was "an ambitious, grasping, domineering, despotic, and most
artful power."
79 A few brief quotations will suffice to reveal the
character of some of the sentiments which were expressed. The
following is an extract from an anonymous pamphlet written in
1834, and entitled England, France, Russia, and Turkey: "Are
not the remains of Turkey to be laid on the tomb of Poland,
unless England and France, in their resistless twinship say no?
... It is by the Dardanelles that we must reach the heart of the
Ottoman Empire; it is from the Bosphorus that our fleets must
issue, to arrest the invader. Invigorate Turkey, you not only
save her but repair the disaster her weakness alone has brought
about. The existence of Poland is bound to that of Turkey. One
hand of iron is laid upon both; unlock that withering grasp, and
both start simultaneously to life. The Dardanelles are the key to
both; both are to be secured by its possession, or sacrificed by its
loss."80 "Is it true that Russia deserves the foul and angry
epithets which are heaped upon her?" questioned the Monthly
Review for January, 1835, in commenting upon this pamphlet.
"Yes; think of Poland! But is her appetite of ambition insatiate
and unsated? yes; think of Turkey!"81 The editorial writer of
The Times was always hostile to Russia and he was occasionally
even quite militant. On February 21, 1836, after criticising the
"flippant apologies" made by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs
relative to the
"insulting convention of Hoonkiar 'Skelessi,'
" he
declared: "We all know quite as well as Lord Palmerston the
"See above, Note No. 29. Urquhart was one of the most active and most
bitter critics of Russia's policy at that time. See D. Urquhart, Le sitltan et le
pacha d'Egyptf (a pamphlet).
"The Times, Feb. 8, 1836.
80The Monthly Review, Jan., 1835, I, pp. 51-52.
M
Ibid., p. 51. See similar reviews in ibid., May, 1835, II, pp. 84-92; July,
1836, II, pp. 439-440; Oct., 1836, III, pp. 149-158, 303-304; Aug., 1837, II, pp.
498-505.
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intrinsic power of this great country [England] ; we all know that
if fairly pitted against Russia, and with her force efficiently di-
rected, she would smash the head of the Tartar Emperor against
the dockyard gate of Sevastopol, or the inmost defense of
Cronstadt."82
Such hostile articles as these, which were frequently reported
to the Emperor Nicholas by Count Pozzo di Borgo, were a source
of constant difficulty for Durham.83 Nevertheless, the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg succeeded in improving greatly the
diplomatic relations between England and Russia. On March
20, 1836, he wrote to a friend: "I have interposed a barrier be-
tween Russia and Turkish conquest, which they [the Russians]
admit to be insuperable, and which therefore they disclaim. I
have while asserting our own superiority and right and power to
intervene, at the same time done it in such a way as to inspire
confidence in our motives and determination, and never at any
moment was English influence more powerful here [at St. Peters-
burg]. Excuse this Vain glory'; it is only in private to you; it will
never be conceded to me in public, but it is my consolation in
sorrow and sickness."84 Lord Palmerston frankly admitted the
value of Durham's success at the Russian Court. On December
14, 1837, after the Ambassador had returned to England, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs declared in the House of Commons
that "it was impossible for any public servant at a foreign court
to have served his country with more zeal and firmness" than
"The Times, Feb. 22, 1836. See ibid., June 4, Oct. I, 1835; Jan. 5, 7, April
18, 19, 22, 1836. Aaron Vail, thei American representative at London, wrote Jan.
22, 1836: "The European Press, without any material exception but that portion
of it which is under Russian control, has not ceased to fan the embers of that
anti-Russian feeling; and the Imperial Court has been galled by the severity and
virulence with which its acts have been scanned, and its policy commented upon
by the acknowledged ministerial organs of England and France, and even by
some German journals, formerly advocates of the doctrines set up by the Holy
Alliance of which the Emperor of Russia was the head and master. Rash and
mendacious as portions of the Press may at times be found all the world over,
still, when with all but an unanimous voice it utters the same sentiments, it
must be acknowledged then unequivocally to speak the public mind." State
Dept. England, XLIII, Vail to Forsyth, No. 224, Jan. 22, 1836.
83
Reid, op. cit., II, pp. 24, 46.
"Durham to Parkes, March 20, 1836, ibid., p. 80.
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Durham had.85 Although Palmerston still believed that the British
Cabinet ought not to "relax in any degree the vigilance with which
[it watched] the proceedings of Russia," he had become convinced
that the Muscovite government had no intention of immediate
aggression.
86
"I think," he wrote to Durham in November, 1836,
"you would not demur to what I said about Russia in my conver-
sation with Esterhazy [the Austrian Ambassador at London] upon
his return here. I said our situation with respect to Russia is
greatly improved, as compared with what it was two years ago.
Then there was much personal irritation between the two govern-
ments and no preparation on our part to resist Russia if neces-
sary; whereas now, by your good management at St. Petersburg
the two governments are placed upon a perfectly good footing of
mutual intercourse, while the vote of Parliament of last session
has put into our hands the means of giving effect, if requisite, to
any remonstrance we might be obliged to make."
87
Moreover, in
the halls of Parliament Palmerston pointed out the absurdity of
the fears of those who were alarmed lest Great Britain should be
attacked by the Russians and he even declared that Russia gave
"the world quite as much security for the preservation of peace as
England did."88
While the British government's fear of immediate aggressive in-
tentions on the part of the Court of St. Petersburg was thus being
allayed, its apprehensions in regard to the policies of Mehemet Ali
were increasing. In 1834, soon after the Egyptian army had been
withdrawn from Asia Minor, an expedition which the Pasha fitted
out under the command of Kourchid Bey, the governor of Jeddah,
K
Parl. Deb., XXXIX, p. 1109. See also Reid, op. cit., II, pp. 39, 59.
"Palmerston to Durham, Sept. 24, 1836, ibid., p. 63.
^Palmerston to Durham, Nov. I, 1836, ibid., p. 65. Palmerston appears to
have had little fear of Russian power. On March 10, 1835, he wrote to his
brother William: "The fact is that Russia is a great humbug, and that if
England were fairly to go to work with her we should throw her back half a
century in one campaign. But Nicholas, the proud and insolent, knows this, and
will always check his pride and moderate his insolence when he finds that Eng-
land is firmly determined and fully prepared to resist him.'
" Palmerston to
Temple, March 10, 1835, Bulwer, op. cit., Ill, p. 5.
Tarl. Deb., XXXIX, pp. IHOIIII. Others entertained similar sentiments.
See views recorded by Lieut.-Col. Frederic Smith, an officer of the Royal En-
gineers, in Marmont, op. cit., pp. 313-316.
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crossed the Hedjaz country and advanced as far as the village of
Kassim, about ten day's journey from Bassorah.89 Kourchid soon
succeeded in occupying the isle of Bahrein in the Persian Gulf and
in effecting a union at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab with a
naval force which the Viceroy had sent around the Arabian penin-
sula. The road to Bagdad lay open before him but as the British
government, alarmed by the advance of the expedition, protested
vigorously to Mehemet AH, the latter, who was already being
troubled by the revolts in Syria, decided that the project should
be abandoned.89 Accordingly, he ordered Kourchid to retreat with
his troops to Egypt. Nevertheless, in the following year he again
took up his aggressive policy and despatched an army against
Yemen.90 While this particular undertaking failed, it was soon
apparent that there was a real danger of the Viceroy's making
himself master of all Arabia if he should be permitted to continue
his activities against the Bedouin.
91
Great Britain had too many vital interests at stake to fail to
become alarmed in such circumstances. She viewed with special
concern the developments in Egypt, Arabia, and Syria, for, it will
be remembered, she was beginning to realize that the bulk of the
future European intercourse with India would flow through either
the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf. It has been noted before that
even in 1834, tne special Parliamentary committee on steam navi-
gation with India reported that the practicability of the former of
those routes appeared to be certain and in order to develop it
suggested that the government should proceed to take action in
cooperation with the East India Company.
92 The committee's
""Brehier, op. cit., pp. 149-150. Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, pp. 235-258.
Annual Register, 1835, p. [499].
"Hall, op. cit., p. 232. Note the following statement made by Sir John Hob-
house (Lord Broughton) in a British Cabinet meeting, June 15, 1838: '"...I
added that the continued encroachments of Mahomet Ali on the shores of the
Persian Gulf rendered a collision between him and ourselves almost inevitable,
unless, indeed, we had made up our minds to allow him to become master of
Bassorah and perhaps of Baghdad.'
" Quoted by A. Hasenclever, Die Orientalische
Frage in den fahren 1838-1841, p. 3 [footnote 10].
"In order to continue investigation of the possibilities of steam navigation
with India a second Parliamentary committee was appointed on June 9, 1837.
This committee, which included Sir John Hobhouse and Lord William Bentinck
among its members, considered various projects for rapid communication with
the East and in a report on July 15, 1837, made the following suggestions:
385] EVOLUTION IN NEAR EASTERN RELATIONS, 1834-1838 59
report was received favorably in the House of Commons93 and
the public press exerted itself to prevent the British people from
losing interest in the question, but nevertheless over two years
elapsed before appreciable results could be obtained. Three par-
ticularly serious, or supposedly serious, obstacles contributed to
this delay. One arose from a problem of navigation. As Sir John
Hobhouse, the chairman of the Court of Directors of the East
India Company, declared in the House of Commons on August
17, 1835, during two or three months of each year the south-west
monsoons blew with so much violence in the Red Sea that it was
then believed no steamship, of whatever size and power, would
be able to face them.94 A second difficulty arose when it came to
finding a method of transporting travellers and goods across the
Isthmus of Suez. For a time the question of building a railroad
was considered but it was finally given up as being impracticable.
95
A third difficulty arose from the fact that the finances of the East
India Company were, unfortunately, in a very dilapidated
condition.96
Fortunately, however, these obstacles did not prove to be insur-
mountable. They were all overcome eventually and, beginning
"Your committee feel bound to recommend a continued and zealous attention
to the subject [of steam navigation to India] on the part of Her Majesty's
Government and the East India Company.
"But strong as your committee are impressed with a sense of the advan-
tages, Political, Commercial, and Personal, which would arise from the more
extended system of communication [proposed], they would earnestly deprecate
any interruption of the valuable arrangements now in progress, with which it
appears to them, from the Evidence adduced, to be perfectly compatible."
Parl. Papers, 1837, VI, Report of Select Committee on Steam Navigation to
India [218 pages].
93
Parl. Dtb., XXV, pp. 930-932.
**Ibid., XXX, p. 609. Other men expressed similar beliefs. See C. R. Scott,
Rambles in Egypt and Candia, II, pp. 79-82.
B5The idea of building a railroad across the Isthmus was suggested as early
as 1833. In 1834 a road-bed was surveyed between Cairo and Suez by a certain
Mr. Galloway who seems to have had considerable influence with the Viceroy.
Rails for the proposed road actually reached Egypt but they were used for
other purposes. See, Parl. Papers, 1840, XXI, Report on Egypt, pp. 61, 72.
Gentleman's Magazine, Dec., 1833, Series 2, XXVI, p. 534. Scott, op. cit., II,
p. 152. See also Galloway's map of the proposed railroad in Parl. Papers, 1837,
VI, Report of Select Committee on Steam Navigation to India, Appendix No. 2.
"See statement made by Hobhouse, Parl. Deb., XXX, p. 609.
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with the year 1837, regular communication with India by the
way of the Red Sea was successfully established and maintained.97
"Egypt is fast becoming of moment in the opinion of other na-
tions," the editor of the Gentleman's Magazine wrote in Sep-
tember, 1838. "Five years ago there was not a single steam-vessel
of any nation plying from her ports; now those of England,
France, Austria, and Egypt number 18 regular opportunities to
and fro every month from Alexandria. When will our Govern-
ment build the 'Great Eastern' of 1500 tons, to go direct (both
ways) between Plymouth and Alexandria in 15 days, with India
mails and passengers and thus keep the French and Austrian
lines from our Indian correspondence?"
98
The realization, on the part of the government of India, of the
value of the Red Sea route was marked by its taking advantage,
in 1838, of a quarrel it had formerly entered into with one of the
native rulers of Yemen, in order to secure for England the
strategic position of Aden.99 The importance of this position as a
coaling station on the road to India was well known at that time.
"It would be needless my remarking on the position of Aden for
a coal depot," Captain Haines, a prominent officer of the Bombay
navy, declared, "It having been already considered on by abler
heads than mine; but as a sailor who well knows the place from
long experience, it will not be considered presumptuous in my
''Note the following statement made by Col. Campbell, in his Report to
Bowring, Jan. 18, 1838: "...I now proceed to give you some details upon the
steam communication between Europe and India by the Red Sea, and which is
daily becoming an object of more and more importance. At present it is con-
fined to letters and passengers, but may shortly be expected to include the
conveyance of jewels and other less bulky merchandise.
"In regard to steam navigation between England and India by the Red Sea,
this is a point which for some years past has been forcing itself upon the atten-
tion of [the] Government and the Court of directors [of the East India Co.],
and has now commenced to be carried into full operation." Part. Papers,
1840, XXI, Report on Egypt and Candia. Appendix A., p. 189.
"Gentleman's Magazine, Sept., 1838, Series 3, X, p. 314, See also The
Monthly Review, March, 1837, I, p. 441.
"On Jan. 14, 1837, the Dona Dowlut, a vessel flying the British flag, was
shipwrecked near Aden. Her cargo was plundered and her crew and passengers
were maltreated by the Bedouin. A year later the Sultan of Aden consented to
the cession of the coaling station demanded as reparation by the British. Cap-
tain Haines, with an English force, took possession of the place in Jan., 1839.
Martens, N. R., XV, pp. 222-250.
387] EVOLUTION IN NEAR EASTERN RELATIONS, 1834-1838 6 1
observing, it is the best adapted port in existence for our over-land
communication via the Red Sea; it is in fact perfect as such, and,
if a pier were built, steamers could at all times and seasons lay
along side of it and receive their coal."100
In the very same year Lord Palmerston manifested his interest
in the developments in the Near East by directing Sir John Bow-
ring to make an extensive study of "the existing state and future
probable situation of Egypt," Candia, and Syria.101 After having
spent a considerable period of time travelling through the various
parts of Mehemet Ali's dominion, where he carefully observed the
existing conditions, Bowring returned to England and, in 1839,
presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs a series of three
elaborate reports one on each of the three provinces he had
been directed to visit. In an introductory paragraph of his most
famous report that on Egypt he pointed out: "The more atten-
tion is directed to Egypt and Syria, the more important and inter-
esting will their position appear; for, in process of time, there can
be little doubt that both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf will
become the high roads to India, . . ,"102 In another part of the
document he stated : "It may be safely predicted that much of the
European trade which now circumnavigates Africa, will in process
of time, take the more direct course through Egypt and the Red
Sea, but that trade will be of gradual growth, and its development
will much depend on the facilities which are given to transit. As
yet, the steam communications with India, have not led to any
considerable increase of commerce, on or through the Red Sea.
It is certain, however, that commerce will soon follow the track of
travellers, but its extent will be greater or less according to the
regulations of the Egyptian Government. The more costly and
1<x>
Parl. Papers, 1839, XL, Correspondence relating to Aden, p. 96. Note also,
the following extract from a "Minute by the Governor of Bombay, to which Mr.
Parish subscribed," March 26, 1838: "Undoubtedly the advantage of occupying
Aden as a station convenient for the purposes of steam navigation, entered largely
into the views of the Bombay Government;. . ." Ibid., p. 38.
l
lbid., 1840, XXI. Bowring's Reports covered a great variety of subjects.
The author was anxious to reveal the true state of the resources of the terri-
tories under Mehemet Ali's rule. See D. A. Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth
Century, pp. 173-175.
**Parl. Papers, 184.0, XXI, Report on Egypt, p. 4.
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less bulky articles will, in the progress of time, naturally be con-
veyed by the most direct and rapid channel. Already articles of
jewelry, precious stones, some rich shawls, and bullion are con-
veyed from and to India by the English steamers." 103 Bowring
did not fail to realize the importance of rinding an improved
method of transit across the Isthmus of Suez. "Steam navigation
will gradually alter the character of our intercourse [with India] ,"
he remarked significantly; "the shortest and the cheapest channel
will be reverted to; the difficulties which the monsoon presented
to sailing vessels in the Indian Seas will certainly be mastered
by the boundless powers of steam . . . The question still remains
to be decided whether or not a canal is practicable from the
Mediterranean to the Red Sea . . . improved as are the arts of
labor and of navigation, and increased as is the importance of
the question by the relative positions of India and Europe, it is to
be desired that serious and detailed investigation should examine
the extent of the impediments, and the means, if means there be
of vanquishing them."
104
Mehemet Ali must have perceived that the Red Sea route was
destined to become of great importance in the future, for he
exerted himself greatly in order to aid those who were endeavoring
1<a
lbid., p. 67. By 1839, it was clear to many that no doubt could any longer
be entertained relative to the merits of the Red Sea steam route to India. The
editor of the Monthly Review, in January of that year, in commenting upon a
pamphlet entitled, "Steam to India, via the Red Sea, and via the Cape of Good
Hope," declared: 'We agree fully with the author, and wonder, indeed, that
doubt or hesitation can any longer attach to the matter. To us, as he eloquently
shows, for all the grand interests concerned, the route via the Red Sea is not
only by far the most advantageous line, but in fact the only line that can be
called a 'Comprehensive Plan,' which is the title of that which he so warmly
recommends." Monthly Review, Jan., 1839, pp. 16-20.
104The value of a canal across the Isthmus was realized by others. Note the
following extract from a letter written at Cairo on Dec. 9, 1839: "I cannot leave
Egyptian subjects (says Mr. D'Abbadie, in a letter to Capt. Beaufort, read at
the last meeting of the Geog. Society) without mentioning the map of Upper,
and particularly of Lower Egypt, made by M. Linant, who having been em-
ployed for nearly ten years as head engineer in the Delta, has had opportunities
of adding many details to the topography of those parts. . . .Lower Egypt must,
sooner, or later, by means of canals, become the high road for merchandise be-
tween Europe and India; and the map contains many notes explaining the con-
struction of such a canal." The Athenaeum Journal of Literature, Science, and
the Fine Arts, Jan. 18, 1840, p. 53.
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to develop it.
105 Some Englishmen, who believed that the Pasha
was willing to cooperate with England in furthering her Indian
interests, advocated that their country, like France, should ally
herself with him instead of with Turkey.106 However, the majority
of Englishmen saw in the extension of his power a direct threat
against their interests in the Orient.
107 Lord Palmerston, who
agreed with the latter, was determined to prevent the ascendancy
of Mehemet Ali. Realizing that if he contributed to the military
and naval resources of the Porte, he would thereby add mater-
ially to the accomplishment of his object, he permitted officers
from the English fleet to enter the service of the Sultan108 and
even despatched, under British pay, General Chrzanowski, a Pole,
whom he considered "
'just the sort of man to be of the greatest
use to Reshid Pasha,'
"
to Asia Minor to study the strategical
situation there.109 On the other hand, he directed Colonel Camp-
bell, the British Consul-General at Alexandria, to complain to the
Viceroy about the latter's extensive system of conscription, his
active military preparations, and his concentration of troops in
Syria. Campbell was also instructed to warn the Pasha "against
the evil consequences" which would result to himself, if he recom-
menced an attack upon "any part of the Sultan's forces."110
1<xsNote the following: "[The] Pasha is fully impressed with a sense of the
value which public opinion attaches to a safe, speedy, and convenient intercourse
with our Asiatic dominions. The subject has been one of frequent discussion
with his highness; and he has continually shown not only the greatest willing-
ness to lend his aid and protection but has on several occasions, made extraordi-
nary exertions and sacrifices in order that the service should not suffer. . . .he has
frequently overcome difficulties which, without him, would have been insuper-
able;. . ." Part. Papers, 1840, XXI, Report on Egypt, p. 72.
iat
Monthly Review, Nov., 1837, III, p. 447. See a statement, which Bowring
made at a later date, quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 4, [footnote 17].
107
Prokesch-Osten, Mehmed-Ali, p. 145. Letters signed "Veritas," The Times,
Sept. n, Oct. 8, Nov. 7, Dec. 8, 1835.
108The most famous of these officers was Captain Sir Baldwin Walker. See,
J. Reid, Turkey and the Turks, pp. 48-50, 52-53. Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 252.
10
*F. 0. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby,' March 7, 1836, quoted by
Hall, op. cit., p. 229.
""Palmerston to Campbell, Feb. 6, 1838, State Papers, XXVI, p. 694. On
March 29, 1838, Palmerston repeated his warning in the following terms: "I have
to instruct you [Campbell] to state to Mehemet Ali that you have been ordered
by your Government seriously to warn him of the consequences to himself, which
will follow any attempt on his part to extend his authority, by force of arms,
in any direction." Ibid., p. 695.
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Later, when Palmerston learned that Mehemet AH had announced
an intention of throwing off his allegiance to the Sultan,
111 he took
a still more decided stand on the question. "The British Govern-
ment/' he wrote to the Consul-General at Alexandria," . . . feels
itself bound, in return for the frank and unreserved Communica-
tion which it has received from the Pasha, to declare to him, in a
manner equally unreserved and explicit, that if he should unfor-
tunately proceed to execute his announced intentions, and if hos-
tilities should (as they indisputably would) breakout thereupon be-
tween the Sultan and the Pasha, the Pasha must expect to find Great
Britain taking part with the Sultan, in order to obtain redress for
so flagrant a wrong done to the Sultan, and for the purpose of
preventing the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; . . . ,"112
While British interests in the Near East were developing, and
while Lord Palmerston was taking such a decided stand against
the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, the ties of alliance between Eng-
land and France were tending to lose their hold. It has been
pointed out upon a former occasion that even as early as 1833,
when the Cabinets of the two western Powers were perfectly
agreed in their opposition to Russian intervention in Turco-Egyp-
tian affairs, evidence existed proving that they were not in accord
upon all that appertained to the question of the Near East. As
time progressed, and as rival interests between the two courts
developed elsewhere, the Anglo-French estrangement became
more serious and also more obvious. While Broglie was at Louis
Philippe's foreign office he was particularly careful to avoid action
which might incur hostility abroad. However, M. Thiers, who
became Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 22, 1836, inaug-
urated a more aggressive policy.
113
Immediately after entering
upon his official duties he set about consolidating French influence
in northern Africa. With the aim of furthering the conquest of
Algiers he planned to despatch an expedition against the Bey of
Constantine. While protesting that he had no thought of extend-
ing French control over either Tunis or Tripoli, he refused to
"'Campbell to Palmerston, May 25, 1838, ibid., pp. 695-697. See also,
Raikes, Journal, III, p. 289. Raikes, France since 1830, I, p. XXX.
"'Palmerston to Campbell, July 7, 1838, State Papers, XXVI, pp. 698-699.
See also, Palmerston to Granville, June 6, 1838, Palmerston to Ponsonby, June
23, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 267, 269.
113
Lavisse et Rambaud, op. cit., X, pp. 392-393.
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recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan over those territories and,
in order to support his policy, sent a fleet under Admiral Hugon
to Tunis to oppose, by force if necessary, the entry of the Ottoman
squadron into the bay.
114 In addition, a secret negotiation was
initiated, both at Constantinople and at Cairo, for the purpose
of establishing, under the guarantee of the French government,
the relations of the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt upon a more
secure foundation.118 With the hope of eliminating the isolation
of France on the continent, he engaged in an attempt to secure
a marriage alliance between the Houses of Orleans and Habs-
burg. Louis Philippe was strongly in favor of such an arrange-
ment but the prejudices of the Emperor of Austria, his family,
and his court against a government born of the Revolution of
1830, proved too strong a handicap to permit the project to
succeed.116
Naturally, the aggressive policies adopted by Thiers aroused
apprehensions in Great Britain. The time was particularly aus-
U4
Hall, op. cit., pp. 225-226. Letter from Constantinople, Dec. I, 1836, pub-
lished in the Augsburg Gazette and copied in The Times, Dec. 30, 1836.
"This negotiation was without important results. See Hall, op. cit., pp.
226-227.
"The proposed marriage alliance was to be between the Duke of Orleans
and the Archduchess Maria Theresa. See, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 143-144. Met-
ternich to Apponyi, July 30, 1836, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 155 ff. Louis
Philippe had been anxious for some time to draw closer to the Eastern Powers.
Austria and Prussia were inclined to favor his advances. Note the following
extract from a message sent by the Prussian King, Frederick William III, to
Rauch, his military attache at St. Petersburg: "Ludwig Philipp hat zum
Oefteren die Neigung gezeigt sich den Continentalmachten zu nahern und in
ihrem Sinne zu handeln. So lange indessen der Kaiser seine Antipathien gegen
ihn nicht zu iiberwinden im Stande ist und sich hieriiber unverhohlen, ganz
offen, ausspricht, so lange wird auch auf Ludwig Philipp wenig zu rechnen sein
und er allerdings andere Alliirte suchen miissen. Wollte der Kaiser aber an
seiner vorgesassten Meinung in etwas nachlassen, so ware es auch ein grosser
Gewinn fur die conservative Partei." Ranch's Report, July 23, 1837, quoted by
H. von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im ntunzehnten Jahrhundert, V, p. 62.
See also, Blanc, op. cit., V, pp. 29, 33, 35 ff. Haussonville, Histoire de la politiquf
exterieure du gouvernement \ranqais, 1830-1848, pp. 63, 81-85. Even as early as
September. 1835, Barton, the American representative at Paris, was able to
write: ''This Govt. by the late laws against the press, appear to have sealed
their peace with the three northern Powers, and it is probable that they are
gradually detaching themselves from the English Alliance." State Dept. France,
XXVII, Barton to Forsyth, No. 17, Sept. 7, 1835.
66 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [392
picious for such apprehensions to develop, for in March, 1836, a
serious disagreement upon the question of a joint intervention in
Spain in favor of the young Queen Isabella, whose right to the
throne was being challenged by her uncle, Don Carlos, had
occurred between the Cabinets of the two western Powers.117 The
situation was not improved in September, 1836, when Thiers re-
signed his duties, and the direction of foreign affairs at Paris was
taken over by Count Mole. Mole entered office on September
6, and just two weeks later Palmerston wrote to his friend,
Lord Granville : " 'France is putting herself in a false position, and
at no distant time she will find her mistake. We have performed
the duty of friendship in warning her; the fault will be hers if the
warning is in vain.'
"118
Again, in a letter written on January 27,
1837, he stated:
"
'Our speech [to be delivered by the King on the
opening of Parliament] will be moderate and short. On foreign
affairs we shall say little, and especially not one word about
France or [the] French alliance. We can say nothing in their
praise, and therefore silence is the most complimentary thing we
can bestow upon them.'
"119
At Constantinople, the growing coolness between England and
Fnance was marked by an augmentation of the influence of the
former and by a corresponding decline in the influence of the
latter. It will be remembered that Lord Ponsonby and the Porte
were in perfect accord upon the question of opposition to the
UIFaucher to Reeve, March 26, 1836, L. Faucher, Biographie et correspond-
ence, I, pp. 45-46. Blanc, op. cit., V, pp. 34-35, Raikes, France since 1380, I,
pp. XVIII-XX. Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 247.
^Palmerston to Granville, Sept. 20, 1836, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 241. Note
also the following, Palmerston to Granville, Jan. 2, 1837: "'I do not like the
French speech [delivered upon the opening of the legislative chambers] at
all ... In short, the speech is a thorough Mole speech; and all I can say is,
I wish him a speedy and safe deliverance from the cares of office, for it is
evident that the reports we heard of his anti-English feeling were by no means
exaggerated, . . .
' "
Ibid., pp. 242-243. Bulwer did not agree with Palmer-
ston. See a footnote in ibid., p. 243.
^Palmerston to Granville, Jan. 27, 1837, ibid., p. 243. The omission of a
reference to France in the King's speech attracted attention. Note the follow-
ing extract from the diary of the Earl of Malmesbury: "February 5th [1837].
French very indignant at no mention of them in King's speech. Their govern-
ment paper calls the omission an insult. No doubt the Ministers are angry
with Louis Philippe because he will not go the length they do about Spain."
Earl of Malmesbury Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, I, pp. 72-73.
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developing power of Mehemet AH. At the same time Admiral
Roussin was inclined to be friendly in his attitude towards the
Viceroy and even proposed under the excuse of
"
'saving the
dignity of the Sultan,'
" the idea of holding out
"
'to the Pasha the
prospect of obtaining for his son the reversion of his Syrian
possessions, in return for the abandonment of the other territories
which he occupied.'
" 12
When, in 1836, the Sultan entertained the
idea of renewing the struggle with his hated vassal it was to Eng-
land that he looked for assistance. Although his appeal for aid
was rejected, it is not probable that he failed to perceive that the
hesitation of Palmerston was prompted from fear that the Forte's
"Military resources would be unequal to the contest, rather than
from any desire to see the status quo in Syria maintained."
121
Also, it was apparent at the Turkish capital that the British gov-
ernment viewed with suspicion the aggressive policy which France
was following in her relations with Algiers and Tunis.
122 That fact
was of particular importance in improving the influence of Pon-
sonby with the Porte, for the Sultan was alarmed by the French
encroachments against his vassals in northern Africa.
128
In 1838, the developing cordiality in Anglo-Turkish relations
culminated in the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and naviga-
tion which replaced the ancient capitulations. One provision in
Article II of this treaty was of real significance. It read as fol-
lows: "... the Sublime Porte formally engages to abolish all
monopolies of agricultural produce, or of any other articles what-
soever, as well as all Permits from the local Governors, either for
the purchase of any article, or for its removal from one place to
another when purchased; and any attempt to compel the subjects
of Her Britannic Majesty to receive such Permits from the local
"F. O. France 562, Granville to Palmerston, June 25, 1838, quoted by
Hall, op. cit., p. 228.
M1
F. 0. Turkey 271, 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 8; Palmerston to
Ponsonby, May 7, 1836, cited by ibid., p. 228.
""Letters from Constantinople, Aug. 17, Dec. I, 1836, The Times, Sept. 9,
Dec. 30, 1836.
"'Note the following extract of a letter from Constantinople, Sept. 14, 1836:
"Admiral Roussin went yesterday to take leave of the Sultan. His reception was
remarkably cool and formal. The Sultan, as well may be supposed, being highly
incensed against the French Government in consequence of its late unprincipled
proceedings at Tunis." The Times, Oct. 7, 1836.
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Governors, shall be considered as an infraction of Treaties, and
the Sublime Porte shall immediately punish with severity any
Viziers and other Officers who shall have been guilty of such mis-
conduct, . . . ,"
124
It is obvious that this article was directed
primarily against His Highness the Viceroy of Egypt. Henry
Bulwer, who actively aided Ponsonby in bringing the negotiations
to a successful conclusion, later commented that "in the destruc-
tion of monopolies the astute and determined old Sultan saw as
Lord Ponsonby had expected him to see the means of bringing
Europe and his rebellious vassal into differences" and hence the
"order was given to settle and sign without an hour's delay."125
When Palmerston learned of the arrangement he wrote enthusias-
tically to Bulwer: "'A thousand thanks ... above all for your
treaty, which as far as I can judge is a capo d'opera, and will be
ratified without reserve;. . . We certainly shall not reject it from
any concurrence in the French apprehension that it will be bad
for Mehemet Ali, and drive him to declare himself independent
in order to escape from its obligations.'
"126
Count Mole, like Palmerston, professed anxiety to prevent a
fresh outbreak of hostilities in the Near East, and he even joined
with the latter in warning the Egyptian Pasha not to permit his
forces to attack those of the Grand Seignior.127 In the Chamber
of Deputies the French Minister of Foreign Affairs emphatically
proclaimed his adherence to the alliance with England.
128 Never-
theless, it was obvious that the sympathies of the people of France
treaty was signed at Balta-Liman, near Constantinople, Aug. 16,
1838. See, State Papers, XXVI, pp. 688-692. Martens, N. R., XV, pp. 695-701.
Noradounghian, op. cit., II, pp. 249-253. At first the French were alarmed lest
Mehemet Ali would not accept the arrangement. See, Journal des Debats, Sept.
17, 1838. The Times, Oct. I, Nov. 26, Dec. 27, 1838. However, when the Pasha
announced that he would not object to its provisions the government of France
signed a similar arrangement with the Porte, Nov. 26, 1838. See Noradounghian,
op. cit., II, pp. 256-260.
U5
Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 263.
""Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 13, 1838, ibid., pp. 284-285.
"'Mole to Louis Philippe, July 15, 1838, Taschereau, Revue retrospective,
ou archives secretes du dernier gouvernement, 1830-1848, p. 100. The Times,
Aug. 8, 1838. Revue des deux Mondes, Aug. 15, 1838, XXXI, p. 561.
^Archives Part., CXXIII, pp. 416-417.
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were overwhelmingly in favor of the cause of Mehemet Ali.129
Frenchmen pointed with pride at the extensive improvements
which had been wrought in Egypt, for they realized that the
success of those improvements was due largely to the activities of
the corps of their countrymen who were in the Viceroy's
employ.
130
"For our part," the Journal des Debats declared on
September 17, 1838, "we believe that the interest of France in
the Mediterranean is equally to applaud and assist the power at
Alexandria as that of Constantinople."
131 The National, an organ
of the radical "left" was willing to take a more decided stand.
"Mehemet Ali," it stated, "has detached at least two magnificent
provinces from the tottering monarchy of the Osmanlis132 . . .
Egypt and Syria, in which the Viceroy and Ibrahim may be said
to have merely a life interest, will be exposed to all the perils of
anarchy after the death of those two powerful personages, who
will have no political descendants. But will France allow this
newly created empire to be consumed in intestine warfare, or
again to fall under the dominion of the Porte, or, in other terms
under the yoke of the Autocrat [of Russia] ? The neighborhood
of Toulon, the possession of Corsica and Algiers, give to France,
with regard to Alexandria and Cairo, advantages nearly equal to
""At that time French writers openly advocated that the independence of
Mehemet Ali should be recognized by the Powers. See, L. P. D. D'Aubignosc,
La Turquif nouvelle, II, pp. 446-447. F. Mengin, Histoire sommaire de I'Egyptf
sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Aly, pp. 511-524. At the same time, French
agents exerted themselves to increase the influence of their country with the
peoples of Syria. These activities on the part of Frenchmen occasioned increased
apprehensions in Great Britain. See E. H. Michelsen, The Ottoman Empire and
its Resources, pp. 14-15.
""Note the following: "L'Egypte est la fille adoptive de la France; de son
sein sont sortis les elements precieux qui ont servi a clever 1'edifice qu'elle pre-
sent au monde civilise." Mengin, op. cit., p. 512. "La France est regardee, en
Orient, comme la protectrice naturelle de Mehemet-Ali; elle n'est point 6trangere
a sa grandeur; elle 1'a constamment soutenu." Revue des deux Mondes, Oct. I,
1838, XXII, p. 141.
fournal des Debats, Sept. 17, 1838.
132Lord Palmerston entertained views diametrically opposed to those of the
National. He believed that the Ottoman Empire would not fall unless some
"
'Kind neighbours'
"
should forcibly tear it to pieces. See, Palmerston to
Bulwer, Sept. 22, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 286-287.
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those which Russia possesses with respect to Constantinople.
France, therefore, ought to watch over Egypt and the neighboring
regions as over a succession which Providence and the wishes of
mankind may one day adjudge to her civilizing genius."133
Lord Palmerston realized that such sentiments were entertained
by the French. He undoubtedly believed as one of his trusted
diplomats did that there was "a policy dating far back in the
traditions of the French Foreign Office, which would assign to
France the possession or patronage over Egypt."
134 That policy
was natural for France when France was the enemy of England,
but it was a policy impossible for her if there was to be a sincere
alliance between the two countries. ". . . the mistress of India,"
Palmerston's diplomat declared, "cannot permit France to be
mistress directly or indirectly of the road to her Indian do-
minions."135 It is certain that before the end of the year 1838,
the British Minister of Foreign Affairs had determined that he
would act immediately, regardless of what the attitude of France
might be if Mehemet AH should again venture to attack the
Porte.
"
'My opinion is,'
" he wrote to Granville on June 5, 1838,
"
'and has long been made up; it is that we ought to support the
Sultan heartily and vigorously; with France if France will act with
us; without her if she should decline.'"
136
Thus, as England's
interest in the Orient increased, her anxiety to defend her posi-
tion in that part of the world was augmented greatly. It was
""Extract copied from the National, in The Times, July 6, 1838.
"'Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 292. See also Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 28, 1838,
ibid., p. 283. Palmerston and Bulwer were not the only Englishmen who
were suspicious of the French. See, "Observations" by Lieut.-Col. Smith in
Marmont, op. cit., p. 305. Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 1839, XLVI, pp.
100-115. The Times, Sept. 12, 1837, Sept. 13, 1838. Note the following ex-
tract from a pamphlet published in 1836 and entitled A jew Remarks on Our
Foreign Policy: "Our most natural allies are the Germans, and our most natural
enemies, or to use a less odious word, our natural rivals, the French and Rus-
sians." The author even questioned whether a war with France would not
have been better for Great Britain than the "quasi-alliance" which had existed
"for the last five years." Monthly Review, Sept., 1836, III, pp. 132-133. See
ibid., July, 1836, II, p. 444.
"'Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 293.
""Palmerston to Granville, June 5, 1838, ibid., p. 266.
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obvious, even at the time, that she would not again passively
permit a rival Power to extend its influence there as Russia had
in 1833. The Tsar Nicholas must have realized this fact, for in
a conversation with Barante, which the latter reported to Mole
on February 13, 1839, he declared: "Egypt! the English wish it.
They have need of it for the new communication which they wish
to open with the Indies. They have established themselves in
the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea. Vous vous brouillerez avec
eux pour I'Egypte."
137
Anglo-Russian relations had improved while Durham was
British ambassador at St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, the British
were still determined that the Russians, as well as Mehemet Ali
the ally of the French should not increase their power in the
Near East. On June 8, 1838, Palmerston wrote to the Queen's
representative at Paris :
"
'What 7 should like, and what I should
think I could get the Cabinet to agree to, would be a short con-
vention between England and France on the one hand, and
Turkey on the other, by which the two former should bind them-
selves for a limited time to afford to the latter naval assistance,
in the event of his demanding it to protect his territory against
attack; and the wording might be so framed as to include the
case either of Russia or of Mehemet Ali. . . .
"Now, all this I write to you on the supposition that France is
honest and can be trusted. .
.you will use your judgment as to the
degree to which you will confidentially sound Mole on this matter.
It must not be forgotten that one great danger to Europe is the
possibility of a combination between France and Russia,* which,
though prevented at present by the personal feelings of the
Emperor, may not always be as impossible as it is now; and it
would be well to fix the policy of France in the right track
with respect to affairs of the Levant while we have the power
137Barante to Mole, Feb. 13, 1839, Barante, op. tit., VI, p. 184. The
attempts of the English to establish a line of communication through Egypt to
India were carefully watched by the French. See Revue des deux Mondes, Jan.
15, 1838, XXIX, p. 236-248. D'Aubignosc, op. tit., II, p. XXXVI. Mengin, op.
tit., p. IX. Letter from Alexandria, June 6, 1838. The Examiner, July I, 1838.
138The "Legitimists" in France favored such an alliance. See an editorial
in The Times, Jan. 16, 1836.
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to do so.' "339 Undoubtedly Palmerston had in mind the danger of
an attempted division of the Ottoman Empire on the part of the
Tsar and Louis Philippe, the former taking Constantinople and
the latter Alexandria.
In the very same year the situation of affairs came near being
complicated by a threatened renewal of strained relations be-
tween England and Russia.140 The British, for a considerable
period of time, had been suspicious of the advances made by the
Muscovites in the direction of Persia and India. Indeed, agents
of the government of St. Petersburg were engaged actively in
intrigues against British interests at Teheran, in Afghanistan, and
even in India. 1 *1 One of the most prominent of those agents, as
the English government well knew, was Count Simonitch, the
Russian Envoy to the Court of the Shah of Persia. Palmerston
was alarmed by his activities, and in October, 1838, after Simon-
itch had influenced the Shah to lead an attack against Herat, drew
up a long protest which was forwarded promptly to the Russian
capital where it was presented to Nesselrode by Lord Clanricarde,
the new British Ambassador to Russia.142 Anxious to preserve
friendly relations with Great Britain, the Tsar's Chancellor im-
mediately directed his master's Ambassador at London to offer to
139
Palmerston to Granville, June 8, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 268-269.
See also, Palmerston to Granville, July 6, 1838, ibid., pp. 270-272. Count Mole
was unwilling to agree to Palmerston's proposals. See Mole to Louis Philippe,
July 15, 1838, Taschereau, op. cit., p. 100. Henry Wheaton, the American rep-
resentative at Berlin, reported that Palmerston likewise proposed in 1838 to
Russia to draw up a concerted agreement between all the Powers for the protec-
tion of Turkey. See No. 12, Appendix D.
140
L. C. Sanders, Lord Melbourne's Papers, p. 452. See also, Melbourne to
Russell, Sept. 26, 1838; Palmerston to Melbourne, Sept. 9, 1838, ibid., pp. 452-
453. Reeve to his mother, Dec. 3, 1839, J. K. Laughton, Memoirs of the Life
and Correspondence of Henry Reeve, I, pp. 105-106.
'"Martens, N. R., XV, pp. 678-679. Pad. Papers, 1839, XL, Correspondence
relating to Afghanistan, and Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan.
H. Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, pp. 139 ff. The year 1838 wit-
nessed a fresh outbreak of anti-Russian declarations in the British press. See,
Monthly Review, Dec., 1838, III, p. 607. Gentleman's Magazine, Dec. 1838,
Series 3, X, pp. 652-653. The Times, Sept. 24, Nov. 15, 19, Dec. 17, 20, 27,
1838. The Examiner, Nov. 4, 1838, pp. 691-692, 694.
14
*Parl. Papers, 1839, XL, Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanis-
tan, pp. 176-180.
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Palmertson a conciliatory reply.
143 The latter must have been
entirely satisfied with this reply, for on December 20, 1838, he
declared to Count Pozzo di Borgo: "The despatch from Count
Nesselrode which your Excellency has communicated to me con-
tains. . .assurances the most full and complete; and Her Majesty's
Government accept as entirely satisfactory, the declarations of
the Imperial cabinet, that it does not harbour any designs hostile
to the interests of Great Britain in India; . . .and that in the future
the Russian agents in Persia will unite themselves with those of
Great Britain in earnestly dissuading the Shah from engaging
again in any expedition similar to that which he has lately under-
taken against Herat. . . . The two cabinets being thus entirely
agreed as to the future, it appears to Her Majesty's Government
that no good could result from any controversial discussion as to
the past."
144
Hence, by the opening of the year 1839, the danger
of an immediate break between England and Russia because of
their rival interests in the Orient had again been dispelled and
cordial relations had been restored. To be sure the Court of
St. James was awake to the importance of its Near Eastern in-
terests and it was not reconciled to the idea of permitting Russia
or, in fact, any Power to attempt aggressions against either
14
*Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, Oct. 20, Nov. i, 1838, ibid., pp. 181-186.
See also, Clanricarde to Palmerston, Nov. 20, 1838, ibid., p. 194.
144Palmerston to Pozzo di Borgo, Dec. 20, 1838, ibid., pp. 192-193. See also,
Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, Jan. 29, Feb. 21, March 5, 1839; Palmerston to
Pozzo di Borgo, April 4, 1839, ibid., pp. 195-200, 204-205. Melbourne to
Russell, Nov. 14, 1838, Sanders, Melbourne's Papers, p. 455. The British gov-
ernment's fear of Russia, it should also be noted, tended to decrease in 1838
because of an improvement in Anglo-Austrian relations. The Emperor Francis
II had died on March 2, 1835, and his successor, Ferdinand I, was less inclined
to maintain a close alliance with his sovereign brothers Nicholas I and Fred-
erick William III. See a letter from Constantinople, Nov. n, 1835, The Times,
Dec. 10, 1835. A commercial treaty which was concluded between England and
Austria, July 3, 1838, was hailed as marking the triumph of British influence
over that of Russia at the court of the Emperor Ferdinand. See, The Exam-
iner, Oct. 21, 1838, p. 660. The Times, Oct. 29, 1838, Jan. 4, 1839. Letter from
Constantinople, Nov. 7, 1838, ibid., Nov. 28, 1838. For copies of the said treaty
see, State Papers, XXVI, pp. 677-686. Martens, N. R., XV, pp. 626-639.
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Turkey or the countries bordering on India.1 *5 Nevertheless, real
significance lay in the fact that the British government's appre-
hensions, in regard to the policies which the Tsar was expected to
adopt in the near future, were to a considerable extent allayed.
At the same time, it was evident that the rival interests which
had developed between England and France in northern Africa,
Spain, and the Orient would make an agreement between those
two states especially difficult to maintain if the Turco-Egyptian
conflict were ever to be renewed. In the year 1833, the Cabinets
of the western Powers, alarmed by the Turkish policy of the
Emperor Nicholas, had united in opposition to Russia. At the
beginning of the year 1839, the possibility of such an alignment
was not entirely removed but it was, to say the least, very im-
probable.
"'Perhaps it should be mentioned in this same connection that there was a
tendency for Austrian interest in the Near East to increase because of the develop-
ment of steam navigation on the Danube. A leaflet entitled "Information on the
Trade of the Danube" by Charles Cunningham found in State Dept. Consular
Letters, Constantinople, Vol. II, reveals the importance of the trade on the latter
in 1837 and 1838. In 1837, 1,300 vessels entered the Danube from the Black Sea
and 1,242 departed from the river. In 1838, 968 vessels were loaded at Galatz
and Ibraila alone. This was an increase of 89 over the preceding year. The
imports up the Danube into Galatz were valued at 86,674 f r 1837 and
136,998 for 1838. Vail, the American representative at London, after calling
attention to Austria's improvement of the Danube and mentioning that this
brought her into contact with Russia at the mouth of the river, declared: "Thus
industry, that great civilizer of nations and never ending source of universal
prosperity, is now operating a change in the politics of those two nations;"
State Dept. England, XLIII, Vail to Forsyth, No. 214, Nov. 28, 1835.
CHAPTER III
THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE VERSUS THE
QUESTION OF ALEXANDRIA
When Mehemet AH, in the spring of 1838, announced his inten-
tion to declare himself independent, the Sultan refrained from
taking immediate action against him. Nevertheless, Mahmoud
was so exasperated by the attitude which his hated vassal as-
sumed that he at once surrendered himself completely to the views
of the Turkish war-party and set about placing his army and
navy in a condition which would warrant a more aggressive
policy.
1 He sent men, guns, horses, and supplies of all kinds to
the forces of Hafiz Pasha in Asia Minor; he imported powder, to
the amount of five schooner loads, from London; and he pushed
forward the activities in the Ottoman navy yards "with all possible
speed."
2 When winter came on, although it was contrary to the
established Turkish practice, he retained his sailors and his
marines in active service.2 In January of 1839, he called together
a great council of all his chief ministers and pashas to discuss the
question of peace or war, he ordered a new levy of 80,000 men
to be made, and he directed a subordinate, the Riala Bey, to pro-
ceed to Alexandria in order to secure for his master reliable infor-
mation relative to the military and naval preparations which were
being carried on by the Egyptians.
3
Moreover, late in the year
1838, with the aim of securing foreign aid to further the ac-
complishment of his plans, he sent Reschid Pasha upon a special
*At that time the Turks who were about the Seraglio were divided into two
parties. One, wishing for peace at all hazards, urged the Sultan to rely upon
the protection of Russia. The other, imbued with a bolder and more patriotic
spirit, preached incessantly a combination to destroy Mehemet Ali. See Bulwer,
op. cit., II, p. 256. Hafiz Pasha and his officers in the army were particularly
anxious to measure their swords with the Egyptians. See Ponsonby to Palmers-
ton, Jan. 27, Feb. 8, March 19, 1839, Pad. Papers, 1841, XXIX, Correspondence
relative to the Levant, I, pp. 2, 3, 8.
*John Reid, Turkey and the Turks, pp. 47-48. See also, Hall, op. cit., pp.
237-238. State Dept. Turkey, VIII, Brown to Porter, July 15, Aug. I, 1838.
*Ponsonby to Palmerston, Jan. 27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 2.
Paton, op. cit., II, p. 127.
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mission to England.
4 In fact, according to one observer, it ap-
peared as though he neglected nothing that was called for by the
critical situation in which he was placed.5 Although some, like the
noted von Moltke who was then in the Ottoman service, must have
realized that many of Mahmoud's preparations were more ap-
parent than real, Europeans perceived more and more clearly,
as time advanced, that he was set on adopting a bellicose policy.
6
"The lazy Turk," a contemporary wrote, "seemed determined for
once to shake off his habitual sloth; and the best informed Franks
at Constantinople began to speculate on what would be the result
of the evident determination on the part of the Porte to settle its
difficulties by an appeal to arms."7
Early in the fall of 1838, Lord Palmerston suggested to Achmed
Fethi Pasha, the Ottoman representative at London, that
"
'the
Sultan ought to employ himself in organizing his army and navy,
and in improving his revenue,'
" in order that he " 'should thus
make himself strong enough to be able to beat Mehemet Ali by
his own means.' "8 It is obvious, though, that the British Minister
of Foreign Affairs believed the time had not yet come when
4
Hall, op. cit., pp. 239-240. The Porte, it seems, was particularly anxious
to win the cooperation of Great Britain. See a letter from Constantinople, Sept.
12, 1838, The Times, Oct. 4, 1838.
5
See a letter from Constantinople, Sept. 4, 1838, published in the Allgem-
eine Zeitung and copied in The Times, Oct. I, 1838.
'See the account of Turkish preparations for war as given in letters written
by von Moltke between July, 1838, and June, 1839, published in H. von Moltke,
Briefe uber Zustande und Begebenheiten in der Tiirkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis
1839, pp. 286 ff.
7
John Reid, op. cit., p. 47. Note also the following extract from a letter
from Constantinople, Oct. 3, 1838: ". . . unless the European Powers insist on
the disarmament of both parties [Turkey and Egypt], all their efforts for the
preservation of peace in the East are likely to prove but of temporary avail."
The Times, Oct. 25, 1838. Evidently Commodore Porter, the American, had a
higher regard for Turkish character than Mr. Reid. In 1836 he wrote: "A
Turk will prevaricate sometimes if necessary, and is skilful as a diplomatist and
negotiator, in which characters he endeavors to gain every advantage, is always
covetous, and perhaps sometimes may be corrupted, but in general no one
respects truth more than he does, or holds it more sacred or inviokte; . . .
"Perhaps no people in any part of the world are generally so regardless of
truth as the Franks, and Rayahs of the Levant." State Dept. Turkey, VIII,
Porter to Forsyth, No. 376, Feb. 5, 1836.
"Ponsonby to Palmerston, Sept. 13, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 281.
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Mahmoud unaided could with a reasonable chance of success try
conclusions with the Viceroy.
"
'I strongly urged upon him
[Achmet Fethi Pasha],'" he wrote on September 13, 1838, to
Lord Ponsonby,
"
'How expedient it is for the Sultan to abstain
from attacking Mehemet AH, because Mehemet's army is now
probably better than, or at least as good as that of the sultan.'
"8
At the same time Palmerston was unwilling, probably because of
the danger of incurring the hostility of Russia and France, to prom-
ise that the British government would join the Grand Seignior in
an attack upon the Pasha. Consequently, when Reschid Pasha ar-
rived in London he found that it was impossible to persuade
Palmerston to enter into any arrangement other than one which
would provide for a strict maintenance of the status quo.
9 Such an
arrangement, however, was not the kind that the Porte desired,
and when the terms which the British Minister of Foreign Affairs
was willing to accept became known at Constantinople, Nouri
Effendi, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, even went so
far as to declare to Lord Ponsonby "that no Treaty would be of
any use to the interests of the Porte, which had not for its object
the destruction of Mehemet Ali. . . ."10 The Ottoman government,
he let the Ambassador understand, was resolved not to bind itself
in any way so as to prevent it from taking advantage of some
future opportunity to destroy its hated vassal.
11
When the governments of the great Powers perceived that there
was danger of war being waged between the Porte and the
Viceroy, they all manifested concern. The Russian government
as on former occasions, was particularly anxious it seems to pre-
vent an outbreak of hostilities in the East.12 The Tsar and his
ministers must have feared that if, in conformity with the terms
*See a copy of the terms of the treaty which was drawn up at London,
Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 13-15.
10
Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 22, 1839, ibid., p. 13.
"Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6, 1839, ibid., p. n. See also, Rechid to
Palmerston, April 26, 1839; Palmerston to Rechid, May 6, 1839, ibid., pp. 9-11.
"See, Barante to Mole, Oct. 25, 1838, Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 143-144.
Note the following extract from a despatch, Clanricarde to Palmerston, April I,
1839: "My colleagues here are firmly convinced that it is the sincere and earnest
desire of the Emperor that Turkey should remain in perfect tranquility: and I
see no reason to differ from them in that opinion." Levant Correspondence, I,
pp. 8-9.
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of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, they should again send troops to
the Turkish capital, a break would result between Russia and the
two western Powers. At any rate M. Boutenieff was instructed to
warn the Porte that the assistance to the Turkish government
provided for in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi could not be claimed
if the Turks were the aggressors in a war with the Egyptians,13
and Count Medem,the Russian Consul-General at Alexandria, was
directed to urge the Pasha not only to withdraw his forces from
the advanced positions they had occupied in Syria but also to
promise that he would remain on the defensive, satisfied with
merely repulsing the enemy, in case they were attacked.
14 Met-
ternich, who likewise was very anxious to preserve peace, believed
that the united remonstrances of all the great Powers was neces-
sary in order to put a stop to the "warlike ebullitions" in the
Levant. In March, 1839, he urged Mr. Milbanke, the British
charge d'affaires at Vienna, to call the "earnest attention" of Her
Britannic Majesty's government to the matter, and he let it be
known that he was about to send a messenger to Constantinople
with instructions to Baron Stiirmer, the Austrian Internuncio in
Turkey, to state to the Sultan that if Mehemet Ali attacked him
he might count on the assistance of the Powers to aid in repelling
such attack, but if the Turkish army should be the aggressor he
"Granville to Palmerston, April 8, 1839, Ibid., p. 5.
"Nesselrode to Medem, March 29, 1839; Bouteneff to Medem, April 12/24,
1839; Campbell to Palmerston, May 7, 1839; Clanricarde to Palmerston, May
14, 1839, ibid., pp. 59-61, 63-64, 18-19, 16. The situation of affairs in Russia,
it seems, was such that the Tsar could not afford to risk his country's being
involved in a European war. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 95, 191-194. Henry
Wheaton, the American representative at Berlin, wrote on January 9, 1839: "It
is supposed by the best informed persons here that the checks which the invad-
ing policy of Russia has recently encountered at Constantinople, in Circassia,
and on the frontiers of India, together with the seeds of dis-content which are
thickly sown throughout the vast Empire, have contributed to multiply the
embarrassments which its ruler constantly encounters in the restless ambition,
corruption, and faithlessness of the nobles, who regard him and his family as
strangers to their nation. . . . His recent tour in this country has only con-
tributed to swell the contempt and hatred previously felt for the Russian name
and race, notwithstanding the showers of gold, decorations, and other baubles
which he scattered in his path." State Dept. Prussia, I, Wheaton to Forsyth,
No. 93, Jan. 9, 1839. "Confidential."
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must not be surprised if the Powers should leave him to his fate.15
Lord Palmerston, who on that occasion was quite willing to co-
operate with the Austrian Chancellor, sent similar instructions to
Lord Ponsonby.16 Baron Werther, the Prussian Chief Minister,
and Count Mole, the French Secretary of Foreign Affairs, also
exerted themselves to prevent hostilities from breaking out be-
tween the Viceroy and the Sultan.17
Although the Powers were thus united in their efforts to main-
tain peace in the Orient, their representatives were unable to per-
suade the Sultan to abandon his determination to declare war.18
When it became apparent that their remonstrances were to
prove of no avail the Cabinets of the five great nations awoke to
the fact that they must agree upon some common course of
action, or the peace of Europe even would be in serious danger.
The securing of such an agreement, however, in 1839 as on many
other occasions, involved great difficulty. At that time the Powers
were confronted in the Near East by two fundamental questions
which, in the Parliamentary language of the day, may be termed
the "Question of Constantinople" and the "Question of Alex-
andria." 19 In connection with the former but not the latter
of these questions the interests of England and France were iden-
tical and they were obviously in opposition to those of Russia.
The Russian government, it will be remembered, had promised by
the treaty of alliance with Turkey, signed on July 8, 1833, to
afford to the Porte the "most efficacious assistance" in case its
"tranquillity and safety" were again endangered. Hence, when it
became apparent that that "tranquillity and safety" was being en-
"Milbanke to Palmerston, March 28, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
4-5. See also, Beauvale to Palmerston, May 8, 1839, ibid., p. 15.
"Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 15, April 12, 1839, ibid., pp. 4, 5-6.
"Russell to Palmerston, June 5, 1839; Granville to Palmerston, Feb. 15,
1839; Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6, 1839, ibid., pp. 30, I, n.
"Inclosure in Ponsonby to Palmerston, May I, 1839, ibid., pp. 21-22.
MM. d'Haussonville, referring to the two questions at issue in 1839, pointed
out that "le premier [question], commun avec toutes les nations de 1'Europe,
la Russie exceptee, c'etait la duree de 1'empire ottoman et son independence absolue;
le second, qui nous etait particulier, c'etait la consolidation, aux meilleures condi-
tions possibles, de 1'etablissement egyptien. Cela s'appelait, dans le langage
parlementaire du temps, la question de Constantinople et la question d'Alex-
andrie." Haussonville, op. cit., I, p. 148.
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dangered the Cabinets of the Western Powers were alarmed lest
Russian troops and Russian war vessels should repeat the inter-
vention in Turkish affairs which they had effected with success
six years earlier.
It is true that in the period between 1833 and 1839, Anglo-
Russian relations had improved greatly. Nevertheless Lord Palm-
erston was as determined as ever in the latter part of that
period that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi should not result in a
second Russian armed intervention in the affairs of Turkey.20
"
'The Cabinet yesterday agreed/
" he wrote, on June 8, 1838, to
Lord Granville,
"
'that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare
himself independent, and separate Egypt and Syria from the
Turkish empire. They see that the consequence of such a declara-
tion on his part must be either immediately or at no distant time
conflict between him and the Sultan [sic.]. That in such conflict
the Turkish troops would probably be defeated; that then the
Russians would fly to the aid of the Sultan, and a Russian garrison
would occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles; and once in
possession of those points, the Russians would never quit
them.' " 21 France, also, was determined that Russia should not
profit at the expense of the Porte.
22
Moreover, in 1839 there was
considerable evidence which indicated that Austria was inclined
to unite with and that Prussia was, at least, not ready to oppose
England and France in their determination to prevent Russian
aggression against Turkey.
23 It was obvious, in fact, that if Russia
MOn Sept. 13, 1838, Palmerston declared, in a letter written to Ponsonby,
that " 'it would be most important for the interests and independence of the
Porte to get rid of that treaty [of Unkiar Skelessi];'" Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp.
281-282.
"Palmerston to Granville, June 8, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 267. See
also, Barante to Mole, Dec. 17, 1838, Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 159-163.
"Note the following: "... the government of France and England, in par-
ticular, were apprehensive, lest the eventual discomfiture of the Turkish army,
an event by no means improbable, should be followed by the arrival of a
Russian force in the Bosphorus, in accordance with the stipulations of the
treaty signed ... at Unkiar Skelessi." Annual Register, 1839, p. [408].
*"See Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 53, 60-61; Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., IV, pp.
12, 21-22. Russia and Austria had rival interests in the control of trade upon
the Danube river. See letters from Constantinople, Feb. 16, March 21, 1839,
The Times, March 18, April 15, 1839. Note also the following: "Austria pre-
served a sort of neutrality [in the East, according to the correspondence re-
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should attempt to repeat the policy which she had followed in
1833 in her relations with Turkey she would be in great danger
of encountering a strong and determined coalition which would
be formed to oppose her.
At the same time, it was also apparent that if Russia should
refrain from adopting an aggressive policy in regard to Turkey,
and if the attention of the European Powers should be directed
to the question of limiting the power of Mehemet Ali in other
words, if the so-called "Question of Alexandria" should become the
most important subject of European diplomatic relations an en-
tirely different alignment of Powers would result. Under such
circumstances England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, united by
similar interests, would probably be able to agree upon a common
course of action, and France, the friend and self-appointed protec-
tor of the Viceroy, would be the Power which would be in danger
of finding itself isolated.
24
Consequently it was to the interest of
France to emphasize the danger of-Russian intervention at Con-
stantinople and to minimize the danger which would result from
the aggrandizement of the power of Mehemet Ali. On the other
hand, it was to the interest of Russia to play up the importance
of the danger which would result from the latter and to exert
herself in order to allay the fears which other European courts
entertained relative to the former.
Count Mole must have experienced very little difficulty in seeing
the true significance of the situation, for at a very early date he
brought the matter to the attention of Lord Granville. He ad-
mitted that there were "shades of difference" between the inter-
ests of England and France in regard to Eastern affairs, and in
order to prevent serious consequences resulting therefrom he
urged that the two Powers should come to an understanding for
concerted action. Their object, he pointed out, ought to be to
gain time and thus stave off a crisis in the Levant. The best way
ported in the Toulonnais on May 8, 1839], determined, however, on opposing the
new encroachments on the Ottoman Empire contemplated by Russia." Ibid.,
May 14, 1839. Guichen accuses the Prussians of being very subservient to
Russian policy. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 37-39.
"The four Powers named above, it will be remembered, were all unwilling
to permit the Viceroy of Egypt to increase his strength at the expense of the
Porte. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 23, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I,
p. 15.
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to attain that object, according to his opinion, was "to indulge"
the Pasha in the expectation that England and France would
employ their "good offices" at Constantinople to secure the succes-
sion of his son to the government of Egypt on the same conditions
under which he held it himself.25
Marshal Soult, who on May 12, 1839, succeeded Mole as Secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs, was also anxious that England and France
should agree upon united action in the Near East. Unlike Mole,
however, he and his colleagues in the Cabinet were unwilling to
admit openly that there was a real difference between the interests
of the two Powers. Lord Granville, after a conversation with M.
Duchatel, the new Minister of the Interior, and General Schneider,
the new Minister of War, reported in a despatch written to Lord
Palmerston on May 24, 1839, that both of those statesmen, im-
pressed by the seriousness of the danger with which the Eastern
situation threatened the peace of Europe, had expressed anxious
desires for a cordial concert between England and France. "I may
therefore, I think," he wrote in conclusion, "give your Lordship
reason to expect that whatever may be suggested by Her Majes-
ty's Government as most expedient to be done in the present
alarming state of affairs in the East, will be most favourably at-
tended to by the French Government." 26
In the meantime, the Porte was continuing actively its prepara-
tions for war. The Turkish Ministers, in answer to the inquiries
made repeatedly by the European diplomats, gave assurances that
the Sultan's troops would not attack the Egyptians, but the war-
like activities at Constantinople and elsewhere in the empire be-
spoke differently.
27 It is significant, it should be noted in this
connection, that the Grand Seignior complained bitterly to Lord
Ponsonby against the pretentions of Mehemet Ali. He even de-
"Granville to Palmerston, Feb. 1"$, 1839, ibid., pp. 1-2. Count Mole, while
speaking of the variation in the interests of the two nations, alluded to Egypt's
affording a means of communication and transit between Europe and the
British Empire in India, "which was an object of far greater importance to
England than to France." Granville professed that he did not see why this
should tend to a divergence in the measures to be adopted for averting a
collision between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. Ibid.
"Granville to Palmerston, May 24, 1839, ibid., pp. 19-20.
"Granville to Palmerston, May 27, 1839, ibid., pp. 20-21. Letters from
Constantinople, March 27, 1839, commented on in The Times, April 18, 1839.
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manded that the Pasha should restore Adana, Damascus, Aleppo,
Seyda, Jerusalem, and Naplous, and that he should reduce his
forces to a figure which would be compatible with his condition
as a subject. 28 Furthermore, he sent orders to his forces in Asia
Minor to move forward, thus demonstrating that he was deter-
mined to follow up his threats and his preparations by aggressive
belligerent measures.
29
On April 21, 1839, the army under command of Hafiz Pasha
effected a crossing of the Euphrates river near the village of Bir,
30
but Mehemet Ali, who was probably influenced by the remon-
strances against war which were made at Alexandria by the rep-
resentatives of the great Powers, was too cautious to permit
Ibrahim Pasha to accept immediately the Ottoman challenge and
attempt to expel the invaders.
31 He even promised in a despatch
which the Consuls-General received on May 16, 1839, that in case
the Sultan's forces which had just crossed the Euphrates should
retire to the other side of the river, he would order his own troops
to execute a retrograde movement and he would recall his son
Ibrahim to Damascus. If that pacific demonstration should be
followed by a "retrograde movement on the part of the army of
Hafiz Pasha, beyond Malatia, his highness would enjoin the gen-
eralissimo to return to Egypt." In addition, the Viceroy suggested
"that if the four Powers [England, France, Austria, and Russia]
consented to guarantee the continuance of peace, and interest
themselves in securing the hereditary reversion of the government
[of his possessions] to his family, he would withdraw a portion of
his troops from Syria and be ready to conclude a definitive ar-
rangement conducive to the wants of the country, and calculated
^See Ponsonby to Palmerston, May I, 1839, and an "Inclosure" published
with it. Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 21-23.
Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., IV, p. 14. See also Ponsonby to Palmerston,
April 6, 1839; Campbell to Palmerston, May 4, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I,
pp. n, 16. Extracts from a despatch, Roussin to Soult, May 16, 1839, quoted
by Guizot, op. cit., IV., p. 332. Annual Register, 1839, p. [409].
30
Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., IV, p. 14. Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 331.
"For comment on the remonstrances of the Consuls-General and the result-
ing attitude of Mehemet Ali, see a report which was prepared by Count Medem,
May 3/15, 1839, quoted by Schiemann, op. cit., Ill, pp. 507-511. See also a
letter from Alexandria, April 7, 1839, The Times, April 30, 1839. Annual Register,
1839, p. [409].
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to guarantee its security."
32 It was only after a body of Turkish
cavalry had sacked a number of villages in the district of Anteb
and after they had occupied the town of Ouront that the Pasha
finally directed his army to adopt measures of an aggressive char-
acter. In answer to letters written in June, 1839, informing him
about the above mentioned outrages, he ordered Ibrahim Pasha
to despatch an officer to Hafiz Pasha to demand from him an ex-
planation of his conduct, and during the interval while he waited
for a reply, to send forward a sufficient number of troops to pro-
tect the province and the garrison of Anteb against a coup de
main. If the Turks should persist in their aggressions and march
against the latter, the garrison should retreat towards the main
army, which should advance at the same time "a la recontre [sic]
de I'armee turque." Thus it should be made certain that the battle
would be fought on Egyptian territory and that the Turks would
appear to be the aggressors.
33
When Marshal Soult learned that the Turkish forces had
crossed the Euphrates he became alarmed and determined at once
to make a final effort to persuade Mahmoud and Mehemet to
refrain from actual hostilities. With that in view, late in May,
1839, he sent two officers from his own staff, M. Caille and M.
Foltz, upon special missions to Alexandria and Constantinople.
84
Furthermore, in order to be sure that the French diplomatic rep-
resentatives in the Near East would lend their hearty cooperation
he forwarded instructions outlining his views to both Admiral
Roussin and M. Cochelet. According to a report written by
Lord Ponsonby on June 16, he ordered the former "to apply in
the strongest manner" to the Sublime Porte to prevent hostilities
"Martens, N. S., Ill, p. 872. The Times, June 27, 1839. Annual Register,
1839, p. [409]. See also a despatch from the French Consul-General in Egypt,
May 15, 1839; and a declaration "made by Mehemet AH to Colonel Campbell,"
[no date given], Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 53-54, 65.
"Mehemet AH to Ibrahim, June 1839, Martens, N. S., Ill, pp. 874-875.
See also, Granville to Palmerston, June 24, 1839; and a Minute of interview
between the four Consuls-General and Mehemet AH, Levant Correspondence, I,
PP- 95-96, 109-110. Thureau-Dangin quotes the following extract from a des-
patch which he maintains Mehemet AH sent to Ibrahim:
"
'Au regu de la
presente depeche, vous attaquerez les troupes ennemies qui sont entrees sur
notre territoire, et, apres les en avoir chassees, vous marcherez sur leur grande
armee, a laquelle vous livrerez bataille. Si, par 1'aide de Dieu, la victoire se declare
pour nous, vous passerez le defile de Kulek Boghaz, et vous vous porterez sur
Malathia, Kharpout, Orfa et Diar bekir.'
"
Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., IV, p. 52.
"Granville to Palmerston, May 31, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 24.
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and "to put an instant end" to them if they had begun. He also
directed Roussin to communicate with the British Ambassador at
the Turkish capital with the aim of inducing him to take a
similar stand. This, however, Ponsonby refused to do, his excuse
being that he had no instructions to that effect.36 Nevertheless,
Roussin, unwilling to be discouraged by the attitude of his
British colleague, did not hesitate to comply with the wishes of
his superior. He informed the Porte immediately that it must,
without delay, recall the army of Hafiz Pasha from the Egyptian
side of the Euphrates or it would be considered to be the aggres-
sor.
35 M. Cochelet, whose despatch from Soult was similar in
language to the one which the Marshal sent to the French Am-
bassador at Constantinople, made equally energetic representa-
tions to the Viceroy.
36
While Roussin and Cochelet were endeavoring thus to persuade
the rivals in the Orient to refrain from hostile measures, Lord
Ponsonby was actually encouraging the Porte to come to con-
clusions with its hated vassal. It was of course necessary for him
in his official communications to the Ottoman ministers to follow
the directions of Lord Palmerston and insist on a maintenance of
the status quo, but in his unofficial transactions he assumed an
attitude of an entirely different character. Indeed, the way in
which he acted at Constantinople soon became so notorious that
Marshal Soult complained to Palmerston about the matter,37 and
35
Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 16, 1839, ibid., p. 152.
""Campbell to Palmerston, June 16, 1839, ibid., pp. 145-146. See also,
Guichen op. cit., pp. 47-48.
STSoult to Bourqueney, July 6, 1839," Bourqueney to Soult, July 9, 1839,
quoted by Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 333-335. In June, 1839, Roussin had written to
Soult:
"
'Votre Excellence a du voir, depuis longtemps, dans ma correspondance,
que j'ai perdu toute confiance dans mon collegue anglais et dans les vues de son
gouvernement. J'ai ici des motifs immediats qui justifient mes soupgons, et
1'offre que lord Ponsonby a faite, a notre insu, d'employer les troupes de 1'Inde
pour empecher 1'invasion du territoire de Bassorah par les troupes egyptiennes.'
"
See Roussin to Soult, June 14 and 16, 1839, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., p. 61.
See also, Barante to Mole, Jan. 31, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, p. 172. In July,
1839, Palmerston admitted to Bourqueney:
" '
. . . je ne saurais vous nier que
1'opinion personnelle de lord Ponsonby, opinion que je ne partage pas, a toujours
etc opposee au maintein du statu quo de Kutaieh; il preferait meme les
partis extremes comme susceptibles au moins d'un denoument favorable; mais
je suis fonde a croire que, dans les rapports officiels a Constantinople, I'ambassa-
deur a fait passer ses opinions personnelles apres ses instructions.'
"
Bourqueney
to Soult, July 9, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 505.
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M. Metternich even claimed that Ponsonby was responsible for
the warlike stand which the Sultan had taken. 38 On May 20,
1839, Ponsonby himself wrote to Palmerston that "no one of the
Great Powers would have continued in a pacific attitude so long
as the Sultan did, had any one of them been exposed to even a
small part of the danger and the provocations he had to bear
with,"
39 and two days later he admitted openly in a similar
despatch that after Nouri Effendi had informed him of the Porte's
determination to attack the Viceroy he had said in answer that it
only remained for him to hope that the Porte had taken the "best
measures to secure success."40
The French representatives in Turkey, handicapped by the
effect which Lord Ponsonby's attitude had upon the Porte and
by the hatred which Mahmoud bore against Mehemet, failed to
secure, immediately at least, the results for which they strove.41
The Ottoman authorities became
"excessively angry" when
Roussin demanded that they should withdraw their troops from
Syria
42 and they promptly refused to grant an order for the sus-
pension of hostilities.
43 In Egypt, however, the French were more
successful. Mehemet Ali, influenced it seems by the representa-
tions of Cochelet and Caille, consented to instruct his son Ibrahim
to halt his advance and await future instructions.44
M
Metternich to Apponyi, May 21, 1839, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 345-
346. See also, ibid., p. 345, [footnote]. Vicomte de Guichen characterizes Pon-
sonby as "1'homme le plus dangereux qui ait jamais tenu une ambassade, . . . ,
passionne, violent, brouillon, mu par une seule idee, sa haine centre le Pacha
d'Egypte et centre la France." See Guichen, op. cit., p. IX.
"Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 20, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
28-29.
*Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 22, 1839, ibid., pp. 70-72.
4ISome evidence which has been found indicates that on June 28, just two
days before his death, Mahmoud finally consented to grant an order for the
suspension of hostilities. See "Telegraphic despatch from Strasburg," July 15,
1839, ibid., p. 172. Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 342.
**Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 16, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 152.
"Mouriez, op. cit., IV, pp. 49-52.
"Mehemet Ali to Ibrahim Pasha, June 16, 1839, Martens, N. S., Ill, p. 875.
Mouriez, op. cit., IV, pp. 30-32. Col. Campbell criticized Cochelet in a despatch
written to Palmerston June 16, 1839, claiming he believed that if the Frenchman
had "held out" a little longer the "united remonstrances" of the representatives
of the great Powers might have led the Pasha to promise "to retire the
Egyptian troops, in the event that they were ... in the Sultan's territory; but
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At the same time when Marshal Soult set about adopting
measures to prevent hostilities in the East, he and his colleagues
also took steps with the aim of protecting the French position in
case those measures failed to accomplish their purpose. On May
2 5> l %39> almost as soon as it was known at Paris that the
Turkish troops had entered Egyptian territory,
45 M. Duperre, the
Minister of Marine, presented in the Chamber of Deputies a
project of a law which provided for a grant of 10,000,000 francs
to the government. With this amount, Duperre proposed to aug-
ment the French naval forces in the Mediterranean.46 Also, Soult,
on whom the chief responsibility for the French foreign policy
rested, moved to secure a definite understanding with the British
Ministers relative to the alarming situation which was developing
in the Levant. He professed to Lord Granville that he concurred
in the opinions of Palmerston on the subject47 and he ordered
Baron de Bourqueney, the French charge d'affaires at the Court of
St. James, "to communicate to the English Cabinet aH the in-
formation which reached Paris, all the ideas which sprang up, and
all the measures which were preparing in consequence of the new
position, and to establish between the two governments the most
frank and intimate cooperation." 48
"
'In thus exposing to the
Cabinet of London the entirety of our point of view upon the
important circumstances of the moment,' the Duke of Dalmatia
wrote, 'we tender to it an unequivocal pledge of our confidence,
and of our desire to act with it in the most perfect accord.'
"49
Palmerston was quite willing to cooperate with the French, but
be it remembered, he was determined that such cooperation must
be on the basis of British terms. Soult must have been well aware
of what those terms were, but as it has been suggested before,
instead of admitting that they differed from the terms which
M. Cochelet was ... so glad that he had prevailed so far on the Pasha with-
out the aid of his Colleagues, that he hastened to accept the Pasha's offer [to
instruct Ibrahim to halt his advance], in order that he might be able to say
that France had done everything, and that her voice was all-powerful." Levant
Correspondence, I, pp. 145-146.
"Granville to Palmerston, May 23, 1839, ibid., p. 19.
"Archives Parl, CXXIV, p. 666.
4TGranville to Palmerston, May 31, 1838, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 24.
^Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 335.
"Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, quoted by ibid., pp. 335-336.
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France favored, he attempted to hide the fact that there were any
real differences between them and the latter. "The necessity of con-
ceding toMehemet Ali the hereditary investiture of at least a part of
his actual possessions seems now to be almost unanimously ad-
mitted," he wrote on June 17, 1839, to Bourqueney. "...[but]
we cannot flatter ourselves with a hope that the Porte will con-
sent to yield to him this increase of moral force unless, by way
of compensation, some advantage is granted to itself which may
furnish a material guarantee against the eventual enterprises of an
enemy whose power it has thus augmented. The nature and the
extent of this advantage are surely not easy to determine. Lord
Palmerston thinks that it should not fall short of the entire
restitution of Syria.
"At Berlin, they seem to admit that the Sultan should content
himself with merely a portion of that province. For ourselves,
Monsieur, we acknowledge that the Porte has a claim to a sub-
stantial compensation, but we think that the moment for fixing
the exact proportion has not yet arrived, that such a question
cannot be decided until after much important and complicated
data has been considered, the appreciation of which cannot be
the work of a moment ....
"You should wish, Monsieur, to permit Lord Palmerston to
read the present despatch."
50
Since Soult did not attempt to oppose the British position,
Palmerston assumed that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs
was willing to take a stand similar to it.
"
'We understand each
other upon all points;'" he declared after reading the Marshal's
despatch,
"
'our accord will be complete. Principle, end, means of
execution, all is full of reason, simplicity, and clearness. This is
not the communication of one government to another; call it
rather an understanding between colleagues, between members
of the same Cabinet.' " 51
In truth, during the early stages of the negotiations upon Turco-
Egyptian affairs in 1839, England and France did succeed quite
well in reaching an agreement relative to the important problems
which were at stake. One of the first of those problems which
M
Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, ibid., pp. 488-489. Levant Corres-
pondence, I, pp. 77-79. Note The translation follows Guizot.
"Bourqueney to Soult, June 20, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 494.
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confronted the two western Powers after Marshal Soult entered
office was that of agreeing upon joint instructions to the naval
forces which they were sending to the Mediterranean. Late in
May, Granville suggested to Soult that a combined Anglo-French
fleet, the commanders of which would have "identical" orders,
should proceed to the East and that the object of such fleet
should be "to arrest the progress of hostilities."
52 The Duke of
Dalmatia concurred readily in the idea and he even became im-
patient when Palmerston delayed following up immediately the
suggestion made by the British Ambassador at Paris. Granville
reported, June 17, 1839, that Soult was disappointed because he
had received no official communication from the British foreign
office. The French had seven sail of the line off Smyrna already.
Louis Philippe's Minister of Foreign Affairs was going to send
three more, and according to Granville, he was confident of the
moral effect which the two allied fleets would have in the Near
East if they would only cooperate.53 Marshal Soult, in a letter
written on the same date, declared to Bourqueney: "We anxiously
await an answer . . . upon the proposed instructions to Stopford."
54
Two days later Palmerston complied with the wishes of the
Marshal by forwarding to Paris a copy of the directions which he
believed the Admiral of the British Levant fleet should follow. He
suggested therein that the outbreak of war, or the continuance of
it if it had already broken out, should be prevented. He was un-
willing that any means other than those of persuasion should be
employed in order to procure the consent of the Sultan to a
suspension of hostilities, but he proposed that if the Viceroy
should refuse to refrain from fighting, "the [British] Admiral
should then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing
in their stringency," as he might find necessary, or might think
"best calculated to accomplish the desired result."
65 Palmerston
also took into consideration, in the instructions proposed, the pos-
sibility of a Russian force entering "the ports and territory of
Turkey with the professed object of protecting the sultan, and of
"Granville to Palmerston, May 31, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 24.
"Granville to Palmerston, June 17, 1839, ibid., pp. 76-77.
"Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, ibid., p. 79.
"Proposed Instructions to Stopford, ibid., p. 83 ff. Annual Register, 1840,
PP- 453-457-
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repelling the Egyptian invaders." "In such a case," he ventured,
"and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha the order
for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain
information that such order had been obeyed, it would be ex-
tremely desirable that the British squadron should proceed to
Constantinople, and should remain there, or in the Black Sea,
until the Russian forces had evacuated the Turkish territory."86
After Soult had become acquainted with this document he in-
timated unofficially to Granville that he was satisfied with the
"general statement" of it and he made remarks which led the
latter to believe that he would send similar instructions to the
French Admiral in the Levant.57 The British Ambassador reported
those facts to Palmerston in a despatch written on June 22, and
on the third day following that date the British Minister of For-
eign Affairs, stirred to action by fresh reports of an alarming
character from the Orient, directed the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty to send the instructions, which had been prepared,
to Stopford.
58 If further communications between the English
and French governments should lead to a modification in them,
he wrote to Granville, that modification could easily be provided
for later.59 This, however, was not necessary for the instructions
to the French naval forces which were prepared promptly by
Soult were quite similar to those drawn up by Palmerston. The
Admirals of the two fleets, the French Minister declared, "should
act towards each other with all the confidence and frankness
requisite to introduce into their operations the same unanimity"
which subsisted between the two governments.
60
"Ibid., p. 456.
"Granville to Palmerston, June 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 89.
See also, Granville to Palmerston, June 24, 1839, ibid., pp. 94-95.
"Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, June 25, 1839, ibid.,
PP- 90-93, 93-94-
"Palmerston to Granville, June 25, 1839, ibid., p. 94.
""Instructions to French Admiral in Levant, June 26, 1839, ibid., pp. 101-
102. Granville, in a despatch written to Palmerston on June 28, 1839, pointed
out that the French proposed, in their instructions to Lalande, to cut off all
communication by sea to the theatre of war. Palmerston, it will be recalled,
had suggested that only those communications which were carried on between
Syria and Egypt should be stopped. See ibid., pp. 104-105.
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A more difficult problem for the diplomats of England and
France was that of negotiating a settlement between the rival
parties in the Near East. Palmerston and Granville, it will be
recalled, had made it clear to the French Ministers that the British
government believed Egypt should become hereditary in the fam-
ily of Mehemet Ali under the sovereignty of the Sultan but that
the Pasha should withdraw his troops from, and give up all his
claims to, the other territories which were under his control.61
Soult, being unwilling to oppose openly the British position was
in favor of leaving the question of terms to the decision of a
joint conference at Vienna between representatives of the Powers.
He believed, he declared in the latter part of May, 1839, that
though a collision should be averted in the Levant for the time
being, it would be necessary for the five great nations of
Europe to concert together as to the means of definitely set-
tling the future relations between the Sultan and the Viceroy.62
A few days later he again referred to the question in a conversa-
tion with Granville and he expressed a desire that if a conference
should take place the instructions issued to the English and
French representatives should be identical.
63 He hoped, un-
doubtedly, that at such a conference the accord between England
and France would be maintained easily because of the danger of a
Russian intervention in Turkey. "In the event of our resolutions
and the attitude of our squadrons not being able to prevent the
two contending parties [in the East] from having recourse to
arms, the necessity of a common action would become evident;"
he wrote on June 17, 1839, "and there is no reason to expect that
we should then be able to induce Russia to abstain from material
interference in a question in which her interests would be so
directly engaged. What we ought to insist on, is that her action
should be determined and limited, in concert with the other courts;
that she should confine herself to the course adopted by France
w
See, in addition to statements made above, Granville to Palmerston, June
14, 1839, ibid., p. 31.
"Granville to Palmerston, May 31, 1839, ibid., p. 24.
"Granville to Palmerston, June 14, 1839, ibid., p. 31.
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and England; and, in fact, that a European convention should
replace the stipulation of Unkiar-Skelessi."
64
When Metternich learned of the French suggestion he imme-
diately objected to the idea of a formal conference and suggested
instead that each of the Cabinets should send its opinion to its
representative at Vienna.*
55 A certain latitude for discussion should
be permitted so that through a compromise of the five opinions
one in which all could agree might be discovered. Such an
opinion, when found, should form the basis of identical communi-
cations from the Powers to the Sultan and to the Pasha.66 Marshal
Soult consented readily to this modification of his suggestion.
67
Palmerston, while discussing the French and Austrian proposals,
declared that the latter was open to fewer objections but that it
also held out "less advantages." He was willing to accede to it
provided that Prussia and Russia did likewise. Consequently, he
forwarded to Lord Beauvale, the British Ambassador at Vienna,
a detailed statement of his own position upon Turco-Egyptian
affairs.68 The outstanding feature of that statement was the
emphasis placed therein upon the contention that Mehemet Ali
should give up all Syria, retaining only Egypt in hereditary pos-
session. He despatched a copy of the said statement to Granville
on June 29, 1839, and in a note which accompanied it he em-
phasized that it seemed to the British government that the affairs
of Turkey could never be secure until Mehemet Ali had evacuated
"Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 488. Note also
the following explanation of the French desire for a conference of the Powers:
"Dans un congres, tout 1'avantage, pensait-on alors, serait pour nous [the
French]. Appuyes sur la Prusse et 1'Autriche nous pouvions faire successivement
tete a 1'Angleterre et a la Russie. Nous etions comme assures d'avance de nous
trouver presque toujours quatre contre un, et, dans la plus facheuse hypothese,
tout au moins trois contre deux." Haussonville, op. cit., I, p. 150.
"Metternich explained that the protocol of Aix-la-chapelle, signed by rep-
resentatives of the Powers in 1818, read that no question relative to the rights
of any state should be resolved upon unless the said state was invited to be
represented in the conference. Turkey could not be invited, he believed, be-
cause she would not send a representative empowered sufficiently to allow
affairs to advance. See Metternich to Apponyi, June 14, 1839, Metternich,
op. cit., VI, pp. 347-348. Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 120-121.
"Beauvale to Palmerston, June 14, 1839, ibid., p. 88.
"Granville to Palmerston, June 22, 1839, ibid., p. 89.
^Palmerston to Beauvale, June 28, 1839, ibid., pp. 117-119.
419] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 93
Syria and recalled his troops to Egypt.69 If Marshal Soult still
had doubts relative to the attitude of the British Minister of
Foreign Affairs they must have been removed when Granville
revealed to him the contents of this document. He declined at
that time to assent to Palmerston's proposition that no settlement
would be satisfactory which did not restore the whole of Syria to
the direct authority of the Sultan but, as before, he refrained
from adopting a stand in opposition to the British contentions.
Instead of doing so he continued to evade the issue. The Court
of Berlin, he claimed, had suggested that the Egyptians should
give up in Syria, only the Pashalics of Tripoli and Aleppo, thus
leaving to them those of Acre and Damascus. Soult said he was
not aware what the Austrian attitude was, and "the French Gov-
ernment had not yet formed any opinion" upon the question of a
settlement between Mehemet and Mahmoud.70 He even con-
tended to Granville, according to a report made on July 2, 1839,
by the latter, that his hesitation to accept Palmerston's proposal
arose from his doubt of the possibility of obtaining Mehemet Ali's
acquiescence in it, rather than from any objection to the arrange-
ment itself.70 Hence, it was only natural that Palmerston should
become optimistic and look forward to the maintenance of a state
of complete harmony in Anglo-French relations.
"
'Soult is a
jewel,'
" he wrote on July 19, 1839;
"
'nothing can be more satis-
factory than his course with regard to us, and the union of
England and France upon these Turkish affairs will embolden
Metternich and save Europe.'
"71
Nevertheless, the accord between England and France was more
apparent than real. Radical differences existed between the senti-
ments relative to Turco-Egyptian affairs entertained by the masses
within the two countries. This fact is revealed very clearly by
articles which appeared in the contemporary English and French
newspapers. "There is one way of settling the question attended
with little immediate difficulty,. . .by laying it down as a funda-
"Palmerston to Granville, June 29, 1839, ibid., pp. 119-120.
"Granville to Palmerston, July 2, 1839, ibid., p. 153.
"Palmerston to Granville, July 19, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 295. Lord
Palmerston declared on July 9, in the House of Commons "that the English
and French governments perfectly understood each other, and were acting in
concert with regard to these important matters [Turco-Egyptian affairs]."
Parl. Deb., XLIX, p. 81.
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mental law that the conflict shall not have a beginning," an
editorial writer stated in The Times. 12 The views expressed in the
Morning Chronicle, Palmerston's organ, were of a more pro-
nounced character. The abandonment of Syria by Mehemet AH,
according to one of those views, was the "sine qua non" of the
final solution of the Eastern question.
73 The French press, on the
other hand, warmly supported the cause of the Viceroy and re-
vealed an attitude of suspicion in regard to the increased interest
of Great Britain in the Levant.74 "Whether France declare in
favor of England or of Russia,75 it must be on condition of obtain-
ing in return her Rhenish frontier and the cession of her former
province of Egypt, and perhaps something more," a correspond-
ent of the National declared. 76 Even the editors of the conserva-
tive Journal des Debats maintained that the hereditary right
should be conceded to the family of Mehemet AH, and one of them
remarked in an article published on June I, 1839, that while
nThe Times, July 5, 1839.
"Extract from the Morning Chronicle copied into the Journal des Debats,
June 27, 1839.
T4Note the following extract from an article signed by Saint-Marc Girardin
which appeared in the Journal des Debats on May 23, 1839: "Depuis qu'elle
est maitresse de 1'Inde, 1'Angleterre a toujours eu les yeux ouverts sur 1'Egypte
et sur la mer Rouge. L'Egypte est, en effet, la route naturelle de 1'Inde; ....
A 1'aide de ses bateaux a vapeur, 1'Angleterre semble en ce moment commencer,
pour ainsi dire, une nouvelle conquete de 1'Asie. ... La pris d'Aden et celle de
Khareck, nous le repetons, . . . indiquent les plans de 1'Angleterre, et comment
elle cherche a se fortifier et a s'etendre pour resister a son adversaire [Russia].
La pris d'Aden et de Khareck fait encore partie de la question d'Orient a un
autre titre; car, par cette conquete, 1'Angleterre a un pris de plus centre 1'vice-
roi d'Egypte. D'Aden, elle le menace a 1'entree de la mer Rouge, et de Khareck
elle survielle le progres de ses armes en Arabic, et protege Bagdad et Bassora."
Those Frenchmen who were alarmed at Britain's Levant policy were not all
newspaper writers and correspondents. See, Campbell's report upon the attitude
of Cochelet. Campbell to Palmerston, July 13, 1839, Levant Correspondence,
I, p. 221.
"Many Frenchmen believed that a war between England and Russia was
inevitable. Some, at least, favored a union with the latter for the partitioning of
Turkey Russia taking Constantinople and France Alexandria. See Guichen,
op. cit., pp. 45-46.
"Extract from the National, copied in The Times, June 7, 1839.
42 1 ] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 95
France had an interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire,
she also had an interest "a la grandeur de I'Egypte,"
77
The views relative to Near-Eastern affairs which were enter-
tained by the various factions existing within the Chamber of
Deputies are also worthy of notice. They were revealed very
clearly when Duperre's request for a credit of 10,000,000 francs
was up for consideration, for that was the occasion of a great and
solemn debate, in which the question of the Orient was examined,
not only in its relations to the immediate quarrel between the
governor of Egypt and his suzerain but also under its most general
aspects.
78 One of the first speakers who took part in the debates
was the legitimist orator, Valmy. After criticizing the government
sharply for attempting to defend Mehemet AH and bolster up
Turkey at the same time, and after warning against the danger
of an Anglo-Russian accord, he let it be understood he was willing
that the Pasha of Egypt should be sacrificed to the Sultan.
79
However, the limited applause it came from the right only it
seems by which his remarks were received indicates that a
majority of the deputies were not willing to support him in the
^Journal des Debats, June i, 1839. See other articles in ibid., May 17,
June 8, 17, 24, 25, 28, July i, 1839. See also an extract from the Siecle of June
14, 1839, copied in Guichen, op. cit., p. 44.
780dilon Barrot, Memoires Posthumes, I, p. 343.
""Note the following: "1'orateur legitimiste aurait voulu, en haine des revolu-
tions, qu'on immolat le pacha d'Egypte au sultan." Blanc, op. cit., V, p.
427. See also The Times, July 4, 1839. Valmy must be given credit, however,
for seeing clearly that the Soult Administration was assuming a false position.
In commenting on its policy he declared: "II en resulte que nous divisons les
elements musulmans qu'il faudrait reunir, que nous detruisons a Alexandrie ce
que nous faisons a Constantinople, que nous mecontentons le sultan et le vice-
roi en voulant les epargner tous deux, et que nous n'avons de credit ni sur 1'un
ni sur 1'autre."
"
. . . je 1'avoue," he stated later in conclusion, "rien dans
le langage du ministere ne me fait croire qu'il ait adopte une politique qui le
mette en mesure de regler serieusement le statu quo dans lequel s'engloutit
1'Empire ottoman et 1'equilibre de 1'Europe.
"Je le repete done, je ne veux pas exposer un seul homme ni un seul
vaisseau pour de perilleuses et impuissantes manifestations." Archives Parl.,
CXXVI, pp. 631, 636. Guichen, op. cit., pp. 76-78.
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position which he had taken.80 M. de Carne, the next speaker to
ascend the tribune, declared in a speech which was received by
"marques nombreuses d'approbation" that modern Egypt was a
French creation. France had important commercial and political
interests at stake there which would be benefited by a recognition
of the independence of the Viceroy. The Chamber of Deputies,
therefore, ought to declare itself in favor of such recognition, and
diplomatic Europe ought to recognize French influence in Egypt
as being on a par with English influence in Portugal and the in-
fluence of Austria in Italy.
81 Later in the day M. de Lamartine,
who had traveled extensively in the Orient,82 revealed that he had
little faith either in the suggestions made by Carne or in those
advanced by Valmy. France, he maintained, should withhold her
support from both the Viceroy and the Sultan. She should favor,
instead, a partition of the territories which were held by Mehemet
and Mahmoud between the four great European Powers Eng-
80*Archives Parl., CXXVI, pp. 632-636. Vicomte de Guichen maintains in
his Crise d'Orient et I'Europe, [p. 78] that "La Chambre, presque unanime-
ment, applaudit Valmy," but the editors of the Archives Parlementaire have
described the applause given Valmy as follows: "Foix a droite: Tres bien!
tres bien! (Une legere agitation succede a ce discours, et la seance reste
quelques instants interrompue.)" See ibid., p. 636. For Valmy's attitude towards
England, note the following extract from his speech: "De son cote, 1'Angleterre,
fatiguee de tant d'impuissance, a cesse d'agir franchement de concert avec nous.
Elle a songe a prendre sa part du statu quo; c'est 1'Egypte qu'elle convoite
et que le sultan est appele aujourd'hui a conquerir pour elle." Ibid., p. 634.
Other deputies accused England of having designs against Egypt. See, in par-
ticular, the statements attributed to M. Denis and M. de Tocqueville, in ibid.,
pp. 643-649, 705-708.
K
Ibid., pp. 637-638. Carne also stated: "je dis qu'en face de 1'avenir qui
peut se produire. il est de Pinteret de la France d'agir immediatement, d'agir
seule, se declarer qu'elle protege 1'Egypte; qu'elle est la dans son role legitime,
dans son role naturel; qu'elle prend sous son abri une nationalite qui n'est
menagante pour personne, une nationalite qui importe a Pequilibre europeen;
qu'elle la protege contre le despotisme maritime, tout aussi bien que centre
le despotisme militaire." Ibid., p. 639.
M
See A. de- Lamartine, Souvenirs, impressions, pensees, et paysages pendant
un voyage en Orient, (1832-1833).
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land, France, Austria, and Russia.83 His statements, like those of
Valmy, did not receive the general approval of the deputies. In-
deed, they were even followed by "Sensation," "Murmures,"
"Violent* murmures" and "Vive agitation"
The most significant speech which was delivered on this
occasion in defense of the Levantine policies of the Ministry was,
undoubtedly, the one delivered by M. Guizot.84 According to him,
Mehemet Ali's success in Egypt was due largely to French in-
fluence and cooperation.
"
'We have protected it [Egypt] from
its origin...'" he explained. "'We beheld there a natural dis-
location of the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps a rising power des-
tined at some future day to become independent and to play its
part in the affairs of the world.'
"85 In calling attention to the policy
which he thought France should follow he declared: "'To main-
tain the Ottoman Empire for the maintenance of the equilibrium
of Europe, and when, by the force of events, by the natural
progress of facts, some dismemberment takes place, some province
detaches itself from that Empire in decadence, to favor the trans-
formation of that province into a new and independent sovereignty
which may take its place in the family of nations, and assist at a
future day in the new European equilibrium, destined to replace
that whose elements will exist no longer; such is the policy suit-
**Archives Pad., CXXVI, pp. 649-653. Note in particular the following extract
from Lamartine's speech: "La politique de la France doit etre tout autre; elle
doit etre francaise, elle doit etre europeenne. Son systeme, c'est le systeme
europeen; c'est Pequilibre maintenu par PAutriche et par elle dans 1'Orient
comme dans 1'Occident; non pas ce chancelant et faux equilibre qui repose
aujourd'hui sur cette section d'empire a Constantinople, equilibre que n'est au
fond que la domination russe en Orient, sous le nom de Mahmoud, sans com-
pensation, sans surete, sans avenir pour nous, mais un equilibre fonde sur une
part egale d'influence et de territoires attribute des aujourd'hui en Orient aux
quatre grandes puissances qui y ont droit et interet, la Russie, FAutriche, la
France, et 1'Angleterre. Voila le systeme qui s'appelle le systeme occidental."
Ibid., p. 652. See also, Odilon Barrot, op. cit., I, pp. 343-344.
84
Guizot, although not a member of the Cabinet, was on the best of terms
with those who did belong to it. See Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 314.
Ibid., p. 330. Archives Part., CXXVI, p. 713. Note: The phraseology of
the two sources is not exactly the same. The translation follows that of the
Mtmoirts.
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able to France; to this she has been naturally led, and in this,
according to my opinion, she will do well to persevere.'
"88 In
other words, the policy which M. Guizot advocated was that of
the status quo ante helium in 1839, and it was, he later claimed
in his Memoires, the policy which the Ministry and the great
majority of the members of the Chamber of Deputies favored.87
Meanwhile, as the Cabinets of England and France appeared
to be in accord upon Turco-Egyptian affairs, "the Court of Rus-
sia looked on in silence and remained in suspense, visibly dis-
turbed by the impending future and [doubtful] of the attitude it
would have to assume."88 The Emperor Nicholas had no desire
for war, and realizing that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi furnished
a constant source of danger to the peace of his Empire, longed
for the day to arrive when the term of that arrangement should
expire.
89
Nevertheless, he was resolved that he would not permit
other Powers to violate the rules denned therein, nor would he
consent to the merging of the said treaty into some more general
compact of the same nature by which all of the great European
nations would become obliged to defend the Porte.90 Hence when
it was suggested that a conference of representatives from the
latter should be assembled at Vienna to negotiate with the aim of
discovering a policy upon which all could agree, Nicholas and his
"*Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 330-331. Archives Parl, CXXVI, p. 713. Note the
following contemporary comment upon Guizot's speech: "M. Guizot a noble-
ment defendu ce qu'il appelle la politique seculaire de la France; il a felicite
le ministere du 12 Mai de s'etre rallie a cette politique; il a protest^ avec
energie centre ces chimeriques partages que Ton nous fait toucher au doigt, et
contre ces alliances non moins chimeriques qui nous feraient payer 1'abandon de
1'empire ottoman en un agrandissement territorial sur nos frontieres du nord.
La politique de M. Guizot, c'est le maintien de 1'independance de la Turquie,
c'est le statu quo." Journal des Debats, July 2, 1839.
8TThe debates were closed on the day following, July 3, 1839, and a
ballot was taken to determine whether the credit asked for by Duperre should
be granted. The measure was passed, 287 to 26. Archives Parl., CXXVII,
p. 4. For a more detailed discussion of the French debates see Guichen, op. cit.,
pp. 71-84.
88
Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 339.
''Goriainow, op. cit., p. 53.
*Lord Palmerston, as well as Marshal Soult, had favored concluding such
a compact. See Palmerston to Ponsonby, Sept. 13, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II,
p. 282.
425] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 99
ministers opposed the idea. They probably would have agreed to
it if they had been assured that at the proposed conference the
concluding of a settlement between the Sultan and the Viceroy
would be the only matter which would be considered.91 However,
it was believed at St. Petersburg that the maritime Powers would
insist upon the admission of their fleets into the Sea of Marmora
and that they would demand the signing of a joint-convention to
guarantee the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman
Empire.
92 "
'In any affair/
" Nesselrode wrote to Struve, the
Russian charge d'affaires at Vienna,
"
'it is necessary first of all to
know to whom one ought to speak. In the present situation we
ought to speak to the Pacha of Egypt. Therefore, the allied war
vessels ought to be sent to Alexandria. They [England and
France] wish to send them into the Sea of Marmora. They would
speak to the Ottoman Porte and I fear very much that they would
then speak to it for the last time, car elle n'est plus de force a se
tenir longtemps debout, si I'on en venait au point de tirer le canon
devant les tnurs du serail' "93 The Tsar's government preferred
that instead of taking a part in a conference at Vienna, Russia
and Austria should hold strictly to the stipulations of the con-
MSee Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I,
p. 168.
"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 53. Note also the following extract of a letter
written on July 24, 1839, by Count Nesselrode to Meyendorff, the Russian
representative at Berlin: "Vous verrez, mon cher Meyendorff, que 1'idee d'une
conference a Vienne, sur les affaires turco-egyptiennes, n'est pas de notre gout.
Nous devons cette conception qui, certes, n'est pas une conception bienveillante
pour la Russie, a notre bon prince Metternich qui, de gaiete de coeur, a em-
brouille une affaire devenue tres simple et placee sur le meilleur terrain, par
la raison que tous les cabinets sont tombes d'accord, aussi bien sur les mesures
a prendre pour preserver le trone du Sultan d'une chute inevitable dans cette
crise, que sur les bases de 1'arrangement a conclure entre la Porte et le pacha
d'Egypte. Ce qu'il y avait a faire a etc fait sans conference et peut-etre tout
juste parce qu'il n'y a pas eu de conference. Je ne sais, en verite, ce que Ton
pourrait faire de plus a Vienne, a moins qu'on ne veuille s'occuper des futurs
contingents et Her les mains a la Russie, ce qui ne saurait nous convenir d'aucune
maniere. Notre refus de participer a cette conference fera beaucoup de bruit
dans le monde et excitera de nouvelles mefiances en Angleterre. II m'a paru
utile que vous fussiez informe des motifs qui nous 1'ont dicte." Nesselrode, op.
cit., VII, pp. 285-287.
""Quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
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vention of Miinchengratz.
94 The thing to do, according to Count
Nesselrode, was to take steps by diplomacy to prevent Ibrahim
from marching upon Constantinople. If that was done it would
not be necessary again for the Emperor to send a Russian fleet
into the Bosphorus to protect the throne of the Sultan. The two
rivals in the Levant could under such circumstances even be per-
mitted to settle their difficulties without the aid of foreigners and,
consequently, the danger of a break resulting between the
European Powers because of conflicting views upon the Eastern
question would be removed.95
At the same time the Russian statesmen desired to avoid
antagonizing England and France. The hereditary Grand Duke,
who later became Emperor Alexander II, and Count OrlofT were
then at London. " 'Whenever I have met Count Orloflf during the
last five days,' Bourqueney wrote on May 29 to Soult, 'he has
denied with emotion the authenticity of the news of the resump-
tion of hostilities between the Turks and the Egyptians. He
founds his assertion on the last letters of the Emperor. ... He
has held the same language to nearly all the members of the
diplomatic body.'
"96 Some days later the French envoy con-
tinued: "The Russian Embassy listens, watches, but hesitates
both in action and language. There have been many Russians in
London during the last month . . . and [amongst them] some
enjoying the highest confidence of the Emperor. I venture with
timidity an opinion hastily formed; but it appears evident to me
that . . . they [the Russians] are not prepared for extreme
**Ibid., p. 53. Metternich in some of his despatches defended Russia's
policy in the Near East. See Metternich op. cit., VI, pp. 345-351. Barante to
Soult, July 13, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, p. 256. However, in the words of M.
Goriainow, "Quoique le prince Metternich ne manquat pas de protester de sa
fidelite a 1'alliance avec la Russie, il n'etait pas etranger a l'ide de restreindre la
trop grande influence que 1'empereur Nicolas avait acquise sur la Turquie
depuis le traite d'Unkiar-Iskelessi. Outre cela, il lui souriait de convoquer a
Vienne une conference de tous les representants des puissances europeenes, au
milieu desquels il occuperait la premiere place." Goriainow, op. cit., p. 53.
"See extract of a despatch, Nesselrode to Struve, July 4, 1839, quoted by
ibid., p. 54.
"Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 339-340.
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measures." 97 This despatch was written on June 17, 1839, and
just ten days later M. de Kisseleff, the Russian charge d'affaires
at the British Court, transmitted to Lord Palmerston a significant
note which Nesselrode had addressed on June 15, 1839, to Count
Pozzo di Borgo. In that note the Russian position relative to
Turco-Egyptian affairs was explained carefully. Undoubtedly the
Tsar's Chancellor hoped thereby to gain the confidence and co-
operation of the British ministers. "The last despatches from Con-
stantinople . . . and from Alexandria . . . apprize us that the Otto-
man and Egyptian troops had approached so near to each other
that a conflict between them appeared imminent," he declared.
"... There remains but one task to us to fulfil, that is, to con-
fine this struggle within the narrowest possible bounds, so that it
may not compromise the maintenance of the general repose of
Europe . . .
"The real danger for Europe at large is not in a combat carried
on in Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the
Pasha of Egypt . . . The danger would not begin to become
serious until in the event of the fate of arms, declaring against the
Sultan, the Pasha of Egypt should profit by this advantage to
place the safety of Constantinople and the existence of the Otto-
man Empire in peril. . . .
"
. . . it has appeared to us essential to come to an understand-
ing, frankly, with the Great Powers of Europe, who, equally with
us, have at heart to prevent the danger which we have just
pointed out. Among those Powers Great Britain is incontestably
the one that can exercise the greatest influence over the fate of
this question, and can cooperate in the most decisive manner in
realizing the pacific intentions of our august Master.
"With this conviction his majesty desires you, Sir, to come to
an explanation with the British Cabinet on this subject, without
the least reserve. Have the goodness to submit to that Cabinet,
that it is as much for its interest as for ours, to take care that
the struggle between the Porte and Egypt shall not assume so
97
Bourqueney to Soult, June 17, 1839, ibid., p. 493. Guichen quotes
despatches to prove that the Russians were working even before that early
date to destroy the Anglo-French entente. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 51 ff., 68
IO2 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [428
serious a character as may ever place the safety of the capital of
the Ottoman Empire in danger;
"That in order ... to set due bounds to the action of the Pasha
of Egypt ... it would be necessary to declare to him in the most
formal manner, 'That as long as he shall confine himself to the
defence of the territories which have been assigned to him by
the arrangement of Kutaya; as long as he shall not extend his
military operations beyond the district of Diarbekir and Orfa,
... so long will Great Britain in conjunction with the other
Powers of Europe, remain a passive spectator of the struggle
which is going on in Syria; but that from the instant . . . that he
shall extend the theatre of war beyond the defiles of the Taurus
in order to carry it into the centre of Asia Minor, from that
moment England would consider such act of hostility as if it were
directed against herself, and would thenceforward act as if she
were at open war with the Pasha of Egypt;' . . .
"If England came [sic] to an agreement with us to issue a
declaration couched in these terms, the Emperor will authorize his
Representative at Alexandria to hold precisely the same
language. . . .
"For the moment," Nesselrode pointed out in conclusion, "we
must confine ourselves to what is most pressing, that is to say, to
guard against the ill-advised policy of the Sultan dragging us into
a complication of a nature to bring on a chance of a European
conflict ... it is with this view that we have thought it indis-
pensable to come to a frank explanation with England, by taking
in London the step of which by the Emperor's orders, I have
pointed out to you the plan and the object. It will prove to the
British Ministry that, far from wishing to bring about a complica-
tion in the Levant, we are using all our care to prevent one; and
that, instead of greedily availing ourselves of the stipulations of
our Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, we are ourselves the first to
desire to prevent the recurrence of a crisis which would compel us
in spite of ourselves, again to take up a military attitude on the
shores of the Bosphorus."
98
Lord Palmerston must have been puzzled when he received the
despatch from which the above extract has been quoted. The
^Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 96-98. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 457-460.
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communication from Kisseleff, he wrote to Beauvale on the day
after it was handed to him, was "generally speaking" satisfactory
but the British could not agree with the Russian government when
it stated that the Powers might remain passive spectators if the
contest between the two rivals in the Levant was confined to Syria.
Austria, France, and England seemed agreed that the existing
relative positions of the Pasha and the Sultan were incompatible
with the safety of the Ottoman Empire and therefore some differ-
ent arrangement must be concluded. Some parts of Nesselrode's
despatch, according to the views expressed by the British Minister
of Foreign Affairs, might perhaps be construed to imply that Rus-
sia, instead of being of this opinion, was satisfied with the status
quo. Other parts of the despatch, though, he admitted, indicated
that Russia was "not disinclined" to take into consideration the
possibility of making some more permanent settlement."
While the advance made by Count Nesselrode to the British
government must have had some influence upon the attitude of
Lord Palmerston, it is certain that the latter did not abandon
immediately all of his apprehensions in regard to the intentions
of Russia. "I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the
Porte," he wrote to Lord Ponsonby on July 5, 1839, "that if
the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept
military or naval aid from any European Power, in the contest
with Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government trusts that the
Porte will at the same time address itself to Great Britain to the
same effect." 100 Some days later, after having learned that the
Sultan's health was in a critical condition, Palmerston wrote again
to Ponsonby advising that if Mahmoud died and if consequently the
presence of the British squadron at Constantinople should appear
useful, he should in concert with the French Ambassador Roussin
offer its assistance to the Turkish government.
101
Furthermore,
the British Minister of Foreign Affairs issued instructions to
Admiral Stopford, dated July 18, 1839, directing that if a Russian
"Palmerston to Beauvale, June 28, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
117-119. Palmerston was less critical in a despatch in which he directed Clanri-
carde to reply to the Russian proposals. See, Palmerston to Clanricarde, July
9, ibid., pp. 156-158.
100
Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 5, 1839, ibid., pp. 124-125.
101
Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 13, 1839, ibid., p. 166. See also, Palmerston
to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, July 13, 1839, ibid., pp. 166-167.
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fleet entered the Bosphorus he should apply for the admission of
his vessels through the Dardanelles.
102
While the representatives of the great Powers were negotiating
and corresponding thus, events destined to alter the situation
materially were occurring in the Near East. The Viceroy, in June,
1839, it will be remembered, had sent instructions to Ibrahim to
avoid hostilities. The measure which he then adopted was too
tardy to accomplish its object. On June 21, several days before
the arrival at the Egyptian camp of M. Caille, who carried the
pacific instructions which Mehemet Ali had prepared, a decisive
battle was fought between the forces of Ibrahim and those of
Hafiz Pasha near the village of Nezib. The Ottoman army was
routed, and when Caille arrived on the scene it was only with
difficulty that he was able to persuade the Egyptian commander
to refrain from following up his victory by a vigorous offensive.103
Fate was merciful on this occasion to the aged Mahmoud, for
on June 30, 1839, before the news of the engagement at Nezib
had reached Constantinople, he expired. After his death, Abd-ul-
Mejid, his sixteen year old son, was proclaimed Sultan and a
new group of ministers, headed by Reouf and Kosrew Pashas, took
charge of the government. Nouri Eifendi, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, announced on July 3, 1839, that his young sovereign,
willing to offer Mehemet Ali a full pardon for the past, was ready
to concede to him Egypt in hereditary possession if he would
agree to evacuate Syria, Adana, the Holy Cities, and the Island of
Crete.104 In addition, Kosrew Pasha, the Grand Vizier, sent orders
to Hafiz Pasha to suspend hostilities, and he directed Achmet
Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman fleet, to retain his vessels
within the Dardanelles.105 Achmet, however, dissatisfied with the
new government, put to sea at once. Off the Island of Tenedos,
^Instructions to Stopford, July 18, 1839; Palmerston to Ponsonby, July
18, 1839, ibid., pp. 167-168.
103
Mouriez, op. cit., IV, pp. 38-4.1. Annual Register, 1839, p. [411]. For a
contemporary account of the battle of Nezib see von Moltke, op. cit., pp. 378, ff.
104
Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 3, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 183.
See also Granville to Palmerston, July 22, 1839, ibid., p. 186. On July 5, 1839,
Kosrew Pasha sent such an offer to Mehemet Ali. See Grand Vizier to Mehemet
Ali, July 5, 1839, ibid., p. 227.
105
Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 3, 1839, ibid., p. 183. Annual Register,
1839, p. [43-
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July 5, 1839, he feU m with the French fleet commanded by
Admiral Lalande. Osman Bey, the second in command of the
Turkish squadron, who had formed an acquaintance with Lalande
while he was in Tunis, obtained an interview with him on this oc-
casion and declared at that meeting that Mahmoud had not died
a natural death but had been murdered by Kosrew and Halil
Pashas.106 The former, who had assumed the leadership of the
government, he claimed was at the head of a Russian party which
intended to surrender the country into the hands of the Musco-
vites. In order to prevent this from happening, his superior officer,
Achmet, had resolved to sail to Crete in order that he might come
to terms with Mehemet Ali. After that had been accomplished the
fleet would return and in cooperation with the army of the
Taurus under command of Hafiz Pasha would overthrow the pro-
Russian Kosrew and his associates. Lalande, refusing to cooperate
with Achmet Pasha and Osman Bey in their projects, advised that
they should proceed to Rhodes rather than to Crete. Nevertheless,
he took no steps to prevent them from executing their
intentions.107 Instead of stopping at either. Rhodes or Crete they
sailed direct to Alexandria where they delivered up their squadron
unconditionally into the hands of the Pasha.
108
News about these alarming developments in the Near East
began to arrive at Paris about the middle of July. Soult, who
must have been aroused greatly by the gravity of the situation,
10
*Halil Pasha was the Seraskier in the new government. See Annual
Register, 1839, p. [411].
197
Affaires etrangeres. Turquie 278, fol. 44, Lalande to Roussin, July 5, 1839,
quoted by A. Stern, in Revue Historique, CVII, pp. 325-326. Ponsonby to
Palmerston, July 8, 1839, Roussin to Ponsonby, July 7, 1839, Levant Corres-
pondence, I, p. 188. Paton, op. cit., II, pp. 138-141. See also an article written
by the Prince de Joinville, who was with Lalande during the interview with
Osman Bey, published in Revue des deux Mondes, Aug. I, 1852, LXXXVII, pp.
425-482.
108The indifference with which Lalande acted on this occasion did not fail
to attract attention. Marshal Soult, who had been particularly anxious that the
status quo should be maintained, despatched a sharp reprimand to him and in
discussing the surrender of the Turkish fleet with Lord Granville, admitted that
the Admiral's conduct appeared inexplicable. See Affaires etrangeres. Turquie
278, fol. 182, Instructions to Lalande, July 27, 1839, quoted by Stern in Revue
Historique, CVII, pp. 327-328. F. O. France, 584, Granville to Palmerston, July
29, 1839, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 244.
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became active immediately. On July 17, 1839, having learned
already that the Sultan was dead, he wrote to Bourqueney:
"Although it is at present extremely difficult to anticipate the
nature of the influence which this change of reign may exercise
upon the destinies of the Orient, it is evident that a crisis has
arisen which calls for the most serious and loyal concurrence of
all the Cabinets to secure the continuance of peace. It seems to
me that the moment -has arrived to act upon the idea already
suggested by M. de Metternich, of guaranteeing, by means of an
interchange of diplomatic declarations, the maintenance of the
integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and in order
to prevent any delay, I have resolved to assume the initiative
myself in the necessary steps to be taken for that object. . . .
Lord Palmerston will no doubt reply to the communication which
you will make to him in terms sufficiently precise to attain the end
we have in view."109 Nine days later, after he had received addi-
tional information from the Levant, Soult continued: "I think
. . . that it will be desirable to continue the course adopted up to
this time, . . . which consists in subordinating as much as pos-
sible to an intimate and sustained concert between the Cabinets,
the action which some amongst them are prepared to exercise
in the Eastern question. As regards 'England and France, includ-
ing also Austria, although she does not as openly proclaim her
views, the principal, the veritable object of this concert, is to
restrain Russia and to accustom her to treat in common on
Oriental affairs. It is enough to say that under existing conjunc-
tions there is more reason than ever for our strict unanimity,
. . .
"110 On the same day Lord Granville reported in a despatch
written to Palmerston that the French government was of the
opinion that neither the disastrous overthrow of the Turkish army,
nor the traitorous conduct of the Capitan Pasha, nor the pros-
trate attitude of the Divan ought to affect the course which the
10
"Soult to Bourqueney, July 17, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 513-514.
Palmerston replied favorably to Souk's proposal. See Palmerston to Bourqueney,
July 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 175. Soult was always anxious to
make it appear that the most important question at issue was that of protecting
Turkey against Russia. The question of the terms which should be enforced
upon the two rivals in the Levant, he wished to have it believed, was a matter
of only secondary importance. See Soult to Bourqueney, Aug. 22, 1839, Guizot,
op. cit., IV, p. 545.
"Soult to Bourqueney, July 26, 1839, ibid., p. 519.
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great Powers of Europe should pursue. A declaration to that
effect, Soult believed, should be made to Mehemet AH. He would
write to Vienna to let Metternich know the French opinion and
he would urge him to adopt a similar one.111
In the meantime some progress in the direction of securing an
understanding between the eastern Powers and Great Britain
relative to a settlement of Turco-Egyptian affairs was being made
by means of informal discussions which were promoted at Vienna
by the Austrian Chancellor. ."Upon all the details," Lord Beauvale
wrote to Palmerston, July n, 1839, "Prince Metternich agrees to
your Lordship's ideas without reserve, and is sure of their adop-
tion by Russia: so that, according to him, England, Austria and
Russia are placed exactly upon the same line, and there only
remains to induce France to relinquish her deviations from it."112
"The outline of the terms is already sketched," he stated in
another despatch written the same day, "and may be considered
as adopted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. . . . Prince
Metternich requests the British government to persuade France."
The only points which remained to be agreed on by the repre-
sentatives of the four Powers, according to the British Ambas-
sador, were those relative to the possession of the east coast of
the Red Sea, the amount of tribute to be levied upon Egypt by
the Sultan, the "obligation of [Mehemet Ali to accept Ottoman]
treaties," and the extent of disarmament to be required of the
Viceroy. He admitted that these points would yet occasion many
difficulties, but he maintained: "It is clear that Vienna in its
relations with that place [Constantinople] is nearly a month
ahead of London and Petersburg."113
The activities at the Austrian capital were intensified when it
became known there that the Sultan was dead and that the new
Ottoman government proposed to offer its pardon to Mehemet
Ali. Beauvale reported to Palmerston on July 19, 1839, that
events had totally changed the state of things, and it might be felt
lu
Granville to Palmerston, July 26, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 195.
lu
Beauvale to Palmerston, July II, 1839, ibid., p. 180.
U8Beauvale to Palmerston, July II, 1839. Ibid., pp. 178-179. According to
Beauvale, Metternich was applied to by the Porte for advice and this, with the
proximity of Vienna to Constantinople, threw the negotiation very much into
his hands. "... nor," Beauvale commented, "considering the identity of his
objects with our own, can it be better placed." See ibid.
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by Her Majesty's government to require an alteration in their
determinations. It was probable, he thought, that the Sultan and
the Pasha would come to an agreement, for the latter would prefer
closing at once rather than waiting for the interposition of the five
Powers.114 Metternich's views were of a similar character.115
Alarmed lest a direct settlement should actually be concluded
between the two rivals in the Orient, he immediately despatched,
probably with the consent of the Vienna representatives of the
Powers,
116 instructions to Constantinople for the Internuncio and
his colleagues to adopt measures to dissuade, if possible, the Sultan
from prostrating himself before Mehemet Ali, and to engage him
to rely upon the European Powers for protection.
117 These
instructions sent from Vienna on July 16, arrived in the Ottoman
capital on the 27th, and before the day of their arrival was spent
the European representatives Sturmer, Ponsonby, Roussin, Bou-
tenieff, and Koenigsmarck had signed the famous collective note of
July 27, i839,
118 framed in the following terms: "The undersigned
U4Beauvale to Palmerston, July 19, 1839, ibid., p. 192.
""See an extract of a despatch, Metternich to Roller, Austrian representa-
tive in Berlin, July 26, 1839, Berlin Archives, vol. 3, quoted by Hasenclever,
op. cit., p. 54 [footnote 115].
"'See an extract of a despatch, Sturmer to Metternich, July 29, 1839,
Vienna Archives, Turkey 50, quoted by ibid., p. 55 [footnote 118]. Metternich's
fear was well founded. Note the following extract of a despatch, Ponsonby to
Palmerston, July 29, 1839: "It [the collective note] was . . . most fortunately
well-timed, for the Ottoman Ministers had actually resolved upon concessions to
the Egyptian Pasha, which would have been at this moment on their way to
Alexandria, and which would have mischievously complicated the affairs of this
country." Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 292-293. Annual Register, 1840,
p. 467.
"'Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 50-52. Granville to Palmerston, July 22, 1839,
Levant Correspondence, I, p. 186. See also the diary of the Princess Metternich,
[Fiirstin Melanie] under date of Aug. 2, 1839, Metternich, op. cit., VI,
pp. 309-310.
^Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 53. Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839,
Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 292-293. The issuance of the collective note, as
Hasenclever points out, was provoked by Metternich alone, and it was perhaps
the only outward result of the negotiations for the Vienna conference plan.
Metternich's chief interest was not in saving Turkey but in securing the unity
of the Powers and their domination of the situation in the Near East. Hasen-
clever credits Maltzan with claiming that Metternich hoped to crown his
career's accomplishments with the settlement of the Near Eastern question. See
Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 47, 50-55.
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have received, this morning, from their respective Governments
instructions, in virtue whereof they have the honor to inform the
Sublime Porte, that agreement among the Five Great Powers on
the Question of the East is secured, and to invite it to suspend any
definitive resolution without their concurrence, waiting for the
effect of the interest which these Powers feel for it."119
Regardless of the profession which was made in the text of the
collective note, it is evident that on that occasion the Russian
government was still anxious to avoid entering into a conference
for the settlement of the Near Eastern question.
120 On the same
day that Sturmer and the other European representatives at Con-
stantinople signed the note quoted above, after he had learned
that the Porte had offered to make peace with the Viceroy, the
Russian Chancellor wrote to M. de Kisseleff: "These determina-
tions [of the Porte to make peace], dictated by a genuine spirit
of conciliation and wisdom, simplify greatly the question, the
solution of which the Allied Cabinets have at heart. The Porte,
induced by a just appreciation of its true interests, has anticipated
the propositions which the Five Powers were on the point of making
to it. ... It has resolved to offer to Mehemet AH the inheritance
of Egypt in return for the cession of Syria. . . .
"The basis of negotiation has thus been laid down by the
Porte itself. It has of its own accord opened the deliberation, and
has virtually fixed its locality at Constantinople, the only place
where it was fitting that interests, having direct reference to the
future fate of the Ottoman Empire, should be discussed."
121 It is
quite apparent that the cause for the persistent refusal on the part
of Russia to join in a conference with the other Powers was the
Cabinet of St. Petersburg's time-worn fear that at such a confer-
*State Papers, XXVIII, pp. 408-409. Levant Correspondence, I, p. 293.
Annual Register, 1840, p. 468. Martens, N. S., Ill, p. 875.
1JOSee an extract of a despatch, Nesselrode to Strove, July 18/30, 1839,
quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 55-58. Nesselrode complained to the foreign
Ambassadors at St. Petersburg but evidently was not greatly dissatisfied when
he learned that the collective note had been signed. The note, it can be seen
readily, did not in any way bind Russia to enter into a formal conference
between the Powers. See Barante to Soult, Aug. 10, 1839, Barante, op. cit.,
p. 296. Hasenclever, op. cit,, p. 55.
'"Nesselrode to Kisseleff, July 15/27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
257-259- Annual Register, 1840, pp. 463-466.
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ence England and France especially the latter would insist on
the conclusion of a convention to guarantee the integrity and the
independence of the Ottoman Empire.
122 On July 25, 1839, Baron
Meyendorff, the Russian representative at Berlin, declared to Sir
George Hamilton, the British charge d'affaires, that the Musco-
vite Cabinet would be willing to sign at once a declaration of the
independence of the Turkish Empire and that it would promise,
along with the rest of the European Cabinets, not to seek to
profit by the existing state of things, but guaranteeing the in-
tegrity of the Empire was something entirely different.123
The persistent hesitation of Russia to unite in a conference with
the other Powers for the settlement of the affairs of the East
pleased the French most highly. "M. de Metternich has forwarded
an answer in conformity with our declaration in favor of the inde-
pendence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," Marshal Soult
wrote on August i, 1839. "According to what M. de Sainte-
Aulaire [the French Ambassador at Vienna] writes to me, the
Chancellor of Austria, who recently appeared to be quite satisfied
with the intentions manifested by Russia, is now extremely uneasy
on that point. It appears that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, far
from continuing the assurances, otherwise sufficiently vague,
which it had at first proffered of its desire to act in concert with
the other Powers,
124 now recedes, under frivolous pretexts, from all
that might substantiate or reduce them to formal acts. I am sur-
prised at the astonishment which M. de Metternich evinces at
this proceeding. I never imagined that, in the actual question,
Russia would be brought to associate herself frankly with the
other Cabinets whose policy is so opposed to hers; ... It is
^See an extract from Nesselrode's report to Nicholas, Aug. 3/15, 1839,
quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 58-60.
123Hamilton to Palmerston, July 31, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I,
pp. 236-237.
"'Note the following comment made by M. de Barante at a later date: "II
[the Tsar] en fut mecontent et presque irrite. Toute fois apres quelque delai,
apres plus d'une conversation avec 1'ambassadeur d'Autriche, il lui dit qu'un
plenipotentiaires russe se rendrait a la conference de Vienne. Quelques heures
apres cette determination, qui n'etait encore ni officielle ni ecrite, la mort du
Sultan fut soudainement annoncee." quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 46,
[footnote 90]. See also Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 261, 265. Russell to Palmer-
ston, July 6, 1839; Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1839, Levant Correspond-
ence, I, pp. 162, 168.
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necessary . . . that the Powers, particularly France and England,
should hold an absolutely uniform language towards the Cabinet
of St. Petersburg and to address it only by measures identical in
character."125 On another occasion he professed that he personally
was disposed to think that the ground on which the Powers should
propose to negotiate with Mehemet Ali should be the latter's ob-
taining the hereditary possession of Egypt and his giving up the
other pashalics which he was then holding; "but," he continued,
"... some latitude must be given to our Representatives at
Vienna, to accede to terms more favourable to Mehemet AH."126
Although the Marshal did follow a cautious policy, the apparent
accord between England and France was destined to be short-
lived. When it became known at London that the Turkish fleet
had been treacherously surrendered to the Pasha, Palmerston was
aroused to action, and accordingly on August 3, and 5 and 7, he
forwarded to Bourqueney and to Granville, respectively, for the
approval of the French government sets of proposed instructions
of a drastic character for the two Admirals in the Mediter-
ranean.127 Palmerston's plan was for the fleets of Stopford and
Lalande to sail direct to Alexandria and demand the release of the
Turkish vessels. If the Viceroy should refuse to do promptly as he
was ordered, the allied squadron should then secure their ends by
resorting to force. Such measures, however, were entirely too
drastic to secure the endorsement of Marshal Soult. "The
hostilities in the East are evidently terminated," he reflected
in a despatch written on August 6, 1839. "Neither by land
nor by sea have we any announcement of an intention to continue,
or rather to resume them. ... In this state of things, the
defection of the Ottoman fleet is an unfortunate and much to
be regetted event, for which we must endeavor to provide a
remedy; but it scarcely constitutes one of those cases of
imminent danger which justifies such extreme measures as are
"5
Soult to Bourqueney, Aug. I, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 527-528.
^Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 2, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 235.
m
See Palmerston's proposed instructions to the two Admirals, Aug. 3, 1839;
Supplementary instructions to the Admirals, Aug. 3, 1839; Palmerston to Lords
Commissioners of Admiralty, Aug. 5, 1839; Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 5,
1839, ibid., pp. 233, 234, 238-239, 240. See also, Palmerston to Lords Commis-
sioners of Admiralty, Aug. 7, 1839; Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 7, 1839, ibid.,
pp. 255-256.
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now proposed to us ... an act of hostility against Mehemet AH
would not facilitate the plan proposed by England and France in
concert. In destroying the Egyptian fleet we would not only add
no strength to the Porte, but also we would not induce the Viceroy
to abate his pretensions in the slightest degree ... I do not
hesitate to say that in ruining the Pasha of Egypt we shall bring
about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Our policy today,
as from the commencement of the crisis, ought to be to take care
above all other considerations that Constantinople receive no for-
eign protection without our common consent."
128
Only a few days before the above quoted despatch was written,
Soult received information from Cochelet which, it appears, in-
fluenced him to be more outspoken than he had been formerly in
his favoritism for Mehemet Ali.129 As Palmerston, influenced by
news of the events which were taking place in the Levant, was
at the same time becoming more determined in his hostility
towards the Viceroy, it soon became apparent that England and
France would very probably be unable to reach an agreement
upon all that appertained to the question of the Near East. On
August 13, 1839, Soult directed the French Minister of Marine,
Duperre, to instruct Admiral Lalande that if the Captain Pasha's
fleet was still outside of the harbor of Alexandria he should com-
municate with the captains of the vessels and try to induce them
to return to Constantinople. No force should be used, though, un-
less it was necessary for self-defense. In case the Ottoman
squadron had already entered Egyptian waters, and in case
Mehemet Ali refused to give it up, the French Admiral should be
satisfied with leaving a few warships to observe it and return
with the remainder of his armament to his station off the coast
of Asia Minor. Furthermore, when he first went to Egypt he
to Bourqueney, Aug. 6, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 532-535.mCochelet had reported that the Viceroy, conscious of the power he
possessed, could not be induced to recede in any essential point from the condi-
tions of a reconciliation which he had put forward in communication with the
Consuls-General at Alexandria on July 14 and 15, 1839. At that time, the Pasha
declared he would not be satisfied unless he received the hereditary possession
of all the provinces and all the Sandjaks which he held. According to Cochelet
he had more than 60 war vessels and an army of 200,000 men with which to
enforce his demands. See, Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 5, 1839, Levant Cor-
respondence, I, pp. 256-257. See also, Brief Summary of two Interviews between
Pasha of Egypt and Consuls-General, July 14 and 15, 1839; Mehemet Ali to
Grand Vizier, July 16, 1839, ibid., pp. 244-246, 296.
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should leave behind an adequate portion of his fleet to be ready to
act if the Russians should appear at Constantinople or if an allied
squadron should be summoned by the Porte to sail into the Sea
of Marmora. "It must not be forgotten," Soult declared in con-
clusion, "that this [the latter], after all, is the principal question,
and that consequently, watchfulness on this point should be in-
cessant."130
The instructions which Palmerston at length prepared for Stop-
ford were of an entirely different character. "I am to acquaint
your Lordships," he wrote on August 24 to the Lords Commis-
sioners of the Admiralty, "that it is Her Majesty's pleasure that
Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should not be precluded from execut-
ing any instructions given to him by Lord Beauvale, and arising
out of the negotiations at Vienna, provided the measures to be
taken shall be such as Sir Robert Stopford may think himself
to have adequate means to execute, even though the French
Admiral should not receive corresponding instructions from his
own Government or from the French Ambassador at Vienna."131
The divergence between the respective positions taken by Eng-
land and France became most obvious after it was known in the
west that the European representatives at Constantinople had
issued a "collective note" to the Porte enjoining it "to suspend
any definitive resolution" without the concurrence of the Powers,
for the immediate danger of Russian intervention in Turkey,
which had tended to hold the two western Cabinets together, was
thereby removed.
132 On August 20, 1839, the day after Palmer-
130Soult to Duperre, Aug. 13, 1839, ibid., pp. 288-289.
131
Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Aug. 24, 1839,
ibid., p. 314.
""Lord Ponsonby was elated after the note of July 27, 1839, had been
signed. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839, ibid., pp. 292-293. Annual
Register, 1840, pp. 467-468. Palmerston was also well pleased. See Palmerston to
Ponsonby, Aug. 21, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 311. Note also the
following extract of a despatch, Bourqueney to Soult, Aug. 18, 1839, which was
written after Palmerston had learned from Austrian sources about the signing
of the note of July 27, 1839: "Votre Excellence jugera, par ce qui precede,
du changement qui s'est opere depuis trente-huit heures dans 1'esprit des
membres du cabinet anglais.
"On n'admettait pas la possibilite du concours de la Russie: aujourd'hui,
on 1'espere.
"On esperait le concours de 1'Autriche jusqu'au bout: on n'en doute plus."
Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 542-543.
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ston had received from Lord Ponsonby a copy of the collective
note, he wrote to Henry Bulwer, the British charge d'affaires at
Paris in the absence of Lord Granville, stating that the five Powers
were the friends and the allies of the Sultan. They, in fact, had
declared spontaneously in the note of July 27, 1839, their inten-
tion to uphold the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman
Empire. The British government felt, therefore, that they were
bound to compel Mehemet Ali to return the Ottoman fleet. More-
over, because of the fact that the government of Great Britain be-
lieved that all future steps ought to be taken, if possible, col-
lectively by the five and that a decision concerning such steps
ought to emanate from Vienna, which was the central point of
negotiations, it was about to send instructions to Beauvale to take
up with the representatives of the Powers at the Court of the
Emperor Ferdinand the question of insisting on the restoration of
the fleet as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation what-
ever upon any other point. The consular agents at Alexandria,
according to Palmerston's view, should be instructed by the dip-
lomats at Vienna to demand of Mehemet Ali the restoration of the
Turkish vessels, and if he should refuse to obey, then they [the
consular agents] should all withdraw. If that did not bring the
Pasha to terms, Syria and Egypt should be blockaded, Egyptian
merchant ships should be seized on the high seas and in Syrian
ports, Candia should be occupied and restored to the direct
authority of the Sultan, and finally, Mehemet Ali should be
notified that the allied fleet would defend the Turkish Empire
"against any attack on his part, as effectually as if it were a
Turkish fleet."133 "Her Majesty's government," Palmerston de-
clared "will give instructions to Sir Robert Stopford to take any,
or all, of these steps, if he shall be directed so to do by Her
Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna . . . and you are instructed to
invite the French Government to send similar instructions and
authority to their Ambassador at Vienna, and to their Admiral in
the Mediterranean."133
The British Minister of Foreign Affairs must have realized,
however, that there was not much chance that the French Min-
isters would send such instructions to their representatives, for
"'Palmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 20, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 309-
310. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 472-475.
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in his despatch to Bulwer, which, by the way, the latter was
directed to communicate to Soult, he warned that Stopford
might act "either with, or without the co-operation of any one of
the other squadrons," and, on August 25, 1839, Just fiye days after
he had written thus to Bulwer, he wrote as follows to Beauvale:
"Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to proceed ... in
concert with the other Four Powers and are ready to make some
sacrifice of opinion in order to arrive at unanimous action. But if
your Excellency should find it impossible to obtain an unanimous
assent of your colleagues to any course of proceeding on this mat-
ter which would be consistent with the principles upon which the
British government is acting, or which could be likely to attain
the objects in view, your Excellency is authorized to act in concert
with a less number than the Four, if you shall find that any
reasonable and effectual course of proceeding is assented to by
such a proportion of the Five as may give to that course adequate
moral weight and sufficient physical means."
134
It soon became apparent that what Palmerston must have at
least suspicioned in regard to the intentions of the French govern-
ment was based on excellent grounds. Bulwer reported on August
26, 1839, that from a conversation he had had with Soult that
same morning he was induced to apprehend that the government
of France was resolved to throw obstacles in the way of the se-
lection of Vienna as the place for settling and agreeing upon the
affairs of the East. The cause for that resolution, Bulwer believed,
was to be sought in the difference which really existed between
the views of the French government and those entertained by the
other governments relative to the manner in which they should
deal with Mehemet Ali. "I fear," he added, "that no decided
measures of a coercive character will be employed by France for
"'Palmerston to Beauvale, Aug. 25, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 315-
317. In another despatch written on the same date to Beauvale, Palmerston
pointed out that up to that time nothing had happened to alter the opinion of
the British government as to the nature of the final settlement which it would
be desirable for the five Powers to effect between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali,
nor to change its belief that if the five should agree to press any given arrange-
ment upon the Viceroy, their union would carry sufficient moral weight to ob-
tain from him his acquiescence in their decision. Ibid., pp. 317-319. See also
Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 296.
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limiting the ambition of the Viceroy, or for restoring the [Turkish]
fleet to the Sultan."135
Meanwhile the Court of St. Petersburg, which from an early
date, it will be remembered, had attempted to satisfy the other
European Courts, and in particular the Court of St. James, that
Russia was not desirous of effecting an armed intervention in
Turkey under the provisions of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi,
realized that the seeming accord between England and France in
regard to Eastern affairs was likely to disappear. Nesselrode had
repeated more than once, Lord Clanricarde, the British Ambas-
sador at the Tsar's capital, wrote to Palmerston, July 18, 1839,
that the Russian government was ready to accede to any proposal
which was favorable to the Sultan. In addition, he had expressed
great doubts whether the Powers could prevail upon Mehemet
Ali to resign Syria immediately and he asked the British Ambas-
sador if he believed France would press, "or even propose" to the
Viceroy that he should make such a sacrifice.136 Again, on July
27, 1839, Clanricarde reported that Nesselrode had discussed with
him the
"probability" that France would desire better terms
than those which were favored by the other Powers for Mehemet
Ali and whether she would not insist especially that the Egyptian
should retain the Pashalic of Acre. Of still more significance was
the statement within this despatch which revealed that Nesselrode
had told the representative of Great Britain that the precise terms
of the final settlement to be imposed upon the hostile parties in
the Levant "would virtually depend upon Her Majesty's Govern-
ment."137
While Russia's chief Minister was making advances thus to the
135Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 26, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 321.
13
*Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 18, 1839, ibid., p. 201. Metternich, also,
became suspicious at an early date in regard to the intentions of France. See
Metternich to Apponyi, July 14, 1839, Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 351.
^Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 237.
Nesselrode perceived very early that France was placing more emphasis upon the
conclusion of a convention to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire than
England was. Aug. 3, 1839, Barante quoted Nesselrode as follows:
"
'Je doute
qu'il convienne a PAngleterre,' me repondit M. de Nesselrode, 'de voir 1'etat
de I'Orient sous la garantie commune de 1'Europe.'
" Barante to Soult,
Aug. 3, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, p. 276. See also, Barante to Soult, July 20,
1839, ibid., pp. 265-266.
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British through their Ambassador at the Muscovite capital he was,
on the other hand, becoming less friendly with the French, object-
ing in particular against the attitude which Louis Philippe's gov-
ernment had assumed on the question of sending its fleet through
the Dardanelles.
"If, unfortunately, the hope which the Emperor
has reason to found upon the moderation of the French Govern-
ment," he wrote to Count Medem, the Tsar's representative at
Paris, "should not be realized; if the appearance of a foreign fleet
in the Sea of Marmora should come to aggravate the state of
affairs at Constantinople, the course which Russia would have to
pursue would not be doubtful. In the presence of a foreign fleet
the Emperor's Minister [at Constantinople] would formally pro-
test against the flagrant violation of the principle of the closing
of the Dardanelles; a principle which the Porte has at all times
considered as a fundamental rule of its policy, and which it has
engaged itself to us invariably to maintain; he would declare that
he regarded this violation as contrary to the independence of the
Porte; he would immediately suspend his functions, and quit Con-
stantinople. Then it would only remain for the Emperor to take
such measures as he might consider necessary to re-establish the
Porte in its entire independence, and to enable it to fulfil its en-
gagements towards us, free from all foreign constraint."
1
?
8
As time advanced, the anxiety of Russia to come to an under-
standing with Great Britain increased. Clanricarde stated in a
despatch written to Palmerston August 10, 1839, that Nesselrode
had repeated to him the same assurances which he had formerly
made that the Russian government was most desirous of avoiding
any military demonstration, or any necessity for carrying into
execution the main clause of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.139
August 22, 1839, less than two weeks later, the British Am-
bassador continued: "Count Nesselrode told me yesterday, that
he had that morning received a courier from London; that the
English Government took the same view of the affairs of Turkey
"'Nesselrode to Medem, July 25/Aug. 6, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I,
pp. 304-306. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 469-472. See also, Metternich, op. cit.,
VI, p. 353, [footnote]. Metternich to Apponyi, Aug. 7, 1839, ibid., pp. 352-354.
Barante to Soult, July 13, Aug. 3, 1839, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., pp. 105-107.
139
Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 10, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
299-300.
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as that of Russia; that the French Government, in reply to a
proposition made by your Lordship, had refused to be a party to
coerce Mehemet Ali, who had become more and more insolent,
and positive in his demands upon the Sultan."140 Finally, on August
27, 1839, the Russian Chancellor informed Clanricarde that the
Emperor, having reason to believe that the British government
was better disposed toward Russia and that it entertained a more
favorable and just opinion of his views and policy than theretofore,
was desirous of improving that disposition to the utmost and of
strengthening the good understanding which "so happily existed"
between the two Powers. Hence, His Majesty had resolved on
sending Baron de Brunnow, one of his most favored diplomats,
upon a special mission to London.141 The Emperor Nicholas and
his ministers perceived, undoubtedly, that the most strategic posi-
tion in the whole affair was that occupied by Lord Palmerston. If
the latter agreed to unite with the Russians upon a definite pro-
gram, it was practically certain that Austria and Prussia would do
likewise142 and France would be forced either to conform with
"Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 22, 1839, ibid., p. 375.
141
Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 27, 1839, ibid., p. 375. On the same
date, according to Clanricarde, Nesselrode told him that the French government
would "on no account" join in coercing the Pasha of Egypt by force of arms.
It deemed it better that the Sultan should accede to Mehemet Ali's demands
than that armed interference should be effected to prevent the dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire. In answer, Clanricarde claimed, he said that he was
sure that, even if the British government were to be alone in such a course,
it would support the just rights and interests of the Sultan. Nesselrode replied
"in a manner that showed it was a decision which had been maturely formed.
'You may be sure that we shall not desert you in such a case.'
"
See Clanricarde
to Palmerston, Aug. 28, 1839, ibid., p. 376. In the same despatch Clanricarde
remarked: "On the whole, I found Count Nesselrode yesterday more at his
ease upon the state of the Turco-Egyptian Question, than he had been, because,
although it appeared more difficult than ever to settle without some act or
demonstration of armed intervention, there appeared a chance of Russia and
England acting in concert." Note also the following statement which Barante
reported Nesselrode had made to him:
"
'Nous profitons du moment ou lord
Palmerston est aimable pour nous!'" Barante to Soult, Aug. 28, 1839, Barante,
op. cit., VI, p. 311. See also, Schiemann, op. cit., Ill, p. 383 [footnote].
142
Austria and Prussia, it should be remembered, were inclined to favor the
position taken by Palmerston. See Russell to Palmerston, June 26, 1839;
Beauvale to Palmerston, July n, 19, Aug. I, 2, 1839; Hamilton to Palmerston,
July 24, Aug. 14, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 122, 178-181, 192-193,
269-271, 272, 202-203, 302.
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the wishes of the other Powers or permit herself to be isolated.
However, if the British Minister of Foreign Affairs remained
hostile to Russia, he would beyond question agree to some sort of
union with the French. Under such circumstances Russia could
not even count upon the active support of her eastern neighbors
Austria and Prussia. Hence her position would be one in which
there would be real and immediate peril.
Thus at the close of the month of August, 1839, the diplomatic
stage for the solution of the Turco-Egyptian question was almost
set. The actors had been chosen and each was assuming his
proper role. France, in her desire to alienate Russia from the
Concert of Europe and to wind up the whole affair by a joint con-
vention guaranteeing the integrity and the independence of the
Ottoman Empire, was well on the road to failure, and Russia, anx-
ious to avoid what France desired, was about to succeed. The
destruction of the Turkish army and the surrender of the Capitan
Pasha's fleet had caused the European Powers, excepting France
apparently, to look with alarm upon the threatening position of
Mehemet Ali, while on the other hand the engagement which M.
Boutenieff had taken on July 27, 1839, binding his Court to act in
cooperation with the other great Courts of Europe, had removed
the fears which those Courts entertained lest Russia should at-
tempt an independent intervention in Turkey under the pro-
visions of the treaty of 1833. In other words, the triumph of the
cause of those who wished to see the crisis in the Near East settled
on the basis of the "Question of Alexandria" over that of those
who wished to see it settled on the basis of the "Question of
Constantinople" was imminent.
CHAPTER IV
THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF
JULY 15, 1840
When the Russian Cabinet ordered Brunnow, the Tsar's Minis-
ter at Stuttgart, to go on a special mission to London, it gave him
instructions defining the limits within which his superiors were
willing that he should negotiate. The courts of the maritime
Powers, it directed therein, should be requested to abandon the
idea of concluding a convention to guarantee the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire. They should also be asked to renounce the
project of having their fleets enter the Sea of Marmora if Russian
forces should appear there to defend Constantinople against the
army of Ibrahim Pasha. If they so agreed, Brunnow should, in
turn, announce that the Emperor was ready to consider as a
permanent European principle that the Bosphorus and the Dar-
danelles should be closed to the warships of all nations both in
times of peace and in times of war. Furthermore he should then
declare that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would not be renewed,
1
and that if it should be necessary to send a Russian detachment
to the aid of the Porte it would be done not by reason of the
said treaty, but because of engagements about to be contracted
between the Powers of EUCOJDC. and the Sultan.
2
The Russian Envoy Extraordinary arrived at London on Sep-
tember 15, 1839, and immediately began negotiating with Lord
Palmerston. His Emperor, he was careful to explain to the British
Minister, agreed entirely with the British views concerning the
affairs of Turkey and Egypt, and would join in whatever measures
'During an Interview at London, Brunnow declared to Palmerston :
"
'Si
vous consentez a reconnaitre et a sanctionner formellement le principe que je
viens de poser, je suis pret a vous annoncer que sa majeste ne tient nullement
a renouveler le traite d'Unkiar-Iskelessi. Cette transaction a toujours etc mal
comprise chez vous. L'empereur ne 1'a jamais conclue dans 1'interet exclusif de
la Russie. Sa majeste a daigne la signer parce qu'elle 1'a envisagee comme un
moyen de salut pour la Porte . . . sa majeste est decidee a ne point faire
durer ce traite, si nous parvenons a nous concerter entre nous et a nous entendre
sur les moyens necessaires pour assurer a 1'avenir 1'existence et le repos de
1'empire ottoman.'
"
See Brunnow's report, Sept. 12/24, 1839, quoted by
Goriainow, op. cit., p. 67.
'Ibid., p. 63.
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might be necessary to carry those views into effect. Nicholas
would unite with England, Austria, and Prussia, either with
France or without her. Though politically speaking, he saw the
advantage of having France one of the party, personally he would
be better pleased if she should be left out.
3 He felt that he de-
served to be trusted and he hoped that the British government,
trusting him unreservedly, would agree that if Mehemet AH by
belligerent measures should place Constantinople in danger and
render any military or naval operations in the Bosphorus or Asia
Minor necessary it would leave that to him, and that it would on
its part undertake whatever was to be done in the Mediterranean
and on the coasts of Syria and Egypt.
4
Palmerston must have foreseen that the French Ministers
would be alarmed when they learned of the advances which were
being made by the Russian representative to Great Britain and
it is probable that he believed they would then be more inclined
to make concessions in order to come to an understanding with
Great Britain in regard to the Turco-Egyptian question. At any
rate, he revealed the principal facts about the negotiations,
"
'ex-
cept the preference of the Emperor to leave France out,'
"
to
Count Sebastiani, the French Ambassador, who early in September
had returned to the British capital after a leave of absence.
5 He
let Sebastiani believe that he personally favored the Russian over-
tures.6 It seemed to him, he contended, that there was no wise
medium between confidence and distrust. If England and France
should tie up Russia by a treaty, they could trust her, and
trusting her, they had better mix no evidence of suspicion with
their confidence.7 Sebastiani reported promptly to his own gov-
ernment the opinions of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs.
"It is evident to me, Monsieur the Marshal," he declared, "that
the English Cabinet regards the abolition of the Treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi as an ample success for its policy in the East. Now this
success it does not consider as too dearly purchased by its previous
assent to the appearance of Russian forces in the Bosphorus; . . .
'See also, Barante to Soult, Oct. 23, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 345-347-
Guichen, op, cit., pp. 133-137.
4
Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 24, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 300.
*Ibid.
"Sebastian! to Soult, Sept. 23, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 551.
'Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 24, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 301.
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"I told Lord Palmerston that the convention [that Brunnow
proposed], the basis of which he had just explained to me, would
be looked upon in Europe as an act of weakness and of pusillanim-
ite towards Russia. Lord Palmerston considers it as an able
measure; the action of Russia, even at Constantinople, regulated,
denned in advance by the concurrence of the other Powers, seems
to him to be the action of the five courts and an abdication of
the exclusive protectorate of Russia."
8
When Marshal Soult received notification of what was going on
at the British capital he was aroused indeed. , It was not without
feelings of painful astonishment, he replied to Sebastiani, that he
perceived a man of such "enlightened judgment" as Lord Palmer-
ston entertain with so much complacency a project like the one
proposed to him by M. Brunnow. After criticising bitterly the
Russian advances and, after charging that the Tsar's government
entertained most aggressive designs, he continued: "Whatever
may be the consequences of a deplorable difference of opinion,
should it effect the accomplishment of the favorite project of
Russia, that of separating us from our Allies, we shall not have
incurred the responsibility of it. We will keep our ground. It
will not be our fault if we no longer find there those who at first
placed themselves side by side with us." 9
Regardless of the attitude which the head of the French Cabinet
assumed, Palmerston undoubtedly would have accepted the
Russian proposal had the decision rested with him alone.10 Several
8
Sebastiani to Soult, Sept. 23, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 552-553. Sebas-
tiani concluded his despatch as follows: "Lord Palmerston, a qui j'ai demande
ou aurait lieu la signature de la convention qu'il venait de m'analyser, m'a
repondu: 'Je nV avais pas songe, mais a Londres si Ton veut.' "
'Soult to Sebastiani, Sept. 26, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 406-408.
See also extracts from a despatch, Soult to Sebastiani, Sept. 10, 1839, quoted
by Guichen, op. cit., pp. 129-132.
10On Oct. 25, 1839, Palmerston wrote to Clanricarde: "... he [Brunnow]
had several long conversations with myself, and with other members of Her
Majesty's Government, upon various matters connected with the relations be-
tween Great Britain and Russia.
"The substance of all his communications on these different matters was
extremely satisfactory; and nothing could be more conciliatory than his manner
upon every occasion. He was frank and unreserved in his conversations; and his
mission, whatever may be its results, as to the main point upon which it bore,
cannot fail to produce beneficial effects upon the relations between the two Gov-
ernments." Levant Correspondence, I, p. 438, Annual Register, 1840, p. 475.
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members of the British Ministry, however, were unwilling to agree
to his views, and at an important Cabinet meeting, held on
October i, 1839, at Windsor, they gained the upper hand.
11 "
'Ac-
cording to the unanimous opinion of the Council,'
" Palmerston
informed Brunnow on the following day,
"
'the military interven-
tion of Russia, if it should become necessary for the protection and
defence of Constantinople, ought to take place in such a manner
as that it might be combined with a certain degree of cooperation
and assistance on the part of the naval forces of England.
"
'This co-operation,'
" he explained,
"
'might be settled so as not
to blend and not to bring in contact the forces of one Power with
those of the other. . . . Each of the two Straits would be placed
under the protection of the respective Powers, whose forces would
in this manner remain separated, and would not find themselves
in [the] presence of each other. You on one side, we on the other,
would be there to prevent the Egyptian Army from crossing the
canal of Constantinople. ... All that would be necessary for us,
would be to prove to the nation, that we have not consented to
allow ourselves to be excluded from a common operation, having
for its object to preserve the Capital of the Ottoman Empire; that
we have not formally agreed to a principle by which Russia would
be empowered to exercise that protectorate alone.'
"
Brunnow, be-
lieving that his instructions were too precise to admit of any
deviation therefrom, answered, "That the will of the Emperor,"
being for him the sole rule of his conduct, it was necessary for him
to stop at the point at which they had arrived. He would report
faithfully to his court the observations which had just been im-
parted to him and would "wholly reserve to the Emperor to
pronounce upon them a decision which rested with himself
alone."12
While Brunnow and Palmerston were negotiating thus the gap
between the positions taken by the British and French govern-
ments in regard to the affairs of the Near East was widening
rapidly. On August 30, 1839, Bulwer reported from Paris that
he believed the French government would endeavor seriously to
"Guizot, op. cit., IV., pp. 363-364. Brunnow to Nesselrode, Sept. 26/Oct. 8,
1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 442, Annual Register, 1840, p. 481.
"Brunnow to Nesselrode, Sept. 26/Oct. 8, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I,
pp. 442-446. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 482-483.
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get the Pasha to abandon a portion of his demands, but that he
feared it would be unwilling to resort to any other means than
those of persuasion to accomplish that purpose.
13 Five days later
Palmerston had a long conversation with Sebastian! from which
he gathered that France was disinclined to be a party to any
active measures of coercion which might be employed against
Mehemet Ali. The steps which the five Powers would be able to
take for such a purpose, Louis Phillipe's representative claimed,
would be unsatisfactory. Some of them would be insufficient; oth-
ers were likely to overshoot their mark. The withdrawal of the con-
suls might be resorted to if it were done by the five jointly, but
he doubted very much that it would produce any effect. A block-
ade would be ineffectual. Mehemet Ali, he believed, had very few
merchant vessels which could be seized, and Ibrahim, even though
his communications by sea with Egypt were cut off, could secure
supplies by advancing.14 September 27, 1839, Palmerston con-
versed again on the subject of the affairs of the Levant with the
French Ambassador. At that time the latter presented a plan of
settlement which he declared his government was willing to
accept.
15
According to that plan Mehemet Ali would evacuate
Adana and he would hold Crete in tenure for life only, but all
the other territories which he occupied would be given to him in
full hereditary possession. Mehemet Ali was becoming very strong
and it was necessary to secure peace immediately, Sebastian! ex-
plained. The settlement proposed by the French, he argued, would
"Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 354-
356. Soult, it appears, did urge the Pasha to abandon part of his demands. See
Guichen, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
"Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 10, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
366-370.
"At an earlier date Sebastiani had suggested to Palmerston, on his own
responsibility and without Soult's knowing of it, that Syria should be divided
between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. The line of division, he suggested,
should be drawn from the coast at Beyrout through Damascus. When Soult
learned of the French Ambassador's suggestion he refused to agree to it. See,
Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 23, 1839, Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 27, Oct. 4,
1839, ibid., pp. 395-397, 398-400, 412-414.
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strengthen the Sultan, for Mehemet AH would be satisfied and
would always be ready to defend his overlord.16
The British Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the French should
have foreseen, was not in a mood even to consider such a proposal
as the one which was made to him by Sebastiani on September
27. On September I, almost as soon as he perceived that
France was unwilling to take steps of coercion against the Viceroy,
he wrote to Bulwer: " ' . . . anxious as we are to continue to go
on with them [the French], we are not at all prepared to stand
still with them. . . .
"
'They must therefore take their choice between three courses :
either to go forward with us, and honestly redeem the pledges they
have given to us and to Europe; or to stand aloof and shrink from
a fulfilment of their own spontaneous declarations; or, lastly, to
go right about and league themselves with Mehemet Ali, and em-
ploy force to prevent us and those other Powers who may join
us from doing that which France herself is bound by every
principle of honour, and every enlightened consideration of her
real interests, to assist us in doing, . . .
' "17 Instead of adopting
the plan which Sebastiani suggested to him, Palmerston replied
with a counter project. The British government was willing, he an-
nounced to the Frenchman, to add to the hereditary investiture of
Egypt in favor of the Viceroy, the possession equally hereditary
of the Pashalic of Acre, exclusive of the fortress. But, he added,
it must be on condition that the King's government will accept "its
share of action in constraining Mehemet Ali should he refuse the
conditions offered." 18
Unfortunately, Sebastiani forwarded to Soult the facts concern-
ing the proposal Palmerston had made to him in the same des-
patch in which he revealed that the British Cabinet had rejected
the plan suggested by the Imperial Court of Russia. The Mar-
"Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 28, 1839, ibid., pp. 404-406. The French hoped
to win the support of Austria to their views. See Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug.
30, Sept. 13, 1839; Beauvale to Palmerston, Oct. 3, 1839, ibid., pp. 354-356,
380-381, 424. Undoubtedly the French Ministers were led to believe by their
reports from Cochelet that Mehemet Ali would not accept less favorable terms.
See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 143-144.
17Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. I, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 297. See also,
Sebastiani to Soult, Sept. 5, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV., pp. 546-550.
"Sebastiani to Soult, Oct. 3, 1839, ibid., p. 554.
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shal, whose belief that the English government would never go
to the extreme of allying itself in the Levant with Russia
19 was
thereby strengthened, and who was urged on constantly by the
French press to defend Mehemet Ali, 20 replied to Sebastiani, Oc-
tober 14, 1839: "'The King's government, after having weighed
maturely the objections of the Cabinet of London [to the French
proposal], feels bound to persist in the views which I have already
communicated to you on the basis of a settlement of the affairs of
the East. If our own interests alone were concerned, we might
make concessions in favor of our desire to bind more closely our
alliance with England; but the question is not of that nature; it
consists solely in determining conditions which, while combining
in just measure the rights of the Sultan and the future security of
his throne with the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, may tend to the
pacification of the Ottoman Empire. We feel convinced that the
proposals of the British Cabinet could not attain this end, and
that, rather than submit to them, Mehemet Ali, who would see
in them his ruin, would plunge into the chances of a resistance
less dangerous to himself but more embarrassing and compromis-
ing for Europe. . . . We should decline driving him to this course,
even though we felt absolutely certain that our refusal would be
the signal for a close alliance between England and Russia. For-
tunately this certainty is far from existing; the reasons which have
once already caused the failure of such a strange combination
subsist in all their strength. I do not believe they can escape the
penetration of Lord Palmerston, and I know positively that some
of his colleagues are very deeply impressed by them. Finally,
if, contrary to all appearances, this combination should be realized,
without doubt we should lament it as the rupture of an alliance to
which we attach much value; but we should apprehend little from
its immediate effects, because a coalition contrary to the nature of
things, and condemned beforehand, even in England, by public
"Ibid., p. 365.
""Note the following: "The desperate fidelity with which the French press
clings to its ancient possession Egypt, should not be lost sight of in the
arrangement of the dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali." The Times,
Oct. 21, 1839. See also ibid., Sept. 19, Oct. 23, 1839.
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opinion,
21 would necessarily be tainted with impotence.'
" 22
Palmerston listened with the " 'most earnest attention' " when
Sebastiani revealed to him the contents of this despatch and after
the latter had finished speaking he replied:
"
'I announce to you,
in the name of the Council, that the concession which we had
agreed to of a "portion of the Pashalic of Acre is withdrawn.'
"23
It is evident that when Soult and his colleagues decided to favor
openly the cause of Mehemet Ali they realized that such a course
would tend to occasion suspicion at the other European courts
in regard to their intentions. A report drawn up by Granville,
October 25, 1839, soon after his return to Paris, is significant in-
deed in this connection. The French government, he wrote, stated
that if it were supposed that it had any desire to aggrandize the
Pasha of Egypt such supposition was groundless. France would
be willing even, if it were possible, to restore "Egypt itself" to
the Sultan.24 The question, however, was not what was desirable
but what was feasible. France did not see "the means of driving
Mehemet Ali out of Syria." She could not furnish a military force
"See, in this connection, editorials in ibid., Oct. 25, Nov. 14, 1839.
22Soult to Sebastiani, Oct. 14, 1839, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp.
365-366. See also, Bulwer to Palmerston, Oct. 7, 1839, Levant Correspondence,
I, pp. 417-419. It was significant of the divergent courses upon which the two
governments were embarked that, almost at the same time, Admiral Roussin
was recalled from Constantinople, and Colonel Campbell from Alexandria the
Frenchman because of his hostility to, and the Englishman because of his
sympathy with Mehemet Ali. The former was succeeded by Admiral Pontois and
the latter by Colonel Hodges. See, Hall, op. cit., p. 257. Palmerston to Hodges,
Sept. 27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 401. Paton, op. cit., II, pp.
162-164.
"Sebastiani to Soult, Oct. 18, 1839, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp.
366-367. See also Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 29, 1839. Levant Correspond-
ence, I, pp. 458-462. At the same time when England and France were failing
to agree upon a plan of solution for the Turco-Egyptian question, Mehemet
Ali was being encouraged by Cochelet's activities to persist in all of his de-
mands, and the Ottoman ministers were being directly encouraged by the
representatives of England, Austria, and Russia to persist in refusing to carry
on any negotiations whatsoever with the Viceroy. See Guichen, op. cit., pp.
167, 169 ff.
"Soult, it seems, was always anxious to make it appear that his govern-
ment entertained no partiality in favor of Mehemet Ali. See ibid., pp. 102-
103, 176.
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for that purpose; England was not prepared to send an army to
the Levant; nor were Austria and Prussia able to do so. There-
fore, measures of coercion could be undertaken by Russia only,
and the moral power of the Sultan would be far more seriously
impaired by having his Empire and his capital protected by the
Muscovites than by the undue aggrandizement of his vassal.25
After the total rout of the Turkish army and the surrender of the
fleet by the Capitan Pasha, Marshal Soult explained upon- a later
occasion, the position of affairs was entirely changed. ". . . we
had to consider," he declared, "what it was possible to do, as well
as what arrangement it was desirable to effect. The French Gov-
ernment is not disposed to deny, that the arrangement proposed
by the British Government, if it could be carried into effect, affords
a better security to the Turkish Empire than the arrangement
proposed by France; but we have not the means of compelling
Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, and we must not vouloir Vimpos-
sible." A naval blockade, he emphasized, could not effect that
object. Russia alone could send troops, and her occupation of
Constantinople and Asia Minor would be a "far more irrecover-
able blow" to the independence of the Sultan than if all the terri-
tories occupied by the Egyptians were conceded to the administra-
tion of Mehemet Ali.26
Lord Palmerston, it appears, was unmoved by the French
contentions. Influenced by the reports which he received relative
to discontent existing within the domains of the Viceroy,
27 he re-
"Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 25, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 457.
On Oct. 21, 1839, Granville wrote to Palmerston: "[At the French foreign
office] I found with regret, that the language of the Marshal manifested a less
anxious desire to act in union and concert with Her Majesty's Government, than
appeared in his communications with me on his first undertaking the duties
of Minister for Foreign Affairs." Soult spoke, Granville reported, of Mehemet Ali
as having an army 150,000 strong and a fleet of 20 sail of the line. Ibid., pp.
436-437-
"Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 18, 1839, ibid., pp. 489-490.
"Note the following extract from a despatch, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Oct.
16, 1839: "The reports from the Consuls in Syria, which go home, and other
information I have received all show how little solid power the Egyptians have;
and a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Inter-
nuncio, which I have read, . . . , gives an account from Alexandria of a similar
state of things." Ibid., p. 473. See also Young to Palmerston, Aug. 19, 1839;
Werry to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1839; Ponsonby to Rechid, Oct. 25, 1839:
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fused to believe that the latter could offer any serious resistance
to a European force. On November 22, 1839, he wrote to Gran-
ville: "With respect to the notion, that the Five Powers acting in
union with the Sultan, have not the means of compelling the Pasha
of Egypt to evacuate Syria, that opinion is one which it can scarcely
be worth while seriously to argue; the disparity of forces between
the two parties . . . being so infinitely great, that resistance on
the part of the Pasha must necessarily be vain." Furthermore,
Great Britain could not agree, he continued, that Russian assist-
ance to the Sultan, if given in pursuance of a concert between the
five allied Powers, would necessarily occasion favors or concessions
from Turkey to Russia that would be injurious to the former's
independence.
28
In the meantime Baron Brunnow had returned to his former
post at Stuttgart and had communicated to the Court of St.
Petersburg the full particulars concerning his mission to the Court
of St. James.
29 The Tsar and his Cabinet received Brunnow's
reports with real satisfaction. "The Emperor has been well
pleased," Nesselrode wrote to Meyendorff, October 8, 1839,
"... If the plan of Lord Palmerston is adopted the Anglo-
French alliance is ipso-facto dissolved and is replaced, in the
affairs of the Orient, by an accord between the two Imperial
Courts and England. . . . For myself, I avow to you that I should
like very much the plan of Lord Palmerston."30 The letter from
which this extract has been copied was written after Nicholas
and his Chancellor had read the first despatch which Brunnow had
forwarded to them after his arrival in England. When they re-
ceived his final reports they were still far from being dissatisfied.
They were aware that the kind of a settlement which the French
Laurin to Stunner, Oct. 15, 1839, ibid., pp. 414-415, 415-416, 484-485, 486. The
reports which the French government received from the East were contradictory
to these. See, Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 25, Dec. 6, 1839, ibid., pp. 500, 514.
"Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 22, 1839, ibid., pp. 490-491.
"While Baron Brunnow was returning to Stuttgart, he met Metternich at
Johannisberg, on the Rhine, and succeeded, it seems, in convincing him that
the Russian plan for the settlement of the question of the Near East was
sound. Goriainow, op. cit., p. 73. Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 102. King of Belgians
to Victoria, Oct. 24, 1839, Queen Victoria's Letters, I, pp. 189-191.
*Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Oct. 8, 1839, Nesselrode, op.cit.,\ll, pp. 288-289.
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government wished was not in conformity with their own desires.31
Seeing in the proposals of Lord Palmerston the means of realizing
the essential parts of their program as well as an opportunity for
the destruction of the troublesome Anglo-French alliance, they
determined immediately to agree to them. Accordingly they so
instructed Brunnow and ordered him to return to. Great Britain
where he should negotiate with the view of concluding a conven-
tion on the basis of the English conditions.
32
It would have been very difficult for the Cabinet of St. Peters-
burg to adopt a policy which would have been more satisfactory
to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs.
" '
. . . The Russian
government agrees,'
" he stated on December 6, 1839,
"
'to our
proposal about the Dardanelles, and is willing that if a Russian
force shall enter the Bosphorus, ships of war of all the other co-
operating Powers shall enter the Dardanelles. . . . This will give
us a pull upon France, and will enable us to carry our own views
into execution about Turkey and Egypt; for Austria and Prussia
will side with us and Russia; and France if she stands aloof,
will be left to herself.' "33
The French Cabinet, on the other hand, was both surprised and
disturbed. Marshal Soult and his colleagues had not expected to
see Russia abandon her privileged position in regard to Turkey by
admitting that French, English, and Austrian ships of war might
appear simultaneously with her own in the waters before Con-
MThe Brunnow missions have often been explained as having been occasioned
by Russia's desire to separate England and France. At the time Nesselrode claimed
that his advances to England were made because of the similarity in British
and Russian views upon Levant affairs. It is probable that some truth lies with
each of these contentions. See Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Nov. 19, Dec. 20,
1839, ibid., pp. 292, 297. Clanricarde to Palmerston, Oct. 18, Nov. 5, 1839,
Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 458, 482. According to Hasenclever, Nesselrode
maintained in a report to the Tsar that the Brunnow mission was prompted by
fear lest France, England, and Austria should unite in an alliance to guarantee
the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire. It is Hasenclever's
contention that Brunnow was sent on his first mission to London merely to feel
out the British position. If his mission was directed against anyone it was
against Metternich. See Hasenclever, op. c\t., pp. 82-85.
"Clanricarde to Palmerston, Nov. 22, 1839; Nesselrode to Kisseleff, Nov.
10/22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 503, 504-505.
"Palmerston to Granville, Dec. 6, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 305-307.
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stantinople.
34 Less than two weeks before it became known in
western Europe that Russia was ready to concede all that Lord
Palmerston demanded, Marshal Soult had declared in a despatch
written to Sebastiani that France had had in view principally the
European side of the question. England, he complained, had been
too much engrossed with considerations relative to the respective
positions of the Porte and of the Viceroy. France had aimed, above
all, to abolish the exclusive and predominant protectorship which
Russia was beginning to impose upon the Porte, or at least to
prevent that protectorship from finding in the current crisis a new
occasion for its exercise and its legalization. England had at
first appeared to pursue the same object, but, he feared, she had
since "somewhat lost sight of these views." 36 The news which soon
arrived unexpectedly from the Muscovite capital seemed to prove
that Soult's suspicions in regard to the intentions of Russia were
without foundation. The French Cabinet thereby lost its leading
argument against the ideas and plan of Lord Palmerston.
36 The
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, adopting the only logical
course which remained open to him, instructed Sebastiani, De-
cember 9, 1839, to convey to the English Ministers his satisfaction
at the unlocked for concessions on the part of Russia. "We may
now," he said, "at last hope for a return to the true path; . . .
if the overtures of Russia are such as they have been described to
you, if they contain nothing more, nothing at least that can change
their bearing, I am ready to authorize you to accede to them
formally. I even go farther; the King's government, acknowledg-
ing with its accustomed loyalty, that a convention entered into on
such a basis would change materially the aspect of affairs, would
find in it a sufficient motive to reconsider the whole of the Eastern
question, even with regard to the points on which each of the
Powers seemed to have formed its opinion so absolutely that pro-
"Guizot, op. clt., IV, p. 369.
*5Soult to Sebastiani, Nov. 25, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 507-510.
The Russian government protested loudly when it learned about this despatch.
See Nesselrode to Brunnow, Dec. 20, i839/Jan. i, 1840; Nesselrode to Medem,
Dec. 26, 1839, ibid., pp. 545-547, 549-55 1. V
"Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 369.
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longed debate appeared impossible."
37 The French, nevertheless,
continued their extensive naval preparations in the Mediterran-
ean,
38 and "some days" after the despatch, a part of which has
been quoted above, was written, the Marshal returned to the
position of suspicion in regard to Russia which he had taken
often before "to repulse the urgencies of the English Cabinet."
"
'I repeat it,'
" he wrote to Sebastiani,
"
'all these tactics resolve
themselves into two words: They [the Russians] seek to break
up the Anglo-French alliance to which Europe has owed for ten
years the preservation of peace. It is impossible that the Cabinet
of London cannot fail to see this as clearly as we do; and as I am
certain it would deplore such a result equally with ourselves . . .
I feel no hesitation in calling the most serious attention of Lord
Palmerston and his colleagues to this state of things.'
" 39
In due course of time, Brunnow arrived at the British capital
on his second mission, bringing with him an elaborately worked
out plan of an arrangement, which was in harmony with British
views, for the settlement of the Eastern question. The quarrel
between the Porte and the Pasha, he proposed therein, should be
settled definitely under the guarantee of Europe. Mehemet AH
"Soult to Sebastiani, Dec. 9, 1839, ibid., p. 557. See also, Palmerston to
Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, Jan. 1903, XVIII, p. 126.
"Palmerston objected strongly to the French naval preparations. See
Palmerston to Granville, Dec. 10, 13, 1839; Granville to Palmerston, Dec. 9,
13, 1839, Jan. 13, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 520-521, 523, 521-522,
523-524, 554-555. Soult to Sebastiani, Dec. 9, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV., pp.
558-559-
^Ibid., pp. 369-370. Barante accused Prussia and Austria, as well as
Russia, of desiring to see the Anglo-French alliance destroyed. See Barante to
Soult, Dec. 14, 1839, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., p. 180. It is certain that
Metternich, at least, had no love for France. On April 27, 1840, he wrote to
King Leopold of Belgium: "Your Majesty calls France a dangerous neighbour,
and you add that what is happening there displeases you, and deserves general
attention. I quite agree; but I extend the principle beyond the present to the
past. France is a lost land (as far as lands can be) and a ceaseless source
of misfortune for the whole of Europe. When the foundations of order are
shattered in any empire, it will take more than a lifetime to restore it to
equilibrium in itself and with its neighbours. . . . Yet this State continues its
baleful propaganda, based upon the impulse to communicate its own misery to
others in order to have equality." Quoted by E. C. Corti, Leopold I of Belgium,
P- 125.
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should receive Egypt and Syria to the fortress of Acre,40 in hered-
itary possession. All the other territories which he held he should
restore to the Sultan immediately. If he refused to accept such
an arrangement, measures of coercion denned by the representa-
tives of the Powers at London should be employed against him.
In the event of Ibrahim Pasha advancing into Asia Minor,
Russia would pass the Bosphorus with troops for disembarkation
and would undertake the defense of Constantinople in the name
of the concert. The other Powers might then pass the Dardanelles,
each with two or three ships of war, to cruise in the waters of the
Sea of Marmora "between Gallipoli and the Gulf of Moudania."
As soon as the object proposed was attained by the submission of
Mehemet Ali, the Porte would resume full and immutable posses-
sion of the right of closing the two Straits against all the flags of
Europe.
41 Brunnow revealed his proposals to the British govern-
ment early in January, 1840, and on the fifth day of the month
Palmerston declared to Sebastian!: "'Brunnow is empowered to
negotiate with the object of bringing about a permanent and defin-
ite solution of the Turkish and Egyptian question, in order to en-
sure the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Baron
Neumann has arrived from Vienna and has expressed to us that
Austria is entirely with us and Russia in this important affair. I
think I can say for certain that Prussia will look at matters in
the same light. It only remains for us, therefore, to secure a
European accord on a question which is incontestably the most
important that we have had to deal with these last years. We
sincerely hope that the co-operation of France will not be
refused. . '"42
40When Palmerston discussed Brunnow's proposals with Sebastiani, Jan. 4,
1840, he declared:
"
'J'ai vivement combattu cette idee [the cession of Syria
to the fortress of Acre to Mehemet Ali] dans mes entretiens avec M. de
Brunnow; elle compromettrait le principe: I'Egypte seule et le desert pour
frontiere, voila le vrai. J'ai ramene M. de Brunnow et je suis sur de 1'adhesion
des deux autres.' " Sebastiani to Soult, Jan. 5, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 562.
"Measures suggested by Brunnow for Settlement of Turco-Egyptian ques-
tion, Jan. 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 529-531. Sebastiani to Soult, Jan.
5, 1840, *Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 559-561.
"Affaires etrangeres, 654 Angleterre, Sebastiani to Soult, Jan. 5, 1840,
quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 258.
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Matters, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly. The representa-
tives of England, Austria, and Russia were able to agree upon the
main points at issue,43 but the plenipotentiary of Prussia was
without instructions,44 and the Ambassador of France was unable
to announce what attitude his court would assume in case the
other Powers resolved to employ coercive measures against the
Viceroy.
45
Furthermore, before the negotiations had proceeded
very far it was resolved that the final arrangement which should
be concluded should be in the form of a convention between the
Powers on the one hand and the Porte on the other.46 Hence it
was necessary to await the arrival of a representative from
Turkey. This delay of affairs was intensely gratifying to Marshal
Soult who believed that the Emperor of Russia would not author-
"Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Jan. 31, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 8-9.
Palmerston to Ponsonby, Jan. 25, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 560.
Beauvale reported to Palmerston, Jan. 12, 1840, that Metternich was willing
even to go on without France if France refused "to go along" with the
other Powers. Ibid., pp. 559-560. From April until June, 1840, the Austrians,
nevertheless, did hesitate to go on without France. This was occasioned perhaps
by Austrian suspicion of Russian intentions. On January n, 1840, Muhlenberg,
the American representative at Vienna, wrote: "Under these circumstances [the
physical weakness of Metternich] little business of any consequence can be
expected to be transacted for sometime here, the Prince [Metternich] being the
center from which alone light, heat and activity emanate. . . .
"The Austrian Government, as you are no doubt aware, does not like the
French people or the Government but there is no little jealousy entertained on
the other hand towards Russia, a jealousy which is certainly not on the decline
having been newly awakened by some rather imprudent publications in regard
to Germany evidently emanating from Russian Agents." State Dept. Austria, I,
Muhlenberg to Forsyth, No. 10, Jan. n, 1840.
""On Jan. 25, 1840, Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby that the Prussian envoy
expected to receive instructions soon similar to those which had been received
by the plenipotentiaries of Austria and Russia. See, Levant Correspondence, I,
p. 560.
"Soult maintained continually that the means of coercion which the
Powers proposed to employ against Mehemet would be inadequate. He wrote
to Sebastiani, Jan. 26, 1840: "A moins d'abandonner le sultan a sa faiblesse, ne
seraient-elles pas forcees de souffrir qu'une armee imperiale traversal 1'Asie
Mineure et la Syrie pour refouler jusqu'en Egypte les soldats du vice-roi? Je ne
pense pas que cette extremite put convenir a 1'Angleterre plus qu'elle ne nous
conviendrait a nous-memes." Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 569.
48The idea of having the Porte become a party to the convention was
suggested by Palmerston. See Sebastiani to Soult, Jan. 20, 1840, ibid., pp. 564-
568. Guichen, op. cit., p. 208.
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ize Brunnow to bind his court by a treaty to which the Porte was
a party.
47 He calculated that it would be two months before an
envoy of the Sultan could arrive in London, and he seemed to re-
joice, Granville reported on January 31, 1840, that the French
government would not be under the immediate necessity of refus-
ing or assenting to sign a convention of the five Powers in regard
to the affairs of the Levant. 48
Although Louis Philippe's Minister of Foreign Affairs did not
expect that the negotiators at the British capital would attain
important results in the near future, he realized that the situation
was a dangerous one for France.
49 The position which Palmerston
had taken "disturbed and wearied" him and his colleagues. They
began to fear that their cause was not being defended properly at
the Court of St. James. Because of Sebastiani's "antecedents"
they looked upon him as "too favorable to Turkey," and so nearly
in accord with the opinions of Lord Palmerston as to be ill fitted
"for the vigorous support of opposite views." He appeared to
them to be neither a true representative of the French govern-
ment, nor an effective interpreter of the policy for which the
debates [of June and July, 1839] in the Chamber of Deputies
"had established a precedent."50 Therefore, they resolved to recall
"Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 564.
The French Ministers continued to believe that an alliance between England
and Russia was not practicable. See an extract taken from a speech delivered
by M. Villemain, the Minister of Public Instruction, in the Chamber of
Deputies early in Jan., 1840. The Examiner, Jan. 12, 1840, p. 19. For addi-
tional remarks made by Villemain concerning Near Eastern affairs see Journal
des Debats, Jan. 12, 1840.
^Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 31, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
573-574-
^It should be noted that on Jan. 27, 1840, Sebastiani reported that Palmer-
ston had replied in the affirmative to Neumann's official inquiry as to whether,
in the event of the four Powers arriving at an agreement, and France with-
holding her consent, the clauses of the treaty would be acted upon in spite of
her abstention. See Affaires etrangeres, 654 Angleterre, Sebastiani to Soult, Jan.
27, 1840, cited by Hall, op. cit., pp. 258-259.
50
Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 370. Note the following extract from a letter,
Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843: "... it did so happen that
Sebastiani was sincerely anxious to maintain the integrity and independence of
Turkey, and did not care a straw for Mehemet Ali; and that Guizot was heart
and soul for Mehemet Ali, and did not care much about the dignity and inde-
pendence of the Turkish empire." English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 127.
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him, and they chose as his successor, Frangois Pierre Guillaume
Guizot, who, it will be remembered, had argued eloquently on July
2, 1839, for the maintenance of the status quo in the Near East.
Before Guizot departed from Paris he received instructions from
Marshal Soult which revealed clearly that the main object of his
mission should be to obtain from the government of England great
concessions to the advantage of the Egyptian Pasha. "The King's
government," Soult explained in those instructions, "has believed
and still believes that, in the condition in which Mehemet Ali finds
himself, to offer him less than the hereditary possession of Egypt
and Syria as far as Mount Taurus, would be to expose ourselves
to a refusal ... on his part which in case of need he would sus-
tain by a desperate resistance the rebound of which would shake
and perhaps subvert the Ottoman Empire; . . . ."51
Before Guizot had an opportunity to attempt negotiations on
the basis of the Marshal's instructions, the Soult Ministry, having
sustained a parliamentary defeat on the question of granting
a donation of 500,000 livres per annum to the Due de Nemours,
resigned.
52 Soult and his colleagues went out of office on February
29, 1840, and their places were taken directly by a cabinet formed
under the leadership of M. Thiers. In the Chamber of Deputies,
January 13, 1840, Thiers had delivered a noteworthy address de-
fending the Anglo-French alliance.
53 His remarks on that occasion
"Instructions given by Soult to Guizot, Feb. 19, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V,
p. 416.
"Ibid., IV, pp. 374-375-
"Journal des Debats, Jan. 14, 1840. The Times, Jan. 15, 1840. Raikes,
France since 1830, I, p. XVI. Blanc, op. cit., V, pp. 454-456. Concerning the
Anglo-French alliance, Thiers said: "... pour moi je ne puis pas encore
renoncer a cette belle et noble alliance, qui est fondee, non seulement sur la
puissance matrielle mais sur la force morale des principes. Car quand nous
sommes avec PAngleterre, nous ne sommes pas obliges de cacher notre drapeau,
tandis que telle autre alliance qu'on nous conseille nous forcera a le cacher.
Mais, d'accord avec PAngleterre, nous pouvons clever nos deux drapeaux; ils
portent pour devise: Libertt modernee et Paix du monde. . . .
"Eh bien! je le dis avec confiance, tous le torts ne sont pas du cote de
PAngleterre, il y a eu des malentendus des deux cotes, et je suis convaincu
qu'il serait facile d'aplanir les difficultes en eclair cissant quelques parties de la
question, et ce serait la un grand avantage." Journal des Debats, Jan. 14, 1840.
See also, Boudin, Histoire de Louis Philippe, II, pp. 418-420.
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attracted much attention and were commented upon extensively
throughout both England and France.
54 An English press corres-
pondent who heard the speech went so far as to declare: "It
[Thiers' speech] . . . had as powerful an effect as any burst of
eloquence that I ever witnessed. Thiers rose to warmth and
eloquence only when treating of the English alliance. He had
certainly for the moment the sentiments of the chamber against
him, so much so that once or twice he raised an incipient murmur.
He braved all, and overcame all, however, and none dared to lift
up a voice against him. This speech is more than an effort of
eloquence, it is a great and good act tending strongly to re-knit
those bonds between the countries which foolish hands were daily
loosening."
55
Consequently, when Thiers entered office many ex-
pected that the two western Powers would come promptly to an
understanding in regard to Turco-Egyptian affairs. 56 Lord
Palmerston even remarked that he did not despair of finding that
the opinions of the new French Ministers would "approximate more
"The Constitutionnel, a. Paris paper, declared that Thier's speech was a
"disco urs-ministrf."
"Et, en realite, M. Thiers venait de poser sa candidature
du haut de la tribune." Blanc, op. cit., V, p. 457. See also, Boudin, op. cit., II,
p. 420.
"The Examiner, Jan. 19, 1840, p. 35. Lamartine, who spoke in the Cham-
ber of Deputies on Jan. n, 1840, favored partitioning the Turkish territories,
giving Constantinople to Russia, Egypt to England, Asia Minor to France, and
the coast of the Adriatic to Austria. According to his opinion, Mehemet AH
was only an "ephemeral adventurer." "The high road from Asia to Europe,
since the perfection of steam," he declared, "lay through Egypt and the Red
Sea. Mehemet AH posted himself as the gaoler of that sea, the obstacle to
prevent the communication between East and West, which England would
never suffer, if it took her a century's war to put it down. By supporting Egypt,
France made herself the rival of England, whilst she might remain England's
friend, with more advantage." Ibid., J. Irving, The Annals of Our Time, p. 22.
Journal des Debats, Jan. 12, 1840. Lamartine's ideas were condemned both by
the Ministry and by the press in France. See a speech delivered by Villemain in
answer to Lamartine and editorial comment thereon. Ibid., Jan. 12, 13, 1840.
MSee a letter from Paris, March 25, 1840. The Times, March 27, 1840.
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nearly than those of their predecessors, to the views of the Four
Powers." 57
Time soon revealed, however, that Thiers was no more anxious
than Marshal Soult had been to defy the wrath of public opinion
in France by joining those who wished to coerce the Viceroy. In
instructions which he sent to Guizot he declared that it was essen-
tial to gain time, to say that the French Cabinet had formed no
absolute opinion or resolution, to discuss the various lines of
policy, to demonstrate the inconveniences of that which Lord
Palmerston was anxious to see adopted, and thus to retard a
final decision. It was necessary also to hold no official relations
whatever except with the English Ministers, and in this way to
disengage the French government from the ties imposed on it by
the note of July 27, 1839. He did not mean that France should re-
cede from the obligation which she had contracted when Roussin
signed the collective note, but he hoped that in the presence of
incessant difficulties attending a concert between the five Powers,
the Sultan and the Pasha would come finally to an agreement
between themselves, 58 or rather, that from being tired of the
question, the Powers would accept and guarantee to the Porte and
its vassal, "the maintenance of the status quo; which, according to
his [Thiers'] opinion, was the best of the combinations."
59
"Palmerston to Beauvale, March 12, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
600-603. Annual Register, 1840, p. 491. On March 9, 1840, Granville had written
to Palmerston: "M. Thiers then proceeded to say, that whatever turn affairs
might take in the East, there was no danger of firing of cannon between our
fleets; he hoped that the. two Governments might arrive at a concordance of
opinion in the Turco-Egyptian Question, but even should they not agree upon
the measures to be pursued, such disagreement would not affect the friendly
relations between the two countries." Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 598-599.
See also, Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review,
XVIII, p. 128.
raAt a later date, June, 1840, the British suspicioned rightly that Thiers was
secretly encouraging the Sultan and the Pasha to come to an agreement be-
tween themselves. See, Hall, op. cit., pp. 269-272. Letters from Constantinople,
June 27, 1840, The Times, July 20, 30, 1840.
M
Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 64. On April 25, 1840, Thiers wrote to Barante:
"
'En
resume le gouvernement du Roi est pret a negocier. II ne consentira, il est
vrai, a entrer dans aucune conference, dans aucune deliberation commune et
formelle, parce qu'il croit qu'il pourrait en sortir de nouvelles complications. II
ne fait aucune proposition, il ne prend aucune initiative, mais si le project de
transaction qui avait etc mis en avant, et qui consistait a donner a Mehemed AH,
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It did not take long for Lord Palmerston to perceive that the
hopes which he had entertained in regard to the policies of Louis
Philippe's new ministers would not be realized.60 They continued
the naval preparations in the Mediterranean which had been
begun while Marshal Soult was in office and that was particularly
distasteful to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs.61
"
'The
truth is,'
"
the latter wrote on April 16, 1840,
"
'however reluctant
one may [be to] avow the conviction, that Louis Philippe62 is
a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed. However, there he
is, and we call him our ally; only we ought to be enlightened by
experience and not to attach to his assertions or professions any
greater value than really belongs to them; more especially when,
as in the case of Egypt,
63 his words are not only at variance with
moyennant la retrocession d'Adana, de Candia et des villes Saintes 1'investiture
hereditaire de la Syrie et de 1'Egypte, si ce project qu'il croit reunir, plus
qu'aucun autre, les conditions de succes, etait agree par les cours alliees, il
n'hesiterait pas d'user de toute son influence pour decider Mehemed AH a
1'accepter.'
" Quoted by Schiemann, op. cit., Ill, p. 396, [footnote].
*In a conversation with Granville, March 13, 1840, Thiers took up the
same line of argument which Soult had pursued. It was a matter of indiffer-
ence to the French government, he claimed, whether or not Mehemet Ali re-
tained Syria, but he was persuaded that the coercive measures which the Powers
proposed to use against the Pasha would fail and that the attempt would
entail evils of far greater magnitude than any that could be apprehended from
Egyptian occupation of the disputed territory. At the same time he declared
also that no ministry in France, however composed, could act hostilely against
Egypt for the purpose of restoring the pashalic to the direct authority of the
Porte. Granville to Palmerston, March 13, 20, April 3, 1840, Levant Corres-
pondence, I, pp. 603-604, 605-606, 617. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843,
English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 128.
"Palmerston to Granville, March 5, May 5, 1840; Granville to Palmerston,
March 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 597-598, 644-646, 598-599.
"By the name "Louis Philippe," Palmerston probably meant the French
government. It is true, however, that he was particularly hostile to the
French King. See Palmerston to Granville, April 23, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II,
pp. 311-312.
"See also, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 42-43. The attitude of France in regard
to Egypt disturbed other Englishmen besides Lord Palmerston. The following is
an extract from a letter published in The Examiner: "England holds rank as a
first rate power by her Eastern empire, and quick and sure communication and
connection with that empire has become an object of vital necessity. If France
would deny us this, France is our enemy, our gratuitous and self-made enemy.
War with her becomes inevitable, sooner or later, and it comes better when all
the powers are leagued against her, than when she shall have had time to detach
one of them from the group." The Examiner, April 5, 1840, p. 212.
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his conduct, but even inconsistent with each other. The Cabinet
have determined that we must without delay bring the French
to a clear and definite arrangement about their fleet; unless they
will reduce their ships in commission to ten the number which
Soult stated to you in July last as the intended amount of the
French active force, we must go down to Parliament and ask
for an additional vote upon the specific ground of the unexplained
armament of France.' "64
During the month of March, 1840, Guizot had conferences
frequently with Palmerston and other members of the British
Cabinet.65 The question of the Near East was often the subject of
conversation at those conferences and, although some of Palmer-
ston's colleagues were very anxious to avoid measures which might
occasion a break between England and France, Guizot realized,
ere long, that it would be difficult to induce the English Secretary
of Foreign Affairs to modify his plans.
"
'I am now convinced,'
"
he reported to Thiers, March 12,
"
'that Lord Palmerston has
no intention of doing or deciding anything until the arrival of the
Turkish plenipotentiary. We have therefore time [before us].
But I must even now observe to your Excellency that this advan-
tage would become a danger perhaps should we suffer ourselves
to suppose that, because he does nothing now, he will do nothing
later, and that we shall be definitely released from taking a resolu-
"Palmerston to Granville, April 16, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 310-311.
Two days before Palmerston wrote this letter, Thiers declared in the Chamber
of Peers: "La France croit que les provinces conquises par le pacha sont plus
utilement, placees dans ses mains que dans celles du Sultan. Car la Syrie, par
exemple, exposerait le Sultan a depenser beaucoup d'hommes et d'argent pour
administrer une province qui finirait par lui echapper, tandis que, laissee dans
les mains du Pacha, celui-ci en tirera assez d'argent et d'hommes pour la bien
gouverner." Journal des Debats, April 15, 1840. See also Parl. Debates, LIV, p.
782. Granville to Palmerston, April 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 628.
*Guizot, in his Memoires has described at length his early proceedings at
London. See, Guizot, op. cit., V, chapters XVII and XVIII. Guizot learned at
one of his early conferences with Palmerston about two drafts already prepared
for an arrangement to conclude the Turco-Egyptian question. These two drafts,
one of British and the other of Continental perhaps Austrian origin, according
to Guizot, were similar except that the latter was to be signed by the repre-
sentatives of the great Powers alone while the former was to be signed by the
representatives of the Porte as well as by those of the Powers. In both,
Mehemet Ali was to be denied the possession of Syria. See ibid., pp. 44-45.
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tion because we are not pressed to do so immediately. The more
I observe, the more I satisfy myself that the British Cabinet
considers the circumstances as favorable for settling the affairs of
the East, and wishes seriously to take advantage of them. It
would much prefer to act in concert with us; [and] it is disposed
to make concessions to establish that concert. Nevertheless, if, on
our part, we do not decide on something positive, if we appear to
desire only to adjourn and convert all difficulties into impossibil-
ities, a moment may arrive, I think, when, . . . the British
Cabinet would act without us and with others rather than not act
at all.'
" 66
Meanwhile, the Porte, conforming with the suggestion which
Palmerston, in his despatch of January 25, 1840, had directed
Ponsonby to make to it, ordered Nouri Effendi, the Turkish
Ambassador at Paris, to proceed to London. It was not the inten-
tion of the Porte that Nouri should be its permanent agent at
the conference of the Powers, for it was anxious to be represented
by an abler person who, "coming direct from Constantinople,
would be better informed as to the state of affairs in the East and
more capable of enlightening the western diplomats as to the
chances of success" which various proposals might have. The
mission of the Turkish Ambassador residing in France was to
continue only until such a personage could be sent to succeed
him.67
April 7, 1840, soon after his arrival at the British capital, Nouri
forwarded to the representatives of the five great Powers notes
similar in character, informing them that he had power to con-
clude a convention for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian
question.
68 The Sultan expected, he intimated, that such a con-
vention would be drawn up on the basis of his [the Sultan's]
offer to grant the hereditary possession of Egypt to Mehemet Ali
provided that the Viceroy would restore to him the Ottoman fleet
and evacuate all of the other provinces which he [the Viceroy]
"Ibid., pp. 59-60. King Louis Philippe believed that Guizot's fears were
groundless. See an extract of a letter, Baudrand to Guizot, March 30, 1840,
quoted by ibid., pp. 61-62.
"Ibid., pp. 87-88.
w
lt is doubtful if Nouri Effendi had been granted as much power as he
claimed. See ibid., p. 75. Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 137-138.
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was then holding.
69 Guizot replied the following day by a brief
acknowledgment in which he stated to the Ottoman plenipoten-
tiary that he would lay the note before his home government.70
Lord Palmerston and the envoys of Austria, Prussia, and Russia,
on the other hand, answered the notes which Nouri had written
to them by statements almost identical, expressing a willingness
to concert with His Excellency in order to discover the best means
of realizing the "friendly intentions" which the representatives of
the five Powers had manifested in the name of their respective
courts, by the collective note of July 27, iSjQ.71
In the interval which had elapsed while the negotiations were
being delayed because of the absence of a Turkish envoy, the
government of Berlin had finally sent instructions to von Biilow,
its minister at Queen Victoria's Court, ordering him to follow a
policy in conformity with the one which had been adopted by
Austria.72 Consequently, when Nouri Effendi arrived in London
and announced that he was empowered to negotiate on the basis
favored by Palmerston and Brunnow, it appeared as though
France was the only Power which stood in the way of an im-
mediate settlement.
"'
... all the world is at the feet of England,'
" Guizot wrote
to the Due de Broglie, April 7, 1840;
"
'all the world offers to do
what she pleases; we alone say no, we who call ourselves her par-
ticular friends. And it is in the name of our friendship, to main-
tain our alliance that we ask her not to accept what all the others
offer. We are in the right, but we are not accommodating.' "73
Thiers also, it appears, perceived that the four Powers were
*"Nouri Effendi to Palmerston, April 7, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
624-625. Nouri Effendi to Guizot, April 7, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 420-423.
Ibid., p. 76.
MGuizot to Nouri Effendi, April 8, 1840, ibid., p. 424. At first Thiers was
so dissatisfied with Noun's note that he ordered Guizot to make no additional
reply. Later he permitted him to make an evasive one. See ibid., pp. 76-78.
Guizot to Nouri Effendi, ibid., p. 425.
n
lbid., pp. 77, 424-425. Palmerston to Nouri Effendi, April n, 1840, Levant
Correspondence, I, p. 627.
MSee Ponsonby to Palmerston, Feb. 26, 1840, ibid., p. 605.
"An extract from a letter quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 52-53. See also,
Guizot to Dumon, April 7, 1840, De Witt, Lettres de M. Guizot a sa Famille et
a ses amis, pp. 186-188.
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united upon the principles involved in regard to the Turco-
Egyptian question and that France was in danger of being iso-
lated, for about the middle of April, when it was proposed to him
that there should be established in London a formal conference
of the five Powers to consider and determine what measures
should be adopted to settle the Eastern affair, he refused to be a
party to such a conference, stating that if it should be decided
there to drive Mehemet Ali out of Syria, France would refuse to
assist in carrying out such measures, and her refusal to join in
them after she had been a party to the conference would render
her separation from the other Powers a more marked step than
it would be if no conference of the five were to take place.74
Many writers have criticised Thiers for adopting such an un-
compromising attitude. Those criticisms are, to a large extent at
least, unjust. The policy followed by the administration of Mar-
shal Soult, to which Thiers fell heir, and the temper of the French
people placed him in a position from which there was no other
safe nor creditable escape.
75 Because of the existing circumstances
it was imperative that he should refuse to cooperate with the other
Cabinets of Europe if they should attempt to coerce Mehemet Ali.
It is certain that if he had joined with Lord Palmerston and his
allies on the basis of the Anglo-Russian terms his official career
would have ended immediately. He maintained always that the
amount of territory which the Pasha should receive would matter
little to him if the latter would accept it willingly, and it is prob-
able that he was sincere in this contention. While he was declar-
ing to the representatives of the Powers that France would not
join them in coercing the Pasha, he was at the same time writing
to Cochelet directing him to warn Mehemet Ali to be more
moderate in his demands.76 Indeed, in one of his despatches to
the French Consul-General at Alexandria he even enjoined him
"to make it clearly understood by Mehemet Ali," that France
"Granville to Palmerston, April 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
628-629. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review,
XVIII, pp. 128-129.
75
See Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 313.
7aGranville to Palmerston, April 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 630.
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would not "sacrifice its alliance with England to the interests of
the Pasha."77
Although in April, 1840, the governments of England, Austria,
Prussia, and Russia were agreed upon the main principles which
were involved in the question of the Near East, they were not
ready to sign a convention to which France would not be a party.
Austria and Prussia particularly were anxious that the concert of
Europe should be complete.
"
'All we desire,'
"
von Billow de-
clared to Guizot, early in April, 1840, "... 'is that France
should not separate from the other Powers in this matter; this is
nearly the only instruction I have received from my sovereign.
Can we not find some middle course which may preserve to all
parties their old engagements and personal situations, and form
the basis of a pacific settlement between the Sultan and the Pasha?
It is necessary to seek for varied combinations, for some trifling
concessions on all sides, some modifications in the form or quality
of the Pasha's dominion, in a word, a ground somewhat new on
which we may unite.'
"78 The attitude which Baron Neumann,
the Austrian representative, assumed in his conversations with
Guizot was of a similar character. On April 15, some days after
von Biilow made the statement quoted above, he intimated to the
Frenchman that even all Syria might be given to Mehemet AH for
life if France would join with the other Powers. 79 When Guizot
replied that the King's government, on its own account, attached
little importance to the distribution of territory between the two
parties; that it earnestly desired that the transaction should be
acceptable to both; but that nothing authorized it to believe that
the Pasha would be disposed to give way on the heirship of
Syria,
80 the Austrian continued: "'My government is as anxious
as yours for the maintenance of peace in the East; . . . what
"Granville to Palmerston, May i, 1840, ibid., p. 644. At a later date,
Tillers, while speaking to Bulwer of the attitude which he maintained in regard
to Mehemet AH, declared: "'In short,' ... 'to you I speak in his favour, but
to himself I argue in favour of Turkey.'
" Bulwer to Palmerston, July 17, 1840,
ibid., II, p. 7.
"Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 78-79. This statement was made by von Billow
during an interview which he had with Guizot "Des qu'on avait su Nouri-
Effendi arrive a Londres, et avant la remise de sa note." See ibid., p. 78.
"Two days earlier, April 13, von Billow had likewise intimated that Syria
might be left to Mehemet Ali for life. See ibid., pp. 79-81.
"Ibid., pp. 81-82.
a00,,
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we consider important is, that there should be a really effective
settlement, and this cannot take place unless we all fall into the
same view. The Emperor, my master, and the King of Prussia
equally, desire this.'
" 81
In truth, the government of Austria was alarmed considerably
by the situation of affairs. On April 25, 1840, Prince Metternich
forwarded to Neumann a memoir in which he discussed the
means that the four Powers would have at their disposal to
coerce Mehemet AH in case France refused to cooperate with
them. He had no intention, he let it be known, of allowing Aus-
trian troops to be employed in the East; Prussia was not inter-
ested sufficiently in the terms of the settlement to be enforced
upon the Pasha to cause her to do so; and England, he believed,
had no land forces which would be available for such an under-
taking. Russia had both an army and a navy in the region of the
Black Sea. The Emperor Nicholas might be willing to send them
against Mehemet AH and England and Austria could be counted
upon to furnish their fleets, but it would be necessary to detach
from these a naval force of considerable strength to watch the
French squadron. Therefore, he concluded, it would be extremely
difficult for the four courts to succeed without the cooperation of
the fifth. 82
"Ibid., pp. 82-83.
^Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 429-439. Hasenclever points out that in a
secret note which accompanied this memoir, or memorandum, Metternich
explained that Austria was not opposed to the use of forceful means, but the
latter must take the Russian standpoint strictly into account. An agreement
regarding everything must be reached first to assure final success. He sharply
rejected a notion advanced by Palmerston that all might be left to chance.
Undoubtedly Metternich was determined to take no chances of permitting further
Russian aggression against Turkey. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 144-147. See
also Metternich to Apponyi, May I, 6, 1840, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp.
404-408. Note in particular the following extract from the despatch of May 6:
''Lord Palmerston a un travers dans 1'esprit qui 1'empeche toujours d'avoir
completement raison dans une affaire quelconque. La ou son esprit marche
droit dans le principe, il oublie de scruter les moyens d'execution, tandis que
la ou son attitude peche par la base, il est fertile en expedients. Dans le
conflit turco-egyptien, il est place droit sur la base des principes, mais ses
idees sur les moyens comminatoires n'ont pas le sens commun. Je crois
le lui avoir demontre par ma derniere expedition." The attitude which Austria
assumed worried both Palmerston and Nesselrode. See, Nesselrode to Meyendorff,
April 13, 1840. Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 19-22. Palmerston to Beauvale,
March 28, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 610-611.
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With the aim of winning the assistance of France, the Austrian
Chancellor promptly instructed Neumann to suggest that Syria
should be divided into two portions. The southern portion com-
prising all of the territory south and west of a line beginning at
Beyrout and extending to the northern point of Lake Tiberias;
that is to say, the greater part of the Pashalic of Acre, including
the fortress, should be retained by Mehemet Ali, while the re-
mainder of Syria, forming the second or northern portion should
be surrendered to the Sultan. The Austrian envoy at London
explained this proposal to Guizot, May 5, 1840, and remarked
that if Mehemet Ali rejected it, Austria, though unwilling to fur-
nish troops, would be disposed to unite her flag to those of
England and Russia in the employment of means of maritime
constraint. . . . Lord Palmerston, whom he had interviewed on the
preceding evening, appeared to be determined, he declared, to
push matters to that end, even though the execution should be
left to England alone.83 Three days later when Guizot himself
conversed with Palmerston, he found him willing to agree to the
Austrian proposal. "The surrender of the fortress of St. Jean
d'Acre," Guizot wrote in his Memoires, "he [Palmerston] evi-
dently considered a painful sacrifice; for which he consoled him-
self by telling me, what I knew already, that, to effect this arrange-
ment and in case of the Pasha's refusal, Austria agreed to partici-
pate in coercive measures by joining her flag to those of England
and Russia. He then detailed his plan of compulsion, which con-
sisted in a triple blockade of Alexandria, of the coasts of Syria
and of the Red Sea. He seemed satisfied that such a blockade,
obstinately prolonged, if requisite, would force the Pasha to sub-
mit, without any necessity of a campaign by land or of employing
Russian troops.
84 He was, he said to me, quite determined to
follow up this plan rigorously if the new bases for an arrangement
83
Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 85-86. Palmerston to Granville, July 21, 1840,
Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 8-10.
"Palmerston's opinion probably was based on the reports he had received
from the British agents in the East. On Dec. 29, 1839, Ponsonby had written:
"I have long believed that a British maritime force, acting in conjunction with
the Sultan's flag on the coast of Syria, cutting off the communication with
Alexandria, and closing that port, would paralyse the whole body of Mehemet
Ali's power." Ibid., I, p. 557. See also, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 3, 1840;
Moore to Ponsonby, Feb. 21, 1840, ibid., pp. 609, 610.
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were not accepted. ... I confined myself to persevering in the
system which I had previously advocated, saying that I already
had transmitted these new overtures to the King's government,
that I waited its answer, and that, under all circumstances, it
would require time in order to consider whether the success of
such an arrangement could be brought about by pacific measures,
the only course of proceeding it considered practicable and
effectual."85
The government of France was destined to have ample time for
debate as to the resolution which it should take in answer to the
proposal just mentioned, for the approaching arrival of Chekib
Effendi, the representative whom the Porte was sending from
Constantinople, was announced directly at the British capital and
as a result the deliberations upon Eastern affairs were suspended
until his appearance.
While the diplomats waited thus, other affairs, much less
weighty, but still of considerable momentary interest, became the
principal objects of attention and negotiation between Paris and
London.86 One of these was the so-called
"sulphur dispute" be-
tween England and the Kingdom of Naples. In the month of
March, 1840, the British government had protested against the
monopoly of the trade in the sulphur products of Sicily which King
Ferdinand was attempting to establish.
87 Instead of complying
with Great Britain's demands, Ferdinand began to make elaborate
preparations for the defense of his realm. A camp was formed
near Reggio, a general levy of the reserves was decreed, an army
of over 10,000 men was ordered to be embarked for Sicily, and
the King himself, it was said, was on the point of assuming per-
sonally the defense of that island.
88 When the British government
learned of the defiant attitude of the Italian Prince, it directed
Admiral Stopford to blockade the coast and to seize and send to
Malta such Neapolitan merchant vessels as he could capture.
89
Thiers, seeing in this situation an opportunity to better the feel-
ings which existed between England and France, resolved to
"Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 86-87.
"Ibid., pp. 87-88.
"'Hall, op. at., p. 264.
**The Times, April 15, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 89-90.
"Ibid., p. 93.
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suggest to the two parties that he should act as mediator between
them. On April 12, 1840, he communicated his offer to do so to
M. Guizot, whp in turn presented it to Lord Palmerston. The lat-
ter accepted the interposition of the French without delay.
90
King
Ferdinand did likewise but approximately two and a half months
elapsed before the affair was settled completely.
91
The question of the restoration to France of Napoleon's body
was another matter which attracted the attention of diplomats at
London and Paris in May, 1840.
" The King consents to trans-
port the remains of Napoleon from St. Helena to the Invalides, in
Paris,'
" Thiers wrote to Guizot, May 4. " 'He is as anxious on
this point as I am, and that is not speaking lightly. The consent
of the English Cabinet must be obtained. I do not know how it
can be honorably withheld. ... If England gives us what we
require, she will set the seal of her reconciliation with France; the
entire past of fifty years will be abolished; the effect, in her favor,
in France will be enormous. It is under this point of view that
the matter must be proposed. A refusal on the contrary would
produce an injurious impression. I do not, and I cannot expect
it; . . .'
" 2 Thiers was not destined to be disappointed on this
occasion for when Guizot brought the matter to the attention of
Lord Palmerston, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs granted
his consent immediately.
93
While the attention of the diplomats in western Europe was
being directed momentarily from Turco-Egyptian affairs, an event
which was destined to have important consequences occurred at
Constantinople. That event was the dismissal of the Grand Vizier,
Kosrew Pasha. Kosrew always had been an uncompromising
opponent of Mehemet AH. When the latter, who had declared per-
"Ibid., pp. 97-98. The Times, April 23, 24, 30, 1840.
M
See, Thiers to Granville, July 5, 1840; Guizot to Palmerston, July 7,
1840; Palmerston to Guizot, July 7, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 426-429.
"Ibid., pp. 106-108.
K
Ibid., pp. HI-II2, Irving, op. cit., p. 25. On May 13, Palmerston wrote to
his brother William: "'The French Government have asked us for leave to
bring over from St. Helena the remains of Bonaparte, and we have given them
permission to do so. This is a thoroughly French request, but it would have been
foolish in us not to have granted it; and we have therefore made a merit of
doing so readily and with a good grace.'" Palmerston to Temple, May 13,
1840. Bulwer, op. cit., Ill, p. 39. See also Broughton, op. cit., V, pp. 265, 267.
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sistently that he would not be satisfied unless he received Egypt,
Syria, and Adana in hereditary possession9 * and who must have
foreseen that he would not attain his ends if he placed his trust
in the mediatory efforts of the Concert of Europe,
95 had exerted
himself to persuade the Ottoman government to enter into direct
negotiations,
90 the Grand Vizier, seconded ably by Halil and
Reschid Pashas, had refused to listen to his proposals. There
was, however, a faction at Constantinople, headed by the mother of
the Sultan, which advised that the Viceroy's advances should be
received favorably,
97 and as the anxiety of the Porte to come to
terms with its vassal had increased with the passing of time, the
influence of this faction had increased in a corresponding manner.
Consequently, many who were familiar with the situation at the
Turkish capital looked upon the downfall of Kosrew as having
been occasioned by the insidious intrigues of the Sultana Mother
and her friends who were accused of being in alliance with the
Pasha.98 Those suspicions may have been false99 but it should
"See, The Times, Oct. 24, 1839. Campbell to Palmerston, Sept. 26, 1839,
Werther to Palmerston, Nov. 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 434-435,
491. Adana, Mehemet AH maintained, was "the door to his house" which he
never could be willing to surrender. Campbell to Ponsonby, Oct. 19, 1839;
Medem to Nesselrode, Oct. 8/20, 1839, ibid., pp. 479-480, 503.
"Col. Hodges, the British Consul-General, took special care to impress
upon the Pasha that the Powers would not tolerate his pretensions. See Hodges
to Palmerston, Dec. 30, 1839, Jan. 4, 6, 13, 14, 16, 23, 24, 1840, ibid., pp.
574-576, 585-589. Paton, op. cit., II, pp. 167-173. Mehemet AH was aroused
greatly by the attitude which the British Consul-General assumed and he
accused England of desiring to occupy Egypt in order "to make of it a station
on the road to India." See, a letter from Alexandria, Jan. 17, 1840, The
Examiner, Feb. 16, 1840, p. 105. Letter from Alexandria, Jan. 16, 1840,
published in The Augsburg Gazette, Feb. 14, 1840, and copied in The Times,
Feb. 20, 1840, and The Examiner, Feb. 23, 1840. Guichen, op. cit., pp. 219 ff.
M
See, Mehemet AH to Grand Vizier [no date given. Rec'd. at Constanti-
nople, Sept. 24, 1839], Feb. 23, 1840; Ponsonby to Palmerston, March II, 1840,
and an Inclosure, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 431-432, 611-613, 615. Letter
from Alexandria, Oct. 17, 1839, The Times, Nov. 8, 1839.
97
Ponsonby to Palmerston, Oct. I, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 434.
Guichen, op. cit., p. 298. Hall, op. cit., p. 272.
98
F. 0. Turkey 405, Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 1840, cited by
ibid., p. 272, Annual Register, 1840, p. [189].
MSee an extract from a despatch written by Pontois to the French Cabinet,
May 17, 1840, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 204.
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be noted, nevertheless, that when Mehemet AH learned of the fall
of his old enemy he declared at once to Cochelet, who had brought
the first news of it to him, that the last obstacle to a satisfactory
conclusion of his quarrel with the Sultan had been removed. He
would, he announced, forthwith send back to his sovereign the
Turkish fleet, and Sami Bey, his confidential Secretary, would pro-
ceed without delay to Constantinople to make the necessary
arrangements.
100
Before the news of the overthrow of Kosrew Pasha reached
western Europe Chekib Effendi arrived at London. While Chekib
did not know that the Grand Vizier had been dismissed, he did
know that the unsettled state of affairs in the Near East was very
embarrassing to the Ottoman government. He had hoped, he
wrote to the representatives of the five Courts on May 31, 1840,
promptly after his arrival, to find the Turco-Egyptian question
solved. It was with the deepest regret that he discovered it was
not, for the Turkish Empire was in a very critical position and
the necessity for a solution of this question was becoming daily
more urgent. The Powers, he pleaded, should redouble their
"generous efforts" in order to put an end to an evil which was
increasing continually and which threatened the peace of the
East.101
The diplomats at London, it appears, were convinced by
Chekib's note that there was real danger in further delay. Guizot,
on transmitting a copy of it to Thiers, stated :
"
'If your Excel-
lency . . . judges it [Chekib's note] of a nature to require new
instructions, I beg you to forward them at once . . . evidently
the matter is about to receive an impulse which, without perhaps
leading to a definite result, will for some days at least, be strong
100See an extract from a despatch, Cochelet to Thiers, May 26, 1840, quoted
by ibid., pp. 205-206. No one perhaps was more alarmed by these developments
in the Near East than Lord Ponsonby. He even threatened to resign if his
advice regarding the coercion of Mehemet AH was not followed, and he sent
his Dragoman, Pisani, to London to make an oral report to Palmerston upon the
extremely serious situation in Turkey. See Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 153. See
also F. 0. Turkey, 394, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840, quoted in
Cambridge Hist, of Br. For. Policy, II, pp. 639-640.
10IChekib Effendi to Palmerston, May 31, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I,
pp. 658-660. Chekib Effendi to Guizot, May 31, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp.
441-443. See also, ibid., pp. 190-191.
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and pressing. Everyone is now convinced that there is, for the
Ottoman Empire, danger in delay; . . .'
"102
Thiers, however, who even hoped that the Sultan, because of his
increasing embarrassments, at length would agree to conclude
a settlement direct with the Viceroy, was not alarmed by the
situation of affairs in the Levant and did not believe that the
French government should alter its policy.
"
'I see but one course
to follow,'
" he wrote in reply to Guizot,
"
'it is to answer this
[Chekib's] note as [you did] that of Nouri Effendi. Acknowledge
its reception by saying that France is ready, as ever, to listen to
the proposals for settlement that may be made, and to take the
part in them to which she is in some measure compelled by the
friendly interest she has ever evinced towards the Porte. We
must not seem to abjure the note of July 27, 1839; . . . But say
nothing whatever of that deplorable engagement to terminate the
Eastern question [by a concerted action] between the five
[Powers].'"103
Although the government of France did hold firmly to the
position which it had maintained previously, the representatives
of the four Powers did not abandon at once their hope of finding
some plan of procedure in regard to Eastern affairs by which all
of the five great nations of Europe might be united. Neumann
and von Billow, true to the policies which they had followed in
April and May, 1840, were particularly active in their search for
such a plan. The former had not received, as yet, an answer to
the proposal he had made to Guizot on May 5, but he must
have perceived that that proposal was doomed to be rejected. At
any rate he was willing to make additional concessions.
"
'If
Mehemet Ali must have Syria, let him have it,'
" he declared to
the French Ambassador, June 12, 1840,
"
'not hereditarily, no,
that cannot be; it would be too much opposed to the principle of
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, Mehemet Ali must
give up the district of Adana; the Porte requires it for its safety.
But let us finish this business. I suspect that Lord Palmerston
wishes to wait, to delay, that he expects that, at some later period,
Ibid., p. 191.
103
Ibid., p. 208. See also, Thiers to Guizot, June II, 1840, quoted by ibid.,
pp. 194-195. Guizot's reply to Chekib, June 21, 1840, conformed with Thiers'
instructions. See a copy of it in ibid., p. 443-444.
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... he will conclude the affair in a manner more conformable to
his views. Meanwhile the mischief increases, the danger presses;
it is now clear that prolonged doubt injures the Sultan more than
the Pasha, and all threatens a crisis which nobody desires.'
"104
The Prussian Envoy adopted an attitude similar to that of his
Austrian colleague.
"
'M. de Neumann and M. de Billow/
"
Guizot wrote to Thiers, June 15, 1840, "are again ready to leave
to the Pasha Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life, provided that
he restores Adana and Candia.' "105 Baron Brunnow, even, Guizot
believed, being anxious that the affairs of the Near East should
be regulated by the Powers in concert, was ready to be more con-
ciliatory in his attitude towards France.106
Thiers hestitated. The willingness of the German diplomats to
make additional concessions and the conciliatory attitude of
Brunnow seemed to prove to him that ultimately he would carry
his point.
107 "
'Certainly,'
" he replied to Louis Philippe's Ambas-
sador at London, June 19, 1840,
"
'if it were agreed to yield
Syria, (comma) and Egypt hereditarily to the Pasha, the five
Powers would then act reasonably, and we should make great
efforts to succeed. But the Pasha's head is inflated,108 and we are
sure of nothing with him.'
"109
lot
lbid., p. 198.
lm
lbid., p. 201.
106
See an account of an interview between Brunnow and Guizot, June II,
1840, ibid., pp. 196-197. Brunnow, it seems, had received instructions from St.
Petersburg urging him to speed up the negotiations. See Hasenclever, op. cit.,
P- 154-
107
Thiers was interested particularly in Brunnow's attitude,
"
'which could
only be ascribed to disasters in Circassia.'
" "
'It was clear,'
" he declared,
"
'that
Russia was not ready to embark upon serious operations elsewhere.'
"
Affaires
etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Thiers to Guizot, June 16, 1840, quoted by Hall,
op. cit., pp. 267-268. Thiers was probably influenced by the reports which he
had received from Barante. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 290292.
108The Viceroy, determined that his demands should be conceded, was
preparing actively for war. See, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 682-683.
109
Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 201. Guizot was troubled by the comma which
Thiers inserted after the word "Syria" and wrote to him asking an explanation.
Thiers replied, June 30, 1840: "'Ma virgule ne signifiait rien . . . je voulais
parler de 1'Egypte hereditaire et de la Syrie hereditaire.'
"
Ibid., p. 203. Thiers
undoubtedly was led by his reports from Cochelet to believe that the Pasha
would not accept less favorable terms. See Guichen, op. cit., p. 297.
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Regardless of the fact that Baron Brunnow maintained a con-
ciliatory attitude towards France while he was conversing with
M. Guizot, he was determined that the final arrangement which
the Powers should enter into for the settlement of the Turco-
Egyptian question should be on the basis of the Anglo-Russian
terms. It was preferable even, according to his opinion, to do
nothing at all rather than to conclude a bad arrangement like the
one which was advocated by France.110
Palmerston's views were similar to those of the Russian Envoy
Extraordinary. When the Austrian and Prussian diplomats,
alarmed by the reports which they had received concerning affairs
in Turkey, had talked about further concessions, he had talked
about delaying and had persisted in the belief that time was
"
'pour le Sultan?
"11X On June 12, 1840, after it was known at
London that Kosrew Pasha had fallen and after Brunnow had re-
ceived instructions from St. Petersburg ordering him to speed up
the negotiations, Palmerston, who then must also have been willing
that matters should be hurried to a conclusion, informed Guizot
that he wished to know the "
'positive opinion of the French
government'
"
upon Neumann's proposal of May 5 to which
he (Palmerston) had given his consent.112 Guizot, hesitating to
reply on his own responsibility, transmitted this request to his
superiors at Paris.
113
Thiers, answering on June 16, declared:
"
'We could not suggest it [Neumann's proposal] to Mehemet AH;
he would refuse it, and we could not refute his arguments which
we should ourselves consider to be sound and well founded.' "114
Palmerston, undoubtedly, was not surprised to learn that the
French government rejected the Austrian proposition. On June
15 he had received a despatch written by Granville on the I2th
which revealed that Thiers continued to insist upon a settlement
""Vienna Archives, England 295, Neumann to Metternich, June 26, 1840,
quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 157, [footnote].
lu
Berlin Archives, vol. II, Billow to Frederick William III, June 5, 1840,
quoted by ibid., p. 152, [footnote]. See also, Palmerston to Neumann, June II,
1840, quoted by Treitschke, op. cit., V. p. 74.
"'Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 199-200.
lbid., p. 200.
U4
Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Thiers to Guizot, June 16, 1840, quoted
by Hall, op. cit., pp. 267-268.
154 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [480
which Mehemet AH would accept willingly.115 "The arrangement
which M. Thiers holds out," he remarked dryly, in his reply to
Granville, . . . "is the very arrangement which has actually been
in existence for the last six years."
118
At the same time when it was becoming apparent that France
would not abandon her demand for a settlement which would
be acceptable to the Viceroy, news from the East which aided in
bringing matters to a climax, arrived at London. The announce-
ment of the downfall of Kosrew Pasha was made at the British
capital early in June.
117 About the middle of the month Count
Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, learned from French
sources that the Viceroy had declared to Cochelet, when the latter
announced the dismissal of Kosrew to him, that, he would return
the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan and that he would send Sami Bey
upon a special mission to Constantinople. Apponyi reported this
intelligence to Neumann on June 16, the same day on which
Thiers forwarded to London his refusal to accept the Austrian
proposal to divide Syria between Mehemet AH and the Sultan.118
Its effect was immediate. Lord Palmerston and the three other
plenipotentiaries, according to Guizot, saw in it nothing more, or
at least they were determined that they had a right to see in it
nothing more than an act long concerted between the Pasha and
France. They looked upon the step which Mehemet AH had taken,
and its success, first, as threatening the ruin of the note of July
27, 1839, and of the common action of the five Powers; and
secondly, as the complete and personal triumph of France at
Alexandria and Constantinople.119
" '
. . . those who, in the hope
of obtaining the common action of the five Powers,'
" he wrote to
U5
Granville to Palmerston, June 12, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 665.
"'Palmerston to Granville, June 26, 1840, ibid., pp. 666-667.
"The Russians were alarmed greatly by the fall of Kosrew. See, Nesselrode
to Meyendorff, June 27, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, p. 29. At London
Brunnow declared to Neumann and Billow: " 'qu'a la verite, le moment pour-
rait prochainement arriver, ou il aurait a annoncer que le cabinet Imperial
voyant que la negociation de Londres ne mene a aucun resultat et que la crise
augmente en Orient se reserve la faculte d'agir a elle seule, selon les circon-
stances.'
"
Berlin Archives, vol. n, Billow to Frederick William III, June 19,
1840, quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 154, [footnote].
118Guizot to Thiers, July n, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 212.
Ibid., pp. 211-218.
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Thiers,
"
'promoted a settlement founded on the concession of
Egypt in hereditary sovereignty, and Syria for life [to Mehemet
AH], have paused in their endeavors, and seem to have renounced
them entirely.'
" 12 The despatch from which this extract has
been copied was written on July n, 1840. It was not the first
warning which Guizot had given to his government. As early as
June 24, he had stated that
"
'Lord Palmerston, profiting by
the disappointed hopes and discontent of his colleagues and the
other plenipotentiaries, might suddenly reengage them in his sys-
tem, and induce them to adopt, all four together, his project for
withdrawing Syria from the Pasha, and the employment, if neces-
sary, of coercive measures.'
"121
Thiers, however, believed that his hope of seeing a direct ar-
rangement concluded between the Sultan and the Pasha was about
to be realized. On June 30, 1840, after he received a telegraphic
despatch from Cochelet122 which announced that Mehemet AH,
true to his former promises, had ordered Sami Bey to repair to
Constantinople
"
'to offer to the Sultan the homage of his de-
votion, and to request his orders for the return of the Turkish
fleet,'" the President of the French Cabinet wrote to Guizot:
"
'We must [appear to] infer from this intelligence, without too
much zeal and without drawing too much attention to it, that a
spontaneous arrangement . . . , between the sovereign and the
vassal, would be the best of all solutions. The Pasha thinks that
the impulse of feeling to which he yields will be reciprocated, and
that a treaty will follow immediately. He believes . . . that the
hereditary rule over Egypt and Syria will be granted to him; he
says nothing with respect to Candia, Adana, [and] the Holy
Cities, and when told he must make sacrifices in order to obtain
an immediate [and] direct settlement, he replies: "Be at your
ease, everything will be arranged." ... at Constantinople, it was
thought, at the date of the latest news, that the restoration of the
fleet would produce a great effect upon the Divan, and that liberal
concessions might ensue . . . Such a state of affairs ought to sug-
"Ibid., p. 213.
121Guizot to Thiers, June 24, 1840, quoted by ibid., p. 202.
^A telegraphic despatch from Cochelet, June 16, 1840, quoted by ibid.,
p. 208.
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gest many arguments against any conclusive decision at
London.' "123
Nevertheless, Thiers did realize that it was necessary to act with
caution. " 'I have written to Alexandria and to Constantinople
recommending moderation on both sides/
" he mentioned in his
despatch to Guizot;
"
'but I have given advice only, and have
been careful to restrain our agents from any participation on their
own responsibility, and as a French undertaking, in a treaty hav-
ing for its object this direct arrangement. Should such an attempt
be imputed to us, you may deny it. Young Eugene Perier has
been sent to Alexandria to remonstrate most urgently with the
Pasha, if he should incline to pause, and if, after having offered the
fleet, he should retract his word, and become unaccommodating
in the general conditions of the treaty. I have even counseled him
[Mehemet Ali] to accept Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life.'
"124
In another despatch written on June 30, 1840, Thiers remarked
hesitatingly: "'I have consulted the Cabinet; they deliberate,
they incline a little towards a concession. Meanwhile we shall see.
Delay explaining yourself. We must wait for a short time. Noth-
ing is decided.'
"125
While Thiers and Guizot were corresponding thus the repre-
sentatives of the four Powers, being alarmed by the reports con-
cerning developments in the Levant, and, in addition, being dis-
satisfied because they believed Thiers had submitted Neumann's
proposal of May 5 to Mehemet Ali before he had answered it,126
were preparing for action. On June 21 and 28, two successive
Sundays, they met secretly at Palmerston's home and came to
terms about the elements of a treaty, for the rescue of the Sultan,
Ibid., pp. 208-209.
*Ibid., p. 210. See also, Granville to Palmerston, July 17, 1840, Levant
Correspondence, II, p. 7. Perier arrived in Egypt July 15, 1840. Mehemet Ali
refused to be influenced by his representations. See, Hodges to Palmerston, July
16, 23, 26, 1840, ibid., pp. 70-72, 76-77. The Times, Aug. 15, 20, 1840.
m
Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 203.
""On July 21, 1840, Palmerston wrote a long despatch to Granville in which
he defended the policy followed by the four Powers. In that despatch he pointed
out: "They [Neumann, Billow, and Brunnow] said that this [the fact referred
to above] seemed to them to render any further negotiation with France on
these matters impossible, because it turned out that it was not France, but
Mehemet Ali, with whom the negotiation was to be carried on." Levant
Correspondence, II, pp. 8-10.
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to which France would not be a party.127 Still, a formal decision
was postponed.
Before the British Minister of Foreign Affairs could sign a
treaty it was necessary that he should secure the consent to it of
his colleagues in the Cabinet. Many of those colleagues were un-
willing that England should enter into any arrangement which
might occasion a break in the Anglo-French alliance. A close
understanding with the government of Louis Philippe, they be-
lieved, was an essential element of Britain's foreign policy.
128
Consequently, they balked when Palmerston proposed to the
Cabinet that England should join with the three Eastern Courts
without France to conclude with the Porte a convention for the
pacification of the Levant.
Palmerston, exasperated because of the objections of his col-
leagues, determined that he either would carry his point or that
he would resign.
"
'The difference of opinion which seems to exist
between myself and some members of the Cabinet upon the Tur-
kish question, and the extreme importance which I attach to that
question,'" he stated to Melbourne, July 5, 1840, "'have led me,
upon full consideration, to the conviction that it is a duty which
I owe to myself and to my colleagues to relieve you and others
from the necessity of deciding between my views and those of
other members of the Cabinet on these matters, by placing, as I
now do, my office at your disposal."'129 The British Minister
recapitulated, in his letter, the history of the Turco-Egyptian ques-
tion, and furthermore explained why he was determined that his
"7
Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 156-160. Treitschke, op. cit., V, p. 75.
^Note the following extract from Guizot's Memoires: "Parmi les collegues
de lord Palmerston, lord Holland, lord Lansdowne, lord John Russell et lord
Minto etaient ceux avec qui j'avais les relations les plus frequentes et les plus
libres. Lord Holland, d'un esprit charmant, d'un coeur genereux et d'un caractere
aussi aimable que son esprit, etait 1'ami declare de la France, 1'hote bienveillant
des visiteurs frangais en Angleterre, le partisan perseverant de 1'alliance des deux
pays, et il se plaisait a manifester, en toute occasion, ses sentiments . . . ce fut
a Holland-House que j'allai chercher et que je trouvai les plus nobles plaisirs
de la conversation et de la vie sociale. Lord Lansdowne et lord John Russell
etaient moins expansifs, mais egalement sinceres dans leurs liberates et bien-
villantes dispositions envers la France:" Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 50-51. See also,
ibid., pp. 67-68, 191-193. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, April 13, June 27, 1840,
Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 19-22, 29.
""Palmerston to Melbourne, July 5, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 356 ff.
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policy should triumph.
"
'The immediate result of our declining
to go on with the three Powers because France does not join us/
"
he declared,
"
'will be, that Russia will withdraw her offers to
unite herself with the other Powers for a settlement of the affairs
of Turkey, and she will again resiime her separate and isolated
position with respect to those affairs; and you will have the
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi renewed under some still more objection-
able form. We shall thus lose the advantages on this point which
it has required long-continued and complicated efforts on our part
to gain, and England will, by her own voluntary and deliberate
act, re-establish that separate protectorship of Russia over Turkey,
the existence of which has long been the object of well-founded
jealousy and apprehension to the other Powers of Europe.
"
'The ultimate results of such a decision will be the practical
division of the Turkish empire into two separate and independent
states, whereof one will be the dependency of France, and the
other a satellite of Russia; and in both of which our political in-
fluence will be annulled, and our commercial interests will be
sacrificed', . . .'
" 13
Fortunately for the success of Palmerston's policy, several
despatches from Colonel Hodges were received at London, July
5, 1840, the same day the letter, a part of which has just been
quoted, was written, announcing that a revolt against the author-
Ibid., pp. 359-360. See also Appendix B, and Palmerston to Melbourne,
July 6, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 361-363. It is interesting, at least, that, a
few days before Palmerston wrote these letters to Melbourne, an article appeared
in the Morning Chronicle, Palmerston's organ, describing a project for the estab-
lishment of extensive steamship communications through Egypt to India. The
following is an extract from a French translation of it which appeared in the
Journal des Debats, July 4, 1840:
"
'On parle de la prochaine formation d'une
compagnie autorise'e par une charte royale pour etablir une communication, au
moyen de navires a vapeur, entre 1'Angleterre et Calcutta, Madras et Ceylan.
Les experiences faites par la compagnie des Indes a Bombay ne laissent aucun
doute sur la reussite du plan propose qui serait d'une importance immense pour
notre commerce avec 1'Inde. ... la compagnie de navigation a la vapeur avec
PInde propose d'etablir une ligne complete de communication a travers PEgypte,
de 1'Angleterre a Calcutta, Madras et Ceylan; . . . Cette nouvelle compagnie
se propose d'avoir un surintendant et des agens qui resideront en Egypte, pour
expediar les passagers a travers PEgypte.'
"
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ity of Mehemet AH had broken out in Syria.131 The "Maronites,
the Druses, and the Mutualis" of Mount Lebanon all had taken
up arms.
132 The Pasha had adopted measures to quell the dis-
turbances. He was ready to offer concessions. The Maronites,
Hodges believed, might be calmed for the moment, but the others
"were still full of dissatisfaction." This news arriving at a most
opportune time seemed to prove that Mehemet Ali would not be
able to resist seriously the fulfillment of the terms which the
plenipotentiaries of the four Powers proposed to enforce upon
him. Ibrahim Pasha, the dissenting members of the British Cab-
inet must have foreseen, would not dare to march upon Constan-
tinople, for with Syria in revolt and the Mediterranean dominated
by an Anglo-Austrian fleet it would be impossible for him to ad-
vance and at the same time keep open his necessary communica-
tions with Egypt. At any rate, all excepting Lord Holland and
Lord Clarendon, the two who were opposed most violently to
risking a break with France,
133 consented finally to agree to the
conclusion of a treaty
134
as outlined by Palmerston and the repre-
sentatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.135
Guizot, it will be recalled, had realized, when it became known
at London that Kosrew Pasha had fallen and that Mehemet Ali
was preparing to carry on negotiations direct with the Porte, that
131
Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 20, 1840. Levant Correspondence, I,
pp. 674-677, 678-679, 680-681, 681-682. See also, Guizot to Mme. Guizot, July
22, 1840, DeWitt, op. cit., p. 199.
""These revolts, it appears, were occasioned by the attempt of the Egyp-
tians to enforce conscription upon the Syrians and by the intrigues of British
agents. See, Hodges to Palmerston, June 19, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I,
pp. 680-681. Armagnac, Nezib et Beyrouth, souvenirs d"Orient, de 1833 a 1841,
pp. 223-269. A. Laurent, Relation historique des affaires de Syrie, depuis 1840
jusqu'en 184.2, I, pp. 18-42. Letter from Constantinople, June 28, 1840, The
Times, July 18, 1840.
m
Greville, Memoirs (Series 2), I, pp. 258-259, 261-262, 268.
M4Much credit for influencing the members of the Cabinet to agree to Palm-
erston's proposal was due to Lord John Russell. See, Palmerston to Russell,
Dec. 4, 1840, S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I, p. 362. J. Russell,
Recollections and Suggestions, pp. 223-224.
135On July 8, 1840, Palmerston announced to the plenipotentiaries of Aus-
tria, Prussia, and Russia that he had won the consent of the Cabinet to the
plan of concluding a treaty without the concurrence of France. See, Hasen-
clever, op. cit., pp. 160-163. Broughton, op. cit., V, pp. 276-277.
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the envoys of the four Powers might abandon all hope of coming
to an understanding with France and that they might agree to act
without her. He saw that the affair was " 'in a state of crisis,'
"18e
but he did not see that it was nearing a conclusion.
"
'Extreme re-
serve has been practiced for some days/
" he reported to Thiers,
July 14,
"
'. . . I know that Chekib Effendi has had several
long interviews with Lord Palmerston, particularly one on Sunday.
Propositions are preparing, both as to the settlement of the affair
and the mode of action, which will be communicated to us when
all is arranged (should all be arranged) to obtain either our ad-
hesion or refusal.' "137 It is evident that he was imbued with the
erroneous belief that time was not pressing, that France ran no
risk in further delay, and that if the four Powers did agree upon
some course of action they at least would go through the form of
presenting their plans to France for her
"
'adhesion or refusal' "
before they entered into them formally.138
While Guizot was consoling himself with a false impression con-
cerning the situation of affairs, the plenipotentiaries of England,
Austria, Prussia, and Russia, influenced by fresh news from the
Levant139 and encouraged by the victory which Palmerston had
won over his dissenting colleagues in the Cabinet, were pushing
forward energetically their secret negotiations.
140
Finally, on July
""Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 216.
Ibid., pp. 219-220.
138
It appears that Guizot's friend, the Princess de Lieven, who had arrived
in England June 22 on a mission "de vendre ses diamants et de voir ses amis"
was misled in a conversation which she had with von Billow to believe that there
was no danger of a convention being concluded by the four Powers immediately,
and that "a day or two before July 15," she passed this mistaken belief on to
Guizot. See, DeWitt, op. cit., p. 195. E. Daudet, Une vie d'ambassadrice au
sitclf dernier, pp. 305-314. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English His-
torical Review, XVIII, p. 129. Duchesse de Dino, Chronique de 1831-1862, II,
PP- 347, 35I-352-
138On July 7, 10, 12, 1840, additional information about the revolt in Syria
was received at London. See, Hodges to Palmerston, June 6, 16, 1840; Chekib to
Palmerston, July 7, 1840; Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840; Moore to
Ponsonby, June 10, 1840; Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 671-674, 683-684,
686-687.
"The following was Palmerston's explanation to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843,
for having kept these negotiations secret: "... when at last we found it cer-
tain that she [France] would not act with us [the four Powers] we did not
think it prudent to let her into our counsels, for fear she should thwart us by
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15, 1840, their deliberations having proved successful, they
signed, without consulting the representative of France, a conven-
tion for the pacification of the Levant. That convention, which in
form was concluded between the representatives of the four Pow-
ers on the one part and the envoy of the Sublime Porte on the
other, consisted of five articles and a "Separate Act," and it was
accompanied by a "Protocol" and a "Reserved Protocol." The
conditions which the Powers proposed to force upon the Viceroy
were named in the separate act. "His Highness [the Sultan]," it
was provided therein, "promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for him-
self and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration
of the Pashalic of Egypt; and ... to grant to Mehemet Ali for
his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of
the fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern
part of Syria, . . .
"The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto
the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space
of 10 days after communication thereof shall have been made to
him at Alexandria, by an agent of His Highness; . . .
"If within the space of 10 days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali
should not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan
will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pash-
alic of Acre; but His Highness will still consent to grant to
Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line,
the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt, provided such offer be
accepted within the space of the 10 days next following, . . .
"If, at the expiration of 20 days after the communication shall
have been made to him . . . Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the
proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pashalic
of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw
that offer, and to follow, in consequence, such ulterior course as his
own interests and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him."
The separate act provided also that the Pasha should surrender at
once the Turkish fleet; that he should pay to his overlord tribute
annually proportionate to the greater or less amount of territory
intriguing in Europe and by sending information to Egypt." English Historical
Review, XVIII, p. 130. See also, Metternich to Apponyi, Aug. 4, 1840, Metter-
nich, op. cit., VI, pp. 410-411. For an account of the final negotiations see
Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 163-170.
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over which he might obtain the administration, according as he
accepted "the first or the second alternative;" that all treaties and
all laws of his sovereign should be applicable to the pashalics under
his control; and that his military and naval forces, forming part of
the forces of the Ottoman Empire, should "always be considered
as maintained for the service of the State."141
By Articles I, II, and III, of the convention of July 15, 1840, the
Powers undertook to assist the Porte actively to reduce the Pasha
to submission in case he should refuse to accept the terms which
were to be communicated to him by the Sultan. Great Britain and
Austria would, in the meantime, order the commanders of their
fleets to assist the latter in cutting off the communication by sea
between Syria and Egypt and to afford, "in the name of the al-
liance, all the support and assistance in their power to those
subjects" of his in Syria who might "manifest their fidelity and
allegiance to their sovereign." Furthermore, if Mehemet AH
"should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the
High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan,
addressed to their representatives at Constantinople," would "pro-
vide for the defense of his Throne by means of a cooperation
agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two
Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the capi-
tal of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression."
Finally, by Article IV of the convention, the Powers agreed that,
although in the existing emergency it might be necessary to send
military and naval forces to defend Constantinople, in the future
they would conform to "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire,"
in virtue of which it had "in all times been prohibited for Ships
of War of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dar-
danelles and of the Bosphorus."142 Thus, almost a year after the
European diplomats at Constantinople had issued their famous
141
Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 1012-1015. Staff Papers, XXVIII, pp. 345 ff.
Noradounghian, op. cit., II, pp. 307 ff. Martens, Nouveau recueil general, I, pp.
1 60 ff. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 448 ff.
142
Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 1008-1012. State Papers, XXVIII, pp. 342 ff.
Noradounghian, op. cit., II, pp. 303 ff. Martens, N. R. G., I, pp. 156 ff. Annual
Register, 1840, pp. 446 ff. In the protocol of July 15, 1840 it was explained that
the Porte reserved to itself, as theretofore, to deliver passes to light vessels
under flag of war, which might be employed according to custom "for the
service of the correspondence of the legations of friendly Powers." State
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collective note to the Porte, an arrangement for the solution of the
Turco-Egyptian question was concluded. France, however, was
not a party to that arrangement, nor was she aware even of its
existence. Hence it still remained to be seen, not only whether
Mehemet Ali would accept the conditions imposed upon him by
the separate act of the convention of July 15, 1840, and whether
the four Powers would be able to coerce him effectively in case he
did not, but also what course the government of France would
follow when it became aware of what had been done.
Papers, XXVIII, p. 347. Martens, N. R. G., I, p. 162. Annual Register, 1840,
p. 450. In the reserved protocol it was laid down that inasmuch as the "state
of affairs in Syria, the interests of humanity," and the grave considerations of
European policy made it imperious that as far as possible all delay should be
avoided in the accomplishment of the pacification which the convention was
intended to effect, the "preliminary measures" to be taken by Austria and
Great Britain should be carried into execution at once "without waiting for
the exchange of ratifications." State Papers, XXVIII, p. 347. Martens,
N. R. G. I, p. 163. Annual Register, 1840, p. 451.
CHAPTER V
THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE
On July 17, 1840, Palmerston invited Guizot to call at the
British foreign office, where he read to him a memorandum ac-
quainting him with the convention which had been concluded.
Palmerston claimed in that memorandum that the Courts of
Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia had given to the gov-
ernment of France throughout the whole course of the negotia-
tions which had commenced in the autumn of the preceding year,
"the most reiterated, manifest, and indisputable proofs," not only
of their desire to arrive at a perfect understanding with it in regard
to the arrangements necessary to effect the pacification of the
Levant, but also of the great importance which they never had
failed to attach to the moral effect accruing from the union and
concurrence of the five Powers in a matter of such serious interest
and so intimately connected with the maintenance of peace in
Europe. They had seen, with the deepest regret, that all their
efforts to obtain the desired end had proved fruitless. Conse-
quently they had adopted the resolution of proceeding onward
without the cooperation of France and had concluded with the
Sultan a convention intended to solve in a satisfactory manner
the existing complications in the Levant.
1
After Palmerston had finished reading, Guizot immediately
objected to the arguments advanced in the memorandum in de-
fense of the course followed by the concert of the four Powers. In
reply to the Frenchman's objections the British Minister contended
that the plan of the arrangement which the plenipotentiaries
had signed was based on ideas suggested by Count Sebastiani in
September, 1839.
2 ^ Sebastiani had made such suggestions, Guizot
maintained, he had done so in his own "individual capacity" with-
out instructions or authority from his superiors at Paris, for no
trace of them could be found in the records of the French em-
bassy. They were made in a formal manner, Palmerston insisted.
^Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 1-2. Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 221 ff. Annual
Register, 1840, pp. 495 S.
^Sebastiani had suggested on his own responsibility, it will be remembered,
that Syria should be divided between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. See above,
footnote 15, Chapter IV.
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The mere absence of evidence concerning them in the published
records of the embassy did not afford conclusive proof that the
Count had had no authority for making them. Moreover, he
argued that it was impossible to separate the individual and the
public character of an ambassador in the manner implied by M.
Guizot, especially when that ambassador was speaking to a secre-
tary of state in an official interview, and in a conversation arising
over despatches which he had come to communicate from his
court. 3
The French Cabinet, on receiving intelligence concerning the
Treaty of London, felt not only "discontented and vexed" but also
"surprised and wounded."4 Thiers, in particular, was aroused be-
cause of the famous arrangement and on July 20, 1840, in answer
to a question that Henry Bulwer asked him concerning the French
fleet which had just sailed for Tunis, he declared: "'This is not
the time to ask or to give explanations: the alliance between
England and France is at an end. M. Guizot has received the
official intelligence, that an agreement has been come to by the
Four Powers, to which we have not even been asked to accede . . .
I cannot understand an alliance on small questions, and a differ-
ence on great ones. Should England separate from us on the
Eastern Question, such a separation will be a general one. France
will, as I have already said, isolate herself: she is confident in her
strength, and the more so as the Government has on this subject
the whole population of France behind it. Should an occasion,
therefore, arise on which the dignity or the interests of my country
call upon me to act, I will do so without fear and with decision.
I regret it deeply; but I cannot but see in the state of affairs, as
now announced to me, eventualities which may disturb the peace
of Europe.'
" 5 A day later Thiers wrote to Guizot admitting that
"Palmerston to Bulwer, July 22, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 10-13.
4
Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 228.
5Bulwer to Palmerston, July 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 7-8.
Annual Register, 1840, p. 498. On July 26, 1840, Bulwer conferred again with
Thiers. Thiers asked the British charge d'affaires on that occasion if England
wished anything for herself in the Levant. In Syria, he declared, she "might
have points to desire" for the "sake of the communication with the East
Indies," and therefore the suspicion of the French people concerning the inten-
tions of Great Britain, though possibly erroneous, were more justifiable [than
those which the English people entertained in regard to France]. Bulwer to
Palmerston, July 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 37-40.
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he was surprised greatly because of the turn which affairs had
taken. The government, he stated, had expected that the agitation
which for several days had manifested itself in the English Cabinet
would end in a proposition, similar to the one which Neumann had
suggested on June 12, leaving to France the choice of associating
herself or not with the four Powers for the execution of that pro-
position.
6 On the same date he forwarded to the French Ambas-
sador a formal note in reply to Palmerston's memorandum of
July 17, 1840. He enumerated in that note problems which he
believed would arise when the four Powers attempted to carry out
the provisions of the treaty of July 15, and he gave warning
that henceforth France could not be influenced save by what she
owed "to peace" and "to herself." The conduct which she would
maintain in the serious circumstances in which the four Powers
had just placed Europe would depend upon the solution which
would "be given to all the questions which she had pointed out."7
When it became known publicly in France that the four Powers
had concluded a convention which they had kept secret from the
Ministers of Louis Philippe a wave of indignation swept through-
out the country.
8 The excitement was intense particularly in the
capital. "Anger and surprise run mountain high in Paris," a cor-
respondent of an English journal wrote at the time. "That Eng-
land should join hands with Russia, though but for a special pur-
pose, and in a direct defiance of France, was an event that, from
M. Thiers down to the shoe black at the corner of the street, no
Frenchman could have believed."9 The Bourse was panic
stricken10 and almost the whole of the public press, led by the
*Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 230. See also Affaires etrangeres 655 Angleterre,
Thiers to Guizot (undated) quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 282.
''Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 18-19. Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 231-235.
Annual Register, 1840, pp. 498-500.
80n Aug. 10, 1840, the Duchesse de Dino wrote in her Chronique: "Toutes
mes correspondances sont a la guerre, d'une fagon qui me desole." Dino, op. cit.,
II, p. 347. See also an extract from a letter, Lavergne to Guizot, July 30, 1840,
quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 250. Bulwer to Palmerston, July 27, 1840,
Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 41-42. Raikes to Wellington, July 31, 1840, T.
Raikes, Private Correspondence, p. 142. Leopold to Metternich, Aug., 1840,
quoted by Corti, op. cit., p. 127.
*The Examiner, Aug. 2, 1840, p. 483.
10The rise and fall of the French Bourse were significant for those variations
were due largely to the changes in public sentiment in France. See Appendix A.
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Constitutionnel and the Courrier Fran$ais, both ministerial organs,
maintained that the Treaty of London was an insult and an outrage
put upon their nation, and they called loudly for war "war to the
knife" with
"perfidious Albion."
11 Even the conservative Journal
des Debats spoke defiantly. Although it did not despair for the
maintenance of peace, it did not shrink back from the possibility
of war. The French singlehanded, it believed, could carry on hos-
tilities to advantage. If war did break out it would be terrible, but
France, who had not provoked it, who had done "all that her
honor would permit her to do to prevent it," would throw herself
into the struggle "tout entiere."
12
Thiers and Louis Philippe,13 who must have been encouraged
by the bellicose clamor which was raised in Prance, determined
directly not only that they would follow a policy of isolation but
also that they would make extensive preparations for war.
"
'. . . it will be necessary to choose the moment to act in order to
throw ourselves into a cleft and to break up the coalition,'
" Thiers
informed Guizot, July 21, 1840,
"
'. . . we must assume our position
and watch events with coolness. The King is perfectly calm; we
[the Cabinet] too are the same. Without any stir, we intend to
make preparations solid rather than apparent. We shall make
them apparent if the situation requires it and if respect for public
opinion renders it desirable.'
"14 Soon thereafter an officer was ap-
pointed to draw up detailed plans for the fortification of Paris,15
an extraordinary credit of 8,120,000 francs for the marine was
decreed16 and the men belonging to the classes of 1836 and 1839
were called into military service.
17
Furthermore, steps were taken
uThe Times, July 31, Aug. i, 3, 10, 12, 13, 17, 1840. Annual Register, 1840,
p. [172].
u
Journal des Debats, July 29, 1840. See extracts from other French journals
quoted in Guichen, op. cit., pp. 342-343.
"Note the following statement which was written Aug. 8, 1840: "On dit
que, dans cette question [of the attitude of France to the Treaty of London],
le Roi des Frangais est absolument d'accord avec M. Thiers, et qu'il a dit qu'il
preferait la guerre a la revolution." Dino, op. cit., II, p. 345.
"Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 251.
K
Ibid., VI, pp. 25-26.
"Royal Ordinance, July 29-Aug. 5, 1840, J. B. Duvergier, Collection complete
des lois, decrets, etc., XL, pp. 263-264.
"Royal Ordinances, July 29-Aug. 5, 1840, ibid., p. 264. Granville to
Palmerston, Aug. I, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 60.
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in diplomacy to persuade Austria and Prussia to refuse to ratify
the treaty of July 15, i84o;
18 Admiral Pontois, the French Am-
bassador at Constantinople, was instructed to make energetic re-
presentations to the Porte in order to influence it to grant to the
Viceroy terms more liberal than those agreed upon by the repre-
sentatives of the four Powers;
19 and Count Walewski, a natural
son of Napoleon, was sent on a special mission to Alexandria with
the aim of inducing the Pasha, on his part, either to accept terms
which it was thought Pontois would succeed in persuading the
Porte to grant or to give to the government of France power to
negotiate in his behalf with the concert of the four Powers.20
Neither the threatening attitude of the French government nor
the blustering of the Paris press had any noticeable influence upon
Lord Palmerston. The warlike measures which the former had
adopted were entirely uncalled for, he stated in a despatch to
Granville, August 4, 1840. They could be looked upon only as a
gratuitous affront to the four Powers. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's
government did not intend to take any notice of them. It would
not ask for explanations; nor would it apply to Parliament for any
additional vote of credit. To do either one or the other would be
to give to the strange proceedings of the French government an
importance which it did not deserve. The British naval forces in
the Mediterranean, Palmerston believed, would be quite strong
enough to do everything which could be required of them in pur-
suance of the engagements of the treaty of July 15, 1840. The
"Bloomfield to Palmerston, Aug. 15, 1840, ibid., p. 89. See also No. 16,
Appendix D.
"The representations which Pontois actually made to the Porte were later
the subject of a controversy between the French and allied diplomats. Ponsonby
and the Austrian envoy Sturmer accused Pontois of having directly threatened
the Porte that, in case the treaty of July 15 was carried into execution through
armed intervention against the Pasha, France would "join its efforts" with
Mehemet AH to raise the populations of Asia and Europe against the existing
administration of Turkey, of which the French government proclaimed itself "the
enemy." Pontois later denied that he had indulged in such threats, and both
Guizot and Thiers, when questioned by British and Austrian Ministers, denied
that he had been instructed to do so. See Sturmer to Metternich, Aug. 17,
1840; Palmerston to Ponsonby, Sept. 4, 1840; Palmerston to Guizot, Sept. 9,
1840; Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 7, 1840; Guizot to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840,
Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 116-117, 125-126, 130, 131, 192-193.
^See Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840, ibid., p. 198.
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force of the fleet also would be
"abundantly sufficient" to secure
it against molestation or insult from any squadron which France
might think proper to send to the Levant.
21
Count Nesselrode and the Emperor Nicholas, who were pleased
greatly when they learned of the conclusion, by the plenipotenti-
aries of the four Powers, of the famous Convention of London,
22
entertained opinions very similar to those of the British Minister
of Foreign Affairs. The former, in a letter to Meyendorff, written
August 8, 1840, in which he announced that the convention had
been signed, explained that it was only when she was supported
by England that France was able to be truly formidable upon the
continent. In the existing circumstances, he believed, once that
she was convinced that she could not succeed in promoting division
within the ranks of the allies, she would submit. It was his opin-
ion, he declared, that she would hesitate when it came to declar-
ing war upon four of the great Powers.
23
"Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 4, 1840, ibid., pp. 62-63. See also, Palmerston
to Hodges, July 16, 18, 1840; Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 25, 1840, ibid., pp.
3-5, 22.
"See an extract of a despatch, Thiers to Guizot, Aug. 23, 1840, quoted by
Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 292-293. Note also the following extract from a despatch,
Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Sept. 25, 1840: "Dans mes depeches, j'ai en plus
particulierement soin de faire resortir les avantages immenses que nous offre,
pour 1'avenir, la rupture de cette funeste alliance anglo-frangaise, avantages qui
ne me paraissent pas encore assez sentis et apprecies a Berlin . . . C'est un
grand service que nous avons rendu a 1'Europe; on le comprendra avec le temps;
on 1'acceptera comme on accepte avec avidit nos secours dans les grandes
crises sociales." Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 39-40. Note also the following
extract from Raikes' Journal, Aug. 12, 1840: "Kisseleff, the first Russian secre-
tary, held high language to me about the treaty; he said, We must have the
letter of the bond, and no tergiversation, else we shall march/
"
Raikes,
Journal, IV, p. 42. Lord Broughton, describing a cabinet meeting of Aug. 9, 1840,
wrote: "Palmerston also informed us that Brunnow had told him the Emperor of
Russia would not only send a squadron from the Black Sea to help us, but had
offered to come in person, commanding his Baltic fleet, to defend the shores of
England. At this we all laughed, and Palmerston added that he had only given
civil thanks for this magnificent offer." Broughton, op. cit., V, p. 290.
"Ne'sselrode to Meyendorff, Aug. 8, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp.
35-37. Nesselrode, like Palmerston, did not believe it would be necessary for
Russia to send forces to the defense of Constantinople. See, Nesselrode to
Titow, July, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 112-113. See also Guichen,
op. cit., pp. 331-337-
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At Vienna and at Berlin, on the other hand, the news of the
warlike activities of the French occasioned alarm. Prince Metter-
nich talked about the danger of a revolution in France
24 and the
new King of Prussia, Frederick William IV, who was determined
that his country would not take part in a general European war if
one should break out, had a definite declaration sent to all the
Powers that he adhered firmly to his father's pacific policy and
"demanded that the neutrality of his state should be guaranteed
formally."
25
Moreover, in Great Britain, although the public remained calm
and refused to believe that Thiers would recommend war "to
support the tyrannical and rebellious pasha of Egypt,"26 there
were many who doubted if it would be wise to ignore the French
protests entirely. Even Lord John Russell who a few weeks before
had exerted himself to persuade his colleagues to accept the policy
advocated by the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Lord
Melbourne, the Prime Minister, were disturbed by the situation
and appeared to be inclined to make concessions.
"
'England has
no wish to quarrel with France or to unsettle Europe,'
" the latter
stated to Guizot, July 28, 1840.
"
'Austria too has no such desire.
This affair is unfortunate and might become extremely serious;
but we can arrest it, and wish to do so. And France who has re-
"Note the following extract from a letter, Metternich to Apponyi, Aug. 20,
1840: "Le mal de la France, c'est la Revolution, et c'est parce que M. Thiers
la represente que seul il est fort . . . le parti conservateur et celui du progres ont,
depuis 1'avenement de M. Thiers, chacun un chef [the King and Thiers]; la
lutte entre ses deux partis a done pris un caractere qu'elle n'avait pas anterieure-
ment aux evenements du ier Mars, et la question qui reste a resoudre est de
savoir auquel d'entre eux restera la victoire!" Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp.
412-413.
"Treitschke, op. cit., V, p. 79. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 326-331,
348-349-
MThe Times, Aug. I, 3, 1840. Note the following extract from an editorial
in The Times, Sept. 24, 1840: "With very rare exceptions, the English journals
have treated the whole Eastern question in a mild and conciliatory spirit. The
petulance of French presumption and asperity has been met throughout Great
Britain by calm forbearance . . . They have threatened us without retort, and
as yet with impunity; and their press has borne down upon us, almost in line
of battle, without even a signal being hoisted in any part of the British empire
that there was an enemy in sight." Many Englishmen, it seems, believed Louis
Philippe would not dare to begin a foreign war because of the danger of revolu-
tion at home. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 339-340.
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fused to advance with the four Powers, may aid them to halt.'
"2T
The government of France being aware that such sentiments were
entertained in Great Britain and in Germany28 refused to despair
for the success of its policy because of the obstinacy of Palmerston
and the Russians.
July 31, 1840, Guizot was summoned to the Chateau d'Eu for
a conference with Louis Philippe and M. Thiers. At that meet-
ing, he has reported in his Memoires, he found the King "ani-
mated in words," but promising himself that, in the end, the peace
of Europe would not be disturbed, and Thiers "also desiring the
maintenance of peace, [but] much preoccupied with the chance of
war and the means of meeting it," if events should drive France to
that alternative.29
When Guizot departed from Eu on his return to London he
carried with him two distinct projects for the settlement of the
question of the Near East which would bring about the reconcilia-
tion of France with the concert of the four Powers. Both of these
projects assumed the willingness of the latter to tear up the docu-
ments which they had mutually agreed upon July 15, 1840. The
first provided for the guaranteeing of the status quo. According
to that plan the five Powers would guarantee the existing state
of the Ottoman possessions on the basis of the arrangement of
Kutayah. The Pasha would have no hereditary rights and if he
"
'or anyone else'
"
should invade the states of the Sultan the five,
including France, would employ their forces against the invader.
The second project provided for the mediation of France, on
behalf of Mehemet Ali, with the Concert of Europe. If that pro-
posal should be accepted France would insist that her ally should
receive the hereditary tenure of Egypt and the government for life
of Syria. It, however, was not to be proposed unless there was a
strong probability of its being accepted, for it had the inconven-
ience of depending upon the willingness of the Pasha to request
that France should negotiate for him.
30
*T
Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 254. Many Englishmen, undoubtedly, questioned
the advisability of exchanging a French for a Russian alliance. See Guichen,
op. cit., pp. 344-346.
^Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 254-255, 266-267.
"Ibid., pp. 255-256, 264-266.
M
Ibid., pp. 270-271.
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In addition to these two proposals Guizot carried back to Lon-
don a letter from Louis Philippe to King Leopold of Belgium, who
at that time was at Windsor Castle, greatly alarmed by the
thought of a war being declared between his niece and his father-
in-law. " 'The situation in which France finds herself,'
"
the King
wrote,
"
'is neither of her choice nor of her creation. . . . The
situation is particularly painful for me who have always scouted
the notion that England could ever enter into an alliance without
France. I find I am wrong. For the present we can only wait and
see. But there is one thing we must do and that is to arm, and we
are doing so vigorously. Our role must be one of expectation. We
must see what England means to do, before deciding what France
shall do, either in the way of restoring or preserving the balance of
power.'
" 31
The French Ambassador, very soon after his arrival in England,
proceeded to Windsor, where he delivered Louis Philippe's letter
and at the same time explained to Leopold the French project for
the maintenance of the status quo. The latter, who previously
had advocated that a "
'great European measure'
"
a treaty be-
tween the five Powers " 'to guarantee against all enemies and
dangers the existing state of the possessions of the Porte'
"
should be concluded to supersede the Convention of London,
32
readily sanctioned Guizot's suggestions and promised that he
would urge them upon Lord Palmerston.
33
There were many at the British Court, including Melbourne,
Neumann, and Biilow, who were willing to consider favorably the
Belgian King's proposals.
34
Palmerston, however, was not one of
that number. "
'King Leopold has mentioned his idea to me,'
"
he informed Guizot, August 21, 1840;
"
'a treaty between the five
Powers which might guarantee the status quo of the Ottoman
Empire . . . [That is] impossible at present. A treaty has been
concluded between four Powers, not with a general and permanent
aim, as would be that of which we are speaking, but with a special
"Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Louis Philippe to the King of the
Belgians, Aug. 13, 1840, quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 285.
"It is probable that the idea of a
"
'great European measure'
"
was sug-
gested first by Wellington. See Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 278-279.
"Ibid., pp. 278-282. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 350-354.
**Melbourne to Russell, Aug. 21, 26, 1840, Sanders, Melbourne Papers, pp.
462-464, 467-469-
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and momentary view. This incidental treaty must follow its
course, and when accomplished, the general treaty may well take
its place. Today we must await events.'
" 35
Instead of agreeing to concessions which might have conciliated
the French, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs prepared a
note, in answer to Thiers' memorandum of July 21, 1840, in which
he defended in a most elaborate manner the course which he had
followed during the entire period of the negotiations preceding the
conclusion of the Treaty of London. No one but the French gov-
ernment itself was to blame for the isolated position of France, he
declared. France had no right to expect that when four out of
the five Powers found themselves agreed upon one course and
when the fifth had determined to pursue a course entirely different
"that the Four should, in deference to the Fifth, give up opinions in
which they were daily more and more confirmed, and which related
to a matter of vital importance to the great and permanent inter-
ests of Europe." It was only in one of the concluding paragraphs
that a vague hope was held out that, when the four should have
brought about such an arrangement between the Porte and its
subject as might be compatible with the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire and with the future peace of Europe, there could then be
nothing to prevent France from concurring with them in such
further engagements for the future as might appear to be neces-
sary "in order to give due stability to the good effects of the inter-
position of the four Powers in favor of the sultan; and to secure
the Ottoman empire from a recurrence of danger."
36
It is evident that the British Minister's determination to make
no concessions was due to the fact that he was convinced that the
French would not dare to intervene in behalf of the Viceroy and
that the policy which the four Powers had adopted would tri-
*5
Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 287-288. Guizot did not present his second pro-
ject to the British government. However, on Aug. 10, 1840, Granville reported
to Palmerston that Thiers had suggested that the Pasha might request the inter-
vention of France. Four days later Palmerston replied that it was needless for
him to point out that in the situation in which affairs then stood it would be
impossible for the five Powers to accept the interposition of France between
them and Mehemet AH. See Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 10, 1840, Palmerston
to Granville, Aug. 14, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 76, 80-8 1.
s Palmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 31, 1840, ibid., pp. 102-110. Annual Register,
1840, pp. 500-510.
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umph speedily. He persisted in his opinions even in spite of the
reports which his agents at Paris forwarded to him announcing
that the French were continuing actively their preparations for
war. 37
"
'I am more than ever confirmed/
" he wrote to Bulwer,
August 23, 1840,
"
'in my belief that for the present at least the
French will remain quiet, and that there will be no war. However
inconsiderate the French nation may be, the French interests grow-
ing up every day will make them pause before they begin an un-
provoked and aggressive war against the four Powers.
"
'Thiers, therefore, sooner or later will give the order to "cease
firing;" the smoke will soon blow away from the eyes of the
French people, and they will see more clearly the objects which
have caused their false alarm; and both Thiers and Louis Philippe
will take care to keep out of a quarrel which nobody means to
force upon them.'
" 38
In the meantime news of the conclusion of the Convention of
London had arrived in the Near East. The Ottoman Ministers
who received this intelligence on August 3, 1840, proceeded with-
out loss of time to carry out their part of the agreement.
39 Rifaat
Bey, accompanied by a Mr. Allison, of the British embassy, was
despatched to Alexandria with the Sultan's ultimatum and
measures were taken promptly for the sending of arms, ammuni-
tion, and troops to the aid of the discontented inhabitants of
Syria.
40
Rifaat Bey arrived at his destination on August n, just one
day in advance of Count Walewski, the agent whom Thiers had
"Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 7, 10, 1840; Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 21,
28, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 73-74, 76, 88, 93.
Talmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 23, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 320. See also,
Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 258-259. Greville to Reeve, Sept. 10, 1840, A. H. Johnson
(editor), The Letters of Charles Greville and Henry Reeve, pp. 6-7.
"Ponsonby to Palmerston, Aug. 5, 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
91, 100.
40The revolts of June, 1840, had been put down ruthlessly. Nevertheless, the
spirit of the rebels was not broken. On July 25, 1840, a British consul wrote:
"Lebanon is a sleeping volcano, and its oppressed and exasperated inhabitants
are only waiting a favourable moment to try once more the fortune of arms."
Moore to Ponsonby, July 25, 1840, ibid., p. 96. See also, Paton, op. cit., II, p. 179.
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sent to persuade the Pasha to be moderate in his demands.41 Five
days later, on the i6th, he informed the latter officially of the
terms of the convention of July 15, i84O.
42
During the twenty
days that followed immediately thereafter the Egyptian metropolis
rivaled even London and Paris as a center of diplomatic activity.
At first the Viceroy was defiant. He had at an earlier date, after
having received unofficial information concerning what had oc-
curred at the British capital, taken steps to withdraw all of his
regular troops from Arabia and had ordered that the preparations
for war in Egypt and in Syria should be pushed forward vigor-
ously.
43
Being convinced that these measures would be adequate
for the defense of the territories under his control, he announced
forthwith that he had decided to resist the execution of the terms
of the famous convention and that all efforts to induce him to
change his opinion would be in vain.44 The Consuls-General of the
four Powers, in reply, remonstrated with him, warning him that,
if he did not accept the terms which Rifaat had offered, the allies
41
Hodges to Ponsonby, Aug. 16, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
147-148.
^Report of Interview between Rifat Bey and Mehemet AH, ibid., pp.
149-152.
^Letters from Alexandria, Aug. 7, 1840, The Times, Aug. 25, Aug. 26, 1840
Mehemet Ali was acting in accord with the advice of Thiers. Note the following
extract from a despatch, Thiers to Cochelet, July 29, 1840, quoted by Guichen,
op. cit., p. 359:
"
'Le but que le Vice-roi et le gouvernment frangais doivent
se proposer, disait notre ministre, est d'annuler les effets que les quatre Cours
attendent de la convention qu'elles ont conclue. Le moyen le plus propre a
faire atteindre ce but est la soumission de la Syrie. . . La France, obligee de
veiller a son honneur et de pourvoir a ses interets, chercherait un champ de
bataille moins eloigne d'elle que 1'Orient. Le Vice-roi qui est sur le premier plan
de la politique, cesserait d'y etre. A cote des grands interets qu'elle serait appe!6e
a defendre et a faire triompher, celui de Mehemet Ali deviendrait bien secondaire.
Elle se trouverait reduite a 1'abandonner a lui-meme. Livre a ses propres forces,
serait-il en etat de resister a toute la puissance anglaise, engagee serieusement
dans une guerre qui aneantirait en Orient et en Occident tout ce qui est faible
et qui lui offrirait 1'attrait d'une si belle et si utile conquete?'
" Cochelet even
went so far as to urge Mehemet Ali to stir up a holy war throughout the Near
East. See ibid., p. 360.
"Minute of Interview between the Consuls-General and Mehemet Ali, Aug.
17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 154-155. Letter from Alexandria, Aug.
20, 1840, The Times, Sept. 8, 1840. The Examiner, Sept. 13, 1840, p. 583.
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certainly would coerce him into submission. 45 Count Walewski,
on the other hand, refusing to advise Mehemet to surrender com-
pletely because of the demands of the Porte, urged all of the
parties concerned to be moderate.
46 At the end of the first period
of ten days the Viceroy was still defiant.
"
'I repeat,'
" he declared
on the same day that he announced that he was determined to
continue upon the course which he had been following," 'that I am
only responsible to Providence.'
" 47
However, before the close of a
second period of equal length he consented to follow the advice
of the French.48 Although he persisted in refusing to comply with
the provisions of the Sultan's ultimatum, he had it announced to
Rifaat Bey and the Consuls-General of the four Powers that
he would be satisfied if he received the hereditary possession of
Egypt and the tenure for life of Syria.
49
"Memoir addressed by Consuls-General to Mehemet Ali, Aug. 19, 1840,
Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 161-163. See also, ibid., pp. 174-180.
^Walewski urged Col. Hodges to use his endeavors to prevent hostile
operations against Egypt and Syria on the part of the British naval forces. He
was instructed, he declared, that in case his request was not granted he should
go on board the English flag ship and present it direct to Admiral Stopford.
Hodges to Palmerston, Aug. 19, 1840, ibid., p. 157.
"Minute of Interview, Aug. 26, 1840, ibid., p. 185-186.
"On Aug. 24, 1840, Hodges reported that the Viceroy had made a formal
application to France for its protection and mediation. That report, however,
was probably incorrect. On the same day, Mehemet Ali declared to the Russian
Consul-General that he had never reckoned on the assistance of France.
"
'It is true,'
" he stated,
"
'that she offered it me three times, but I never
trusted it; and I swear to you that my decision has in no wise been influenced
by the declarations of the newspapers and the language of M. Thiers. M.
Perier told me plainly that France would not interfere in my favour.' " Hodges
to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1840; Minute of Conversation, Aug. 24, 1840; ibid., pp.
173, 178-180.
48Mehemet Ali announced his willingness to make concessions on Aug. 28,
1840. See a letter from Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1840, The Times, Sept. 19, 1840;
ibid., Sept. 28, 1840. It is said that on Sept. 5, 1840, the twentieth day after
the terms of the Treaty of London had been communicated formally to the
Pasha, Sami Bey delivered the latter's final answer to Rifaat Bey and the
Consuls-General of the four Powers in the following language: "His Highness,
my master, accepts the treaty of the i$th of July to the letter. He accepts the
hereditary title of Egypt, and with regard to Syria, he is about to petition the
Sultan that that administration may be granted him in his old age, to cease at
the expiration of his life. The fleet shall be restored, Arabia has been evacuated,
and therefore all will depend on the Sultan's orders." Letter from "on board
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At the same time that the papers relating to the Treaty of London
were sent to Constantinople, instructions were forwarded to
Admiral Stopford, the commander of the British naval forces
in the Levant, to the effect that all communications by sea be-
tween Egypt and Syria should be cut off.80 In order to execute
these instructions Stopford divided his fleet into two divisions,
sending one portion under command of Sir Charles Napier to
operate along the coast of Syria
51 and taking the other under his
own direct control to cruise off the harbor of Alexandria. As long
as it was doubtful whether Mehemet Ali would agree to accept
the terms outlined in the separate act of the Convention of Lon-
don the Admiral and the Commodore refrained from beginning
actual hostilities, but after it became known that he had rejected
them they at once adopted an aggressive policy. The two divisions
of the fleet were reunited September 9, 1840, and on the following
night a landing of troops was effected a few miles to the north
of Beyrout in D'Jounie Bay.
52 Two days later Admiral Stopford,
in cooperation with Admiral Bandeira, who with two Austrian
frigates had joined the British fleet, sent a flag of truce into
Beyrout with a summons to Suleiman Pasha (Colonel Seves), the
commander of an army of 15,000 men stationed there, to withdraw
his troops. Finding the latter's reply unsatisfactory, the Anglo-
Austrian squadron promptly opened fire upon the Egyptian forti-
fications within the town.53 No attempt was made immediately to
occupy the place but other military and naval operations followed
Turkish Steamer Tairi Bahri," Sept. 5, 1840, ibid., Sept. 30, 1840. See also a
copy of a letter, Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, Sept. 5, 1840, ibid., Journal des
Debats, Oct. 3, 1840. Minute of Interview, Sept. 5, 1840, Levant Correspondence,
II, p. 246, Guichen, op. cit., pp. 367-368.
""Admiralty (in letters) 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty, July 16, 17,
23, 1840, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 289. A. Jochmus, The Syrian War and the
Decline of the Ottoman Empire, p. XXIX.
"Napier not only intercepted communications between Syria and Egypt but
also cooperated with British agents who were encouraging the peoples of Mt.
Lebanon to attempt a new revolt. See Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 200-207,
214-215. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 15 ff. E. Napier, Life and Correspondence
of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, II, pp. 6 ff.
E2
Napier to Stopford, Sept. 16, 1840, Annual Register, 1840, pp. 540-541.
Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 48-54. Napier, Correspondence, II, p. 26-28.
63
Ibid., pp. 37-38. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 55-60. Stopford to O'Ferrall,
Sept. 20, 1840, Annual Register, 1840, pp. 537-539.
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in rapid succession and it became apparent very soon that the
allied forces were determined to compel the Viceroy to submit.
54
Reports concerning developments which resulted in the Near
East after the terms of the Treaty of London became known there
began to arrive in France late in August, 1840. The first of these
reports, serving merely to confirm the belief which the French en-
tertained in regard to the attitude of Mehemet AH, did not oc-
casion much alarm. Indeed for a time it even appeared as though
that in spite of them the warlike feelings of the French were
"dying away."
55 The Bourse rallied a point and the tone of the
Paris press became remarkably moderate.56 This period of com-
parative quiet, however, was only the calm before a storm. When
it was announced early in September that the Anglo-Austrian fleet
had cut off communications between Egypt and Syria and that it
was preparing to engage in actual hostilities in case Mehemet Ali
should not submit at the end of his twenty days of grace, a new
wave of excitement swept throughout the country.
57 The French
government, as well as its subjects, was alarmed, and ordinances
providing for the fortification of Paris,
58 and for calling the
classes of 1834 and 1835 to the colors were decreed in rapid
succession.59
"From the base at D'Jounie arms were distributed among the mountaineers
and raids were made into the interior. On Sept. 26, 1840, Sidon was taken by
storm and on Oct. n Beyrout was occupied; see Napier, War in Syria, I, pp.
61 ff. Napier, Correspondence, II, pp. 38 ff. Jochmus, op. cit., p. 17.
"Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 4, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
128-129.
"See comment upon the attitude of the French journals, The Times, Aug.
22, 25, 26, 27, Sept. 2, 1840. Guizot to Mme. Guizot, Aug. 13, 1840, De Witt,
op. cit., p. 209.
"Faucher to Reeve, Sept. 13, 1840, Faucher, op. cit., I, pp. 97-98. See also,
comment upon the attitude of the French journals, The Times, Sept. 12, 15, 17,
19, 21, 29, 1840. Between September i and September 15 the French 3%'s
dropped from 80.10 to 73. See Appendix A.
""Louis Philippe and the Due d'Orleans were strongly in favor of the idea
of fortifying Paris. It was said at the time that their attitude on this question
was due to their fear of a revolution. See Due d'Orleans to Marie-Amelie [his
mother] Aug. 18, 1840, Flers, Le Roi Louis Philippe vie anecdotique, pp. 378-
380. Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 390.
*Royal Ordinances, Aug. 12-Sept. 16, 1840, Sept. 2-16, 1840, Sept. 10-16,
1840, Duvergier, op. cit., XL, pp. 354-356.
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On September 18, 1840, Bulwer, who for several days past had
been suspicious concerning the intentions of Louis Philippe and
his ministers,
60
called upon Thiers at his residence in Auteuil. He
found the latter
"walking up and down in a long room or gallery"
evidently much disturbed. The President of the Council, it soon
developed, had received despatches from Walewski announcing
that Mehemet AH, through Walewski's mediation, had consented
to accept a settlement on the basis of his receiving Egypt heredi-
tarily and Syria for life.61
"
Trance,'
" Thiers declared after ex-
plaining this news to Bulwer,
"
'thinks these conditions reasonable
and just. If your Government will act with us in persuading the
Sultan and the other Powers to accept them, there is once more a
cordiale entente between us. If not, after the concessions obtained
through our influence from Mehemet Ali, we are bound to sup-
port him.' . . . 'Vous comprenez, mon cher, la gravite de ce que
je viens de dire!'
" "
'You know,'
" the Frenchman added later,
however,
"
'what I have been saying to you' ... 'is said as M.
Thiers, not as President of the Council. I have to consult my
colleagues, the King also. But I wish you to understand clearly
the tendency of my own personal opinions.' "62 The same day
Bulwer reported to Palmerston that he was convinced, that M.
Thiers had wished him to understand that he was anxious that
peace should be maintained; that with that in view he had done
all in his power to persuade Mehemet Ali to be reasonable in his
conditions; that he thought that the terms which the latter had
agreed to accept were reasonable; and that if they were granted
the impending struggle would be avoided. But if they were re-
fused, and the execution of the treaty rigorously insisted upon, he,
for his own part, without giving any pledge to the Pasha, still
felt in a certain degree pledged towards him; and "that hewascon-
*Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. n, 14, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
188-189.
"See a copy of a despatch Walewski to Thiers, Aug. 29, 1840, quoted by
Haussonville, op. cit., I, pp. 303-307. This despatch must have been one of
those which Thiers had received.
"Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 324-325. On Sept. 25, 1840, Thiers declared to Lord
Granville: "'II n'a pas de extremite que je ne braverai plutot que la France
soit humiliee;'
" Granville to Palmerston, Sept. 25, 1840, Levant Corres-
pondence, II, p. 226.
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vinced, putting himself out of the question, that it would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to form any Government which would re-
main a perfectly passive and disinterested spectator of the
measures to be pursued. Consequently, that without any decided
act of immediate hostility, or any positive declaration of war, such
a state of things would ensue, as must, ere long, disturb the peace
of the world."63
The "
'mysterious threatening'
"
in which Thiers had indulged
failed to intimidate the British Minister of Foreign Affairs.
"
'. . .if
Thiers should again hold to you the language of menace, however
indistinctly and vaguely shadowed out'," he replied to Bulwer,
September 22, 1840,
"
'pray retort upon him to the full extent of
what he may say to you,., .convey to him in the most friendly
and unoffensive manner possible, that if France throws down the
gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins
a war, she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and com-
merce before she sees the end of it;. . .we should very soon have
nearly three times the number of ships that France could put to
sea, and must, therefore, have the command of all their interests
beyond sea; .... These considerations perhaps might weigh more
with Louis Philippe than with Thiers, but I am inclined to think
that they will weigh with somebody or other at Paris. However,
I may' be mistaken, and the French may either make war, in spite
of their assurances, or commit some violent and outrageous act of
aggression against the Sultan, which the four Powers will be
obliged to resent; in that case France must take the consequences,
and her Government bear the responsibility'."64
"Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840, ibid., pp. 196-197. Bulwer, op. cit.,
II, pp. 428-430. See also, an extract of a despatch, Thiers to Guizot, Sept. 17,
1840, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 311 ff. Bulwer wrote several other
despatches to Palmerston on Sept. 18, 1840. In one of these he mentioned that
he had received "two or three visits from a French gentleman" who was anxious to
arrive at some settlement of the Eastern question. "He came to me today,"
Bulwer declared, "and said he had seen M. Thiers, and that he was convinced
that the French Government would agree, moyennant some slight concession, to
enter into the Treaty of the I5th of July, and to coerce the Pasha, if he did
not accede to the terms proposed to him. ... As I know that he has seen many
of the Ministers, and M. Thiers twice within these few days, I think it desir-
able to give your Lordship the substance of what has been passed between us."
Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 197-198. See also, ibid., pp. 199-200.
"Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 22, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 327-331.
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Many of Palmerston's countrymen, including even some of his
colleagues in the Cabinet, did not agree with him. In the latter
part of July, 1840, it will be remembered, many had doubted if
it would be wise to ignore entirely the French protests against
'the Treaty of London. Their doubts increased with the passing of
time, and when the excitement of the French became intense in
September, 1840, they became so alarmed that they* demanded
that the British government should make some concession in
order to conciliate its former ally.
65
"The more we consider the
propositions which Mehemet Ali, by the advice of France, has
been induced to make to the Porte," an editorial writer stated in
The Times, "the more we are convinced not only that it would
be madness to reject them, but that they would effect a more
advantageous settlement of the Eastern question, even for Turkey
herself, than could be obtained by the most complete success to
the military operations of the allies, and the utter discomfiture of
the Pasha. . . . What the real interests of Turkey require are
security for her European provinces against Russia, and for her
Asiatic [provinces] against Mehemet Ali, and none can be so
complete as the solemn guarantee of all the other Powers, France
included, and their united determination to defend her from all
aggression. . . . No settlement which does not include France can
be safe, satisfactory, or lasting. Despite the miserable insolence
of the French press and of 'Young France:' accept the mediation
of her Government, meet her half way, show a disposition, not to
succumb to menace or defer to unreasonable pretensions, but to
act in a fair spirit of compromise, with a frank and friendly con-
sideration of the feelings of the French nation and we may once
more return to those relations of amity, the cordiality of which
8SNote the following extract from an editorial published in The Times, Aug.
31, 1840: "While we are awaiting the events in the East which may give a
decided turn to the policy of England, Russia, or France, it can neither be
denied nor concealed that this country is placed in the most unaccountable
and ambiguous situation which was ever occupied by a Power of first rate
magnitude. ... in reality England has been placed by Lord Palmerston's
acquiescence in M. de Brunnow's contrivance in the position of a second rate
Power. ... An accidental collision between a French and English brig in the
Levant may suddenly bring down on us a declaration of war from France; or
the slightest indication of a movement on the part of Russia may require the
most decided and rapid measures to prevent the occupation of Constantinople."
See also, similar editorials in ibid., Aug. 29, Sept. 8, 9, 1840.
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ought never to have been interrupted, and on the continuation of
which depend the peace of Europe and the happiness of man-
kind."66 Lord John Russell, who entertained similar opinions,
wrote to Lord Melbourne, September 26, 1840, that the whole
aspect of affairs was changed "by the language of Thiers on the
1 8th." "We have now to deal," he stated, "not with the Pasha,
but with the Pasha and France. ... I have told Palmerston I
think we ought in conference to tell our allies we are ready to
accept Walewski's conditions, provided they (the allies) agree,
and the Syrian insurgents have security against vengeance.
"If you and Palmerston are against this I had much better
retire."67
Those who worked to secure a modification of the terms of the
Treaty of London were aided greatly in their efforts by the attitude
"'Ibid., Sept. 29, 1840. At an earlier date Guizot had induced Charles
Greville to use his influence in getting Barnes, the editor of The Times, to
adopt a pro-French attitude. See Greville to Reeve, Sept. 10, 1840, Johnson,
op. cit., pp. 5-7.
"Russell to Melbourne, Sept. 26, 1840, Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 351. The
opposition which Palmerston encountered in his "own camp" was formidable
indeed. Note the following extract from a letter, Palmerston to Bulwer, March
14, 1846: ..." We had indeed great difficulties to surmount in accomplishing
our purpose [in 1840-1841]; but although that purpose was to rescue Europe
from a perpetually-recurring danger of war, and to protect British interests
from injury by the scarcely disguised encroachments of two great foreign
Powers, yet, nevertheless, the greatest difficulties which I had to encounter in
the whole transaction arose from the unprincipled intrigues in our own camp.'
"
Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 323 [footnote]. Palmerston blamed in particular Ellice,
Holland, and Clarendon. On July 27, 1840, he wrote:
"
'Thiers and Guizot
are very angry, of course, because they had persuaded themselves that the
English Cabinet never would be induced to separate itself from France on this
question. Ellice had misled Thiers; and Guizot had been deceived by the foolish
language held out by Holland and Clarendon, who went talking away in favour
of Mehemet Ali. However, the French had some foundation for their mistake;
for when it came to the point, I found such resistance on the part of Holland and
Clarendon, and such lukewarmness on the part of some of the other members of
the Cabinet, that I sent in my resignation, . . . The dissidents upon this with-
drew their opposition, and the waverers came round to my views.'
"
Palmerston
to Temple, July 27, 1840, ibid., Ill, pp. 42-43. See also Broughton, op. cit., V,
pp. 297-298.
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which the Courts of Vienna and Berlin maintained. Prince Met-
ternich, alarmed at the possibility of a European war,
68 had for-
warded to Paris on August 31, 1840, a note suggesting a plan
whereby France might become reunited with the concert of the
four Powers. According to that plan, France would declare anew
her adhesion to the principles of the collective note of July 27,
1839; she would continue her refusal to agree to the measures of
coercion which the other Powers had decided upon, explaining
that she could not see in them the means of attaining with safety
the desired object [the preservation of the Ottoman Empire] ; and
she would announce that in case of the failure of those means she
then would be ready to join the four Powers and the Sultan in
considering "the most fitting means" for assisting the Porte and
that she would be willing to aid in carrying the latter means into
execution
"according to the circumstances of the moment."
69 Met-
ternich followed up this communication to the government of
France by sending to it others which were also very conciliatory
in character.70 Baron Werther, the Prussian Prime Minister,
"Thiers, who must have known of Metternich's alarm, and probably wished
to encourage it, was particularly vivacious in his attitude towards Apponyi, the
Austrian Ambassador at Paris. See Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 390.
""Substance of a communication stated to have been made by Prince
Metternich to the French government; Beauvale to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1840,
Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 24.3, 126-127. Greville, op. cit., I, p. 282
[footnote]. Thiers did not reply to Metternich's suggestion. See Granville to
Palmerston, Oct. 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 275-276. Metternich
was in a most difficult position it seems. His prestige both abroad and at home
was damaged. Within the Hapsburg monarchy Count Kolowrat, Minister of the
Interior, influenced probably by the sharp drop in the Austrian exchange and
the bad financial situation in general, was leading the opposition to Metternich
and the treaty of July 15. According to Hasenclever, Metternich spent his time
in making violent tirades against Thiers, in warning against Russian land greed,
and in defending conservative principles. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 206-208.
See also Metternich to Leopold, Dec. 5, 1840, quoted by Corti, op. cit.,
pp. 135-136.
"Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 266, 273, 281. Granville to Palmerston, Sept. 25,
1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 227.
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maintained a similar policy.
71 He even appeared to be much
pleased, as William Russell, the British envoy at Berlin, reported
on September 23, 1840, by the news of the concessions which
Walewski had persuaded Mehemet Ali to make, and seemed to
think that a basis was laid thereby on which a final and satisfac-
tory settlement of the Oriental question might be formed.72
At a Cabinet meeting held on October i, 1840, the members of
the British ministry who were opposed to the complete execution
of the July treaty, encouraged by the willingness of the Austrian
and Prussian governments to make some concessions in order to
conciliate the French, forced matters to a crisis, and it was only
through the efforts of Lord Melbourne that a compromise between
them and Palmerston was secured.73 In that compromise the
latter consented to state to the representatives of Austria, Prussia,
and Russia that it appeared to Her Majesty's government to be
expedient that the four Powers should propose to the government
of France such a course as was sketched out in Metternich's note
of August 31, 1840.
Although Palmerston did agree to take the step suggested by
Melbourne it is certain that he still was determined to carry his
policy into execution. It is probable, as Henry Reeve has stated,
that he was aware at the very time when he consented to make
"Although the Prussian government was anxious to preserve peace it became
so alarmed at the belligerent activities of Thiers that it also began preparing for
war. Furthermore a distinct reaction to the warlike clamor in France took
place throughout Germany. It was at this time that Schneckenburger composed
the famous Die Wacht am Rhein and that Niklas Becker wrote the popular
song:
"Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein,
Ob sie wie gier'ge Raben sich heiser darnach schrei'n,
So lang er ruhig wallend sein grimes Kleid noch tragt,
So laflg ein Ruder schallend in seine Wagen schlagt."
See Treitschke, op. cit., V, pp. 80 ff. Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 465 ff. Guichen,
op. cit., pp. 405-410, 413 ff.
"Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 23, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 229.
"Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 354. For additional information concerning the
opposition to Palmerston's policy which was offered in Sept., 1840, by certain
members of the British Cabinet, see ibid., pp. 348-349, 352-353; Sanders,
Melbourne Papers, pp. 474 ff; Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 231-232; Bulwer, op. cit.,
II, pp. 343-344; The Times, Oct. 2, Dec. 7, 1840; Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 261,
263, 265, 267, 271-273, 276, 278-283.
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such a proposal to the representatives of the three Powers that at
least Brunnow and the Emperor of Russia would not concur in it,
and that he agreed to it merely for the purpose of gaining time.
74
It is significant in this connection that on October 2, the very
next day after the compromise in the Cabinet had been arranged,
the Morning Chronicle, a journal under Palmerston's influence,
published an extremely violent article against the French.
75 Fur-
thermore, it is also worthy of note that on October 3, 1840, the
British Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in a letter which he
wrote to Bulwer that " 'If the four Powers were to give way to
the menaces of France, they would soon be compelled to go to
war with her to resist her further encroachments, or they must be
prepared to submit patiently to a succession of aggressions and
insults.'
" "
'In short,'
" he stated in the same letter,
"
'without
further argument, the thing [a modification of the terms of the
Treaty of London] is impossible, unless, indeed (which I cannot
suppose), Mehemet Ali was to turn out to be such a wonder of
the world as to be able to beat the four Powers and the Sultan
united.'
"76
It was known as early as the second day of October that the
Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries would refuse to make a
communication to France in conformity with the British Cabinet's
suggestion "without reference to their Courts and authority from
them."77 Nevertheless, on October 8, 1840, Palmerston sent to the
Ibid., p. 284 [footnote].
"Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 354. See a French translation of the article which
was published in the Morning Chronicle on Oct. 2, 1840, in Journal des Debats,
Oct. 5, 1840. The Morning Chronicle rendered invaluable services to Palmerston.
Note the following extract of a letter, Melbourne to Victoria, Jan. 17, 1842:
"Your Majesty knows very well that Palmerston has long had much communi-
cation with the Morning Chronicle . . . and has made great use of it for the
purpose of maintaining and defending his own policy. ... if Palmerston in the
Syrian affair had not had as devoted an assistant as the Morning Chronicle, he
would hardly have been able to maintain his course or carry through his
measures." Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 374-375. See also, extracts copied from
the Morning Chronicle, in The Examiner, Sept. 6, 20, Oct. n, 25, 1840, pp. 564,
595, 641-645, 673; and in the Journal des Debats, Aug. I, 16, Oct. 9, Nov. 20,
22, 1840. See also, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 122.
"Palmerston to Bulwer, Oct. 3, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 332. See also,
Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 5, 7, 1840, ibid., pp. 333-334, 337-338.
"Melbourne to Victoria, Oct. 2, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 232-233.
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three envoys of Austria, Russia, and Prussia formal notes iden-
tical in character in which he repeated the proposal he had agreed
to make to them.78 Schleinitz, the Prussian representative, replied
on the following day, and Neumann, the Austrian, returned his
answer three days later.
79 Both announced that they were without
instructions concerning such a question, and both promised to
bring it to the attention of their governments. Baron Brunnow,
who also replied on October 12, promised likewise that he would
refer the matter to his government, but the language which he
used revealed very clearly that he was convinced that it would not
be received favorably.
80
While these developments were taking place in London re-
ports from the Levant were causing the excitement in France to
increase. A telegraphic despatch which arrived at Paris on Octo-
ber 2 stated that "after a bombardment of nine days, which
had reduced the town [of Beyrout] to ashes, the Egyptians had
evacuated it at night and the allies had taken possession."
81
Soon thereafter it became known that the Porte, dissatisfied with
Mehemet Ali's answer to the Sultan's ultimatum and disregarding
the representations of the French agents at Constantinople, had
issued a firman, September 14, 1840, decreeing the deposition of
his rebellious vassal and the placing of the ports of Syria and
Egypt in a state of blockade.
82 The Bourse thereupon experienced
"Palmerston to Neumann, Schleinitz, and Brunnow, Oct. 8, 1840, Levant
Correspondence, II, p. 268.
"Schleinitz to Palmerston, Oct. 9, 1840; Neumann to Palmerston, Oct. 12,
1840, ibid., pp. 293-294, 296.
^Brunnow to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840, ibid., pp. 294-295. See also, Rauch
to Nicholas, I, Oct. 13, 1840; Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Oct. 24, 1840, Nessel-
rode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 51-53, 55-60. Nesselrode was uneasy about the attitude
of Austria. On Oct. 10, he wrote to Meyendorff: "La nouvelle de la destitution
de Mehemet Ali a etc un coup de foudre pour Metternich; II a commence
1
a
faiblir et il n'a tenu qu'a un cheveu que 1'Austriche ne nous echappat com-
pletement.
"Les efforts de lord Beauvale et du comte Maltzahn 1'ont, grace a Dieu,
maintenue dans nos rangs, n'est-ce pas curieux que ce soit le ministre de Prusse
qui donne du courage au chancelier d'Austriche?" Ibid., p. 49.
^Journal des Debats, Oct. 3, 1840. This report, of course, was exaggerated.
"'Ibid., Oct. 4, 6, 1840. Lord Ponsonby probably encouraged the Porte to
adopt such a policy. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, Sept. 10, 14, 1840; Ponsonby
to Stopford, Sept. 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 230-232, 235-236,
265. Soon after Palmerston learned of the action taken by the Porte on Sept.
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a terrible panic, during which the 3%s sank as low as 65.25;
enthusiastic crowds in the theaters sang the Marseillaise,
83 and the
"lower orders" exclaimed in the streets : " 'Guerre aux Anglais,
Us ont pris notre Beyrout' which, from the rage expressed on the
subject by the journals, they concluded must be some town in
Normandy on the coast."84
The French government, on its part, was aroused particularly
because of the deposition of Mehemet Ali. A royal ordinance was
issued at once convoking the Chambers to meet October 28,
i84O,
85 and on October 8, Thiers forwarded to Guizot a note in
which he declared: "In the opinion of France, the Viceroy of
Egypt, for [par} the provinces which he governs, for the seas over
which his influence extends, is necessary to secure the balance of
power . . . existing between the different states of the world.
"Impressed with this conviction, France, equally disinterested,
with respect to the Eastern Question, as the four Powers who
signed the protocol of September I/,
86 considers herself called
upon to declare, that the deprivation of the Viceroy, if actually
14, 1840, he sent instructions to Stopford explaining that the British ships of
war should not enforce a commercial blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria,
and he wrote to Granville stating that the British government regarded the
deposition of Mehemet Ali only as a measure of coercion which might be with-
drawn if Mehemet should at an early date accept the conditions offered him.
See Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Oct. 6, 1840; Palmerston
to Granville, Oct. 2, 1840, ibid., pp. 242, 238.
"Raikes, France since 1830, I, p. XLIX, Mile. D'Henin to Mrs. Trollope,
Oct. 8, 1840, T. A. Trollope, What I Remember, II, p. 48. See also, Granville to
Palmerston, Oct. 5, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 267-268. Saint-Arnaud,
Lettres, I, pp. 284-285.
"Raikes, op. cit., I, p. XLIX. See also, Follett to Croker, Oct. 6, 1840,
L. J. Jennings, The Correspondence and Diaries of the Late . . . John Wilson
Croker, II, pp. 367-368. See also extracts from various French papers quoted
in Guichen, op. cit., pp. 382-383, 395-396.
85
Royal Ordinance, Oct. 7-10, 1840, Duvergier, op. cit., XL, p. 405.
""On Sept. 17, 1840, the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers signed a pro-
tocol announcing that they, after having exchanged the ratifications of the con-
vention concluded on July 15, had resolved "to declare formally
"That in the execution of the engagements resulting to the contracting
Powers from the above mentioned convention, those Powers" would "seek no
augmentation of territory, no exclusive influence, no commercial advantage for
their subjects, which those of every other nation" might not equally obtain.
Martens, N. R. G., XV, p. 488. State Papers, XXVIII, p. 348. Annual Register,
1840, p. 452.
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carried into execution, would in her eyes be a blow to the general
balance of power. The question respecting the limits which should
separate in Syria the possessions of the Sultan and those of the
Viceroy of Egypt might be left to the chances of the war actually
begun; but France could not abandon to such chances the exist-
ence of Mehemet Ali as a vassal Prince of the Empire. Whatever
may be the territorial limit which, in consequence of the events
of the war, shall ultimately separate them, their two-fold existence
is necessary to Europe; and France cannot allow the suppression
of either one or the other. Disposed as she is to be a party to any
acceptable arrangement, founded on the twofold guarantee of the
existence of the Sultan and of the Viceroy of Egypt, she confines
herself at present to declaring, that, for her part, she could not
consent to the act of deprivation decreed at Constantinople, being
carried into execution."87
Guizot communicated Thiers' famous casus belli note to Lord
Palmerston on October 10, 1840. For the latter that communica-
tion was most opportune. "The Cabinet met this afternoon,"
Charles Greville wrote on the date mentioned above. "Lord John
Russell was to have taken the lead and developed his conciliatory
notions, but a new turn was given to affairs by a note which Guizot
placed in Palmerston's hands . . . Palmerston brought it to the
Cabinet, where it was read, and, to the extreme surprise of every-
body, it was to the last degree moderate, and evincing a disposition
to be very easily satisfied. ... It would now appear that the
French government would be well enough satisfied if the original
terms offered to Mehemet Ali were still held out to him, . . .
Palmerston began talking of leaving him Egypt for his life, which
was, however, instantly put down by the majority. ... On the
whole the result was satisfactory; . . .
"88
to Guizot, Oct. 8, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 270-272.
Annual Register, 1840, pp. 514-516. Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 505-509. Thiers also
forwarded to Guizot on Oct. 8, an elaborate answer to Palmerston's note of
Aug. 31, 1840. See Thiers to Guizot, Oct. 3, 1840, ibid., pp. 487-505, Levant
Correspondence, II, pp. 276-284. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 517-529.
^Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 291-292. See also, Melbourne to Victoria, Oct. 10,
II, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 237-239. Lord John Russell was at that time
on the point of forcing a new crisis in the Cabinet. See Walpole, op. cit., I, pp.
354-357- Palmerston's position then also was strengthened by the publication of
his note of Aug. 31, 1840. See The Times, Oct. 7, 10, 1840.
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Thiers' note was copied promptly by the press and in both
England and France the public interpreted it as signifying identi-
cally what the members of the British Cabinet had taken it to
mean. 89
"[It] indirectly announces," The Times stated on October
17, 1840, "that the final requisition of France in favour of the
Pasha will be limited to that of which none but the shallow brain
of Lord Ponsonby would deprive him viz., the possession of
Egypt in hereditary sovereignty."
90
It soon became apparent, however, that the President of the
French Council was imbued with far less pacific intentions than
his note had led the British Cabinet and the public in the two
countries to believe.91 If negotiations were reopened at once be-
tween France and the other Powers, he informed Lord Granville
on October 15, 1840, he would ask of the 'Chambers when they
met only their sanction of the expense which had been theretofore
incurred in putting France into a state of defense, but if no such
negotiations were entered into he would then request the granting
of supplies sufficient for an additional increase of the army and
for the putting the national guards "into activity;" he would recall
a considerable portion of the forces in Africa; and he would
assemble "several armies" ready to act on the frontiers. These
statements Granville reported immediately to Palmerston, com-
menting that they evidently were intended to persuade him that
war was inevitable if the four Powers should persist in refusing
"to enter into negotiation with France relative to the conditions
of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet AH, and refuse to make
89The radicals in France were highly dissatisfied with the apparent modera-
tion of M. Thiers. See comment upon articles which had appeared in the Com-
merce, the National, and the Capitole in ibid., Oct. 16, 1840. Raikes, France
since 1830, I, pp. LIV-LV.
wThe Times, Oct. 17, 1840. See ibid., Oct. 20, 1840.
"In the Chamber of Deputies o'n Nov. 28, 1840, Thiers explained the mean-
ing of his note of Oct. 8, as follows: "La note ne s'est nullement expliquee
sur la limite territoriale. C'est avec intention qu'elle a garde a cet egard le
silence; et en vous 1'addressant, je vous ai positivement dit que le cabinet, pour
son compte, n'admettait pas les limites du traite du 15 juillet. Je ne pretends
pas que cela doive determiner aujourd'hui une autre conduite; mais il ne faut
pas attribuer a la Note un autre sens que celui que je lui attribuais le 8
octobre." Journal des Debats, Nov. 29, 1840. See also, accounts of speeches
made by Thiers before the Deputies, Nov. 10, 25, 1840, in ibid., Nov. n, 26, 1840.
Thiers declared on the 25th that if he had remained in office he would not
have permitted the execution of the terms of the treaty of July 15, 1840.
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concessions to obtain the concurrence of the French Government
in a pacific arrangement."
92
Palmerston, as on former occasions, was not alarmed by Thiers'
threats. It is true that on October 15, 1840, he wrote to Ponsonby
stating that it was the opinion of the British government that the
representatives at Constantinople of the four Powers should state
to the Sultan that their respective courts recommended strongly
"that if Mehemet Ali should at an early period make his submis-
sion to the Sultan, and should agree to restore the Turkish fleet,
and to withdraw his troops from the whole of Syria, from Adana,
Candia, and the Holy Cities, the Sultan should not only reinstate
Mehemet Ali as Pasha of Egypt, but should also give him an
hereditary tenure in that Pashalic."
93 That step, though, probably
was taken merely to satisfy the members of the Cabinet who en-
tertained opinions different from those of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs in regard to the danger of war with France.
94 At any rate
*2Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
313-314. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 529-530. See also, Granville to Palmerston,
Oct. 19, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 319. On Oct. 12, Granville had
reported that Admiral Hugon's fleet had been recalled from the Levant for the
purpose of seizing one or more of the Balearic Isles. France would explain to
Spain, he believed, that war with England appeared imminent and as Spain was
not strong enough to protect the Isles, it was necessary that a French fleet
should do so. See Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840; Palmerston to Aston,
Oct. 15, 1840, ibid., p. 298; Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 339-343. In pursuance of
his plans Thiers attempted to draw the chief Italian states into an alliance
with France. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 310-311.
*sPalmerston to Ponsonby, Oct. 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
311-312. Martens, N. R. G., I, p. 205.
"Victoria to Leopold, Oct. 16, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, p. 242. Walpole, op.
cit., I, p. 358. Melbourne wrote to the Queen on Oct. 12, 1840: "The worst is
that Palmerston, and John Russell, with now the greater part of the Cabinet,
proceed upon principles, opinions, and expectations which are entirely different
from one another, and which therefore necessarily lead to a different course of
action. We are anxious to finish the business speedily because we fear that
there is danger of the Government of France being forced into violent measures
by popular outcry. Palmerston, on the contrary, thinks that there is no danger
of war, . . .
"We should be too glad to see the matter settled, leaving Mehemet Ali in
possession of Egypt.
"Palmerston has both the wish and the hope of getting him out of Egypt
as well as Syria." Victoria, op. cit., I, p. 240. See also, Palmerston to Bulwer,
Oct. 3, 1840. Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 333.
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on October 20 when Palmerston replied to Granville he was
careful to make no statement in which hope that the allies would
consent to grant Thiers' demands could be founded. M. Thiers
himself, he declared, could not but see that the threatening arma-
ment, which France without any apparent cause had already
made, had caused the difficulties to be solved to increase instead
of to diminish; "and if the course indicated by M. Thiers should
be pursued, and if still more extensive armaments should be made
by France," it would "be impossible that Europe should not be-
lieve, that . . . the real intentions and designs of France" were
similar to those which, during the Republic and the Empire, had
arrayed Europe in resistance to her aggressions; and thence would
follow a conviction that it would be necessary to meet those de-
signs by the same combination of defensive means which was
"then employed to protect the liberties of Europe."
95
Fortunately for the preservation of peace among the great
Powers the exchange of warlike sentiments between Palmerston
and Thiers was not destined to be continued further.
King Louis Philippe, it will be remembered, had revealed to
Guizot at the conference held in August, 1840, at the Chateau
d'Eu that he was anxious to avoid war. During the early stages
of the agitation in France he sanctioned the military and naval
preparations advocated by his Cabinet,96 but he did so believing
that the four Powers would be baffled by effectual resistance on
the part of Mehemet AH, that an arrangement between the con-
tending parties in the Levant would be concluded, and conse-
quently that the peace of Europe would not be disturbed.97 Fur-
thermore he feared that if he should attempt to oppose the clamor
for war he would thereby take the risk of stirring up a revolution.
98
wPalmerston to Granville, Oct. 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
314-315. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 530-531. See also, Palmerston to Granville,
Oct. 8, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 268-270.
"Odilon Barrot, op. cit., I, p. 351. Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 384. Although the
King seemed to be in accord with the war party in France, Palmerston and
many others realized that he would hesitate long before he would consent to
engage in a war with the four Powers. See Palmerston to Bulwer, July 21, 1840,
Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 318. Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 260-261. Malmesbury,
op. cit., I, p. 122.
""Greville, op. cit., I, p. 384. Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 349-350.
"Dino, op. cit., II, p. 345.
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As time passed it became apparent that the allies were deter-
mined to see their policy succeed and it also became apparent
that revolutionary ideas were spreading in proportion as the pop-
ulace was becoming more and more aroused. The latter fact
became particularly obvious early in October after it was known
in France that the Anglo-Austrian fleet in the Levant had bom-
barded Beyrout. It was at that time that one of the radical Paris
journals, the National, realizing that the King was opposed to war,
stated: "Old men and babblers are the great scourges of a gov-
ernment. Old men wish everything to be stationary; babblers
prevent everything from moving on. This double scourge has
particularly afflicted France. . . . Elective governments are not
subject to these grave evils. When a man has served out his time,
or age has frozen or impaired his faculties, he is left in repose,
which is for him at once a necessity and a duty."99 Moreover, in
another column of the same issue, "in direct juxtaposition with
this article," the editor of the National took care to point out:
"King Louis Philippe this day entered his 69th year."99 A few
days later, on October 15, 1840, an attempt to assassinate the
King was made by a revolutionist named Darmes.100 Louis
Philippe, believing that it was "la paix qu'on a voulu tuer' in
him,
101 became alarmed thoroughly and resolved that the warlike
policy of the government should be abandoned.
102
Accordingly,
when Thiers suggested to him, October 20, 1840, that he should
deliver at the opening session of the legislative chambers an ad-
dress breathing defiance and calling for additional means for pre-
"An extract from an article published in the National and copied in The
Examiner, Oct. n, 1840, p. 648. See also, Guizot, op. cit., pp. 391-392. On Oct.
7, 1840, Thos. Raikes wrote from Paris to Wellington: "The party of the
National have now begun their usual mode of attack, as prelude to Revolu-
tion. The Marseillaise is sung in the theatres, emeutes are predicted, and the
United Societies are busy in sowing sedition. With external war on one hand,
and internal war on the other, the chances are that we shall be involved in
both." Raikes, Correspondence, p. 159.
wThe Times, Oct. 19, 27, 1840. Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 399-400.
101Reeve to Mrs. Reeve, Oct. 18, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 132.
102
Dino, op. cit., II, p. 406. The attempt of Darmes to assassinate the King,
which aroused others in France beside the latter, was followed by a reaction
in favor of peace. See an extract of a letter, Duchatel to Guizot, Oct. 19, 1840,
quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 402-404.
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paredness,
103 he refused to grant his consent.
104 Thiers and his
colleagues, who for some time had been on the verge of retiring
from office,105 resigned immediately. The King, anxious to secure
a ministry which would be willing to adopt a pacific policy in
regard to foreign affairs, appealed again to Marshal Soult. The
Marshal was not willing to resume full responsibility for the con-
duct of governmental affairs, but he did consent to become the
nominal President of the Council of a new administration, the real
head of which was to be M. Guizot, into whose hands Louis
Philippe confided the portfolio of foreign affairs.
With the fall of Thiers and the rise of Guizot it became
apparent that the government of France was resolved to make a
serious effort to avoid an outbreak of hostilities between itself and
the governments of the other four great Powers of Europe over
the question of the enforcement of the Treaty of London. At the
same time, all danger of war was not removed. The French and
German peoples still were greatly excited; the Soult-Guizot Min-
1MSee a copy of the address proposed by Thiers, in ibid., pp. 510512.
10
*Louis Philippe may have been influenced to some extent at that time by
a threatening remonstrance which Lord Melbourne sent to him through King
Leopold of Belgium. See Sanders, Melbourne Papers, p. 487. At various times
during the crisis of 1840, attempts were made by the Courts of both England
and France to influence each other by means of communications carried on
through the Court of Belgium. See Louis Philippe to Leopold, Oct. 10, Nov. 6,
1840, Taschereau, op. cit., pp. 363-365. Leopold to Victoria, Oct. 2, 6, 17, 20,
1840; Victoria to Leopold, Oct. 13, 16, 23, 1840; Victoria to Palmerston, Oct. 12,
1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 233-234, 235, 243-245, 241-243, 245, 239. Greville,
op. cit., I, p. 295. Corti, op. cit., pp. 117 ff. King Leopold was very much
alarmed by the Near Eastern crisis. On Nov. 5, 1840, he wrote to Metternich:
"
'In view of the condition of social sickliness from which Europe suffers, the
Communists regarding the bourgeois as an intolerable burden, quite trivial things,
alterations in the Treaty itself, might bring on a great war, which would turn
into a war of opinions. To confine it to Mehemed would be impossible. I do
not say it in order to strengthen my own proposals, but, as far as I know
Europe, I believe that its entire social form and organization would be trans-
formed and shattered by such a struggle.'
" Quoted by ibid., p. 137. Two days
later he wrote even more alarmingly to Billow. See ibid., pp. 133-134.
105
Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 383. Follett to Croker, Oct. 6, 1840, Jennings, op.
cit., II, p. 368. Dino, op. cit., II, p. 391, 396. Raikes, France since 1830,
I, p. LII. Reeve to Landsdowne, Oct. 5, 1840. Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 123.
Malmesbury, op. cit., I, p. 125-126.
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istry's tenure of office was insecure;
106 and it remained to be seen
what terms, if any, the Porte and its four allies would ultimately
consent to grant to Mehemet AH.
10
*The Austrian Count von Beust was in Paris at the time of the formation
of the Soult-Guizot Ministry. At a later date he stated, concerning the ' situa-
tion in the French capital on that occasion, that "the political excitement then
prevalent in Paris was great; the French felt keenly the humiliation they had
brought upon themselves, and Guizot . . . did not lie on a bed of roses." "I
remember," he continued, "having heard it said more than once: // en a pour
trois semaines. But the three weeks became seven years." Beust, Memoirs of
Frederick Ferdinand Count von Beust, I, p. 33. For additional information on
public opinion in France, and England also, in October, 1840, see Johnson, op. cit.,
pp. 8 ff.
CHAPTER VI
THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED:
FRANCE AND THE FOUR POWERS
RECONCILED
The new Ministers in France did not abandon immediately all
hope of being able to secure a modification of the terms of the
Treaty of London. The Powers ought to modify those terms,
Guizot intimated to Palmerston on the day of his departure from
London, in order to satisfy French amour-propre and in order to
assist the French government to maintain peace.
1
Later, after he
had entered upon his ministerial duties, he made a similar ad-
vance to Lord Granville. He suggested then that the four Powers
and France should agree to a suspension of hostilities in the
Levant on a certain date. According to his plan the status quo
in Syria at that particular time would be the basis of the arrange-
ment which would be made between the Sultan and the Viceroy,
and if the latter should be required to give up any Syrian terri-
tory which he still retained he would be compensated for it else-
where in Crete for example.
2
Palmerston, however, was no more inclined to grant what
M. Guizot pleaded for than he had been to grant that which M.
Thiers had attempted to secure by threat of armed intervention.
"
'We withstood the threats of Thiers,'
" he wrote, October 29,
1840, "'because what he asked could not be granted without
great injury to the interests of Europe; and we cannot expose
those interests to injury out of complaisance to Louis Philippe
Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
336-337-
"Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 6, 1840, Parl. Papers, 1841, Session 2,
VIII, Correspondence relative to the Levant, III, pp. 1-2. See also, Granville to
Palmerston, Nov. 13, 1840, ibid., pp. 24-25. Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 305, 309.
King Louis Philippe made similar suggestions to King Leopold of Belgium. See
Louis Philippe to Leopold, Nov. 6, 16, 1840, Taschereau, op. cit., pp. 364-366.
The King was alarmed greatly by the situation of affairs. Note the following
extract from a letter, Raikes to Wellington, Nov. 7, 1840; "His Majesty [Louis
Philippe] is become such an ardent admirer of peace, that, if he were not with-
held by certain cogent apprehensions, I believe he would now not only sacrifice
Egypt and the Pasha, but even Toulon and Marseilles, if necessary to accom-
plish his desired object." Raikes, Correspondence, p. 183. See also Raikes,
Journal, IV, pp. 85-86.
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or Guizot any more than out of fear for Thiers; ... if we were
to give way, the French nation would believe that we gave way
to their menaces, and not to the entreaties of Louis Philippe.'
"3
Four days later Palmerston forwarded to Paris a reply to
the famous casus belli note of October 8, 1840. In that reply he
went so far as to deny that the Pasha of Egypt was an essential
element of the balance of power in Europe. It was the opinion
of the Turkish government, he pointed out, that the continuance
of Mehemet All in his existing state of military power and with
his hostile intentions towards the Sultan was
"incompatible with
the internal peace and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and de-
structive of the independence of the Sultan as regards his rela-
tions with foreign Powers :...." The extent of the limits within
which it might be necessary to confine the delegated authority of
Mehemet AH, in order to make it probable that for the future he
would be an obedient subject, was a point on which opinion
might differ. Her Majesty's government believed that whatever
might be the views entertained on the subject by foreign Powers,
such views could only serve to regulate the advice which those
Powers might tender to the Sultan. It remained with the latter,
as sovereign of the Turkish Empire, to decide which of his sub-
jects should be appointed by him to govern particular portions
of his own dominions, and no foreign state had a right to control
him "in the discretionary exercise of one of the inherent and
essential attributes of independent sovereignty."
4
M. Guizot, who hoped that the British government would "do
or say something to assist him" in his struggle against the war
party in France, was greatly disappointed by Palmerston's note
of November 2, 1840. The new administration's tenure of office,
it should be remembered, was by no means secure, and among
the Deputies who were finally convened on November 4, just
one day before Granville delivered the British Minister's note to
the government of France,
5 the effect produced by that commu-
'Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 29, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 347.
*Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 2, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp.
338-340. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 531-533.
The first real test of the parlimentary strength of the Soult-Guizot Ministry
came on Nov. 6, 1840, when its candidate, M. Sauzet, was elected President of
the Chamber of Deputies. Sauzet received 220 votes while M. Odilon Barrot,
his chief opponent, received 154. See Journal des Debats, Nov. 7, 1840.
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nication was
"markedly favorable to M. Thiers," the leader of
the opposition.
6
"The note of November 2nd," Guizot wrote to
Henry Reeve, "has seriously injured my position and increased
the difficulties which surround me. ... I am engaged in a great
struggle for the cause of peace, of civilization, of a straightfor-
ward and moderate policy. I am striving for the general good.
Nothing shall discourage me. I do not know if I shall succeed,
but if I do, I shall owe no gratitude to anyone; at least I have
the right to say so, at present."
7
Even the Conservatives in England believed that the position
taken by Palmerston in his famous note was too uncompromising.
"It is ... a subject of great regret," The Times stated, Novem-
ber 13, 1840, "that in Lord Palmerston's first despatch to be laid
before M.- Guizot, his Lordship could put forward no more
conciliatory and more straightforward principles for future agree-
ment, . . . the publication of this document is certainly rather
calculated to strengthen the suspicions we have already expressed
of Lord Palmerston's wilful opposition to every species of con-
cession than to encourage those hopes of an amicable arrangement,
which are so warmly and generally entertained in this country."8
'Letter from Paris, Nov. 13, 1840, The Times, Nov. 16, 1840. Note also the
following extract from the Journal of Thos. Raikes, who was then residing in
France: "Nov. 14, 1840 ... I am very much afraid that this unfortunate
note of the 2nd, in the papers, will undo all the good that we had hoped to
gain by the change of Ministry." Raikes, Journal, IV, p. 90.
'Guizot to Reeve, Nov. 20, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 138. See also,
Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 44.
*The Times, Nov. 13, 1840. In the House of Commons Palmerston
explained in the following terms why he sent to Guizot his reply to Thiers' note
of Oct. 8, 1840: "All I can say is that circumstances prevented me from writ-
ing that answer sooner; and it did not appear to me that the fact of a change
of Government in France was any reason for preventing me from putting an
answer on record to arguments which I could not admit, and to which it was
extremely important that there should be a recorded reply." Parl. Deb., LVI,
p. 113. See also, Palmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 17, 1841, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp.
380-381. Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 414-415. Guizot objected particularly because
Palmerston permitted his note to be published by the public press. It is prob-
able that Palmerston's purpose in so doing was to combat the ideas advanced
by the "Friends of Peace" who were holding meetings in Manchester and other
important British cities. See Palmerston to Fox Maule, Oct. 31, 1840, G.
Douglas and G. Ramsay, The Panmure Papers, I, pp. 19-20.
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Palmerston's note caused many to doubt if the allies would
really attempt to induce the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the
governorship of Egypt.
9 Those doubts, however, were not destined
to be realized. On November 9, 1840, despatches from Vienna
arrived at London, and in them it was intimated that Prince
Metternich was in favor of leaving Egypt in hereditary possession
to Mehemet Ali on condition that the latter should agree promptly
to submit to his overlord.10 A day later Palmerston received a
note from Bloomfield, the British charge d'affaires at St. Peters-
burg, announcing that Count Nesselrode had decided to send to
Titow, the Tsar's representative at Constantinople, instructions
similar to those which the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs had
forwarded to Ponsonby, October 15, I84O.
11 Soon after these
communications reached the English capital, on November 14,
1840, the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers signed a memoran-
dum in which they declared that their courts would advise the
Porte to grant its pardon to Mehemet Ali and to reinstate him in
the Pashalic of Egypt provided that he, on his part, should first
offer his submission to the Sultan.12 Furthermore, on the same
date that the memorandum was signed, Palmerston instructed the
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that they should order
Admiral Stopford to send a "competent officer" to Alexandria to
demand from the Pasha the restoration of the Turkish fleet and
the evacuation of Syria, Adana, Candia, Arabia, and the Holy
Cities. The officer, he directed, should give the Viceroy three
days in which to answer those demands, promising him that in
case he submitted to them the four Powers would advise the Porte
to reinstate him in Egypt. If the Viceroy should do as he was
ordered and write an unsealed engagement to the Porte to that
effect, the former should immediately carry it to Constantinople
and present it to the Ministers of the Sultan, but he should decline
to carry any message in which Mehemet did not comply with the
above named conditions.13
*Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 13, 184.0, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 25.
10Beauvale to Palmerston, Oct. 28, 1840, ibid., pp. 14-15, 15.
"Bloomfield to Palmerston, Oct. 31, 1840, ibid., p. 17.
"Ibid., pp. 21-22. Documents Diplomatique-s relatifs a la question d'Orient.
"Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Nov. 14, 1840, Levant
Correspondence, III, p. 23. On the same date Palmerston forwarded two other
communications to the Lords Commissioners. In one he explained that, in case
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At the time when Palmerston and the representatives of Austria,
Prussia, and Russia were outlining conditions which they intended
to enforce upon Mehemet Ali the allied military and naval opera-
tions were being carried forward rapidly in the Levant. "I believe
history does not record such unexampled successes gained in so
short a time by so small a force," Sir Charles Napier has stated
with, evident pride in his War in Syria. "We landed on the loth
of September at D'Jounie, with 5300 Turks, 1500 marines, and
about 100 Austrians; by the loth of October we had managed to
storm and take Sidon, defeat the Egyptians at Ornagacuan,
Ibrahim Pacha at Boharsof, and . . . between prisoners and de-
serters, get possession of 10,000 men, had freed all Lebanon, and
forced Ibrahim to withdraw his troops from Tripoli and Latakia,
abandon the passes of the Taurus, and concentrate the whole of
his army at Zachle and Damascus [jic]."14
Soon after the successes in upper Syria, which Napier men-
tioned, had been achieved, Admiral Stopford received orders from
England to the effect that the allied fleet should attack the famous
fortress of St. Jean d'Acre.
15
Accordingly on the afternoon of
November 3, 1840, a heavy bombardment of the place was begun.
The firing of the British, Austrian, and Turkish gunners must have
been very effective indeed. Great confusion resulted immediately
among the defenders; at about 4 p. m., the fort's magazine blew
up, and before nightfall practically all of the shore batteries were
silenced. The Egyptians, realizing that they would not be able to
continue successfully the defense of their positions, withdrew forth-
with under cover of darkness, and on the morning of November
4, forces from the fleet took possession both of the fortress and
of the town.16
Mehemet Ali, in his written engagement to the Porte, should express a desire
that he should be given the hereditary possession of Egypt, the officer should
not on that account refuse to carry it to Constantinople. In the other he
ordered that Stopford should push forward with vigor the military and naval
operations on the coasts of Syria and Egypt until he heard from Constantinople
that an arrangement had been made with Mehemet Ali. See ibid., p. 24.
"Napier, War in Syria, I, p. 173.
"Ibid., p. 1 86.
"Stopford to O'Ferrall, Oct. 31, Nov. 4, 8, 1840, Annual Register, 1840, pp.
546-549. Ibid., pp. [i92]-[i93]. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 197 ff. Napier,
Correspondence, II, pp. 93 ff. Barker, op. cit., II, pp. 238-239. Paton, op. cit.,
II, p. 196.
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The victory of the allies at Acre was in reality the most impor-
tant event of all the military and naval operations in the Levant
during the war of 1840. Before the date of that victory Mehemet
AH had declared persistently that he would not submit unless his
overlord granted to him, in tenure for life at least, the whole of
Syria as well as the hereditary possession of Egypt.
17
But, on
November n, 1840, two days after the fall of Acre had been
announced at Alexandria,18 he wrote to the King of the French
stating that he would "be satisfied" if he were granted, in addition
to Egypt, only the Pashalic of Acre.
19 Ten days later a British
fleet of six sail of the line under command of Commodore Napier
took up a position off the harbor of the Egyptian metropolis.
20
This threatening move on the part of his opponents added to what
had taken place previously must have convinced the Pasha thor-
oughly that any further resistance on his part would be useless,
for when Napier suggested to him that he should agree to accept
terms which would be in harmony with the ideas advanced by
Lord Palmerston, in his note of October 15, 1840, to Ponsonby,
he did not object to following such a course. 21 In fact on Novem-
ber 27, 1840, he even signed with the British Commodore a con-
vention in which he engaged to order his son Ibrahim to proceed
at once to the evacuation of Syria and promised to restore the
Ottoman fleet to the Sultan as soon as he should receive official
notification that the Sublime Porte had granted to him the hered-
itary government of Egypt, which concession was to be and remain
"Letter from Alexandria, Oct. 28, 29, 1840, The Times, Nov. 12, n, 1840.
"Letters from Alexandria, Nov. 9, 1840, ibid., Dec. I, 1840.
^Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 92-93. According to an Austrian report
from Alexandria, Nov. 15, 1840, Mehemet AH was ready to offer his complete
submission, but Cochelet and Walewski, who had returned to Egypt after his
failure to induce the Porte to accept the Viceroy's terms, had influenced him to
refrain from doing so. See ibid., pp. 98-100. See also Letter from Alexandria,
Nov. u, 1840, The Times, Dec. I, 1840.
*Napier, Correspondence, II, p. 103. Napier, War in Syria, I, p. 249. A
smaller British squadron had been stationed off Alexandria for some time. See
The Times, Nov. 2, II, 17, 1840.
"Napier received a copy of Palmerston's note of Oct. 15, 1840, on the day
that he arrived off Alexandria. See Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 249-252. His
correspondence with Mehemet AH began on Nov. 22, 1840. For the letters
which were interchanged see ibid., pp. 254 ff. Levant Correspondence, III, pp.
72-81. The Times, Dec. 15, 1840.
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"
'guaranteed by the Powers.'
"
Napier, in turn, engaged
"
'to
suspend hostilities on the part of the British forces against Alex-
andria, or any other portion of the Egyptian territory/
"
and
promised that the Egyptian army should
"
'have the liberty of
retiring from Syria with its artillery, arms, horses, ammunition,
baggage, and in general everything'
"
that constituted " 'the stores
of an army.'
" 22
It is true that Commodore Napier and Mehemet Ali were able
thus to agree upon an arrangement which seemed to settle the
most important problems at issue in the Levant. But Napier in
his negotiations with the Viceroy had acted without instructions
either from the British Cabinet or from Admiral Stopford, his
superior in command.23 When Stopford learned of the existence
of the convention of November 27, 1840, he was, to say the least,
greatly dissatisfied.
"
'I am sorry'," he stated in a letter to the
Commodore, December 2, 1840,
"
'to say that I cannot ratify, or
approve of this measure: setting aside the unauthorized manner
and the unnecessary haste with which so important a document
was executed, with the Commander-in-Chief within two days' sail
of you, the articles of that Convention, if carried into execution,
in the present state of affairs in Syria, would be productive of
much more evil than good, and occasion much embarrassment.'
"24
On the same date when Stopford wrote to Napier disapproving
of the arrangement of November 27 he also wrote similarly to
Mehemet Ali.25 Soon thereafter, however, he received from Lon-
don copies of the memorandum of November 14, 1840, and the
instructions which Palmerston had directed the Lords Commis-
sioners of the Admiralty to forward to him. The admiralty instruc-
tions, it will be remembered, provided for the sending of an officer
to Alexandria with the purpose of persuading the Pasha to consent
to accept terms which resembled, in some respects at least, those
defined in the Napier convention. Hence it was necessary for
Stopford to adopt a policy similar to the one which he had just
condemned.
"Ibid., Martens, A'. R. G., XV, p. 489. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 282-
283. Laurent, op. cit., I, pp. 202-205.
^For Napier's explanation of his conduct, see Napier, War in Syria, I, pp.
253-254.
"Ibid., II, pp. 3-4.
K
Ibid., pp. H-I2.
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Captain Fanshawe, the officer whom the Admiral chose to carry
out his instructions, set out on his mission December 6, i84o,26
and arrived at Alexandria two days later. He found the Viceroy
dissatisfied because of Stopford's refusal to ratify the convention
of November 27, but unwilling, nevertheless, to refuse to comply
with the modified British demands.27 Accordingly, on December
II, 1840, after a very brief period of negotiation, the Captain
received from His Highness an unsealed letter to the Porte in
which Mehemet AH announced his "most humble submission" to
his overlord and declared that on the receipt of a firman, making
known in what manner it should please His Imperial Majesty that
the fleet should "be delivered up and despatched" from Alexan-
dria, he would hasten to conform to the sovereign will by carrying
that firman into execution. Furthermore, as he was ready to
withdraw all of the Egyptian authorities who were "in the Island
of Candia, in the Hedjaz, and in the two Holy Cities, on the
arrival of His Imperial Majesty's firman in that respect," the
above mentioned places would be evacuated without delay. 28
Fanshawe, believing that this letter met the demands outlined in
the instructions which Stopford had passed on to him, returned
immediately to the fleet, and "after delivering the Pacha's reply
Z6See Instructions for Fanshawe on his Mission to Alexandria, Dec. 6, 1840,
ibid., pp. 316-317. The most important difference between the terms which
Napier had promised to the Pasha and those which Fanshawe was about to
suggest lay in the fact that in the latter terms it was not guaranteed that the
Sultan would grant to Mehemet AH the hereditary possession of Egypt.
27For accounts of Fanshawe's negotiations at Alexandria, see Fanshawe to
Stopford, Dec. 12, 1840, ibid., pp. 21-27. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 124-
126. Larking to Palmerston, Dec. 22, 1840, ibid., pp. 128-129. Letters from
Alexandria, Dec. 9, 12, 1840. The Times, Dec. 29, 1840. It appears that in
Nov., 1840, Guizot sent a despatch to Cochelet ordering him to advise the
Viceroy to submit to the terms outlined in the memorandum of Nov. 14, 1840,
and that that despatch reached Alexandria before the date of the negotia-
tions between Fanshawe and Mehemet Ali. See Granville to Palmerston, Nov.
20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 35. Metternich to Sainte-Aulaire, Dec.
30, 1840, Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 428.
^Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, Dec. n, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III,
pp. 148-149. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 29-31. See also, Mehemet Ali to
Muhafiz of Candia, Dec. n, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 150-151.
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to the Admiral," proceeded with Mehemet Ali's submissive com-
munication to Constantinople.
29
On December 18, 1840, soon after the British Captain arrived
at the Ottoman capital, he had an interview with the Grand Vizier
during which he narrated the chief events of his mission to the
Egyptian metropolis, and delivered up Mehemet Ali's letter of
December n. In his reply the Turkish Minister avoided prom-
ising that the Viceroy would be pardoned and reinstated in the
governorship of Egypt. The question at issue, he declared, was
one of foreign policy, belonging entirely to the department of
foreign affairs. The Porte would take it into consideration with
the representatives of the allied Courts, and His Excellency the
Minister of Foreign Affairs would make known the intentions of
the Porte. At the same time he did not hesitate to reveal the
sentiments which he personally entertained. When Fanshawe
spoke about the conclusion of peace he exclaimed: "'Peace is
made between two Governments, and not between a Soverign and
one of his rebel subjects.'
" "
'The fleet is ours;'
" he declared on
another occasion during the interview,
"
'Alexandria is our coun-
try; we are perfectly sure of having the fleet sooner or later.'"
30
Although the Ministers of the Sultan, encouraged by Lord Pon-
sonby, probably did hope to secure the complete ruin of the
Pasha31 they hesitated to take any further action without being
assured of the cooperation of their sovereign's allies. Therefore, on
December 20, 1840, in accordance with the Grand Vizier's promise
to Captain Fanshawe, Reschid Pasha, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, called together the representatives of Austria, Great
Britain, Prussia, and Russia, and after mentioning that the Porte
had received copies of Mehemet Ali's letter dated December u,
"Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 28. See also, Mehemet AH to Stopford [no
date given], ibid., pp. 20-21. Levant Correspondence, III, p. 130.
30
Pisani to Ponsonby, Dec. 18, 1840; Fanshawe to Stopford, Dec. 18, 1840,
ibid., pp. 136-137, 168. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 33-35.
31
See a copy of a despatch which the Porte forwarded to Chekib Effendi,
Dec. 8, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 115-116. Both Lord Ponsonby
and the Ottoman Ministers condemned Napier's convention. See Ponsonby to
Palmerston, Dec. 8, 15, 1840, ibid., pp. 112, 134-135. Ponsonby to Napier, Dec.
7, 1840, Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 7-8, 12.
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1840, and the memorandum dated November 14, 1840, asked
them if the Pasha by his letter had complied with the spirit of the
memorandum and if his submission ought to be considered as
real. Lord Ponsonby replied evasively that it belonged to the
Sultan alone to decide this point. "I have precise orders," he
declared, "to advise the Porte to grant [the] hereditary succession
to, Mehemet Ali, so soon as it shall apprize us that the Sultan is
satisfied with the submission of Mehemet Ali; but such advice can
only be conditional; I have not the right to judge of the reality
of the submission, and I must wait, before giving it, for the Sultan
to pronounce himself on the fact of the submission." "I declare,"
he continued later, "that, in my opinion, Mehemet Ali has now
no right; that the Sultan is master to take the course which he
shall consider fitting, and that we can only afford him our ad-
vice." The representatives of the three eastern Powers, taking a
different stand concerning the question, intimated that the Porte
should trust Mehemet Ali and act with moderation towards him.
"The letter is a commencement of submission," the Internuncio
of Austria stated. "If the Sublime Porte demands the delivery of
the fleet, if Mehemet Ali restores it, and if he evacuates the coun-
tries specified in the Memorandum, his submission will certainly
be then complete."
32
The difference of opinion existing between Ponsonby and the
other allied diplomats, which was revealed at the conference held
on December 20, must have encouraged Reschid Pasha and his
colleagues, who wished to enforce severe terms upon the Viceroy,
to hope for ultimate success. Nevertheless, they were careful to
make it appear that the Porte was ready to act in accord with the
policy outlined in the memorandum of November 14, 1840. "His
Imperial Majesty," Reschid Pasha informed Ponsonby, December
27, "wishing to prove by a fresh act the moderation of his
sentiments, is disposed to accept the submission of Mehemet Ali,
and only awaits the fulfilment of the conditions imposed upon
"Protocol of the Conference held at the House of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, on one part, and the representatives of Austria, Great
Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on the other, ibid., pp. 318-329. Levant Corres-
pondence, III, pp. 140-144. N. Bordeano, L'Egypte d'apres les traites de 1840-
1841, pp. 47-55.
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him by the Memorandum of the I4th of November, to consider
that submission as complete, and to confirm Mehemet Ali in the
Pashalic of Egypt.
"With the view of hastening that fulfilment, and of thus prov-
ing more clearly his desire to lend himself, as far as is in his
power, to the views of his august Allies, the Sultan has decided
that Yaver Pacha (Admiral Walker) and Mazloum Bey shall
proceed immediately to Egypt as his Commissioners to receive
the Ottoman fleet, and to ascertain that the places described in
the Memorandum of the I4th of November are evacuated by the
troops of Mehemet Ali."33
In the meantime the danger of a war breaking out between
France and the four Powers because of the execution of the treaty
of July 15, 1840, had practically disappeared. It is true that the
situation in France remained uncertain for some time after the
resignation of Thiers and his colleagues.34 The press, with very
few exceptions, continued its demand for the adoption of an
aggressive policy,
35 and in the Chamber of Deputies the radicals
were able to carry on a formidable struggle with those who de-
fended the policy of the Soult-Guizot administration.
36 Never-
theless, it became apparent before the close of the month of
"Rechid Pasha to Ponsonby, Dec. 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III,
p. 156. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 39-40. Bordeano, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
Guichen, op. cit., p. 461.
**On Nov. 6, 1840, Henry Reeve, who was familiar with conditions in
France, wrote to Lansdowne: 'The French Government is on the slope of
revolution; the silence, the morne attitude of the populace yesterday at the
opening of the Chambers, is the most frightful of all symptoms in France; it
accompanied Louis XVI from Versailles and from Varennes; it followed
Charles X to Cherbourg." Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 135. See also Reeve to Mrs.
Reeve, Nov. 7, 1840, ibid., pp. 136-137.
"See extracts copied from the National and Univers, in The Times, Nov.
2, 1840. See also ibid., Nov. 5, 6, Dec. 9, 1840. On Nov. 3 The Times stated:
"... up to the present moment the Journal des Debats is the only newspaper
published in Paris that defends the new Ministry."
"For summaries of the exciting debates in the French Chambers during the
latter part of November and the early part of December, see Journal des Debats,
Nov. 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, Dec. i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1840. On Dec. 5, 1840, a pacific
address to the King was adopted by the Deputies by a vote of 247-161. Sum-
maries of the French debates will also be found in The Times. A discussion of
them will be found in Guichen, op. cit., pp. 451 ff.
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November that Louis Philippe's new Cabinet, supported mainly
by elements determined to avoid war, was gaining ground.37 After
news of the decisive engagement fought at Acre on November 3,
1840, reached western Europe,
38 Palmerston's British critics even
recognized that fact and admitted that the policy which the
Queen's Secretary of Foreign Affairs and his allies had adopted,
and which he and the Russian Ministers had refused obstinately
to abandon,39 was sure to triumph. "From all that has now been
said and published," Henry Reeve wrote to Charles Greville,
November 24, 1840, "it results that I, for one, have been in great
part mistaken; mistaken as to the danger of Russian interference,
mistaken as to the result of the operations in Syria, and mistaken
as to the real policy and feeling of France."40 Greville, who enter-
tained opinions similar to those of Reeve, wrote in his journal,
December 4, 1840: "In the course of the last three weeks, . . .
a mighty change has taken place; we have had the capture of
St. Jean d'Acre and the debate in the French Chambers. Palm-
erston is triumphant; everything has turned out well for him. . . .
His colleagues have nothing more to say; and as Guizot makes a
sort of common cause with him in the Chamber [of Deputies],
and Thiers makes out a case for himself by declaring objects and
designs which justify Palmerston's policy and acts, and as the
Pasha is now reduced to the necessity of submission, the contest
is at an end."41
37See Reeve to Mrs. Reeve, Nov. 13, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 137. The
decline in the strength of the French war party became still more obvious in
Dec., 1840. That party hoped to be able to make a great demonstration when
Napoleon's body was brought to Paris. But their efforts to do so, when the
event occurred, Dec. 15, 1840, failed miserably. See Journal des Debats, Dec.
16, 1840, The Times, Dec. 18, 1840. The Examiner, Dec. 27, 1840. Guizot, op.
cit., VI, p. 19. Malmesbury, op. cit., I, p. 128.
38
See Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 47. Disraeli to Disraeli, Nov. 21, 1840, W. F.
Monypenny, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, II, p. 96.
39Palmerston to Bloomfield, Nov. 26, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 35.
40
Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 140. See also Reeve to Greville, Nov. 29, 1840,
Johnson, op. cit., p. 48.
"Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 308-309. On Nov. 15, 1840, Palmerston wrote to
Granville: " 'Remusat has let the cat out of the bag by declaring that France,
in protecting Mehemet Ali, meant to establish a new second-rate maritime
Power in the Mediterranean, whose fleet might unite with that of France for
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The dangerous stages of the crisis of 1840, in fact, had been
passed by. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, was
not satisfied merely to prevent war from breaking out between his
country and the four Powers which had signed the convention of
July 15, 1840. In addition, he was anxious to discover some means
by which France might escape from her isolated position and
secure a reestablishment of the concert of the five Powers. When
he entered office, be it remembered, he had hoped to secure this
end through a modification of the terms which the four Powers
had taken steps to enforce upon the Viceroy. He clung to that
idea for some time even after Granville had communicated to him
Palmerston's note of November 2.42 Late in November, with
that idea still in view, he sent Baron Mounier upon an unofficial
mission to England to observe "la disposition des esprits," to talk
freely with men of affairs, and to estimate thus without prejudice
"the chances for the future."43 At London the Baron found "the
most sincere partisans of peace" convinced that it would be neces-
sary for Mehemet Ali to submit to the terms of the treaty of
July 15."
After Guizot had received from Mounier reports concerning the
attitude of the British and after he had learned of the fall of Acre,
he finally gave up all hope of securing a modification in the terms
the purpose of serving as a counterpoise to that of England. That is plain-
spoken, at all events.
"
'If the French scheme for the Levant had succeeded, we should infallibly
have had war before long, and growing out of those very affairs on which we
should have made concessions in order to preserve peace. The moral and diplo-
matic contest we have had with France now will probably tend to keep the two
nations without war for some years to come.'
" Twelve days later he wrote:
"
'This is indeed glorious news from Syria; and our fleet has maintained its old
reputation. This exploit [the capture of Acre] must settle the Eastern
question, . . .
" This result will also render Guizot's task more easy; for nobody can
think in France of going to war now to revive a dead man.'
"
Palmerston to
Granville, Nov. 15, 27, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 351, 365.
"Guizot to Reeve, Nov. 20, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., II, p. 138. Greville,
op. cit., I, pp. 302-306, 309. Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 30, 1840, Bulwer,
op. cit., II, pp. 365-366. Faucher to Reeve, Nov. 12, 1840, Faucher, op. cit.,
I, p. 100.
43
Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 49. Letter from Paris, Nov. 20, 1840, The Times,
Nov. 24, 1840. Greville, op. cit., I, p. 310.
"Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 50. The Examiner, Jan. 10, 1841, p. 19.
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of the Treaty of London. He did not give up, though, his hope of
finding means whereby France might reenter the Concert of Europe.
The French government, he maintained December 18, 1840, in a
letter to Bourqueney, who was still Louis Philippe's charge d'af-
faires at London, had remained foreign to the treaty of July 15,
1840, that is to say it had taken no part in the adjustment of the
relations of the Sultan and of the Pasha through the intervention
of Europe, because it had not been pleased either by the territorial
basis of that adjustment or by the methods of coercion employed
to secure its success. It would not offer opposition
" c
au fait',"
but at the same time it would not associate itself with the four
Powers in order " 'to render homage'
" to the arrangement which
they were enforcing in the Levant nor would it guarantee the
stability of that arrangement. It would remain therefore,
"
'en
dehors du treaty of July 15 and of the coalition which had signed
it.'
"
Nevertheless, after the purpose of that treaty had been
secured there would remain " 'the great question, the question of
the relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe.'
" The relations
of the Sultan and the Pasha formed, for the Ottoman Empire, an
"
'internal question'
"
upon which France and
"
'her allies'
" had
separated from each other. The relations of the Ottoman Empire
with Europe formed an
"
'external question,'
"
general and per-
manent in character, which it would be impossible to regulate
effectively or definitely without the cooperation of France with
the other Powers. Besides this great question exterieure there
would remain also the question of giving guarantees against op-
pression to the Syrians, especially the Christians of Mt. Lebanon,
over whom the direct authority of the Porte was being reestab-
lished. 45
"
'Far . . . from desiring to persist in our isolation,'
" Guizot
declared,
"
'we have always in view the reestablishment of the
4S
Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 54-55. On Dec. 13, 1840, Guizot wrote to Barante:
"Nous n'avons nul dessein de raster etrangers aux affaires generates de 1'Europe.
Nous croyons qu'il nous est bon d'en etre, qu'il est bon pour tous que nous y ren-
trerons. La France est trap grande pour qu'on ne sente pas bientot le vide
de son absence. Nous attendons qu'on le sente en effet, et qu'on nous le dise.
J'ai un degout immense de la fanfaronnade, mais la tranquillite de 1'attente et
la liberte du choix nous conviennent bien." De Witt, op. cit., p. 217.
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Concert of Europe, and we know by what openings, great and
small, we are able to return to it.
"
'We know also that many desire us to return, and we believe
that they are right. Our isolation does nothing for anyone. We
are obliged, both for our safety and for the satisfying of the spirit
[prevailing] in France, to maintain our present armaments. We
have stopped those armaments at the limit which they had attained
when the Cabinet was formed. The Cabinet precedent wished to
push them further; we have declared that we will not do so; . . .
When a door conveniently opens before us for an escape from this
situation, we shall not stubbornly insist on remaining [where we
are].'"
46
The course followed by Guizot pleased the Austrian and Prus-
sian governments greatly. They had been alarmed, it will be
recalled, by the situation of affairs in France and they were ex-
tremely anxious to escape from the critical position into which
they had been drawn through their having signed the convention
of July 15, i84o.
47 After the fall of Acre had been announced at
Vienna, it is true, Metternich wrote to Neumann instructing him
to prevent the French from being under illusions about Syria.
"
'Syria is lost irrevocably, lost tout entiere,'
" he declared.
"
'. . . there is not a moment to be sacrificed in persuading
Mehemet All to submit.' "48 But soon thereafter he took care to
let Count Sainte-Aulaire, the French Ambassador at the Court of
the Emperor Francis, understand that Austria would abstain from
an attack upon Egypt and that she would do so because of her
regard for the feelings of France.
"
'If M. Guizot'," he stated on
that occasion,
"
'should find some advantage in making this truth
known in the [Legislative] Chambers, he may proclaim it [there]
with the assurance that it will not be denied by me.'
"49 Further-
"Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 55-56.
*7Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 2, 16, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III,
pp. i, 31. Greville, op. cit., I, p. 304. Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 40 if.
**Ibid., p. 47. See also Greville, op. cit., VI, pp. 305, 307. Chreptowitch to
Nesselrode, Nov. 17, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 73-76. Metternich, op.
cit., VI, pp. 484-485.
"Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 51. See also, Metternich to Apponyi, Dec. 21, 30,
1840; Metternich to Sainte-Aulaire, Dec. 24, 30, 1840. Metternich, op. cit., VI,
pp. 425-429-
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more, when he learned that the Porte, encouraged by Lord Pon-
sonby,
50 had rejected the Napier convention, he became so aroused
that he requested Beauvale, the British Ambassador at Vienna, to
inform Palmerston that if the Porte hesitated to accept the recom-
mendation of the allied Powers who had urged it to grant the
hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali the Austrian
Court could not admit that the allied Powers should allow them-
selves to be compromised by such hesitation.51 No less concil-
iatory were the utterances of Baron Werther, the Prussian Chief
Minister. Indeed, he even maintained that "Upon no account
would Prussia participate in the destruction of Mehemet Ali;
[for] her aim must be to preserve the Osmanli Empire with the
cooperation of France."
82
Although Lord Palmerston was less disturbed by the situation
in the Levant than were the Austrian and Prussian statesmen, he
did not intend, it appears, to adopt a policy which would prevent
a reconciliation between France and the four Powers or an imme-
diate termination of the Turco-Egyptian question. "It has been
reported," he wrote to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840, "but upon
what authority is not known, that the Porte was, towards the end
"Note the following extract from the diary of the Princess Metternich, Jan.
6, 1841: "Clemens erhielt Depeschen aus Constantinopel. Ponsonby will dur-
chaus nicht, dass man sich mit Mehemed Ali verstandigt, und steigert hiedurch
die Verwirrung immer mehr." Ibid., pp. 486-487. Others were irritated by
Ponsonby's conduct. Reeve wrote to Greville, Oct. 27, 1840: "Admiral Roussin
told me such things of Ponsonby's behaviour to him, especially before the battle
of Nezib, that my hair stood on end. Even now if one could but get him
recalled all might go well: but Lord Alvanley is, or has been, at Constantinople
writing the warmest letters to everybody in his favour." Johnson, op. cit., p. 44.
"Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 3, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 151.
Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 60. Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 115-116.
52
Treitschke, op. cit., V. p. ill. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 427-428, 449-
450, 462, 465-466. Wheaton, the American, wrote from Berlin, Feb. 3, 1841:
"The successful military execution of the quintuple treaty has left so many
points of oriental policy unsettled, that the great German Powers probably begin to
regret having supported the views of Great Britain, in becoming parties to the
arrangement, which has brought upon them unforseen perils without adequate
equivalent advantages. Russia has also been disappointed in her expectation of
being called on to assist in the consummation of the work; but she has at
least the satisfaction of having produced a breach between Franch and Great
Britain which leaves her more free to act in pursuing her own exclusive ends."
State Dept. Prussia, II, Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 169, Feb. 3, 1841.
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of November, but before it had heard of the submission of
Mehemet Ali, disinclined to revoke the decree which had deprived
him of the Government of Egypt. It is not unnatural that such
a feeling should have existed at that time in the mind of the
Turkish Government, but Her Majesty's Government hopes that
subsequent events, and the unanimous advice of the Four Powers,
will have removed these objections on the part of the Porte, and
will have led the Porte to accept the settlement effected by Com-
modore Napier's arrangement, or by the subsequent more ample
submission of Mehemet Ali."53 It is true that as long as Guizot
had attempted to secure a reestablishment of the concert of the
five Powers on the basis of a modification in the terms of the
Treaty of London, Palmerston had opposed his effort.54 But, when
it became apparent to the British Secretary that the Frenchman
had abandoned those attempts, he assumed a more friendly atti-
tude in regard to the question at issue. On January 5, 1841, he
received a despatch from Granville which revealed that Guizot
on January i, had made to the Queen's Ambassador at Paris
statements almost identical in meaning to those which he had
written to Bourqueney, December 18, i84O,65 and, two days later,
the French charge d'affaires at London was able to write that, in
his opinion, Palmerston
"
'was really anxious to discover some
way of bringing back France into the concert, although he was
still undecided as to the manner in which it should be effected.' "60
"Palmerston to Ponsonby, Dec. 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp.
88-89. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 51-53. It should also be noted that on
Dec. 15, 1840, Palmerston informed the Lords of the Admiralty that they should
convey to Commodore Napier the approval by Her Majesty's government of
the steps taken by him on Nov. 27. The four Powers, he stated, could not
guarantee to the Viceroy, as it was promised in Article I of the Napier Conven-
tion, the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, but, he assured, they
would "recommend to the Porte to make the concession specified in the com-
munication" which Stopford had been instructed on Nov. 14, 1840, "to convey
to Mehemet Ali." Palmerston to Lords of Admiralty, Dec. 15, 1840, Levant
Correspondence, III, pp. 87-88. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 49-51.
"Palmerston to Bloomfield, Dec. 2, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 54.
Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 30, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 365-366.
"Granville to Palmerston, Jan. I, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 120.
"
Affaires etrangeres, 657 Angleterre, Bourqueney to Guizot, Jan. 7, 1841,
quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 322.
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Even the Court of St. Petersburg seemed willing to enter into
an arrangement if it was drawn up in accord with Russian
views whereby France and the four Powers would be reconciled.
Such an arrangement, in which the principle of the closure of the
Straits would be set forth, Brunnow pointed out in one of his
despatches, would have the
"
''advantage indubitable'
"
of inducing
France to recognize explicitly that principle which, by Article IV
of the Convention of London, the four Powers had agreed to
accept.
57
Nesselrode, like Brunnow, was willing that the concert
of the five Powers should be reestablished on the basis of the
closure of the Straits.58 At the same time, however, believing that
Russia had won a great triumph through the conclusion of the
treaty of July 15, 1840, he was particularly anxious both to render
permanent the friendship which had been established between
England and the three absolute Courts, 59 and to prevent the resur-
rection of the detested Anglo-French alliance.
60
On January 13, 1841, Guizot, encouraged by the willingness of
the four Powers to enter into an arrangement to which France
would be a party, wrote to Count Saint-Aulaire stating that while
France remained foreign
" l
apres comme avant'
"
to the treaty of
July 15, 1840, she was ready to resume in Levantine affairs,
which were of general interest for Europe, the place which be-
longed to her, and also to reenter, through some convenient open-
"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 83.
"Clanricarde to Palmerston, Dec. 22, 1840; Nesselrode to Brunnow, Dec.
10/22, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 121, 121-122.
w
Hall, op. cit., pp. 319-320.
*On Dec. 28, 1840, Nesselrode wrote to Meyendorff: "Tout ce que nous
demandons a ces deux cours [Prussia and Austria], c'est de ne pas rapprocher
de nouveau 1'Angleterre et la France, ce qui est bien plus encore dans leur
interet que dans le notre. Au reste, je ne sais, en verite, ce qu'il faudra atten-
dre ou craindre dans 1'avenir de la Prusse." Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp.
102-106. On Jan. 27, 1841, Cambreling, the American representative at St.
Petersburg, wrote: "It is understood here, altho I have no official information on
the subject, that Prince Metternich has proposed to the late Min[ister] of
Turkey, another conference to which it was proposed to invite France for the
purpose of deciding upon 'eventualities' or the position and destiny of Turkey,
Syria and Egypt, to which the Emperor has replied in his laconic style, 'Pourquoi
c'est tres bien faite et vite c'est finie' and that, not perceiving the neces-
sity for any further interference, he has declined the proposition." State Dept.
Russia, XIV, Cambreling to Forsyth, No. 10, Jan. 27, 1841.
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ing, into the Concert of Europe.
61 In the same communication he
outlined a series of five "
'points'
"
which he believed should form
the basis of a "
'general act'
"
which the five Powers should sign
"
'in order to terminate in common the affairs of the Orient/ "62
Those five points in substance were as follows:
(1) The declaration of the closure of the two Straits.
(2) The recognition of the status quo of the Ottoman Empire,
"
'in its independence and its integrity.'
"
(3) The securing of guarantees from the Porte for the Christian
population of Syria.
(4)
"
'Certain stipulations in favor of Jerusalem.'
"63
(5) Stipulations for the
"
'general freedom, and perhaps for the
positive neutrality'
"
of the commercial routes both between the
Mediterranean and the Red Sea, across the Isthmus of Suez, and
between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf by way of Syria
and the Euphrates river."64
The plenipotentiaries of the four Powers at London reassembled
soon but they were not willing to state their views as clearly as
had Guizot.65 Consequently negotiations for securing the return
of France to the Concert of Europe progressed very slowly.
"
'I
firmly believe that they [the four Powers] will join with us upon
the general question,'
"
Bourqueney wrote to his superior at
"Guizot, op clt., VI, p. 72.
"Ibid., p. 74-
""Concerning this point Guizot stated:
"
'Cette idee s'est elevee et commence
a preoccuper assez vivement les esprits chretiens. Je ne sais ce qui est possible,
ni sous quelles formes et dans quelles limites 1'intervention europeenne serait en
mesure de procurer a Jerusalem un peu de securite et de dignite ; mais les gouv-
ernements, qui se plaignent avec raison de 1'affaiblissement des croyances des
peuples, devraient bien, quand 1'occasion s'en presente, donner eux-memes a
croyances quelque marque eclatante d'adhesion et d'interet. Que 1'Europe et la
politique de 1'Europe reprennent la figure chretienne; personne ne peut mesurer
aujourd'hui tout ce que 1'ordre et le pouvoir ont a y gagner.'
"
Ibid., pp. 73-74.
"Guizot spoke of those two routes,
"
'qui sont pour toute 1'Europe d'un
grand interet, et qui poseraient, pour les relations si rapidement croissantes de
1'Europe avec 1'Asie, des principes excellents que jamais peut-etre on ne trou-
vera une si bonne occasion de faire prevaloir.'
"
Ibid., p. 74. The "road to
India" was becoming a source of keen rivalry between England and France.
See Guichen op. cit., pp. 490-491.
"Guizot, op. cit., p. 74.
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Paris,
"
'but will they join upon ground as extensive as we desire?
I am a little uncertain about this matter.' "66
At the time when the negotiations at London were progressing
slowly, the situation in the Near East was improving with vary-
ing degrees of rapidity. Mazloum Bey and Admiral Walker,
whom, according to Reschid Pasha's communication to Ponsonby,
December 27, 1840, were to "proceed immediately to Egypt . . .
to receive the Ottoman fleet and to ascertain that the places de-
scribed in the memorandum of the I4th of November" were
evacuated by Mehemet Ali, did not depart from the Ottoman
capital until January 6, i84i,
67 and even then they were not em-
powered to promise to the Pasha that he would receive Egypt in
hereditary tenure, nor were they authorized to order a suspension
of hostilities in Syria. Instead, they carried with them instructions
for General Jochmus, the commander of the allied forces, to de-
mand the surrender of the arms and guns of Ibrahim Pasha's
army.
68
Baron Sturmer, who probably had received instructions from
Vienna similar in meaning to the language which Beauvale re-
ported on January 3, 1841, that Metternich had used in a conver-
sation with him, discovered directly that the Turkish commis-
sioners had not been authorized to assure Mehemet Ali of his
receiving the hereditary title to Egypt, and at once called the
attention of the other diplomatic agents at Constantinople to the
matter.69 Also, he wrote to Reschid Pasha "earnestly" proposing
M
Ibid., pp. 74-75. The hesitation of the allied diplomats may have been
due partially to the refusal of the French to disarm. The French Chambers,
it should be noted, voted, 237 to 162 and 147 to 85, on Feb. i, and April i,
1841, respectively, for the building of extensive fortifications around Paris. See
Journal des Debats, Jan. 14, 22, Feb. 2, March 17, 24, April 2, 1841. The Times,
Jan. 9, 15, 16, Feb. 13, 1841. Gentleman's Magazine, March, 1841, Series 3, XIV,
p. 308. Beust, op. cit., I, p. 34. Odilon-Barrot. op. tit., I, pp. 360-362. Guizot,
op. tit., VI, pp. 28 ff. Broughton, op. tit., VI, p. I.
"Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 44. Palmerston claimed on Jan. 26, 1841,
that the delay of the Turkish commissioners had been due to their failure to
get a boat for passage. See Palmerston to Beauvale, Jan. 26, 1841, Levant Cor-
respondence, III, pp. 160-161. See also, a copy of a letter which the commis-
sioners carried from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, ibid., p. 182.
""Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 44.
"Ibid., pp. 44-45. Sturmer to Ponsonby, Jan. 7, 1841, Levant Corres-
pondence, III, pp. 183-184.
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that he devise, as soon as possible, means to arrest the conse-
quences which would surely result from, the policy that the Porte
had adopted and suggesting that a steamboat should be sent to
Alexandria with additional instructions on this point to Mazloum
Bey.
70
Koenigsmarck and Titow, the Prussian and Russian rep-
resentatives, supported Sturmer in his contentions.
71 At first,
Ponsonby refused to do likewise. 72 When he heard that the Porte
was fully satisfied with the submission of Mehemet AH (as he
repeated to Reschid, January 9, 1841) he would, acting in accord-
ance with his instructions, recommend the granting of the heredi-
tary possession of Egypt to the Pasha, but not before then.
73
A day later, however, he received Palmerston's instructions of
December 17, 1840, and thereupon he too consented to advise
formally in the name of his court that the Porte should grant
Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet Ali.74
Reschid Pasha, in a "message" which he gave on January 9,
1841, "late in the day," to M. Pisani, the British dragoman, stated
that if the Porte did grant Egypt in perpetuity to the Viceroy
and his descendants it would be done only "conditionally" and not
in
"simple form."
75 But on January 12 after he was aware that
Ponsonby had joined with the representatives of the absolute
Courts, he forwarded to the four a Hatti-Sheriff announcing the
definite intention of the Porte to confer the hereditary right to
Egypt upon Mehemet Ali when his submission should be com-
plete.
76
Although the Porte was not aware of the fact, the Viceroy had
already adopted measures to make his submission complete. Two
TOSturmer to Rechid, Jan. 7, 1841, ibid., p. 184.
71Titow to Ponsonby, Dec. 27, i84O/Jan. 8, 1841; Konigsmarck to Pon-
sonby, Jan. 8, 1841, ibid., pp. 186-187, J92 - Th instructions which Nesselrode
sent to Titow, Jan. 4, 1841, were similar to those which Palmerston sent to
Ponsonby Dec. 17, 1840. See Nesselrode to Titow, Dec. 23, i84O/Jan. 4, 1841,
ibid., pp. 152-154.
"Ponsonby to Sturmer, Jan. 7, 1841; Ponsonby to Titow, Jan. 7, 8, 1841,
Ponsonby to Konigsmarck, Jan. 8, 1841, ibid., pp. 185-186, 188-189, I 92 -
"Ponsonby to Rechid, Jan. 9, 1841, ibid., p. 193.
"Ponsonby to Titow, Sturmer, and Konigsmarck, Jan. 10, 1841, Ponsonby
to Pisani, Jan. 10, 1841, ibid., p. 194.
"IMf, p. 193.
78
Hatti-Sheriff of Jan. 12, 1841, ibid., p. 195. See also, Grand Vizier to
Mazloum Bey, Jan. 12, 1841, ibid., p. 196.
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days before the above mentioned Hatti-Sheriff had been issued
Mazloum Bey and Admiral Walker arrived at their destination. 77
Even before that date Mehemet AH had arranged for the surren-
der of the Ottoman fleet and for ordering the evacuation of Syria.
He made those arrangements with Admiral Napier, who had been
sent to Egypt on a mission similar to that of the Sultan's com-
missioners and who had preceded the latter to Alexandria by
approximately forty-eight hours.
78
After the arrival of the commissioners at the Egyptian metrop-
olis the arrangements for the Pasha's formal submission were put
into execution immediately. In fact, on the very day of their
arrival, January 10, 1841, Hamid Bey, one of Mehemet Ali's
officers, and Lieutenant Loring, one of Napier's subordinates,
departed from Alexandria for Syria carrying with them instruc-
tions addressed to Ibrahim Pasha directing him to retreat with
his army to Egypt.
79 Hamid Bey and Lieutenant Loring, it is
true, failed to locate Ibrahim Pasha.80 The Egyptian forces, never-
theless, were in full retreat even before those agents started on
their mission.81 Moreover, on January 20, 1841, Admiral Walker,
in command of the Ottoman war vessels, which he had received
formally from Mehemet Ali, January u,82 sailed for Marma-
rice, a "beautiful landlocked anchorage on the coast of Cara-
mana,"
83 and three days later, after the provisions of the Hatti-
Sheriff of January 12 were known at Alexandria, the Viceroy
"Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 71.
m
lbid., pp. 61 ff. During his stay in Egypt Napier secured from the Vice-
roy his promise that in the future he would put in force in the territory under
his control the terms of the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of Aug. 16, 1838.
See ibid., pp. 74-75. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 199-200. In 1838, after
that treaty had been signed, Mehemet Ali had declared that he would not
object to its provisions. It seems, nevertheless, that he did not carry them
into execution. See Larking to Palmerston, Jan. 21, 1841; Palmerston to
Larking, Feb. n, 1841, ibid., pp. 179-180, 181.
"Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 68.
*Jochmus to Stopford, Jan. 30, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 298.
"Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 97 ff. On Jan. 31, 1841, Ibrahim Pasha ar-
rived, with the major part of his army, at Gaza. Before the end of Feb., 1841,
the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians was completed. See ibid., pp. 141,
191 ff.
"Ibid., p. 71.
Taton, op. cit., II, p. 215.
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himself wrote to the Grand Vizier announcing that he had executed
"to the letter" the conditions required of him. "I wait," he de-
clared, "for the accomplishment of his [the Sultan's] sovereign
promise."
84
Meanwhile, reports concerning the hesitation, late in December,
1840, of the Sultan's Ministers to grant to Mehemet Ali the hered-
itary possession of Egypt had reached Vienna, whereupon Prince
Metternich, becoming greatly aroused, declared that Austria would
remain firm in her pledge to obtain the hereditary title for the
Viceroy and that the refusal of the Sultan to grant it would cause
her to withdraw her moral and material support from him.85 Also,
he wrote to Sturmer ordering him to make known to his colleagues
the attitude of the Austrian Cabinet and to urge them to concur
in measures calculated to give effect to the steps taken at Lon-
don as stated in Palmerston's note of December 17, 1840, to
Ponsonby. If those colleagues did not all agree to concur in such
measures he (the Internuncio) should make independently a
statement to the Divan explaining the determinations of Austria,
leaving it open to the other ministers, should they think it fit, to
do likewise.86
On or very near the same date when Metternich wrote thus to
Sturmer, he complained, according to a report which Beauvale
forwarded to Palmerston, January 17, 1841, that the British gov-
ernment had not used the means in its power to induce the Sultan
to confer Egypt hereditarily upon Mehemet Ali.87 Palmerston,
replying to Beauvale, January 26, 1841, claimed that the Prince's
charges in regard to the policy followed by the Queen's govern-
ment in the past were unjust.88 Be that as it may, it is certain
that soon after the latter date the English Secretary of Foreign
Affairs intimated in a despatch written to Ponsonby that if the
Porte insisted on refusing to grant to the Pasha the hereditary
possession of Egypt, the four Powers would in turn refuse to
"Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, Jan. 23, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III,
pp. 230-231. Bordeano, op. cit., pp. 64-65. Letter from Alexandria, Jan. 22,
1841, The Times, Feb. 6, 1841.
"Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 159.
Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 60.
"Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 160.
"Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, ibid., p. 160.
^Palmerston to Beauvale, Jan. 26, 1841, ibid., pp. 161-162.
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support its demands, thus forcing it to yield "with a bad grace."
89
It is certain, also, that on January 30 Palmerston joined with the
plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia in presenting to
Chekib EfFendi a note announcing it as the opinion of the four
Powers that the Sultan should manifest clemency and generosity
towards the Viceroy by revoking the "Act of deprivation" which
had been decreed against him and by confirming him in the
hereditary control of Egypt. ". . . his [Mehemet Ali's] descend-
ants in the direct line," it was stated in the note, "shall be suc-
cessively named by the Sultan to the Pashalic of Egypt, every
time that that post shall become vacant by the death of the pre-
ceding Pasha."
90
At Constantinople, even before the date when the collective
note addressed to Chekib Effendi was signed, plans were being
laid by the Porte, in consultation with the representatives of its
allies,
91 to name conditions on which the hereditary right to Egypt
would be conferred upon Mehemet Ali. Those plans, after being
completed, were embodied in the famous firman of investiture
which was proclaimed on February 13, 1841, and which provided:
(1) That Mehemet Ali should receive the coveted right to
Egypt but that the Sultan should retain permanently the privilege
of choosing the successors to the governorship from among the
viceroy's descendants in any of the direct male lines.
(2) That the person so chosen must repair to Constantinople
to receive in person the investiture.
(3) That the viceroys of Egypt should be permitted to use no
ceremonials, titles, etc., other than those which were permitted to
the "other Viziers" of the Sublime Porte.
(4) That the provisions of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhane,
92
as
**Palmerston to Ponsonby, Jan. 29, 1841, ibid., pp. 169-170.
"Ibid., pp. 171-172. Documents Diplomatiques.
wLord Ponsonby was accused by his contemporaries of being responsible
for the policy adopted by the Porte early in February, 1841. See Dino, op. cit.,
Ill, p. 47. The Examiner, March 14, 1841. The Times, March n, 12, 13, 15, 19,
1841. It is obvious that Ponsonby did exert his influence at Constantinople to
secure the enactment of harsh conditions to be enforced upon Mehemet Ali. See
a series of letters and other documents which Ponsonby forwarded to Palmer-
ston, Feb. I, 4, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 207-229.
*2For a copy of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhane and a discussion of its terms
see Ed. Englehardt, La Turquie et le tanzimat ou histoire des reformes dans
I'empire Ottoman, I, pp. 257-261, 35 ff.
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well as all laws and treaties, either past, present, or future, of the
Ottoman Empire should be executed "en entier" in Egypt.
(5) That all imposts and revenues should be levied in the
Sultan's name, and that the "tenths, duties [droits], and other
imposts" should be in conformity with the principles in force in the
other provinces of the empire.
(6) That a quarter part of the gross revenue should be paid to
the Porte.
(7) That coinage should be struck only with the permission of
the Sultan, and that it should be identical [pareilles] "to that of
Constantinople."
(8) That the Egyptian army in times of peace should be lim-
ited to 18,000 men.
(9) That the governors of Egypt should appoint military offi-
cers up to and including the rank of kol aghassi (major), but
that the superior ranks should be conferred by the Sultan, "sur la
proposition des dits Gouverneurs" And,
(10) That ships of war were to be built by the said governors
only with the express permission of the Sublime Porte.
93
On the same day that the firman of investiture was issued the Porte
addressed to the French Ambassador, Admiral Pontois, and to
the representatives at Constantinople of the four allied Powers a
circular announcing, prematurely it is true, "the final settlement"
of the Turco-Egyptian question.
94
When Mehemet Ali learned of the terms which his overlord
proposed to grant to him he protested loudly and called attention
to important parts of those terms which he declared that it would
be impossible for him to accept.
"
'The first article [of the
firman],'" Commodore Napier wrote from Alexandria, February
23, 1841,
"
'he [the Viceroy] considers quite inadmissible, as it
would not be acceded to by Ibrahim Pacha, would cause discord
^Levant Correspondence, III, p. 247. Bulwer, op. at., II, 431-434. On
the same day that the firman of investiture was issued, a second was addressed
to Mehemet Ali
"conferring upon him the Government of Nubia, Darfour,
Kordufan, and Senaar, and enjoining him to abolish the Negro-hunts, etc." See
ibid., pp. 435-436. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 250-251. See also, Grand
Vizier to Mehemet Ali, Feb. 13, 1841, ibid., p. 252.
"Ibid., p. 254. Also on Feb. 13, 1841, the Porte forwarded to the Inter-
nuncio of Austria a request for the aid of the Powers in case Mehemet Ali
rejected the terms offered him in the firman of investiture. See ibid., pp. 253-254.
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in his family, and a civil war at his death. He also objects to the
part of Article 6 which relates to the appointment of officers;
hitherto they have all been appointed by him, with the exception
of General of Division, and a sudden deviation from that system
would disorganize the army, and bring his authority into con-
tempt/
"95 In addition, there were two other parts of the firman
which Mehemet AH declared that he could not accept. The sen-
tence in which it was stated that one-fourth of the gross revenue
of Egypt should be paid to the Porte constituted one of those
parts and the portion of an article providing that the Hatti-Sheriff
of Gulhane and all treaties of the Ottoman Empire should be
executed in Egypt constituted the other.
96
The news of the refusal of Mehemet AH to accept all of the
terms of the firman of investiture reached Constantinople about
the middle of March, 1841, and gave occasion there for a renewal
of negotiations between the Ministers of the Porte and the envoys
of the four Powers. Reschid Pasha, who had always favored the
enforcement of severe terms upon the Viceroy, took the initiative
in those negotiations, writing to Lord Ponsonby, March 15:
"The hesitation of Mehemet AH Pasha to accept these moderate
conditions [named in the firman] is scarcely compatible with the
character of a subject, and it is no less clear that to grant the
demands as made by him, is a thing as injurious as it is opposed
to the rights of the Sultan's sovereignty."
97 Lord Ponsonby in his
reply to the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that his
opinion coincided entirely with the opinion expressed by the latter.
The Porte, he advised, should remain inactive and consult its
.
"Napier to Palmerston, Feb. 23, 1841, quoted by Napier, War in Syria, II,
p. 236. See also ibid., pp. 233-234. Napier agreed with the Pasha that some of
the provisions of the firman were unjust. See ibid., pp. 234-235. Napier,
Correspondence, II, pp. 142-143.
**Mehemet AH to Grand Vizier, March 7, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III,
pp. 341-344. The Viceroy talked about renewing the war with his overlord and
did actually adopt measures to improve his means of defense. See Ponsonby to
Palmerston, March 27, 1841, ibid., p. 376. Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 92-97. Letters
from Alexandria, March i, 16, 25, May 22, 26, 1841, The Times, March 29, April
9, June 4, 23, 1841. Gentleman's Magazine, April, May, 1841, Series 3, XV, pp.
420, 530.
"Rechid to Ponsonby, March 15, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 352.
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"faithful friend and Ally [Great Britain]."98 Sturmer, Koenigs-
marck and Titow, to whom Reschid forwarded communications
similar to the one which he sent to Ponsonby, were more cautious
in their replies. The Internuncio announced that he could not
reply in his "own name" to the note which he had received," the
Prussian claimed that he was not authorized to offer advice to the
Porte,
100 and the Russian also found means of excusing him-
self.101 At the same time all three promised that the matter would
be brought to the attention of their "august courts."
While the Viceroy, the Porte, and the representatives at Con-
stantinople of the four Powers were debating and corresponding
in regard to the conditions which the Sultan should attach to his
grant to Mehemet Ali, of the hereditary title to Egypt, the diplo-
mats in western Europe were continuing their negotiations for the
conclusion of an arrangement whereby the Concert of Europe could
be reestablished. In January, 1841, it will be remembered, nego-
tiations to secure such an arrangement had been initiated by the
French but no appreciable results had been attained. The progress
made during the following month was more satisfactory, for it
was known in the west at that time that the Viceroy had surren-
dered the Turkish fleet and that the Porte had announced it would
grant Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet Ali as soon as his submission
was complete.
102 But even then it was impossible to secure an
agreement upon the basis of the points which Guizot had sug-
gested in his despatch to Sainte-Aulaire, January 13, 1841. Guizot's
proposal relative to the Isthmus of Suez, Lord Palmerston claimed,
was
"
'not a suitable subject for a provision in a treaty.'
" The Brit-
ish Minister of Foreign Affairs objected also to the idea of including
in the arrangement to be signed by the five Powers, a stipulation
for the protection of the Christian subjects of Syria. This matter,
he declared, could be taken care of better in a special note urging
^Ponsonby to Rechid, March 18, 1841, ibid., pp. 371-372. See also Ponsonby
to Palmerston, March 27, 1841, ibid., p. 371.
"Sturmer to Rechid, March 18, 1841, ibid., pp. 372-373.
100
Konigsmarck to Rechid, March 17, 1841, ibid., p. 374.
101Titow to Rechid, March 7/19, 1841, ibid., pp. 374-375.
102Both King Louis Philippe and Guizot were very anxious at that time
to secure the return of France to the Concert of Europe. See Louis Philippe to
Leopold, Feb. 4, 1841, Taschereau, op. cit., p. 366.
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the Sultan to declare for religious toleration. Furthermore, both
he (Palmerston) and Brunnow were opposed to the Frenchman's
suggestion in regard to guaranteeing the independence and the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.103 In fact, the only point con-
cerning which the diplomats were able to agree was the one pro-
viding for a declaration of the closure of the Straits.
104
At length, late in February, 1841, a plan of an arrangement,
which, it appeared, each of the five great Powers would accept
immediately was perfected. According to that plan the representa-
tives of the four Powers and the Porte would sign a protocol "de
cloture" announcing that the Turco-Egyptian question had been
solved, and inviting France to return to the Concert of Europe.
After that had been done, the representatives of the allied Powers
and the charge d'affaires of France would in turn sign a conven-
tion proclaiming the closure of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles
to the warships of all nations.
105 At this time, however, a new
difficulty arose. Chekib Effendi declared that he could not affix
his signature to the protocol de cloture until after he had been
notified officially that Mehemet Ali had accepted the firman of
investiture, and Guizot, on the other hand, refused to permit
Bourqueney to accept the convention while the protocol de cloture
remained unsigned.
106
Through the influence of the envoys of Austria and Prussia,
who were extremely anxious to secure a final settlement of the
question at issue,
107 an attempt was made to secure a compromise.
On March 5, 1841, the representatives of the four Powers signed
a protocol listing the "desired events" which had occurred in the
Near East and announcing that their consuls-general would at
once return to Alexandria, thus implying that the Turco-Egyptian
difficulties had been terminated.108 They offered, in addition, to
10IRohan-Chabot's report to Guizot (no date given); Bourqueney to Guizot,
Feb. 21, 1841, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 75-78, 84-87. See also Guichen,
op cit., pp. 468-472.
10
*On Feb. 12, 1841, Bourqueney was very much discouraged because of
the situation of affairs. See Bourqueney to Guizot, Feb. 12, 1841, quoted by
Guizot, op cit., VI, pp. 79-80.
105
Bourqueney to Guizot, Feb. 26, 1841, quoted by ibid., p. 89.
Ibid., pp. 89-90.
107
Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 328, 329, 333. Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 269-270.
108
Guizot, op. cit., p. 91. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 235-236.
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sign a second protocol by which France would be invited to return
to the European concert but in which no mention of the "question
de cloture" would be made.109 Baron Bourqueney was in favor
of accepting this proposed arrangement and he wrote to Guizot
urging that he [Bourqueney] should be authorized to enter into
it.
110
Guizot, however, although he was anxious that France should
escape from her isolated position, believed that his country should
avoid a union with the four Powers until after the alliance of
those Powers with the Porte had been dissolved through their
having declared that the purposes of the treaty of July 15, 1840,
had been realized, and hence refused to grant the powers which
Bourqueney requested.
111
It is true that soon after Guizot refused to accept the compro-
mise plan he authorized the French charge d'affaires at London to
"initial" a copy of the convention in which the closure of the
Straits was declared.112 The German plenipotentiaries, it is also
true, continued their search for a mode of procedure, by which the
return of France to the Concert of Europe could be secured
directly.
113
Nevertheless, as Guizot persisted in his refusal to
permit Bourqueney to enter formally into an arrangement with
the representatives of the allied Powers before those representa-
tives had announced that the Turco-Egyptian question was
solved,
114 and as Chekib Effendi, supported by Lord Palmerston,
115
"Guizot, op. dt., VI, p. 91.
110
Bourqueney to Guizot (no date given), quoted by ibid., p. 91.
1VL
Ibid., pp. 91-93.
"'Both the protocol de cloture and the convention for the closure of the
straits were "initialed" on March 15, 1841. See Levant Correspondence, III, p.
321-323.
m
Guizot, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
"4
Granville to Palmerston, March 15, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p.
328. On April 16, 1841, Bulwer reported to Palmerston that Guizot had made the
following statement to him: "I do not wish to be mixed up in it [the settle-
ment to be arranged between the Porte and Mehemet AH], or to appear in any
way in it. I have no conditions to make for Mehemet Ali; I have nothing to
do with him or the conditions he may accept. I only say, that until the affairs
in the East shall have been settled, I cannot sign a document which begins by
declaring that they are so." Ibid., pp. 382-384. Guizot, however, did intimate
to Bulwer that he thought some of the Viceroy's objections to the firman of
investiture were reasonable. See ibid.
U5
Bourqueney to Guizot, March I, 1841, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., VI, p.
89. Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 332-333.
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persisted in his refusal to sign a protocol de cloture, a delay in
the securing of a final settlement was inevitable.
Although Palmerston supported Chekib in regard to the "ques-
tion de cloture" especially after it was announced in western
Europe that Mehemet Ali had rejected parts of the firman of in-
vestiture he did not intend to aid the Porte in securing from the
Viceroy his acceptance of all of the conditions which it wished to
impose upon him. On March 13, 1841, he joined with the repre-
sentatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the purpose of issu-
ing to Chekib Effendi a formal communication. In that commu-
nication it was admitted that the new difficulty which had arisen
between the Sultan and his vassal was one of internal administra-
tion, but at the same time care was taken to call the attention of
the Ottoman Ambassador to the principles which had been set
forth in the collective note of January 30, i84i.
116 Three days
later Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby stating that the Sultan should
make it clear that in the appointment of the governors of Egypt
the rule of primogeniture would always be followed unless in
case of infancy or physical incapacity.
117
Again on April 10, 1841,
in a similar despatch to the British Ambassador at Constantinople
he explained that it was extremely important that the matters in
dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali should be settled
"as soon as possible." Furthermore, admitting that on some of
the points at issue the Viceroy was in the right, he went so far as
to instruct Ponsonby definitely to urge the Porte to modify such
parts of the firman of investiture as were "open to reasonable
objections."118
The chief Ministers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia were like-
wise unwilling to support all of the demands of the Porte. Count
""Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers to Chekib Effendi, March 13, 1841,
Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 263-264. The Times, April 15, 1841.
"T
Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 16, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp.
326-327. See also, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 2, 1841, ibid., p. 350.
"^Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 10, ibid., pp. 364-365. Palmerston did not
defend all of Mehemet Ali's demands. The Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhane and the
treaties of the Porte, he declared, must necessarily be carried into effect. See
Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 30, 1841; Palmerston to Beauvale, April 2, 1841,
ibid., pp. 337, 346-349.
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Nesselrode, as usual, "highly" approved of the attitude taken by
the British Minister of Foreign Affairs.
119 Prince Metternich, ex-
asperated because of the delay occasioned by the dispute over the
conditions which the Ottoman Ministers wished to attach to the
grant of Egypt in hereditary possession to Mehemet Ali, assumed
an attitude more aggressive than that of the British and Russian
statesmen. In a despatch which he wrote to Sturmer, April 2,
1840, it should be noted, he ordered the latter to warn the Porte
that if it did not adopt the modifications to the firman of investi-
ture recommended by the Congress of London, His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor would consider himself released from the
obligation which he had contracted on July 15, i84O.120 Baron
Werther's attitude was similar to that of the Austrian Chancellor.
Since King Frederick William IV's Minister at Queen Victoria's
Court had initialed the convention for the closure of the Straits,
he informed William Russell, the British Ambassador at Berlin,
that "the Government [of Prussia] looked upon the Treaty of
July as terminated."
121
The fact that the four Powers favored a modification of some
of the terms which the Porte had offered to Mehemet Ali, Feb-
ruary 13, 1841, became known at Constantinople late in March,
and so strong an impression was produced immediately among
the Turks that Reschid Pasha and Achmed Fethi Pacha, two mem-
bers of the Ottoman Cabinet who were extremely hostile to
Mehemet Ali and who probably had had much to do with the
lu
Clanricarde to Palmerston, April 6, 1841, ibid., p. 381. Guizot, op. cit., VI,
p. 102.
""Metternich to Sturmer, April 2, 1841; Beauvale to Palmerston, April 9,
1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 378-380, 378. See also, Guizot, of. cit.,
VI, p. 101. The Times, April 13, 1841.
^Russell to Palmerston, April 14, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 382.
On April 21, 1841, Palmerston, in reply to Russell, denied that a question
could really be "finished" by merely declaring it so. Prussia, he stated, was
bound by the treaty of July "to determine" Mehemet Ali to accept the ar-
rangement specified in that treaty. By the last letter which Mehemet Ali had
written to the Grand Vizier, he continued, it appeared that the Viceroy ob-
jected to some of the fundamental points specified in the treaty of July. See-
Palmerston to Russell. April 21, 1841, ibid., pp. 384-385.
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preparation of the famous firman of February 13, were obliged
to resign from their official positions.
122
However, even after the fall of Reschid Pasha and Achmed
Fethi Pasha, the Porte hesitated to modify the terms of the firman
of investiture. Reschid's place at the Sultan's foreign office was
taken by Rifaat Pasha, a statesman who, indeed, was more in-
clined than his predecessor had been to make concessions in favor
of the Viceroy.
123 But on April i, 1841, soon after Rifaat had
been vested with ministerial power, instructions were forwarded
in the name of the Porte to Chekib Effendi, directing him to lay
before the British Cabinet arguments defending the parts of the
famous firman which Mehemet Ali had declared he would not
accept, and ordering him to forward to his home government "as
soon as possible" the "official communications which the British
Government" would make to him in reply.124 Nineteen days later,
before those instructions had reached London, the Porte an-
nounced in a memorandum which was presented to the repre-
sentatives of the four Powers at Constantinople, that it had
decided that the succession to the governorship of Egypt should
be regulated in accordance with the principle of primogeniture,
that Mehemet Ali should have the right to appoint officers to any
rank below that of general of brigade, and that the tribute should
m
Guizot, op. cit., p. 105. The Times, April 23, 1841. Brown, the U. S.
Dragoman, referring to the dismissal of the two Turkish officials, wrote in a
letter to Porter that it was
''conveyed in very moderate expressions." "Rechid
Pacha," he stated, "paid a visit a day or two after his dismissal to Rifaat Bey,
now Pacha, and it is said that the Sultan has written him a letter of thanks for
his services with his own hand. Report says that he is soon to be appointed
Grand Vizier." State Dept. Turkey, IX. Brown to Porter, April 7, 1841.
Wheaton wrote from Berlin, May 5: "The ascendancy of Reschid Pasha in the
councils of the Divan has been overthrown by Austrian influence in order to
compel the Sultan to accord such conditions to the Pacha of Egypt as the latter
would be willing to accept." State Dept. Prussia, II, Wheaton to Webster, No.
180, May 5, 1841.
""Note the following extract from a letter "from the Turkish Frontiers,"
April 12, 1841: "Ever since the dismissal of Reschid Pasha from his post, the
state of feeling in the Divan has been very favorable to Mehemet Ali." The
Times, April 28, 1841.
^Instructions transmitted by Sublime Porte to Chekib Effendi, April I,
1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 389-390.
553] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 22/
be settled at a fixed amount.125 These concessions, however, were
not at once embodied in a new firman. The Porte on that occa-
sion, it appears, had resolved to await an answer from Chekib
EfFendi before carrying its promises into execution.
126
It was not until the month of May, 1841, that events moved
rapidly towards a final settlement of the Turco-Egyptian ques-
tion. Chekib EfFendi transmitted a copy of his instructions, dated
April i, 1841, to Lord Palmerston on April 27.127 The British
government did not reply independently in "official communica-
tions," but the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers forwarded to
Chekib, May 10, 1841, a formal note advising the Porte to make
modifications, in the terms of the firman of investiture, almost
identically the same as those which the Porte had itself suggested
on April i9.
128 Even before time sufficient for the advice of the
allied diplomats to reach Constantinople had elapsed, the repre-
sentatives of the four Powers at the Court of the Grand Seignior
had succeeded in persuading the Ottoman authorities to agree to
make the modifications, in the terms to be granted to the Pasha,
which were favored by the allied diplomats,129 and finally on June
i, 1841, a new firman which embodied those modifications and
which took precedence over the arrangement of February 13, 1841,
"'Memorandum from Sublime Porte to Representatives of Four Powers,
April 19, 1841, ibid., pp. 419-420. See also, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 14,
1841, ibid., p. 419. It seems that the action taken by the Porte on April 19
was due, to a large extent at least, to the influence of Austria at Constanti-
nople. See Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 108-110. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp.
267 ff.
"*Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p.
433. It is said that the Porte hoped to secure, in return for concessions in
regard to the terms of the firman of investiture, an official guarantee from
Europe of its independence and integrity. See Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 108. Not
only Palmerston and the Russians, but also Prince Metternich was opposed
to giving such a guarantee to the Porte. See Metternich to Sturmer, April 20,
1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 400-401.
"'Chekib to Palmerston, April 27, 1841, ibid., p. 388.
"^Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia to Chekib,
May 10, 1841, ibid., pp. 404-406. See also, Palmerston to Ponsonby, May n,
1841, ibid., p. 409.
""Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12, 22, 1841, ibid., pp. 433, 435. See also
ibid., pp. 435-440.
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was promulgated. "Henceforth," it was declared in the new docu-
ment, "Egypt shall descend in a direct line, from the elder to the
elder, in the male race among the sons and grandsons. As re-
gards their nomination, that shall be made by my sublime
Porte."130
The fact that the Porte was ready to make the desired modifi-
cations in the firman of investiture was known at London on June
I2.131 On the 8th of the following month it was announced
officially at the British capital that Mehemet Ali had accepted the
hereditary title to Egypt upon the revised conditions offered by
his overlord.132 Consequently, as there was no occasion for further
delay, the representatives of the allied Powers including the Am-
bassador of Turkey attached their signatures, July 10, 1841, to
the protocol de cloture thereby acknowledging formally that the
"difficulties in which His Highness the Sultan [had] found him-
self placed" had "been smoothed," and stating that the British
Minister of Foreign Affairs "in agreement with the Plenipoten-
tiaries of the four Powers" undertook to invite the government of
France "to share in the Act by which the Sultan, on the one part,"
would declare his firm resolution to maintain in the future the
Parl. Papers, 1879, Egypt, No. 4, p. 36. T. E. Holland, The European
Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 110-113. In the firman of June I, 1841,
it was provided that the governor of Egypt should appoint "the officers of the
land and sea forces up to the rank of Colonel." Officers of higher rank were to
be appointed by the Porte. A firman issued late in May, 1841, fixed the
amount of the annual tribute at 80,000 purses (ca. 363,635). See ibid., p. 114.
Martens, N. R. G., XV, p. 490. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 444, 459-461,
463-464.
Ibid., pp. 435-440. In May and June, 1841, after the term of the Forte's
memorandum of April 19 were known in western Europe the French, supported
by the Austrians and Prussians, advocated that the protocol and the conven-
tion should be signed immediately. The British and the Russians, however,
opposed such a move, contending that the Turco-Egyptian question could not
be declared closed until after Mehemet Ali had announced that he would accept
the new terms offered by the Sultan. See Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 108 ff.
Nesselrode to Meyendorff, June, 1841, Nesselrode. op. cit., VIII, pp. 142-144.
Bloomfield to Palmerston, June 19, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 471.
"2
Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 21, 1841; Chasseaud to Ponsonby, June IO,
1841, ibid., p. 472. See also, Rohan-Chabot to Guizot, June 12, 1841, Guizot,
op. cit., VI, pp. 120-121. Unofficial news of the willingness of Mehemet Ali to
accept the terms offered him in the firman of June I, 1841, reached London June
30, 1841. See The Times, June 30, 1841. See also, ibid., June 28, July 5, 1841.
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principle of the closure of the Straits "and the five Powers, on the
other part, would announce their unanimous determination to
respect this principle and to conform themselves to it."133 Three
days later the French charge d'affaires at the Court of St. James
joined with the representatives of the allied Powers in signing the
above mentioned
"act," which has come to be known as the Straits
Convention.134 Thereupon, the reconciliation of France with the
Concert of Europe, as well as the termination of the Turco-Egyp-
tian question, was complete.
The termination of the Turco-Egyptian question and the re-
establishment of the concert of the five Powers were events of
great immediate significance in European diplomatic relations.
The government of Louis Philippe had been taught a lesson, so
to speak. In his Memoires Guizot consoled himself by declaring
that "Mehemet Ali, driven from Syria, [and] menaced even in
Egypt, was established there [in Egypt] with the hereditary title
and on equitable conditions, not because of his own strength, but
through consideration for France and because the Powers which had
signed the treaty of July 15, did not wish to run the risk either of
being disunited or of seeing new complications arise."
135 At the
same time he admitted that after what he had seen and learned
during his mission to England he had "reentered into affairs de-
termined never to subject the foreign policy of France to the
whims, and to the mistaken ideas of the day."
136 "
'Evade nothing
and seek nothing,'
" he wrote to Count Sainte-Aulaire a few weeks
after the signing of the Straits Convention.
"
'It has been our cus-
tom to be confident, vainglorious, [and] insistent. We have in-
toxicated ourselves by our desires as if they were always our right
and our power; we have been fond of the appearance rather than
of the reality. I am convinced that, in order to reestablish and to
extend our influence in Europe, it is necessary to follow the oppo-
site method. I am determined everywhere and on all occasions to
^Levant Correspondence, III, p. 473. Holland, op. cit., p. 99. Noradoungh-
ian, op. cit., II, pp. 341-342. Martens, N. R. G., II, p. 126.
134
Noradounghian, op. cit., II, pp. 342-344. State Papers, XXIX, pp. 703 ff.
Holland, op. cit., pp. 100 ff. Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 1024 ff. Martens, N. R. G.,
II, pp. 128 ff. The documents which were signed on July 10, 13, 1841, were
practically identical to those which were "initialed" on March 15, 1841.
"5
Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 128.
Ibid., p. 129.
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sacrifice le bruit au fait, the appearance to the reality, the first
moment to the last. We shall risk less and we shall gain more.
And besides, il n'y a de dignite que la,' "13T
Russia, on the other hand, was for the moment triumphant.138
It is true, she had given up the rights confirmed to her by the
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. But, according to Nesselrode, she be-
lieved she had lost nothing which was of any real value to her.
She had secured from France, through the settlement of 1841, the
latter's recognition of the principle of the closure of the Straits,
she had avoided entering into an arrangement guaranteeing the
independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and she
had the satisfaction of knowing that the Anglo-French alliance, as
it had existed formerly at least, had not been reestablished.139
lbid., p. 129. Sainte-Aulaire had just received appointment as French
Ambassador to England.
^Note the following extract from a memorial concerning the foreign policy
of Russia during the years from 1825 to 1850, issued by Count Nesselrode
to Nicholas I, Nov. 20 (old style), 1850: "Deux fois a six ans d'intervalle,
assailli par Pambition d'un vassal revoke, 1'Empire Ottoman s'est vu menace
d'une dissolution presque inevitable. Deux fois il a du son salut a 1'intervention
decisive de V. M. La premiere de ces deux crises a donne au monde un spectacle
inou'i dans 1'histoire: ... La seconde, moins brillante peut-etre, a produit
des resultats plus solides. Elle a expulse de la Syrie, pour la confinir desormais
dans les limites restreintes de 1'Egypte, cette nouvelle puissance Arabe que les
ennemis de la Russie avaient un moment songe a substituer sur le Bosphore au
pouvoir dechu de la Porte Ottomane, pour en faire dans 1'avenir un tete de
pont centre nous. Le traite d'Unkiar-Skelessi, centre lequel avaient en vain pro-
teste la France et 1'Angleterre, annule en apparence, a etc perpetue reelement
sous une autre forme. En interdisant 1'entree des Dardanelles aux vaisseaux de
guerre etrangers, le nouvel acte qui 1'a remplace, reconnu par toutes les
Puissances, nous assure dorenavant centre toute attaque maritime. Enfin, un
re"sultat des plus importants pour nous a cette epoque est sorti de cette complica-
tion d'Orient. C'est la dissolution de cette Alliance Anglo-Frangaise, si hostile a
nos interets politiques, si fatale pour la situation des gouvernements conserva-
teurs. Rompue sous les Whigs en 1840, renouee plus tard avec effort par le
Ministere Tory, elle n'a plus traine des lorsqu'une vie precaire et inoffensive et
n'a vegete quelque temps sous le nom specieux d'entente cordiale, que pour se
briser de nouveau avec plus d'eclat encore, centre la question des mariages
Espagnols." Quoted by Treitschke, op. cit., V, pp. 758-759.
""See Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Nov. 10, 1841, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII,
pp. 147-150. Note also the following extract from a letter, Dmitri de Nesselrode
[Chancellor Nesselrode's son] to Meyendorff, Nov. 29, 1841: "La politique
etrangere continue a etre dans un etat satisfaisant; tous les jours on se felicite
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England also, it appeared, had triumphed, and indeed her pres-
tige in Europe was great. A famous British statesman has even
gone so far as to declare, concerning the Near Eastern policy fol-
lowed by the Queen's Minister of Foreign Affairs during the
period 1839-1841, that, ". . . it is difficult to fix upon a page in
the history of this country [England] which records a superior
instance of moral intrepidity. The bold conception and the bril-
liant performance were worthy of Chatham; but the domestic
difficulties with which Lord Palmerston had to struggle place
the exploit far beyond the happiest achievement of the elder
Pitt."140 Furthermore, a recent writer of history has stated that
Palmerston's "rare skill and determination" in carrying out his
plans "must command universal admiration."141 Palmerston, it
davantage des heureuses consequences du traite du 15 juillet, et mon pere
compte beaucoup sur votre eloquence pour faire revenir les Prussians de leur
antipathic centre les Anglais. Medem sera appele a s'acquitter de la meme
tache aupres du prince Metternich." Ibid., pp. 150-151. A marked coolness
existed between England and France as long as Palmerston remained in office.
See Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 112-113, 116-117, 124-125, 130 ff., 412-417. Bulwer,
op. cit., VI, pp. 375-383.
140
B. Disraeli, Tancred, III, Chap. 6, quoted by Monypenny, op. cit., II,
P- 95-
141
Hall, op. cit., p. 329. Hasenclever was also enthusiastic about the triumph
of Palmerston. In his conclusions he declared in part: "Wenn wir jedoch die
englische Politik als Ganzes iiberschauen, wenn wir die damals allerdings kaum
geweckten imperialistischen Gedanken mit in Rechnung setzen, so miissen wir
bekennen, das Palmerston die Bahn zur Grosse Englands richtig empfunden,
vorausgeahnt hat. Den kiirzesten Weg nach Indien hat er vor plotzlichen
Uberfallen durch die russische Flotte vom Schwarzen Meer aus freigehalten;
durch die Verdrangung Frankreichs aus Agypten, durch die Beschrankuug
Mehemed Alis auf das Pharaonenland hat er auch diese wichtigste Etappe auf
der grossen, die Volker verbindenden Strasse nach Indien und dem fernen Osten
dem englischen Einfluss offen gehalten.
"Palmerston's diplomatische Kunst mag hie und da wegen der vonihm
angewandten Mittel anfechtbar sein; seine Politik war jedoch trotz scheinbarger
Schwankungen durchaus folgerichtig; sie entsfrach in jeder Hinsicht den Bediirf-
nissen und den Interessen seines Landes. . . . Was ihn vorwarts trieb, was all
sein Handeln einzig und allein bestimmte und leitete, war das Interesse Englands,
die Grosse seines Vaterlandes: der unbezahmbare Drang, als Staatsmann in der
auswartigen Politik sich geltend zu machen und ungeachtet aller Widerstande
sich durchzusetzen, iiber wiegt in ihm bei weitem die Freude an einer fur das
grosse Ganze oft nurzu unfruchtbaren inneren parteipolitischen Betatigung."
Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 311-312. Guichen, as one might expect, has not been so
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must be admitted, had contributed greatly to the defeat of Russia's
policy of peaceful penetration in Turkey and he had contributed
likewise to the defeat of French peaceful penetration in Egypt.
In other words, he had defended Constantinople from the Tsar
and Alexandria from Louis Philippe. From the British Imperialist
point of mew, it is true, he had accomplished much.
While the termination of the Turco-Egyptian question was of
immediate significance, it by no means implied a permanent solu-
tion of the general question of the Near East. In less than a
decade France was destined to return to an aggressive foreign
policy in the Levant; in less than a decade and a half Russia was
destined, not only to witness the reunion of England and France,
but also to experience their open hostility and to lose much of
what she had gained previously at the expense of the Porte; and
within three-quarters of a century England, despairing perhaps
of ever finding a permanent solution of the question of the Near
East, was destined to abandon her attempts to preserve the inde-
pendence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire and instead, in
order to protect the route across the Isthmus of Suez to India, to
secure under her own control, either directly or indirectly, Egypt,
Arabia, and Palestine the major part of the territory claimed
by Mehemet AH in i839.142 Indeed the termination of the Turco-
Egyptian dispute of 1832-1841 marked only the end of the first
phase of a question which was destined and may still be today
long to play a major role in the rivalries of the great Powers.
impressed by the triumph of Lord Palmerston. According to him one of the
chief consequences of the crisis of 1839 to 1841, and particularly of the excite-
ment which accompanied it in France, was the accentuation of the movement
for German unity which was "pour le plus grand malheur de la France, de
1'Europe et du monde." See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 533-539.
"There were Englishmen who advocated a similar policy in 1841. Note the
following extract from a letter, Napier to Minto, Feb. 5, 1841: "'I dined with
the Pasha yesterday; . . . He looks to England to protect him, and if we do, he
will become our vassal if we wish it; in fact, there is nothing we can ask in
reason that he will not do. Next to Egypt being a colony of England, it is
best that it should be an independent power, paying tribute to the Porte.
Our commerce to India will become very extensive; and the facility of traveling
become easier every day. He intends putting a lock from the canal into the
Nile, to enable passengers to go from hence to Cairo without moving from the
steam-boats that are to be established, and I have no doubt ere long a rail-
road will be made from Cairo to Suez;"
' Quoted by Napier, War in Syria,
II, pp. 179-180. See also Appendix C.
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THE FRENCH BOURSE, JANUARY, 1840, to AUGUST, 1841
The figures given below, which are the closing quotations for
the particular days cited, have been taken from the Journal des
Debats.
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APPENDIX B
FRANCE AND THE EASTERN QUESTION: AN EXTRACT
FROM AN ARTICLE WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN
THE EXAMINER, AUGUST 23, 1840, P. 531.
(From our own Correspondent.}
". . . Whichever country, France or England, really desires to
have an open quarrel, there is cause and pretext enough. There
has been a deviation from the alliance on both sides; and the true
reason is, that the interests of the countries are diametrically oppo-
site. France feels herself oppressed by the superior maritime force
of Great Britain, and she is making a bold effort to be mistress of
the whole south and east coast of the Mediterranean, from Ceuta
to where the Taurus dips into the sea. . She may talk of Mehemet
being independent, of his making part and parcel of the Ottoman
empire, and supporting its integrity; but this is all nonsense, and
she knows it. The new joint empire of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia,
exists by French support, and cannot refuse a French command.
Note. The charges against the French made by the writer of this article
were perhaps overdrawn. Nevertheless it appears that there was some founda-
tion for them. Note, in this connection, the following extract from a summary
of a speech delivered by Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies, April 13, 1841:
"
. . . Un Ministre etranger, meilleur juge que nous-memes de nos interets,
disait a 1'ambassadeur de France:
"
'Nous voyons bien au fond quelle est la politique de la France dans la
question d'Orient; cette politique n'est pas europeene. La France possede le
nord de 1'Afrique; elle y a une armde de 70,000 hommes. Tout pres d'elle se
trouvent le pacha de Tunis et le pacha de Tripoli; qu'est-ce? presque rien: de
malhereux princes musulmans qui tremblent devant la France. Mais un peu au
dela il y a le pacha d'Egypte, qui possede la mer Rouge et 1'Euphrate. Ainsi,
directement par le nord de 1'Afrique, indirectement par son alliance \s\c\ avec
le pacha d'Egypte, la France domine depuis 1'entree la Mediterranee et du detroit
de Gibraltar jusqu'a la mer Rouge et 1'Euphrate; cela ne peut pas nous
convenir.'
"Voila ce que disait un ministre etranger, parlant a un ambassadeur de
France; et assurement vous m'accorderez bien que ces deux personnages etaient
fort competens, que ces deux personages n'auraient pas echange entre eux des
idees pueriles.
"Ainsi, a 1'etranger, nos interets en Orient etaient apprci6s comme des
interets considerables." Journal des Debats, Apr. 14, 1841. See also, Bulwer to
Palmerston, Apr. 16, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 382.
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And this empire stands astride the Red Sea and the Euphrates,
now the only modes of communication with the East. M. Lamar-
tine said in January last, in the debate of the French Chamber,
'England will wage a war of a hundred years, and spend her last
shilling, rather than suffer this.' M. Lamartine knows both Eng-
land and the Levant. For my part, long as I have cherished the
idea of a French and English alliance, I believe this alliance im-
possible as long as France holds the pretensions and the views she
does in the Levant. As for the views of England, she cannot waive
them, for they are identical with her very existence. And France
not abandoning those views, then a war, and a fierce war, with
a full trial of the maritime strength of the two countries, becomes
inevitable, sooner or later. French Statesmen are fully aware
of this, and no doubt regret it. They would willingly content
themselves with preventing England or any Power from monopo-
lizing the shores of the Mediterranean, without seeking to seize
influence there for France, directly or indirectly. But public
opinion in France has espoused the Pasha, seeing nothing less
than a Frenchman in him; and Ministers and Chambers, in
obedience to a general opinion so vaguely founded, have not only
renounced the English alliance, but converted England into a foe."
APPENDIX C
EXTRACTS FROM THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY COM-
MODORE NAPIER IN HIS WAR IN SYRIA,
II, PP. 277, 278-279, 280.
". . . No power in Europe is so much interested in keeping
well with Mehemet Ali as Great Britain, and no power is more
aware of that than France; . . . France had opened a consider-
able trade with Egypt, and she entertained great fears that English
enterprise would supplant her; no wonder, then, that she should
have befriended the Pacha in every possible way. France is as
well aware as we are, that steam navigation having got to such
perfection, Egypt has become almost necessary to England as the
half-way house to India, and indeed ought to be an English colony.
Now if we wished to weaken Mehemet Ali, with a view, in the
event of the breakup of the Turkish empire, which is not far
distant, to have seized Egypt as our share of the spoil, we were
perfectly right in our policy; or even, had we not looked so far
ahead, it might, perhaps, have been politic to have confined
Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so that in the event of his stopping the
road to India by Suez, we might have the road of the Euphrates
open, one remaining in the possession of the Ottoman empire, and
the other in that of the Pacha of Egypt. It is not, however, usual
for a Government to quarrel with their own interests, and it is so
decidedly the advantage of the Pacha of Egypt to facilitate by
every possible means, the passage across the Isthmus of Suez,
that on the whole I believe the soundest policy of Great Britain
would have been to have supported Mehemet Ali, and I have not
the smallest doubt that when France saw we were committed
against him, she seized that opportunity of quitting the alliance
in order to make the Pacha her firm friend. . . .
". . . By raising Mehemet Ali the Porte would have been
strengthened; and indeed, the Pacha, in possession of Syria and
Egypt, would have been as much interested in controlling the
power of Russia as the Sultan himself. Who then was to gain by
reducing the power of Mehemet Ali? Russia! and Russia alone."
Note. France as well as England was interested in the establishment of
steam communication through Egypt to the East. See an account of plans for
the establishment of a steam line from Marseilles through Alexandria and Suez
to the Isle of Bourbon, in the Journal des Debats, April 20, 1841.
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APPENDIX D
EXTRACTS FROM THE INFORMATION AND OPINIONS
OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AGENTS RELATIVE
TO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION
i. Vail to Livingston, No. 52, Jan. 30, 1833, U. S. Department
of State Archives, England, Vol. XL.
''The great motive for the hostile array of the absolute Monarchies of
Europe will never cease to exist as long as liberal principles and the constitu-
tional forms of Government shall occupy, in France, the place of divine rights
and legitimacy; but, within a short time, various causes have transpired to post-
pone the execution of military designs upon that country, and to draw the
attention of the Powers by whom they were entertained to other matters more
nearly affecting them. The cordial co-operation of England in effecting the organ-
ization of the new kingdom of Belgium: the little prospect of neutralizing the
former so long as that object is not accomplished: the triumph of the liberal,
over the Aristocratic party in Great Britain, as exhibited in the late elections:
the strength acquired by the French Administration through the harmony which
subsists between it and the Chambers: the failure of the Duchess of Bern, and
other Carlists to excite internal disturbances, and the restoration of order, con-
fidence and business throughout the Kingdom, have opened the eyes of the
Northern Allies upon the ability of their intended prey to struggle for life, while
they began to feel that their own weapons were too heavy to be borne much
longer without using them. On the other hand, each of the three Powers has
felt that there were causes at home likely to paralyze its energies. Prussia has
to keep down liberalism among the German States: Austria has never been easy
since the French have held, at Ancona, the brand which may set her Italian
Provinces in a blaze; and Russia, though daily loading the Poles with new chains,
needs her best army to curb the indignant spirit of that heroic people. But
another cause seems to be growing out of very recent occurrences in the East,
more powerful than all these together, to break that tyrannical influence which
has been so perniciously extended over the communities of inferior rank: and
that is, Discord among the members of the alliance.
''The rapid advance of the Egyptian Pacha to the conquest of Turkey and
Constantinople seems to have opened the eyes of Russia to the danger, for her
southern Provinces, of allowing an ambitious and powerful chief to substitute
himself in the place of the humble and weak Sultan; and, if appearances are not
misunderstood, Russian diplomacy has been busy in preparing the European
Governments for the intervention of Russian arms in preventing the completion
of the conquest of Turkey. Hence, perhaps, the visit of Pozzo di Borgo to London
to confront the Turkish Ambassador Namik Pacha, whose mission cannot be
supposed to have had any other object than that of craving British aid to super-
sede the necessity of Russian intervention, which is said to be unpopular at
Constantinople, and the ultimate object of which is suspected, at Vienna, to be
the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia, perhaps of Greece; and, at London,
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the establishment of naval stations and supremacy in the Mediterranean. These
suspicions are authorized by the efforts known to be making to increase the
Russian Navy, and by the organization of a military expedition at Sebastopol
under General Mouravieff, who is said to have discretionary orders to move
forwards. If these suppositions be correct and many see in impending events,
confirmation of their correctness the consequences must be a separation of, per-
haps Prussia, but certainly Austria, who, once before, arrested the conquering
army of Diebitsch at the gates of Constantinople, from their great ally, and a
combination of interests between them, France and England, and Bavaria who
has lately undertaken to give independence and a Sovereign to Greece. Whether
these speculations have any foundation in reality or not, it would be hazardous to
affirm; but it is certain that they are the subject of much conjecture here and
in the other Capitals of Europe; and it is equally certain that, although much
time is devoted, in Downing Street, to the still and ever pending Belgian ques-
tion, the Ministers hold frequent Cabinet Councils at which the domestic affairs
of the Kingdom are understood not to be the exclusive subject of deliberation."
2. Vail to Livingston, No. 58, March 22, 1833, U. S. Depart-
ment of State Archives, England, Vol. XL.
"I enclose, by desire of Mr. Buchanan, an extract from the Journal of
St. Petersburg containing an article upon the Russian interference in the affairs
of Turkey. The papers have given news from Constantinople of a more recent
date, from which it appears that the Russian fleet had actually anchored in the
Bosphorus. The new French Ambassador, Admiral Roussin, who arrived about
the same time, had persuaded the Sultan to decline the further aid of the
Emperor, and engaged to arrest the advance of the Egyptian troops. But, in the
meantime, the fleet remained, and the Russian Army of thirty thousand men was
on its way from the banks of the Danube to Constantinople. Whether the Sultan
will, in reality, place more confidence in the diplomacy of Admiral Roussin, un-
supported as it is by any semblance of phisical [sic] power immediately at
command, than in the combined naval and military force of Russia to save his
crown, and perhaps his head, is, with reason, I think, doubted here: And, besides
that the Czar and the Grand Turk have some pecuniary accounts, growing out
of the peace of Adrianople, still left unsettled, many accidental causes may arise
to afford a pretext for not immediately withdrawing the imperial protection from
the Turkish Capital. In that case, conjecture will set itself at work to divine the
effects of the delay upon the general politics of Europe, and reports are already
afloat of a coolness between Russia and France, whose jealousy of each other in
that quarter is now beginning to show itself more openly than it has hitherto
done, in this seeming eagerness to save the tottering empire of the Ottomans from
impending ruin. From the apparent inaction of Great Britain on this occasion
it would appear that her diplomacy was caught asleep at Constantinople. Perhaps
it may have been lulled into security, as to events abroad, by the presence at
the Court of St. James, of Namik Pacha, who, during his stay here, seemed to
divide his time between Downing Street and the Russian Embassy. That
minister, who, as Prince Lieven informed me, was merely the bearer of a letter
from the Porte to the British Government, with orders to take back the answer,
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left England a few days ago, on his way home, leaving, as Resident here, Mr.
Maurojeni, a Greek long employed in the diplomatic service of Turkey."
3. Livingston to McLane, No. 15, Dec. 2, 1833, U. S. Depart-
ment of State Archives, France, Vol. XXVII.
"I have lately in confidence been suffered to peruse the notes which were
presented by the Ministers of France and England at St. Petersburg, to the
Emperor. . . . The answer to these two notes expresses surprise. . . . When the
notes were transmitted from St. Petersburg to this place, a conference was had
by the Ambassador with one of the Ministers here on the subject, when the
latter to excuse the peremptory language of the note, said it had not been so
worded at first, but that it had been altered by the counsel as he supposed of the
English Cabinet. This last circumstance shows the ascendancy of England, and
the avowal produced the natural but not very courteous reply, 'You ought not,
Sir, to have made such a confession.' Although this was given to me in confidence,
I had leave to communicate it to you in the same manner, and I pray you Sir,
to take particular care that nothing contained in my despatches of this nature
be made public, or what is the same thing, shall either confidentially or otherwise,
be communicated to Congress."
4. Livingston to McLane, No. 16, Dec. u, 1833, U. S. Depart-
ment of State Archives, France, Vol. XXVII.
"By my last, No. 15 I informed you of the contents of a correspondance
which had been confidently communicated to me with leave to inform you of its
tenour. I have now the honour to give you some of the results communicated
from the same source, and on the same condition. It appears that the answer
excited much higher feelings in one of the parties than in the other. France
seems to consider the concluding phrase of the answer as a fair reply to the same
phrase in the note, and is inclined to let the matter rest until Russia shall commit
some act hostile to her interest in the East. Great Britain on the contrary takes
the matter in high dudgeon, and it is believed, is now fitting out a strong re-
enforcement for her Mediterranean fleet. Talleyrand will leave this on Sunday
for London: his object will be to allay the spirit that animates the English
Cabinet, and prevent any measure that may lead to an immediate rupture. In
the meantime another note is preparing here to be presented to the Emperor,
asking for the explanation of his intentions, but in a more moderate form.
Whether England will assent to this measure is considered as doubtful. If she
should, the answer of the Emperor will be substantially the same; that his object
is to defend the Sultan, and that none of the other powers have a right to make
any objections to it, more especially those who profess to have the same object.
If, however, the explanation should be demanded in the tone which the present
feeling of the British Cabinet seems to indicate, I [have] been given to under-
stand that no concession will be made, and that any event less 'untoward' even
than the attack on the Turkish fleet at Navarino may bring about a war, which
in the present state of Europe cannot fail to be a general one. If on the other
hand the Emperor should find that he is not ready for the struggle, and amicable
explanations should procrastinate the crisis, it cannot be for a long period. The
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policy of Russia is apparent; She is extending her possessions on the Caspian,
and approaching in that direction to India, not probably with any serious inten-
tion of undertaking so hazardous an attempt, but for the same purpose that
Napoleon threatened the invasion of England. In the meantime she is creating
a naval force on the Black Sea, which the late treaty with the Porte defends
against the entrance of any other power who might interrupt them. All the terri-
tory of Turkey in Europe is within their grasp; and although it is not their inten-
tion to take any violent measure at present to secure this prize; yet the moment
insurrection, assassination, or any other event shall take off their Good Ally,
the Ottoman Empire is at an end. The powers whose interest it would be to
prevent this aggrandizement, and whose united power might enable them to do it,
will be bought off. Austria by an increase of dominion in Italy and in the East.
Prussia by procuring its aggrandizement in Germany. Sardinia has been long
subservient to Russian policy; Bavaria will be kept in check by its family interest
in Greece, and the rest of Germany are distinctly powerless. The only powers
then to stop these great strides to uncontrolable power are England and France.
The debt of the one and the unsettled dynasty of the other may incline both to
tempori[z]e. But still the ease with which England may shut up the entrance
to the Black Sea and the Baltic may induce them to meet the contingency with
their accustomed energy. I have thought it my duty to give you as well my
impressions, as the facts which produced them, and to suggest the propriety of
being prepared with a naval force to make our neutrality respected, if events
should occur which are by no means impossible that may produce a general
European war. It will be quite as necessary in such a conflict as it ever has been,
and perhaps more so. In the discussions which have taken place on this subject,
(and they have been very warm) the answer to an observation that the Russian
commerce would be destroyed by the blockade I have mentioned; was, 'Tht
Americans will carry on our trade.'
"
5. Vail to McLane, No. 104, Dec. 30, 1833, U. S. Department
of State Archives, England, Vol. XLI.
"Looking now towards the East, it must be confessed that the political horizon
there exhibits dark specks which, either accident or the jealousies and antipathies,
for the indulgence of which that quarter of the Globe affords so wide a field,
may blow into a tempest which would shake Europe to its foundation. The Pacha
of Egypt, though induced to pause in his career of conquests, is not subdued,
and has just shown, by his refusal to pay a stipulated tribute to the Sultan that
his submission was but a measure of policy, his allegiance a mere matter of
form, and that his independence from the Porte is absolute. The possessions
he retains in Syria still open to him the road to all the Asiatic provinces of the
Sultan, if not to Constantinople; and he does not relax in his warlike spirit or
preparations. On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia, still holding the
European districts of Turkey, and maintaining a large fleet on the Euxine, is
equally ready, at, or even without, the call of the Sultan who is utterly powerless,
for assistance under the late Treaty between them, to march to Constantinople
on the least appearance, either real or pretended, of danger, overrun all the
Turkish Provinces on both shores of the Euxine, line the Bosphorus with his
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troops and fleets, garrison the forts along the Dardanelles, and, carrying into
effect the secret stipulations of the Treaty which, under such a contingency forbid
the entrance of foreign ships, make himself as completely master of all the
strong points in the Ottoman Empire as if it were a Russian province. These
are all events brought within the pale of possibility by the occurrences of this
year, to which it might be practical, by some further partition of Poland, or
other expedients to be discussed at Vienna, to reconcile Prussia and Austria,
hitherto hostile to any Russian aggrandizement in that quarter; and if there be
truth in the imputation of ambitious projects attaching to the Czar, the oppor-
tunity would seem a fit one for their easy and final accomplishment, were it not
for the decided opposition they would have to encounter on the part of England
and France who unite in watching the course of events with a determination not
to allow them to add to the territorial or political power of the Russian Empire.
That some apprehension of an attempt to effect this is entertained at Paris and
London, is evident from the activity which prevails in the French and English
.arsenals and dock-yards. At Toulon, a fleet capable of carrying an army of
thirty thousand men is nearly equipped, destined, it is said, for new conquests
on the African coast; and orders have been issued to the different naval stations
in Great Britain to put in commission a number of large ships which are now
fitting out with great expedition. That the latter is intended to re-inforce the
British fleet now collected in the Levant is not attempted to be concealed; nor
can it be doubted that the French expedition may, on any emergency, be
diverted from its original purpose and likewise sent up the Mediterranean.
These, which are matters of fact, leave but little room for conjecture, and may
serve to give confirmation to the reports, that Russia having, notwithstanding
the representations of the British and French cabinets, avowed her determina-
tion to execute her Treaty with Turkey, in the event of the latter being menaced
from without, has been given to understand that the stipulations of that
Treaty shall, in no event be regarded, and their execution opposed by force. If
all this be true, the peace of Europe would hang upon the contingency of the
march of a few Egyptian regiments, which a word from any Power desirous to
bring on the commencement of hostilities might easily set in motion. But this is
not the first time, since the French revolution of 1830, that peace would have
been preserved by a display of warlike preparations; and convinced that England
and France are as anxious as ever that the repose of Europe should not be
disturbed, I believe that it is with the same view that the expedient is resorted
to on this occasion. The question, therefore, would, under this hypothesis, be,
whether the Czar, even supposing him assisted by his German allies, would feel
strong enough to meet the combined naval and military force of Great Britain
and France. Their decided superiority by sea, and the ease with which France
might, by flinging her tricolored flag amidst the discontented masses in Germany,
Italy, and perhaps Russia, revolutionize the whole Continent of Europe, are
obstacles which the Russian Monarch cannot but appreciate, and which, I
would incline to think, would prevent his doing anything to provoke a contest
likely to endanger the stability of his throne, and the existence of the domestic
institutions of his own Empire and those of his allies. Reasoning thus, un-
prejudiced observers of events still withhold their belief of the immediate
242 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [568
approach of war, as inevitably to grow out of the state of things here alluded to;
but there is always the chapter of accidents which no foresight can reach; and
it should ever be borne in mind that, with so many elements of discord and
strife, and so ready to be put in motion the general peace stands in constant
danger of being interrupted. It is no doubt with a view to be prepared for such
an event, as well as to avert, by showing themselves ready to meet, it, that
most nations in Europe at all likely to be called upon to take an active part,
preserve their military resources unimpaired, and, in some instances, are consid-
erably adding to them."
6. Porter to McLane, No. 235, Aug. 12, 1834, U. S. Depart-
ment of State, Turkey, Vol. IV.
"The communications of a later date from Alexandria and Syria show a
different state of things from that communicated by Boghos Bey to the foreign
Consuls, and from the measures taken here to profit by the reverses which Ibra-
him has met with, there can scarcely be a doubt that Syria ere long will be in
the hands of its legitimate master, the Grand Seignor.
'We have information that the French force in the Levant is to be increased,
and if this is the case it is hard to determine what will be the policy of France
in this crisis, but as all her measures are directed towards the maintainance of her
ascendency in the Levant she will no doubt do that which is most likely to
secure it. If it should be to her interest that Syria and Egypt should return
under the Dominion of the Grand Seignor she will do all in her power to pro-
mote their subjection, but if not Mehemed Alii will receive the assistance of
France, and as heretofore be excited to resist the efforts of the Grand Seignor to
conquer them.
"The commerce of France with Egypt, as may be seen by the returns ol
our Consular Agent is immense. She has scarcely a competitor, and nearly the
same may be said of other places within the limits of Mehemet Alli's govern-
ment, from which I have been able to obtain returns, and as this state of things,
it is most likely, would not exist if Egypt and Syria were to return to their
former master, there can scarcely be a doubt that every means will be resorted
to by the French Government to prevent their return and thus secure to herself
a commerce so very lucrative. Every article that France can produce from her
soil, and manufactures, is imported in large quantities into Egypt, and every
article produced in Egypt, and coming through it from other countries is im-
ported into France, to the exclusion of almost all other nations from a participa-
tion in the commerce."
7. Clay to Forsythe, No. 34, Sept. 3, 1834, U. S. Department
of State Archives, Russia, Vol. XII.
"The news received here in the month of July, of the arrival of an English
squadron at Napoli and a report, that France was also fitting out a fleet for the
same destination excited the suspicion of the Imperial Cabinet so much, as
to induce Count Nesselrode to demand explanations thereon from Mareschal
Maison. The Ambassador replied, that his Government had no intention of
sending a fleet to that part of the Mediterranean, and, that he supposed the
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British squadron was placed there, more for the purpose of supporting the Whig
Ministry in Parliament, than for any other motive. Sometime afterwards the
Vice Chancellor asked for further explanations, when the Mareschal, after repeat-
ing what he had said before, assured him, that France considered the Turkish
question as settled for the present, and, that if the Cabinet of St. James should
create any difficulties, which he very much doubted since the commercial interests
of Great Britain would be injured thereby, the French Ministry would certainly
take no part in the affair.
"On the I4th of August, a Courier arrived from Constantinople, bringing the
news, that the Sultan, having heard that all Syria was in open revolt and that
Ibrahim Pacha had been defeated, determined to take advantage of the circum-
stances to diminish the power of the Pacha of Egypt. Orders were accordingly
issued for the Turkish fleet to hold itself ready to put to sea. I am informed
that the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople protested separately
against the resolution of the Sultan and declared, that if it were carried into
execution, their governments, as the protectors, of the Pacha of Egypt, would
consider it equivalent to a declaration of war.
"The report which had reached Constantinople, that Ibrahim had been made
prisoner, only confirmed the Sultan in his design of recovering some of his lost
provinces, notwithstanding the representations of the English and French
Ambassadors.
''The Russian charge d'affaires also used his influence to induce the Sultan
to abandon this hazardous enterprise and finally made a formal protest against
the measures. I am told, that Baron Ruchmann stated to the Divan, that, by
the Treaty of Alliance of the 8 July 1833, the Imperial government had stipulated
to support the Porte in case of an attack made upon it by a third Power; but
that if the Sultan should seek to bring about a war by unreasonable conduct,
Russia could not consider herself obliged to interfere and afford armed assistance.
Count Nesselrode, it is said, not only approved of Mr. de Ruckmann's protest,
but charged the Ambassador Mr. Boutenieff, who has returned to his post, to
reiterate the declaration.
"The last news from Constantinople is, that Ibrahim Pacha has been obliged
to shut himself up in Jerusalem to await the arrival of the troops sent to his
assistance by Mehemet Alii.
"It appears from Mr. de Ruckmann's despatches of the 2nd August, that
Lord Ponsonby and Admiral Roussin have altered their tone, and, instead of
protesting against the expedition of the Turkish fleet, have told the Sublime
Porte, that their Governments would not interfere if it succeeded in conquering
the revolted provinces of the Pacha in a short time, (it is said one month was the
period mentioned). Nevertheless, the Russian charge d'affaires did not change
his language, but renewed the declaration that the present was not a 'casus
foederis,' and, that, consequently, Russia would not be bound to come to the
assistance of the Porte, in case it involved itself in difficulties of its own seeking.
These observations had not induced the Sultan to abandon his project; however
his fleet remained at Constantinople at the last dates.
"It is thought, that France and England abandoned their policy in regard
to the protests so suddenly, with the hopes that the Sultan might easily reconquer
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his lost provinces and thus place his Empire in a condition to act independently
of the Russian Cabinet."
8. Vail to Forsyth, No. 168, Jan. 22, 1835, U. S. Department
of State, England, Vol. XLII.
"In the East, likewise, where events have, more than once, conducted the
most powerful nations of Europe to the brink of violent contention, present
appearances are of a more pacific character than they had been for some time
before. Although the relative positions of the parties are not materially altered,
some approximation is stated to have been made if not towards a final adjust-
ment of causes of dispute, at least, towards an understanding of each other's
views. Private accounts of recent date, and well entitled to credit, have been
communicated to me, and announce the removal of the difficulties which had
hitherto stood in the way of an arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha
of Egypt, as the result of a Turkish Embassy to Cairo. The Pacha had agreed
to evacuate those territories which had not been ceded to him, and to pay to the
Sultan the stipulated tribute. Should this agreement prove a pledge of lasting
friendship between the two rivals, it will remove all pretexts for the hostile
attitude assumed and still preserved by England, France and Russia, and greatly
diminish the chances of war in that quarter. It is confidently reported that
the British Ambassador had addressed to the Porte a note requiring a categorical
answer to the question, whether, in the event of a war between England and
Russia, the Porte would allow the free passage of the Dardanelles to the fleets
of both Powers, or confine that privilige to Russian ships, alone; declaring, at the
same time, that, in the latter case, England would, if deemed necessary, enforce
the extension of the privilege to herself, also. This declaration the first so
distinctly expressed by Great Britain, has created considerable alarm in the
Turkish capital."
9. Porter to Forsyth, No. 293, March 20, 1835, U. S. Depart-
ment of State, Turkey, Vol. V.
"The events of the most importance, are, that the Sultan is collecting in
Anatolia, near Syria, a most formidable army, it is supposed and cannot be
doubted for the invasion of Syria; Troops are drawn from every part of the
Empire to reinforce it, and artillery and munitions of war are collected there in
large quantities. The militia is organizing for the protection of the Capital during
the absence of the regular troops; the entire fleet of the Sultan is ready for sea at
a moment's warning; that the Emperor of Russia, with a large body of troops,
on the Black Sea, are ready for whatever may be intended by him. On the other
hand the fleet of Mehemet Alii, his main reliance, with him on board, is ready
for sea, the advance squadron has arrived at Candia, and he has said publicly
that he intends to command in person, and if he can bring that of the Grand
Signer to action, he intends to attempt to carry it by boarding with his Arabs.
Egypt is exhausted of its resources, and means of supplying troops, and Syria
is in a state of great discontent from the cruel and violent measures pursued
against the population by Ibrahim Pacha; the same discontent prevails in Yemen,
where the army of Mehemet Alii, sent to subject the Arabs, has been destroyed
by sickness, fatigue and frequent skirmishing.
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"The avarice of France to engross all the advantages of the commerce of
Egypt, and the desire of England to secure the advantages of a communication
with India across the Isthmus of Suez, induce them to give support to Mehemet
Alii against the Sultan, by furnishing him with the means of keeping up his
fleet, while the desire of Russia to deprive France of these advantages and cut
of[f] the communication between England and her East India possession, induces
Russia to keep a large fleet in the Black Sea, which both England and France
wish to prevent passing the Dardanelles, but which with the Army assembled
there, is ready to act in any emergency to assist the Sultan or further the views
of the Emperor of Russia.
"England and France it would appear have no views hostile to the Sultan,
or otherwise friendly to Mehemet Alii, than their respective interests are con-
cerned, and the same may be said in regard to the Emperor of Russia in his
relations with the Sultan and feelings towards Mehemet Alii, but the apparent,
and indeed, undoubted design of Russia to extend her Empire far East, excites
the apprehension of England for her India possessions, and the aid given by
Russia, which may enable the Sultan to recover Egypt, and deprive France of
her lucrative commerce, thence causes her to act in unison with England in all
the affaires of the Levant. Russia in the meantime protected in the Black Sea
by the strong castles of Dardanelles, from which she has free egress, is encreasing
in strength without pledging herself to any party, and holds herself in readiness
to act as her interest may prompt; a course which compels England and France
to keep up large and expensive fleets in the Levant which the interests they have
to protect will scarcely justify.
"These contending interests serve greatly to retard and embarrass the Grand
Signor in executing his design of reannexing Egypt and Syria to his Empire,
from which they have been separated by Mehemet Alii. A great effort is now
about being made to recover these possessions, and a few months will determine
whether Mehemet Alii and his son Ibrahim Pacha are to continue to rule in
Egypt and Syria, which have been scourged so long by their cruelties and
extortions."
10. Vail to Forsyth, No. 209, October 22, 1835, U. S. Depart-
ment of State Archives, England, Vol. XLIII.
"The mission of Lord Durham, the lately appointed Ambassador to the Court
of the Czar, has supplied matter for endless speculation; ....
"As the political scenes enacting in the East are those which, at present,
chiefly attract attention, and the only ones in which any germ of disturbance
remote as it be can now be discerned, the circumstances to which I have
alluded [regarding the Durham mission to Russia] appeared to me to possess
sufficient interest to justify my seeking, for your Department, information
respecting them on the correctness of which some reliance might be placed. With
that view, I called upon Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador here, who,
on my mentioning the subject, expressed a desire that my Government should be
possessed of the means of forming a correct estimate of the real state of the case.
He said that no credit was to be given to the statements that had been put forth,
either as to the pretended designs of Great Britain in sending Lord Durham to
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St. Petersburg and Constantinople, or as to the jealousy with which the Russian
Government is said to look upon that appointment: That, on the contrary,
Lord Durham had, before his departure, freely conversed with him regarding his
mission, the principal object of which was to secure a continuance of peace and
harmony between the leading European Powers; particularly with reference to
the affairs of the East; and that, under this conviction, the Emperor looked
upon it with the most ^ favorable eye, and had given orders that all facilities
should be given it by his agents abroad. To show me that those dispositions had
been properly seconded, the Count submitted for my perusal a despatch he had
received a few days before from Mr. Butinieff, the Russian Ambassador at
Constantinople, from which it appeared that the visit of Lord Durham there was
anticipated in the most friendly spirit; and that all measures to facilitate its
object had been taken at the Russian Embassy. With reference to the addresses
exchanged by Lord Durham and the Sultan, Count Pozzo said that both their
spirit and language had been misrepresented: that they were a mere interchange
of the civilities shown on all such occasions: that they contained nothing that
could give the least umbrage to the Imperial Court; and that the Sultan, instead
of inviting Lord Durham to become a mediator between him and the Czar, had
merely expressed, in the usual diplomatic language, a desire that he
might be, at St. Petersburg, the interpreter of the friendly sentiments of the Porte.
He stated further that Lord Durham would be received at St. Petersburg with
no other than friendly dispositions, and that nothing was anticipated from his
mission but the means of consolidating the peace of Europe and mutual good
understanding and confidence between its leading Powers.
' At the Count's
request, I promised that I would communicate to you an account of our
conversation.
"Whatever may be the secret or ultimate designs of Russia upon the Otto-
man dominions, the times do not favor their execution; and her rulers cannot but
see it. She is suspected of striving, by covert diplomatic approaches, to prepare
the way for ulterior movements; and the suspicion is probably not altogether
unfounded, notwithstanding the earnest disclaimer of all views of aggrandisement
so often put forth by her Agents. But Russia is too well aware of the eager-
ness with which her conduct is watched, and of the determination formed to
counteract all such views not only by England, but by other Powers in closer
friendship with her to attempt anything calculated to justify the suspicions
entertained of her designs. Her representative here does not conceal the solicitude
with which the Emperor regards the condition of the Porte, nor his determina-
tion that she shall not become a prey to conquest, nor fall under influences
inimical to his interests in the shores of the Black Sea. He says that with that
view, alone, the invasion of the Pacha of Egypt was prevented; and that the
Emperor proved the honesty of his intentions by withdrawing his forces after
that object had been accomplished and the Sultan again placed in a situation
to maintain his independence. In a word, that he had no desire of becoming
the possessor of the Bosphorus; but that, at the same time, he could not consent
to its falling into the hands of any Power by any means capable of controlling
his establishments on the Black Sea. There are, perhaps, in that determination
sufficient motives for the late Russian interference in behalf of the Sultan; and
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if the other Powers could be convinced that the Emperor's policy stops there,
they could have but little reason to object to it. The fact, however, cannot be
concealed that every fresh instance of active friendship on his part towards Turkey
has extended his influence in that quarter; and hence the jealous fear entertained
by all the nations of Europe that the Porte is doomed to become a Russian
Province. The no longer secret treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, by which the Sultan
bound himself to close the Dardanelles against the ships of foreign nations when-
ever Russia should deem such a measure necessary to give effect to her protectorship
of the Ottoman dominions, could not but give umbrage to Great Britain; and
a remonstrance against the provisions of that compact is believed to be one of
the objects of Lord Durham's embassy. The Turkish question, as between Great
Britain and Russia resolves itself, at present, into a common desire to preserve
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, with a view, on the part of the former, to
prevent the Emperor from possessing himself of the means of opening the
Mediterranean to his naval forces, and of disputing with her the supremacy 'in
that sea; and, on the part of Russia, for the purpose of preventing the establish-
ment at Constantinople of a Power which might prove a barrier to her views of
aggrandisement beyond her present territorial limits, both in Europe and Asia.
A permanence of the statu quo is probably all that either party seeks for the
present. It is possible that the diplomacy of Lord Durham may prove successful
in attaining such an object; but it cannot be disguised that the more efficient
negotiator on the side of Great Britain is the large naval force kept up by her
on the Mediterranean station."
ii. Clay to Forsyth, No. 10, Aug. i, 1836, U. S. Department
of State Archives, Russia, Vol. XIII.
"Whenever an editor of a newspaper in Paris or London writes an article
in which the name of the Emperor of Russia appears, or his policy is considered,
it is generally to present him to the reader personally as a heartless Despot and
politically as a grasping and crafty Sovereign, whose only aim, with regard to the
Sultan, is to appropriate to himself as large a portion of Turkey as he can with-
out disturbing the peace of Europe by an overt act of hostility; and who is
constantly setting traps to catch his unfortunate neighbor [Turkey] the
exertions of France and England to the contrary notwithstanding.
"In my opinion injustice is done not only to the character of the Emperor
Nicholas, but also to his views. There is no good reason to believe that his
conduct towards Mahmoud is influenced by any hope of adding more territory
to the Russian Empire, for the Tsar must be aware that his dominions are now
as extensive as they can be for all the purposes of good government and that
any increase of them would only create embarrassments internal and external
without being productive of any corresponding advantages. What then are the
intentions of Russia with regards to the Porte and what interest has the Emperor
to endeavour to exercise an exclusive influence over the Turkish Cabinet? The
answer is simple and would probably suggest itself to many could they but divest
themselves of the idea that the policy of Nicholas I must naturally be the same
as that of Catherine II. In the first place, Russia, under existing treaties enjoys
particular commercial privileges in the Turkish dominions. Her commerce is
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daily increasing and must continue to do so unless interrupted by a war between
the two countries. This reason alone, would be sufficient to justify a wish to
have a predominant weight in the Ottoman councils; at the same time, the
knowledge of such a design cannot authorize the feelings of jealousy it has
engendered in the West of Europe. Secondly The relative positions of Russia
and Turkey, bordering on each other, and the local interests which grow out
of this continguity must give birth to many transactions between them, that
do not necessarily concern other states and which, surely, may be carried on
without third Powers having the right, on any ground, of demanding explana-
tions respecting the different measures that may be resolved on to promote the
prosperity of the two Empires. Again, as the Bosphorus is the only outlet of
the Black Sea, it is apparent that, unless Turkey be friendly, not only the com-
mercial, but every other interest of the southern provinces of Russia must suffer.
The agricultural especially, for the grain of the Tauride and the adjoining govern-
ments only find vent through that channel.
"The conduct of the Emperor therefore, in reference to Turkey, is founded
on considerations of convenience, carried on with motives purely national and
designed to redound to the prosperity of his Empire; not by encroaching upon the
political rights of other Powers, or abstracting from them any commercial
privileges, or lawful claims they may have in the eyes of the Divan: but by
entering fairly into competition with them for such advantages as international
transactions may yield.
"The residence of Lord Durham, the British Ambassador, in St. Petersburg
has enabled him to appreciate the policy of the Emperor towards Turkey, and
to see that His Majesty, so far from endeavoring to sow dissention, is desirous
of peace and aware that the maintenance of it is necessary to the improvement
of his Empire and to recruit the Imperial treasury. The efforts of Lord Durham
to convey those ideas to Lord Palmerston and the success which has, up to the
present time, attended his negotiations to bring about a good understanding
between England and Russia have rendered him very popular at court, and no
foreign representative is treated with as much favour as he is. Nevertheless, it
seems as if his representations have not entirely convinced Lord Palmerston, that
the designs of Russia are not hostile to British interests in Turkey, for Lord
Ponsonby's acts at Constantinople betray a jealousy of the influence enjoyed by
the Russian Minister in that capital, and it is more than probable that the case
of Mr. Churchill was seized upon by his Lordship, rather as a pretext to obtain
the dismission of Akif-Effendi and thus to get rid of a Minister of Foreign
Affairs unfavorably inclined towards England, than as an amends for injuries
sustained by a British subject. This view of the matter, I may add, is taken
by other Diplomatic Representatives in St. Petersburg."
12. Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 87, Dec. 5, 1838, U. S. Depart-
ment of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. I.
"As the Eastern question still continues to attract the attention of the
Governments and People of the old world as that on which its future destinies
depend (although its solution seems to be momentarily suspended by the advan-
tages obtained by British diplomacy over the Russian, and by the energetic
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demonstrations of British naval and military power in the Levant and on the
frontiers of India), I beg leave to communicate the following authentic informa-
tion relating to that subject. . . .
''Some intimation received by the British from the Russian Government
that in case Mahomet Ali should openly throw off his allegiance to the Porte,
Russia might think it necessary to intervene by force of arms, induced Lord
Palmerston, some time since, to propose to the Russian cabinet a conference of
the five great European powers in order to concert the measures they would
jointly adopt in case the Pasha of Egypt should declare himself independent.
Count Nesselrode returned an answer to this proposition, during the stay of the
emperor at this Capital in September last, declining to accede to it upon the
ground that the joint action of the five Powers to prevent Mahomet Ali from
taking such a step was already secured by their actual correspondent conduct,
and that the remonstrances of their agents having hitherto proved sufficient for
that object, it was unnecessary to provide for a hypothetical case which might,
and probably never would occur. Count Pozzo de Borgo communicated this
reply to Lord Palmerston, who after reading it, observed that the necessity for
such a mutual understanding among the five Powers was not obviated by the
reasons stated by Count Nesselrode since the want of it would leave anyone of
them force to act according to its own views of its own interests in the case
supposed, which the others could not passively suffer as it might involve the
undue aggrandisement of that one which should interefere by force of arms
between the Sultan and his revolted vassal. Experience had already shown that a
Power might enter upon such an intervention with the most sincere desire to
avoid acquiring any selfish advantages for itself, and yet might be tempted by
circumstances to accept of such advantages when in the course of events they
presented themselves to view. Thus Russia had declared on the breaking out
of the war between that Empire and Turkey in 1828, that she did not seek and
would not accept any increase of territory as the object of the war. Yet it was
notorious that the treaty of peace by which it was terminated embraced cessions
of valuable territory by which the limits of the Russian empire were extended
in Asia. So also when Russia came to the assistance of the Porte against
Mahomet Ali in 1833, she professed the most disinterested views, yet her armed
intervention ended by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi the object of which was to
shut the entrance of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus against the enemies of
Russia. It therefore became necessary for those Powers which had a common
interest in maintaining the independence of the Porte and the integrity of its
territory to declare prospectively that they would not see with indifference any
future separate intervention which might again lead to the aggrandisement of
any one Power at the expense of Turkey and to the manifest injury of all the
others. That Great Britain, above all, had the deepest interest in preventing
any such intervention, but desired to prevent it by pacific means and had there-
fore proposed the intended conference.
"It is not stated what reply Count Pozzo de Borgo made to this declaration,
but it may fairly be inferred from it that the British Government considers itself
at liberty to concert separately with its allies who are interested in maintaining
the national existence of Turkey the measures which may become necessary for
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that purpose. Among these allies she may safely reckon on the cooperation of
Austria, and I think even of France as any approximation between Russia and
France for the purpose of dismembering the Turkish empire seems to be rendered
nearly impossible by the invincible repugnance of the Sovereign of the one
country and the People of the other to any close connection. We have recently
seen in the adhesion of France to the commercial Treaty concluded by England
with the Porte, an arrangement admirably adopted to develop the natural
resources of Turkey, that whatever desire the French Government may feel to
countenance the usurpation of Mahomet Ali with the ultimate view of extending
its own establishments in Africa further east, it is inevitably compelled by the
force of circumstances to unite in a measure adopted to give increased political
strength to the Turkish Government, to enable it to grapple with its natural
enemy, and at the same time entirely inconsistent with the notion of the
independance of Egypt and Syria."
13. Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 117, June 26, 1839, U. S. Depart-
ment of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. II.
"Since my last Despatch on the Oriental Question, (No. 114,) I have had
an opportunity of seeing a communication made on the 24th April to Lord
Ponsonby by Nourri Effendi, which, although of a date much older than the
other French and English Despatches which I have seen, throws considerable
light upon the causes which have so suddenly disturbed the status quo in
the East.
"In this communication Nourri Effendi recites at some length the answers
which he had already given, by order of the Sultan, to the Austrian internuncio,
remarking upon an insinuation of Prince Meternich that the Sublime Porte
ought to endeavor to find out some mezzo termino, in its relations with the Pacha
of Egypt, in order to avoid the certain evils and uncertain result of war. This
answer stated that the Sultan did not desire war, nor was such a result to be
apprehended unless from the continued encroachments of the person 'styling him-
self the Pacha of Egypt,' whose audacious pretentions the great Christian powers
ought to unite in endeavoring to restrain. That Prince Metternich was doubtless
a very wise and benevolent man, but (intimating in pretty intelligable terms)
that Austria would better manifest her friendship for the Porte by discounten-
ancing the pretentions of Mehemet Ali who refused to perform the duties he
owed to his lawful sovereign. That all the Turkish provinces, which he had
seized and which had been secured to him by the treaty of Kuteyah, upon the
express conditions that he should pay tribute, and confine himself strictly within
the limits marked out by that treaty, had been inherited by the Sultan from his
forefathers; and, Mehemet Ali having failed to perform these conditions, these
countries might justly be considered as reverting from the vassal to his liege
lord; but that the Sublime Porte was willing to leave him in the possession of
Egypt, provided he would evacuate Syria, the continued possession of which by
him endangered the security of the other Turkish provinces in Asia Minor,
Mehemet Ali having fortified the passes of the Taurus chain of mountains in
such a manner as to keep the way always open preparatory to a fresh invasion
of Anatolia, whilst the Porte had only recently thought of creating defensive
works, which it had established far from the frontier at Koniah.
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"The note from Nourri Effendi to Lord Ponsonby closed with a distinct
proposition to the British government to conclude a treaty of alliance with the
Porte, the object of which should be to compel Mehemet AH to evacuate all the
Pashalics of Syria and, in other respects, to perform his. duties as a faithful vassal
and tributary of the Ottoman Empire."
14. Clay to Forsyth, (Without number) Oct. i, 1839, U. S.
Department of State Archives, Austria, Vol. I.
''The departure of Prince Metternich has produced no perceptible effect upon
the affairs of the Empire and but little impression on the public mind; it is
possible, therefore, that even his death would affect the condition of Austria and
its relations with the other states of Europe only so far as to cause a slight fall
in the Government stocks. The complicate question of arranging the matters in
dispute between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt occupies the attention of
the Austrian Cabinet almost to the exclusion of every other subject and the
interest taken in it by the Ministry has been communicated to the public. It is
astonishing to see the eagerness to learn the last news from Constantinople
shewn by persons, of all classes except the lowest, who have no voice in the
Government, who have not even a vote at the municipal elections and whose
opinions would have not the least weight with any member of the Cabinet.
"The decisions made in the conference of the Representatives of the five
Powers at Constantinople are probably communicated regularly to the Depart-
ment by the Minister of the United States at the Sublime Porte. Those
decisions, however, are influenced, in a great degree, by the negotiations which
take place at Vienna, between the Austrian Cabinet, the Ambassadors of Great
Britain, Russia and France and the Prussian minister under instructions received
from their different Governments. Austria, in fact, appears to act the part of a
mediator in the whole business and to use her influence to calm the jealousies
and suspicion known to exist, in all matters relating to Turkey, between the
English, French, and Russian Governments. It is this character which gives to
Austria the great weight she possesses in the conferences and which has enabled
her to make the Powers less distrustful of each other and to induce them to act
with a certain degree of unity in the important and over-agitated question. That
Austria will succeed in the endeavor to maintain the peace of Europe appears to
me evident from two facts which have come to my knowledge. The first is that
the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople has received instructions from
St. Petersburg to act more in concert with the other Representatives and to
consent to coerce the Pacha of Egypt if a resort to forcible means should become
necessary. The second circumstance is that, after a conference held in this city
a few days since, despatches were sent from the Department of Foreign Affairs
to the Austrian Internuncio and by the Representatives of Great Britain, Russia,
France and Prussia at this Court each writing separately to their colleagues at
Constantinople instructing them to inform the Pacha, through the Consuls of
their respective Governments at Alexandria, that unless he consented to the
arbitrement of the questions, between the Sultan and himself, by the five Powers
they were determined to compel him to come to terms and, if obliged by his
refusal to resort to force, the guarantees which they had offered to give him
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would be withdrawn and he would be left to contend with them single handed.
Much will depend upon the answer of Mehemet Ali to these menaces. That able
and wily Prince can scarcely be brought to believe that there will be any
concord in the actions of Powers whose interests are so opposite and who have
little confidence in each other. Under different circumstances the Pacha would
be right in his conjecture but, at present, it would seem to be erroneous for
reasons which may be briefly referred to.
The acquisitions of territory, from Turkey, made by Russia under different
pretenses during the last half century have excited the suspicion of the other
European Cabinets with regard to the ulterior objects of Russia and induced
them to watch more closely her policy in connection with the Turkish Empire.
They have at length discovered, that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and the
occupation of the island of Soulima, give to Russia the complete control of the
Commerce of the Black Sea and the navigation of the Danube at any moment
she may choose to exercise it. Being unable, therefore, to remedy their past
errors the other Powers of Europe seem for the moment resolved to prevent any
further encroachments on the part of Russia. Her statesmen are aware that this
feeling exists to a greater degree than at any former time and Russia is more-
over occupied just now with the subjugation of Circassia which, together with
the dissatisfaction prevailing among the Cossacks would render it dangerous for
her to risk the chances of a war. She will consequently, rather than embroil
herself with England and France, assent to the measures proposed in the con-
ferences at Constantinople and make a merit of what in fact is the necessity of
yielding to circumstances which she cannot evade. Whatever she consents to
will, I am convinced, extend no further than is requisite to arrange the question
between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; Russia will make no treaty stipulations
which will be binding on her for the future or which she cannot find a plausible
pretext, at any time, to annul. She may cease apparently her machinations
against Turkish independence for the moment and claim credit for her forbear-
ance, but let other events take place in Europe to draw off the attention of the
great Powers, or let war be declared between any of them and Russia remain
neutral, the powerful machinery which is destined, in all probability, one day to
overthrow the Ottoman Empire will be again set in motion and the nations most
interest in upholding the 'integrity' of Turkey will be unable to arrest it.
"The Pacha of Egypt has little to hope for form dissensions among the five
Powers and, if he refuse to submit to their arbitrement, they will force him to
do so. But, although Russia may consent to such compulsion, the active part
the brunt will be borne by England and France; not a Russian ship will be
engaged, nor a Russian subject be injured in the contest. The settlement of the
affairs of Turkey will not be final it will not probably last more than five years.
Such at least is my impression and it is founded on the fact that the policy of
Russia is directed to the future whereas that of England and France is shaped
to suit the present.
"The measures taken by England in relation to the Turkish question where
not energetic until lately; the British Ministry appears to have relied, for some
years, upon the moral power given by the rememberance of former greatness and
to have left unheeded the important fact that the glory of past achievements is
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fast fading whilst the Countries she once subsidized, some of which she even
saved from destruction, have acquired strength sufficient to render them power-
ful rivals and dangerous enemies."
15. Wheaton to [Forsyth], No. 153, July i, 1840, Confidential,
U. S. Department of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. II.
"Since my last on that subject the question of the East, and the East itself
remain in statu quo. The Ottoman Empire is crumbling to pieces. The great
Christian Powers after arresting the direct negotiation between the Porte and
the Pacha of Egypt, have not been able to agree on any plan of settlement. The
British Cabinet itself is divided on the question. Various projects of partitioning
Syria by a line to be drawn between St. Jean d' Arce or Beyrout and the Persian
gulf, leaving to the Pacha Egypt and Arabia with the southern part of Syria,
have been suggested between Austria, Great Britain and Russia. But Mehemet
AH laughs at these plans, being certain of the neutrality, if not the support of
France in case of any attempt to coerce him. Russia is very much weakened by
her recent defeat in Circassia, and the demoralized state of her army Austria by
the deficit in her finances; and the Porte itself has nearly exhausted all its
resources in men and money. The conclusion would seem to be that this problem
must at last be solved by time and the death of Mehemet AH alone, unless
indeed he should be unwilling to wait leaving such a precarious inheritance to
his children. In that case he may at any time bring on the necessity of Russian
intervention, and perhaps a general conflagration by ordering Ibrahim Pacha to
march on Constantinople."
16. Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 158, Aug. 5, 1840, U. S. Depart-
ment of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. II.
"Count Bresson, the French Minister at this court, has remonstrated in the
strongest manner against the ratification of the Convention [of July 15, 1840] by
the Prussian Government. He has stated that Prussia was putting all at stake,
as she had no direct interest in the question at issue, could gain nothing in the
scramble for the spoils of the East which must ultimately arise between G.
Britain and Russia (as it could not be supposed that these two powers would
remain permanently united in policy and councils,) whilst Prussia might lose her
newly acquainted Provinces of the Rhine where France must necessarily seek
her indemnity for the further aggrandizement of the other Powers. He has
urged the danger of kindling anew the passion for military glory and conquest
which is characteristic of the French nation; and the honor which would redound
to the Prussian monarch, at the commencement of his reign, from arresting the
progress of this new source of discord among the Great Powers of Europe, by
suspending his ratification in order to give further time for consultation on a
matter on which the peace of the world might be said to depend. He has added
that the King of the French perfectly concurs with his present ministry in
resenting the course of the Plenipotentiaries of the four Powers in London as
equally derogatory to the interests and honor of France, and that the nation
would be ready to second its Government in arming upon an extensive scale in
order to be prepared for any and every eventuality.
254 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [580
"The Prussian Cabinet has replied to these energetic remonstrances that how-
ever much Prussia regretted to see France separate herself from the other great
Christian Powers on this question, she (Prussia) could not separate herself from
her allies by refusing her assent to the decision of the Conference of London,
although the King had given no special instructions to his minister authorizing
him to sign this particular convention."
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206.
Guizot, Frangois Pierre Guillaume,
French statesman, on Anglo-French
relations (1833), 4 1 ! speech of on
Levantine policy of French govern-
ment (1839), 97-98, 98 n; appointed
Ambassador to England (1840),
I 35" I 36; conferences of with Palm-
erston, 140, 140 n; on diplomatic
situation at London, 140-141, 142,
150-151, 152, 154-155, 160; com-
ments of on views of Palmerston,
146-147; on opposition to Palmerston's
policies in British Cabinet, 157 n;
objects to Palmerston's defense of
treaty of July 15, 1840, 164; nego-
tiations of for modification of July
treaty, 171-172, 173 n, 182 n; com-
municates casus belli note to Palm-
erston, 188; appointed Minister of
Foreign Affairs in France, 193; plan
of for modification of July treaty,
195; disappointed by attitude of
Palmerston, 196-197, 197 n; advice
of for Mehemet Ali, 202 n; eager for
France to escape from isolated posi-
tion, 207 ff, 208 n; abandons hope of
securing modification of July treaty,
207-208, proposal of to secure return of
France to Concert of Europe (1841),
212-213, 2I 3 n ; delays signing of
Straits Convention, 222-223; author-
izes Bourqueney to "initial" same,
223; comment of on outcome of
Turco-Egyptian question, 229-230.
Hafiz Pasha, Commander of Turkish
forces in Asia Minor, 75, 75 n, 83.
Haines, Captain, English naval officer,
60 n; on strategic position of Aden,
60-61.
Halil Pasha, Turkish statesman, 17,
149.
Hamid Bey, Egyptian officer, 216.
Hodges, Colonel, English Consul-Gen-
eral at Alexandria, 127 n, 149 n, 158-
159, 176 n.
Hodgson, W. H., U. S. diplomatic
agent, on policies of great Powers in
Near East (1835), 44 n.
Holland, Henry Richard Fox, Lord,
English Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster, opposition of to Palmer-
ston's Near Eastern policy (1840),
157 n, 159, 182 n.
Hugon, Admiral, French naval com-
mander in Mediterranean, 65.
Ibrahim Pasha, Egyptian commander,
13, 13 n, 18, 19, 49, 104, 243, 244.
India. See steam communication with,
Suez route to, and Euphrates route
to.
Isabella II, Queen of Spain, 66.
Itcheli, Turkish pachalic, 22, 23.
Jochmus, General, Baron August von,
German officer in Turkish employ,
instructions for (1841), 214.
Journal de Saint Petersbourg, French
language journal of St. Petersburg,
on diplomatic affairs at Constanti-
nople (1833), 20.
Journal des Debats, Paris daily paper,
on situation in Near East (1833),
15, 20, 21 ; on French interest in
Mediterranean (1838), 69; on Tur-
co-Egyptian question (1839), 94-
95, 94 n; bellicose statements in
(1840), 167.
Kisseleff, Count Nicholai von, Russian
charge d'affaires at London, 101.
Koenigsmarck, Count Hans Carl, Prus-
sian Ambassador to Turkey, 215,
221.
Kolowrat, Count Franz Anton, Austrian
Minister of the Interior, 183 n.
Koniah, battle of (1832), 16.
Konigsmarck, (spelling copied in notes
from some of the sources). See
Koenigsmarck.
Kosrew, Pasha, Turkish Grand Vizier,
104, 104 n; dismissal of (1840), 148-
149; dismissal of announced at Lon-
don, 154.
Kourchid Bey, Egyptian governor of
Jeddah, 57-58.
Kutayah, occupied by Egyptians
(1833), 19; preliminaries of, 24, 24 n.
Lagrene, French charge d'affaires at
St. Petersburg, 34.
Lalande, Admiral, French naval com-
mander in Levant, 105, 105 n.
Lamartine, Alphonse de, French dep-
uty, favors partition of Turkey
(1839), 96-97, 97 n; (1840), 137 n.
Lazareff, Rear Admiral, commander of
Russian fleet sent to Constantino-
ple (1833), 21.
Leopold I, King of the Belgians,
alarmed by crisis of 1840, 172; ef-
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forts of to secure compromise set-
tlement of Turco-Egyptian question,
172; fears revolution in Europe,
193 n.
Lieven, Christophe Andreievich, Prince,
238.
Princes (Countess), 160 n.
Livingston, Edward, U. S. Minister to
France, on the relations of England,
France, and Russia (1833), 239-
240.
London, Treaty of, July 15, 1840, 161-
162, 162-163 n.
Loring, Lieutenant, English naval of-
ficer, 216.
Louis Philippe, King of the French,
141 n; favors Habsburg marriage
alliance, (1836), 65, 65 n; favors
preparations for war (1840), 167,
167 n, 178 n; eager to preserve
peace, 171, 191 ff, 193 n, 195 n; ap-
peal of to King Leopold of Belgium,
172; forces Thiers to resign, 192-193.
Mahmoud II, Sultan, general policy of,
13; warlike policy of (1834), 44,
243; grants permission for Euphrates
expedition (1835), 49; issues firman
to Mehemet Ali, 51-52; preparations
of for war, 244; desire of to renew
war with Egypt (1836), 67; hostile
to Mehemet Ali (1838), 68; pre-
pares to renew war with Mehemet
Ali (i83 8-'39 ), 75-76, 79, 82-83;
death of, 104.
Maison, Marshal Marquis, French
Minister to Russia, on French policy
in Near East (1834), 242-243.
Malcolm, Admiral, Sir Pulteney, com-
mander of English fleet in Mediter-
ranean, 27, 33.
Malmesbury, James Howard Harris,
Earl of, English politician, on French
opinion (1837), 66 n.
Maltzan, Count Mortimer, Prussian
Ambassador to Austria, 108 n.
Mandeville, English charge d'affaires at
Constantinople, 17, 41; peace en-
deavors at Constantinople (1833),
18-19.
Maurojeni. Turkish charge d'affaires at
Vienna and diplomatic agent to
London, 14, 239.
Mazloum Bey, Turkish diplomatic
agent, 205, 214, 216.
Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, foreign
experts in the employ of, 10 n; pre-
pares for war with Sultan (1831-
'32), 13, 13 n; rejects Roussin's peace
proposal (1833), 22, 22 n; designs of,
38; policy of (1834), 43; French
sympathy for, 44 n; sends troops to
Syria, 243; policy of in Arabia
(i834-'35), 57-58; policy of relative to
Euphrates expedition (1835), 49;
discontent in the territories of, 244;
aids development of Suez route to
India, 62-63, 63 n; moves to gain
independence (1838), 64; promises
of to ConsulsXjeneral at Alexan-
dria (1839), 83; orders of to Ibra-
him Pasha, 84, 84 n, 86, 104; defiant
attitude of, 112 n, 127 n; (1840),
148-149, 149 n, 152 n, 175-176, 253;
attempts of at direct negotiations
with Turkish Ministers, 149-150,
155; revolts against the authority of,
X 59> I S9 n ; follows advice of French,
176, 176 n, 179; abandons defiant atti-
tude and agrees to evacuate Syria,
200 ff, 200 n; final submission of to
Porte (1841), 216-217; objections of
to firman of investiture, 219-220,
220 n.
Melbourne, William Lamb, Viscount,
English Prime Minister, attitude of
during crisis of 1840, 170-171, 172,
184, 193 n; on services of Morning
Chronicle to Palmerston, 185 n; on
disagreement within British Cabinet,
190 n.
Memorandum of Nov. 14, 1840, 198.
Mesange, French warship, 25.
Metternich-Winneburg, Clement W. N.
L., Prince of, Austrian Chancellor,
31, 32, 32 n; on French and English
interests in Egypt (1833), 40-41;
eager to preserve peace in Near East
( T 839), 78, 250; claims Ponsonby
responsible for Sultan's policy, 86;
opposes formal conference at Vienna,
92, 92 n; attitude of towards Russia,
100 n; promotes informal discussions
on Turco-Egyptian question, 107,
107 n; initiates collective note of
July 27, 1839, 108, 108 n; effect of
his departure from Vienna, 251; opin-
ion of relative to France (1840),
132 n; attitude of on Turco-Egyp-
tian question, 134 n, 145, 145 n;
proposal of for settlement of Turco-
Egyptian question, 146; alarmed by
bellicose French attitude, 170, 170
n, 183 n; suggests plan for reunion
of France and four Powers, 183;
favors leaving Egypt to Mehemet
Ali, 198, 209; irritated by Ponson-
by's conduct, 2IO, 210 n; threatens
to withdraw Austrian support from
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Porte (1841), 217, 225; complains
about English policy, 217; opposed
to guaranteeing independence and
integrity of Turkey, 227 n.
Meyendorff, Baron Peter, Russian Am-
bassador to Prussia, no.
Miniaut, French Consul-General at
Alexandria, 22 n, 37.
Minto, Gilbert Elliot, Lord, English
First Lord of Admiralty, 157 n.
Mole, Count Louis Mathieu, French
statesman, 66, 66 n, 68; admits
"shades of difference" between Eng-
lish and French policies in Near
East (1839), 81-82, 82 n.
Moltke, Major Helmuth von, Prussian
officer in Turkish employ, 76.
Monthly Review, London Magazine,
on Russia (1835), 55; on steam
communication with India (1839),
62 n.
Morning Chronicle, London journal, on
Turco-Egyptian question (1839),
94; on establishment of steam com-
munication with India (1840), 158
n; article in hostile to France, 185;
service of to Palmerston in
"Syrian
affair," 185 n.
Mounier, Baron, French diplomatic
agent, unofficial mission of to Lon-
don (1840), 207.
Miinchengratz, conference of (1833),
31-32, 32 n; apprehensions aroused
by in England and France, 33.
Muravieff, Lieut.-General, Russian
diplomatist, on mission in Near East
(i832-'33), 15, 17, 18, 19, 19 n, 238.
Muhlenberg, H. A., U. S. diplomatic
representative at Vienna, on situa-
tion in Austria (1840), 134 n.
Namic Pasha, Turkish major-general,
14, 237, 238.
Napier, Commodore, Sir Charles, Eng-
lish naval officer in Levant, 177,
177 n; on allied military and naval
operations in Levant (1840), 199;
negotiates convention of Nov. 27,
1840, with Mehemet Ali, 200-201,
200 n; arranges with Mehemet Ali
for evacuation of Syria, etc. (1841)
216, 216 n; on attitude of Mehemet
Ali regarding firman of investiture,
219-220, 220 n; ideas of on English
Near Eastern policy, 232 n, 236.
Naples, Kingdom of, in dispute with
England (1840), 147.
National, Paris journal, on French
policy (1838), 69-70; (1839), 94;
threatening comment in against
Louis Philippe (1840), 192.
Near East question of denned, 9.
Nesselrode, Count Charles Robert von,
Russian Chancellor, on Tsar's Near
Eastern policy (1833), JS- 1 ^; pro-
poses treaty of alliance with Tur-
key, 28; mission of to Berlin, 32 n;
reply of to English and French pro-
tests, 34; negotiates with Achmet
Pasha (1834), 42; demands explana-
tions relative to French policy, 242-
243; opposition of to English
Euphrates expedition (i835-'36),
52; friendly to England (1838),
72-73; opposes European conference
on Egyptian question, 249; on Rus-
sian policy and Turco-Egyptian
question (1839), 99-100, 99 n, 101-
102, 109, 109 n; favors agreement
with England, 116 ff, 116 n,
118 n; protests vigorously against
French policy in Near East, 117;
on results of first Brunnow mission
to London, 129; claims of regarding
Brunnow missions, 130 n; pleased
with treaty of July 15, 1840; 169,
169 n; uneasy about attitude of
Austria, 186 n; favors leaving Me-
hemet Ali in control of Egypt, 198;
favors return of France to Concert
of Europe, 212; eager to prevent re-
storation of Anglo-French alliance,
212 n; approved attitude of Palmer-
ston (1841), 225; comment of on
outcome of Turco-Egyptian question,
230 n.
Dimitri de, son of Russian
Chancellor, on outcome of Turco-
Egyptian question (1841), 230-
231 n.
Neumann, Baron Philip, Austrian Min-
ister to England, proposals of for
settlement of Turco-Egyptian ques-
tion (1840), 144-145, 151-152; ne-
gotiations of with Guizot and Palm-
erston, 146; attitude of during crisis
of 1840, 172; without instructions,
1 86.
Nezib, battle of (1839), 104.
Nicholas I, Ts*ar of Russia, sends Or-
loff to Constantinople (1833), 24;
hostile to France, 27 n; character
and policy of defended (1836), 247-
248; on Anglo-French rivalry in
Egypt (1839), 71; views of regard-
ing Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 98;
Near Eastern policy of, 77 n, 118;
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pleased with results of first Brun-
now mission to London, 129-130;
pleased with treaty of July 15, 1840,
169, 169 n; opposed to concessions to
France, 185.
Nouri Effendi, Turkish diplomatist and
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 77, 86,
104, 250-251; mission of to London
(1840), 141-142.
Odilon Barrot, French deputy, 196 n.
Olivier, French diplomatic agent, 22.
Orleans, Ferdinand Philippe Louis,
Due d', eldest son of Louis Philippe,
178 n.
Orloff, Count Alexis, Russian diplomat-
ist, mission of to Constantinople
(1833), 24-25, 28; attitude of in
London (1839), 100.
Osman Bey, Turkish naval officer, 105.
Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Vis-
count, English Minister of Foreign
Affairs, on English policy in Near
East (1833), 14 n, 15, 26-27, 26 n,
31; opposition of to Russian policy
in Near East, 31, 33; on Near East-
ern situation, 35; on designs of Me-
hemet Ali, 38; interested in Eu-
phrates expedition project, 39; on
Anglo-Russian relations (1834), 43;
did not fear Russia (1835), 57 n; on
Russian policy (1836), 53, 53 n; on
improvement in Anglo-Russian rela-
tions, 57; eager to strengthen Tur-
key, 63; dislikes French policy, 66;
(1837), 66 n; position of on Vixen
affair, 54; on Durham's success in
Russia, 56; determined to defend
Turkey against Egyptian attack
(1838), 63-64, 63 n, 70; on Anglo-
Turkish commercial treaty, 68; pro-
poses Anglo-French treaty to sup-
port Turkey, 71, 72 n; fears Franco-
Russian combination in Near East,
71-72; protests against Russian in-
trigues in Persia and India, 72; ac-
cepts Russian explanations, 73; fa-
vors Turkish reforms, 76; opposed
to independence of Mehemet Ali,
80; proposal of for European con-
ference on Egyptian questions, 249;
eager to preserve peace in Near
East (i838-'39), 77, 79; Near East-
ern policy of (1839), 87 ff; on An-
glo-French entente, 88, 93, 93 n;
instructions of for English Levan-
tine fleet, 89-90, 103-104, 113; fa-
vors return of Syria to Turkey, 92-
93; uncertain about Russian ad-
vances to England, 103; proposes
plan for naval cooperation against
Egypt, in; becomes more hostile to
Mehemet Ali, 112; favors coercion,
114-115; receives Brunnow's propos-
als favorably, 121, 122 n; makes
counter-proposals, 123; criticizes
French position on Turco-Egyptian
question, 125; proposal of relative
to Pashalic of Acre, 125, 127; not
influenced by French contentions,
128-129; announces Russian accept-
ance of English counter-proposals to
Brunnow, 130; on outlook for set-
tlement of Turco-Egyptian question
(1840), 133; on sympathies of Se-
bastiani and Guizot, 135 n; expecta-
tions of relative to Thiers, 137-138;
hostile to Louis Philippe and French
naval preparations, 139-140, 139 n;
plans of for settlement of Turco-
Egyptian question, 146-147; favora-
ble to return of Napoleon's body to
France, 148, 148 n; requests answer
of France to Neumann's proposal,
153; conferences at the home of, 156;
on reasons for keeping negotiations
secret, 156 n, 160-161 n; threatens
to resign, 157-158; wins support of
English Cabinet, 159 n; defends
treaty of July 15, 1840, 164-165;
unmoved by threatening French at-
titude, 168-169, J 74. J 8o; opposed to
modification of July treaty, 172 ff,
173 n, 185, 195-196; comments of
on opposition in English Cabinet,
182 n; attitude of on deposition of
Mehemet Ali, 186-187 n, 190, 190 n;
quiets opposition in English Cabinet,
1 88; answer of to Thiers' casus belli
note, 196, 197 n; orders negotiations
to be opened with Mehemet Ali,
198, 198-199 n; comments of on
French policy, 206-207 n; favors re-
turn of France to Concert of Europe,
21 1; opinion of on Napier's conven-
tion with Mehemet Ali, 211 n;
moves to influence policy of Porte
relative to Mehemet Ali, 210-211;
(1841), 217-218; reply of to Metter-
nich's criticism, 217; opposed to pro-
posals made by Guizot, 221-222;
supports Chekib in refusal to sign
protocol de cloture, 223-224; agrees
to formal communication to Chekib,
224; views of relative to final set-
tlement of Turco-Egyptian question,
224, 224 n, 225 n; estimates on Near
Eastern policy of from 1839 to 1841,
231-232, 231-232 n.
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Parliament, resolutions of, relative to
steam communication with India
(1834), 39-40; committee action in
on same (1837), 58-59 n.
Peel, Sir Robert, English statesman,
45-46.
Pisani, English Dragoman at Constan-
tinople, 150 n.
Ponsonby, Viscount John, English Am-
bassador to Turkey, 25, 30; attitude
of on Turco-Egyptian relations
(1834), 243; hostile to Russian in-
fluence in Turkey (i835-'36), 51,
51 n, 248; influence of at Constan-
tinople, 66-67; hostile to Mehemet
AH, 51; (1839), 85-86, 86 n; on
French policy at Constantinople, 84-
85; on collective note of July 27,
1839, 108 n; reports unrest in do-
mains of Mehemet AH, 128 n;
alarmed by situation in Near East
(1840), 150 n; accuses Pontois of
attempting to intimidate Porte, 168
n; advice of to Porte relative to Me-
hemet Ali's reinstatement in Egypt,
204; (1841), 215, 218 n, 220-221;
conduct of criticized, 86 n, 210 n.
Pontois, Admiral Edward, French Am-
bassador to Turkey, 127 n; repre-
sentations of to Porte against treaty
of July 15, 1840, 168, 168 n.
Porter, David, U. S. Minister to Tur-
key, on situation in Near East
(1833), 17 n, 19 n; (1834), 242,
244-245; on Turkish character
(1836), 76 n.
Pozzo di Borgo, Count, Russian Am-
bassador to France and later to Eng-
land, 27, 28, 56, 237, 249; on Anglo-
Russian relations (1833), 46, 46 n;
views of on Durham mission to Rus-
sia (1835), 245-246.
Press, of Europe hostile to Russia
(i835-'36), 55-56, 56 n.
Protocol de cloture, of July 10, 1841,
228-229.
of Sept. 17, 1840, 187 n.
Prussia, supports Russian protests to
France (1833), 27; Near Eastern
policy of (1839), 80, 118-119, 118'
n; (1840), 254; London representa-
tive of without instructions, 134;
preparations of for war during crisis
of 1840, 184 n; eager to secure Turco-
Egyptian settlement (1841), 222-
223, 228 n.
Raikes, Thomas, English politician, 46,
46 n; on danger of revolution in
France (1840), 192 n; on attitude
of Louis Philippe, 195 n; on public
opinion in France, 197 n.
Rechid Pasha, (spelling copied in notes
from some of the sources). See
Reschid.
Red Sea route to India. See Suez
route to India.
Reeve, Henry, English politician and
newspaper correspondent, 184; on
danger of revolution in France
(1840), 205 n; on outcome of crisis
of 1840, 206.
Reouf Pasha, Turkish statesman, 104.
Reschid, Mustafa, Pasha, Turkish dip-
lomatist and Minister of Foreign Af- -
fairs, 17, 44, 149; mission of to Lon-
don (1839), 75-76; negotiates relative
to fate of Mehemet AH (i84O-'4i),
203-204, 220-221; announces willing-
ness to reinstate Mehemet Ali in
Egypt, 204-205, 215; resignation of
(1841), 225-226, 226 n.
Rifaat, Bey and later Pasha, Turkish
diplomatist and Minister of Foreign
Affairs, mission of to Alexandria
(1840), 174 ff; appointed Minister
of Foreign Affairs (1841), 226.
Roussin, Admiral, Baron Albin, French
Ambassador to Turkey and later
Minister of Marine, opposes Russian
policy in Turkey (1833), 20-21, 21
n, 25; moves to end Turco-Egyptian
struggle, 21-22, 22 n, 23, 238; friendly
to Mehemet Ali, 36-37, 36-37 n;
(1834), 243; (1838), 67; attempts
to prevent war in Near East (1839),
85-86; complains of Ponsonby's be-
havior, 85 n; (1840), 210 n.
Ruckmann, Baron, Russian charge
d'affaires at Constantinople, protests
against Turkish threat to renew war
with Egypt (1834), 45, 243.
Russell, Lord John, English Secretary
of State for the Colonies, 157 n,
159 n; favored concessions to France
in crisis of 1840, 170, 182, 188, 188
n, 190 n.
Russia, general policy of in Near East,
9, n; influence of supreme in Turkey
(1833), 25; famine in southern pro-
vinces of, 34, 34-35 n; Near Eastern
policy of (i832-'33), 16, 237-238,
240-241; (1834), 42, 45; (1835),
245, 246-247; (1836), 57; not pre-
pared for war (1835), 47; alarmed
at English interest in Near East
(i835-'36), 52, 52 n; eager to pre-
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vent war in Near East (1839), 77-
78, 77 n; difficulties confronting the
government of, 78 n; policy of rela-
tive to Turco-Egyptian question,
98 ff, 118-119; opposes conference
of Powers to settle same, 109-110;
not anxious to intervene in Turkey,
116 ff; views on the aims and policy
of, 252; favorable to ending isola-
tion of France (1840), 212; condi-
tions in, 253; triumphant in 1841,
230.
Sami Bey, confidential secretary to
Mehemet AH, 150, 155.
Sauzet, President of French Chamber
of Deputies, 196 n.
Schleinitz, Freiherr von, Prussian
charge d'affaires at London, 186.
Schneckenburger, German poet, 184 n.
Schneider, General, French Minister of
War, 82.
Sebastiani, Count Horace Frangois,
French Ambassador to England, on
reception of Brunnow's proposals by
English Ministers (1839), 121-122,
122 n; explains French opposition
to coercion of Mehemet AH, 124;
presents plans for settlement of Tur-
co-Egyptian question, 124-125, 124
n; unable to announce attitude of
France (1840), 134; recall of from
London, 135, 135 n.
Simonitch, Count, Russian envoy to
Persia, 72.
Soult, Marshal Victor, Due de Dal-
matie, French statesman, Near
Eastern policy of (1839), 82, 84-
85, 87 ff, 106-107, 106 n, in ff; on
Near Eastern policies of Powers, 88;
proposes conference at Vienna, 91-
92; on Russian opposition to Vienna
conference, iio-m; criticizes Rus-
sian proposals, 122; rejects proposals
for division of Syria, 124 n, 126;
argues against employment of force in
settlement of Turco-Egyptian ques-
tion, 128, 128 n, 134 n; attitude of
after Russian acceptance of English
counter-proposals, 130 ff; pleased by
delay (1840), 134-135; instructions
of to Guizot, 136; withdraws from
office, 136; return of to office, 193.
Steam communication with India, 38
ff, 44 n, 50 n, 58-59 n, 61-62, 61 n,
62 n, 82 n, 139 n, 158 n, 165 n, 232
n, 236.
Stopford, Admiral, Sir Robert, English
naval commander in Levant, naval
operations of (1840), 177; attack of
on Acre, 199; disapproves of Na-
pier's convention with Mehemet AH,
201.
Straits Convention of 1841, 222-223,
229, 229 n.
Sturmer, Baron Bartholomaus. Austrian
Internuncio at Constantinople, ac-
cuses Pontois of attempting to in-
timidate Porte (1840), 168 n; ad-
vice of to Turkish Ministers, 204;
urges Reschid Pasha to concede
hereditary title to Mehemet Ali
(1841), 214-215; unable to reply to
Turkish note, 221.
Suez route to India, 39-40, 40 n, 59 ff,
59-63 ns, 213, 213 n. See also Steam
communication with India.
Suleiman Pasha (Colonel Seves),
French officer in employ of Mehemet
AH, 177.
Syria, revolts in (1834), 43-44, 243;
(1840), 174 n, 177 n; reports con-
cerning revolts in reach London,
T S9) T S9 n > J6o n; naval operations
on coast of, 177-178, 178 n, 199.
Talleyrand-Perigord, Chajes Maurice
de, Prince of Benevento, French
statesman, 239.
Teplitz, meeting at (1833), 31.
Thiers, Louis Adolphe, French states-
man, on French policy in Near East
( J 833), 38 n; Near Eastern policy
of (1836), 64-65; resignation of, 66;
forms ministry (1840), 136; speech
of defending Anglo-French alliance,
136-137, 136 n, 137 n; instructions
of to Guizot, 138; Turco-Egyptian
policy of, 138-139 n, 140 n, 143-
144, 144 n, 151 ff, 152 n; opposed
to formal conference of Powers, 142-
143; request of for return of Na-
poleon's body, 148; rejects Neu-
mann's proposal for Turco-Egyptian
settlement, 153; favors delay, 155-
156; aroused by treaty of July 15,
1840, 165-166; questions England's
policy, 165 n; policy of during crisis
of 1840, 167-168, 171, 175 n; threat-
ening attitude of, 179-180, 179 n,
183 n; casus belli note of, 187-188,
189 n; plan of for additional mili-
tary preparations, 189-190, 192-193;
resignation of in Oct. 1840, 193;
comments of on French policy
(1841), 234 n.
The Times, London daily paper, on
French and English policies in Near
East (1833), 15 n; hostile to Treaty
of Unkiar Skelessi, 30-31; on Russia
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(1836), 55-56; on Turco-Egyptian
question (1839), 93-94; on spirit of
English and French journals during
crisis of 1840, 170 n, 205 n; favors
modification of treaty of July 15,
1840, 181-182, 181 n; on meaning
of Thiers casus belli note, 189; crit-
icizes Palmerston for being uncom-
promising, 197.
Titow, Wladimir, Russian charge
d'affaires at Constantinople, 215,221.
Tunis, French fleet sent to (1836), 65.
Turkey, public opinion in (i832-'33),
16, 17 n, 19 n; negotiations of with
Russia for military aid (1833), 18-
19; opposition in to alliance with
Russia quieted, 28; authorities of
refuse to suspend hostilities (1839),
86, 86 n; same encouraged to refuse
negotiations with Mehemet Ali, 127
n; Ministers of unwilling to pardon
Mehemet Ali (1840), 203; views
upon conditions in, 253; settlement
of Turco-Egyptian question an-
nounced in (1841), 219; request of
for support of Powers, 219 n; gov-
ernment of agrees to modify firman
of investiture, 226-227, 227-228,
228 n.
Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of (1833), 29;
English and French opposition to,
3; 33-34; Nesselrode's defense of,
34-
Urquhart, David, English political
writer, 55, 55 n.
Vail, Aaron, U. S. diplomatic repre-
sentative at London, on interna-
tional situation in Europe (1833),
237-239 240-242; on effect of im-
provement of navigation on Danube
( J 835), 74 n; on situation in Near
East, 244; on Durham's mission to
Russia, 245-246; on Russian policy
in Near East, 246-247; on hostility
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